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ABSTRACT
A FINE GROUP OF FELLOWS:
CIVILIAN ADVISORS, EISENHOWER, AND NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING
by
Valerie Lynn Adams
University of New Hampshire, May 2001

When President Dwight Eisenhower took office in January 1953, he was
immediately faced with the challenges of the cold war. Throughout his two terms
Eisenhower was forced to adapt to political changes within the Soviet Union, the advent
o f the hydrogen bomb, the development o f ICBMs, and the dangers of radioactive fallout.
Constantly facing new threats and fears in a rapidly changing technological world,
Eisenhower often had to rethink certain security issues and make critical decisions. One
tool which Eisenhower used to help him in his decision-making process was civilian
committees.
Historian Richard Immerman recently wrote, “Eisenhower unquestionably valued
civilian input. But why he did so is less clear.”1 This study explains why Eisenhower used
civilian committees as part o f his decision-making process in national security planning
and why he stopped using them. There are three examples of civilian committees which
highlight Eisenhower’s decision-making process, his devotion to the ‘Great Equation,’
his strategic thinking, and his response to the rapid changes brought about by scientific
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and technological advances in weapon development and national security: the Solarium
Exercise (1953), the Killian Committee (1955), and the Gaither Committee (1957).2
My thesis is that using civilian committees was an integral part of Eisenhower’s
decision-making process as long as he controlled the groups. They brought to the NSC
deliberations a “fresh, frequently changing civilian point of view.”3 They allowed the
president and his national security staff to hear all sides of a debate. They served as
educators and often recommended innovative solutions to national security problems.
They served without being burdened by political or interservice rivalries. And
Eisenhower used them deliberately. When the Gaither Committee did not operate within
the rules Eisenhower had come to expect from these committees, he reevaluated the
usefulness o f such committees and decided against their use. The press leaks and
campaigning by Gaither Committee members for the report made it difficult for
Eisenhower to use the committee’s report as he had intended. He lost control o f the
process, became suspicious of the service o f civilians, and ultimately left office warning
the public about the danger o f public policy becoming “captive of the scientifictechnological elite.”4

1 Immerman, review o f The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War, by David Snead, H-Net
Reviews, November 2000, <http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/>.
2 The official name o f the Killian Committee, chaired by James Killian, was the Technological Capabilities
Panel. The official name o f the Gaither Committee, chaired by Rowan Gaither, was The Security Resources
PaneL
3 Letter Lay to Coller, 7/25/55, EL, WHO OS ANSA, NSC Series, Administrative Sub series, Box 4
“Consultants- NSC July 1954-Aug 1956] (4) ”
4 Eisenhower, “Farewell Address,” Public Papers o f the President, 1960-61.

ix

R e p ro d u c e d with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

INTRODUCTION

In the fall o f 1912 at West Point there was a young man determined to excel at
sports, particularly football. During a stunning year, the young Dwight D. Eisenhower led
his team to victory after victory until a devastating knee injury prevented him from
playing again. Instead of leaving football, Eisenhower participated in the game as a
cheerleader and eventually coach of the junior varsity team. As historian Stephen
Ambrose wrote, “coaching brought out his best traits - his organizational ability, his
energy and competitiveness, his enthusiasm and optimism, his willingness to work hard
at a task that intrigued him, his powers of concentration, his talent for working with the
material he had instead of hoping for what he did not have, and his gift for drawing the
best out o f his players.”1During his career in the Army, Eisenhower’s techniques as a
leader were often compared with those of a good football coach. In fact, it was his
dedication to teamwork and his ability to build those teams that made him a natural
choice to be Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces and to oversee the Normandy
Invasion during WWII.2 As Eisenhower wrote towards the end of his life, “I believe that
football, perhaps more than any other sport, tends to instill in men the feeling that victory
comes through hard- almost slavish - work, team play, self-confidence, and an
enthusiasm that amounts to dedication.”3 Eisenhower never forgot those lessons.

1 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 27.
2 Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President, 114-115.
3 Dwight Eisenhower, A t Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends, (New York: Double Day, 1967), 16.
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As President of the United States, Eisenhower drew upon his experiences with
football to urge teamwork among his staff. “He [Eisenhower] wanted to get, as we came
later to express it, all o f the responsible people in the room, take up the issue, and hear
their views,” explained General Andrew Goodpaster. “If somebody didn’t agree, he was
obliged to speak his mind and get it all out on the table or in the Oval Office; and then in
light o f all o f that, the President would come to a line of action, he wanted everybody to
hear it, everybody to participate in it, and then he wanted everybody to be guided by it.”4
As Goodpaster’s remarks indicate, Eisenhower was against a “one-man” government. In
fact, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, saw that Eisenhower’s ability
to build an organization o f able men- to build a team- would be what history recorded as
one o f Eisenhower’s “greatest achievements of his career.”5
Eisenhower himself was aware of the importance his team played. While visiting
Eisenhower in the hospital in Denver in November 1955, Dulles recalled that the
President was concerned with the future, in particular, “that the country might fall into
the hands o f persons who had no real principles and who just believed in ‘give away’ for
the purpose o f trying to buy votes and favor at home and abroad.”6 Explaining to Dulles
that he had “worked very hard to introduce new and solid principles,” he did not want to
see that destroyed. He hoped he could get the American people to understand and accept
these principles before he left office and that it would be gratifying to have his successor
be someone from “within the inner circle of his Administration so that such a successor

4 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History with General Andrew Goodpaster, Robert Bowie, and
Ambassador George Kerman,” 2/27/88, Princeton University, Mudd Library, Woodrow Wilson School, Box
93, folder 10, p.20.
5 Memorandum o f Conversation with the President at Fitzsimmons Hospital, Denver, 10/11/55, EL, JFD
Papers, WH Memorandum Series, Box 3, “Meetings with the President, 1955 (2).”
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would be imbued by the existing spirit and also be able to keep much of the same team
that he had created, and o f which he was very proud.”7
Eisenhower placed so much emphasis on team players, particularly within the
National Security Council, in order to build a consensus for his foreign policy vision.8
That vision sustained the long haul in a cold war against the Soviets without sacrificing
American security or her way o f life. He worked for eight years to build support for this
vision not only from his team, but from the American public at large. This vision was
based on a number of beliefs that he brought with him to the presidency that translated
into the “new and solid principles” he spoke to Dulles about Those principles included
keeping a sound economy, a strong military, and promoting high morale - a spiritual
resolve - within the public. Eisenhower explained to a friend prior to the 1952 election
the importance of those factors to security: “Spiritual force, multiplied by economic
force, multiplied by military force, is roughly equal to security. If one o f these factors
falls to zero, or near zero, the resulting product does likewise.”9 This “Great Equation,”
as Eisenhower called it, was central to his decision making. The budget was not the only
factor driving his policies. Eisenhower was not about to sacrifice security for a balanced
budget, or any other reason for that matter. Neither, though, was he willing to sacrifice a

6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 A top priority in the first months o f his presidency was to make the National Security Council an efficient
decision-making body. Eisenhower used the NSC to set national security policy for the Cold War and he
attended over 300 o f the meetings, encouraging debate and discussion. The process may very well have
controlled any other president through its bureaucracy, but historian Anna Kasten Nelson has demonstrated
that Eisenhower’s NSC was orderly and tamed by the President and that whatever decisions were made, “the
man in the center was President Eisenhower.” See Anna Kasten Nelson, “ ‘The Top o f the Policy Hill’:
President Eisenhower and the National Security Council,” Diplomatic History, 7 (Fall 1983), 307-26.
9 Eisenhower to Lucius Du Bignon Clay, 02/09/52, The Papers o f Dwight D. Eisenhower, ed. Louis
Galambos, 13 vols. (Baltimore, 1970-), quoted in Richard Immerman, “Confessions o f an Eisenhower
Revisionist: An Agonizing Reappraisal,” Diplomatic History, 14 (Summer 1990), 328.
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sound economy for a large and unnecessary military force. Likewise, to guarantee
security, the public had to be spiritually centered and educated about the dangers
involved in the cold war so as to remain sensible, calm, and motivated to participate in
preserving the American way o f life. The economy, military, and public spirituality were
all equal parts for ensuring a national security policy that would allow the United States
to win the cold war without having to fight World War HI.10
One can not understand Eisenhower as a decision maker or grand strategist
without comprehending the emphasis that he placed on the ‘Great Equation.’ As a
decision maker he looked at policy broadly and considered the bigger picture. That meant
considering relations with allies, the economy, military service needs, and so forth. This
is not to say he did not pay attention to narrower problems. As Goodpaster remarked,
Eisenhower “liked to have very thorough, comprehensive evaluations made, targeted
ultimately on specific options and specific lines of policy,” but after such evaluations
were made, Eisenhower placed them within a larger context.11 This became very
apparent with civil defense and the question o f a federally sponsored national shelter
program. Eisenhower could not deny that a fallout shelter might save some lives. The
bigger questions were: should American tax dollars pay for a shelter program when the
government did not currently provide for protection against other disasters such as
hurricanes, tornadoes, or floods? Would that money be better spent on other means of
security? If one did survive, what kind of world would be left, which leads to the

10 Eisenhower’s psychological strategist C.D. Jackson said Eisenhower “was one o f the few who not only
believed but understood that it would be possible to win World War in without having to fight it.” Jackson
Memorandum to the President, 09/21/53, EL, C.D. Jackson Papers, Time, Inc. File, “DDE Correspondance
through 1956 (2),” quoted in Immerman, “Confessions o f an Eisenhower Revisionist,” 341.
11 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 10-11.
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question is survival merely enough? What type of message would such a program send to
American allies and to the Soviet Union? Could the economy and public spirit withstand
such a large project? Recognizing such questions was the first step in making Eisenhower
an effective leader able to oversee eight years o f peace and prosperity.
Eisenhower’s decision-making process was a reflection of his personality and his
pre-presidential experiences.12 He used the process to achieve his ends. He wished to
build a consensus within his administration for his vision o f a cold war policy that could
survive the long haul, and recent scholarship demonstrates that Eisenhower was
successful in establishing a blueprint for a cold war foreign policy that ensured peace for
over forty years. Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman recently made the case that
Eisenhower deserves part of the credit for shaping a policy that ultimately won the Cold
War, writing that Eisenhower devised “the first coherent and sustainable cold war
strategy suitable for the basic conditions that would prevail during the following
decades.” 14
It may seem ironic that Eisenhower spent so much time on building a consensus
and team players when it was he who devised strategy. As Richard Immerman has noted,
“for all his famed deliberations and ‘staffing out’ procedures, he seems consistently to
have approached a problem with his mind all but made up.”14 Immerman even called
Eisenhower his own secretary of defense.15 Eisenhower himself believed that important
national decisions had to be made by a single authority. “Any attempt to use a voting

12 See Immerman, “Confessions o f an Eisenhower Revisionists,” 323; Stephen Rabe, “Eisenhower
Revisionism: A Decade of Scholarship,” Diplomatic History, 17 (Winter 1993), 100.
13 Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman’s Waging Peace: Haw Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold War
Strategy, (New York; Oxford University Press, 1998), 3.
14 Immerman, “Confessions o f an Eisenhower Revisionist,” 323.
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system,” he wrote, “would be futile because a single man, the head, carries all the
responsibility.” 16 However, it is not ironic when one understands how Eisenhower used
his decision-making process.
Rather than appear as the “head” who has his mind all but made up, Eisenhower
realized the value of an intelligent team and sound advice in the volatile era of the cold
war. After leaving office, Eisenhower explained that assuring the nation’s security was
the “primary duty” of the president and that “situations of actual or probable conflict
change so rapidly and the weaponry of modem military establishments increase their
destructiveness at such a bewildering speed that he [the president] will always need the
vital studies, advice, and counsel that only a capable and well-developed staff
organization can give him.”17 To secure those studies, advice, and counsel, Eisenhower
reorganized the National Security Council into an efficient staff organization. He also
cultivated a climate to solicit advice for his own understanding and for wining support
for his policies. Since Eisenhower believed his policies would be more successful if he
listened to all sides of a debate and had the full support of his national security staff,
political scientist Fred Greenstein explained that he consulted people “as much to win
them over as to canvass their views.”18 Walter Bedell Smith, Eisenhower’s Chief o f Staff
during World War II and Under Secretary o f State for Dulles, explained:
His personality is such that it impresses itself
immediately upon senior subordinates as completely frank,
15 Ibid., 330.
16 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “The Central Role o f the President in the Conduct o f Security Affairs,” in Col.
Amos A. Jordan, Jr., ed. Issues ofNational Security in the 1970s: Essays Presented to Colonel George A.
Lincoln on His Sixtieth Birthday, (New York: Praeger, 1967), 213.
17 Ibid., 206-207.
18 Fred Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader, (New York: Basic Books, 1982),
34.
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completely honest, very human and very considerate.. . . He
has great patience, and he disdains no advice regardless of
source. One of his most successful methods in dealing with
individuals is to assume that he himself is lacking in detailed
knowledge and liable to make an error and is seeking advice.
This is by no means a pose, because he actually values the
recommendations and suggestions he receives, although his
own better information and sounder judgment might cause
them to be disregarded.19

This observation o f Eisenhower’s ability to sincerely include everyone in the decision
making process explains why he chose to “staff-out” problems while acting as his own
secretary of defense. He sought advice for the advice itself, but also to develop a
consensus for his policies. Those consulted tended to accept Eisenhower’s policies
readily because, as Greenstein explained, they felt that “whatever line o f action
Eisenhower embarked upon had been informed by consultation with them.”20
Eisenhower learned the art o f winning people over in the military and continued to lead
that way as president.21 In particular, he used this decision-making process to gain
support from his staff for developing a national security policy that reflected the ‘Great
Equation’ and his strategic thinking.
Eisenhower’s strategic thinking can be broken down into three elements:
deterrence based on nuclear weapons; protecting second strike capabilities through early
warning and dispersal of Strategic Air Command bombers and missile sites; and rejecting
limited war. His strategic thinking rested in part upon his understanding of the military
strategist Claude von Clausewitz. Eisenhower learned military history and theory and

19 Walter Bedell Smith to General Maxwell Taylor, 2/1/56, EL, Walter Bedell Smith Papers, quoted in
Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency, 34.
20 Ibid., 34.
21 See ibid., 31-35.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

s
read Clausewitz’s On War three times while stationed in Panama during the 1920s as
staff officer for General Fox Conner. Conner questioned the young officer closely on the
material he read and Eisenhower quickly became fascinated by the subject.22 Eisenhower
had come to decide that, in the nuclear age, there was no room for limited war. This was
based on Clausewitz’s idea that no military commander would surrender if he still had
more powerful weapons at his disposal. In other words, Eisenhower believed that a
limited war would inevitably lead to a general war because it could not be won without
using nuclear weapons which would lead to general war with the Soviet Union. However,
that did not mean Eisenhower was against building a nuclear arsenal.
Deterrence for Eisenhower meant a strong nuclear force which would allow
America to demobilize its conventional forces, thus saving money. He used the specter of
nuclear weapons in the policy o f Massive Retaliation and he used them to keep the
Soviet Union on guard. “Nuclear saber rattling,” as historian Richard Immerman called
it, was a way to get and keep Moscow’s attention.23 The value o f nuclear weapons was
symbolic- to remind the Soviets such a war was suicidal.24 In addition to a nuclear
deterrent, protecting second-strike capabilities identified Eisenhower’s strategic thinking.
Ensuring that, should war come, American forces could retaliate was imperative.
Continental defenses were vital to national security planning. These ideas, along with the

22 Dwight D. Eisenhower, A t Ease: Stories I Tell to Friends, (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967), 182186. For more on the influence o f Clausewitz on Eisenhower see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 138; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1982),135; Saki Dockrill, Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy,
1953-61, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 4.
23 Immerman, “Confessions o f an Eisenhower Revisionist,” 340.
24 Richard Immerman put it this way: Eisenhower “never considered the nuclear option viable, except in the
sense that one considers suicide viable.” See Immerman, “Confessions o f an Eisenhower Revisionist,” 326.
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concept of the ‘Great Equation,’ permeated Eisenhower’s NSC within months o f taking
office.
For example, an NSC memorandum identified the two principal threats to the
survival of American traditions and values as “the formidable power of the Communist
world led by the USSR, and the weakening of our economy which may result from the
cost of opposing the Soviet Union.”23 To counter these threats an integrated political,
military and economic system had to be maintained. That meant balancing the budget,
eliminating waste, educating the public about the nature of the Communist threat, and
improving the readiness of U.S. military forces to meet the Soviet threat. Continental
defense and offensive capabilities, coupled with continued research and development in
special weapons, were key.26 These themes reappeared time after time. The Joint Chiefs
also reflected part of Eisenhower’s strategic thinking, concluding in October 1953 that
the principle deterrent to a Soviet air attack was to convince the Soviets that such an
attack could not achieve their military objectives in war —by ensuring the massive air
capabilities of the U.S. and the effectiveness o f the U.S. air defense.27 These examples
captured Eisenhower’s thinking.
Through his vision for a national security policy based upon his strategic thinking
and ‘Great Equation,’ Eisenhower led the country through eight years of peace and
prosperity. After he left office he boasted that “the United States never lost a soldier or a
foot of ground in my administration. We kept the peace. People ask how it happened - by

25 Memorandum for the Vice President, 6/8/53, EL, WHO NSCS, Special Staff File, Box I, “Basic National
Security Policy, 1953-54(3).”
26 Ibid.
27 Decision on JCS 1924/76, “Magnitude and Imminence o f Soviet Air Threat to the United States- 1957,”
10/30/53, NA, RG218, Box 65, “CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49) sec 5.”
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God, it didn’t just happen, I’ll tell you that.”28 But despite this impressive record,
throughout his two terms as president and for over a decade afterward, historians and
critics portrayed the 34th president as little more than a symbolic figure in the White
House who let his staff carry out policy while he perfected his stroke on the golf course.
By the 1970s, scholarship began to reveal a very different portrait of Eisenhower which
revitalized his reputation.29 While historians once ranked him just above Chester Arthur,
Eisenhower now ranks among the top ten chief executives to ever hold the office/0 As
historians Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman recently wrote, “Today, there is no need
to justify treating Eisenhower as a serious and able policy maker.’” 1This study continues
to build upon this revisionist theme.32

28 Eisenhower quoted in Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 2, The President, 626.
29 The “revisionist” work that came out o f the 1970s include Herbert Parmet, Eisenhower and the American
Crusades (New York: Macmillian, 1972); Blanche Wiesen Cook, Dwight David Eisenhower: Antimilitarist
in the White House, (St. Charles, MO., 1974); Peter Lyon, Eisenhower: Portrait o f the Hero (Boston: Little
Brown, 1974); Charles Alexander, Holding the Line: The Eisenhower Era, 1952-1961 (Bloomington,
Indiana University Press, 1975); Gary Reichard, The Reaffirmation o f Republicanism: Eisenhower and the
Eighty-Third Congress (Knoxville: University o f Tennessee Press, 1975); and Elmo Richardson, The
Presidency o f Dwight D. Eisenhower (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1979). However, the
revitalization o f Eisenhower’s stature came in full force in the early 1980s. Historian Robert Divine, in
Eisenhower and the Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), rejects Eisenhower’s reputation
as a do-nothing president. Divine is frank that he wrote with a basic sympathy for a badly underrated
President and argues that Eisenhower was skillful and active in directing foreign policy. Political scientist
Fred Greenstein’s The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader, (New York: Basic Books, 1982)
also challenged the earlier interpretations that surrounded Eisenhower and portrayed instead an articulate,
intelligent, and skilled politician. Finally, Stephen Ambrose’s Eisenhower, vol. 2, The President, (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1984) argues that the country was “damned lucky to have him” as he oversaw eight
years of peace. What Eisenhower did best, according to Ambrose, was managing crises, and he succeeded
because o f his international perspective and decision-making skills. For an excellent analysis o f these three
books, in addition to how individual case studies have sustained or challenged their conclusions, see Stephen
Rabe, “Eisenhower Revisionism: A Decade o f Scholarship,” Diplomatic History, 17 (Winter 1993), 97-115.
30 David Porter, “American Historians Rate Our Presidents,” in The Rating Game in American Politics, ed.
William Penderson and Arm McLaurin, (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1987), 13-37.
31 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 5.
32 Stephen Rabe summarized the core beliefs o f Eisenhower revisionism as such: “Eisenhower approached
the presidency in a thoughtful, systematic way. He had developed during his military career superb
management skills and a comprehensive knowledge o f international affairs, and he used those assets to
master the presidency and dominate the policymaking process.” See Rabe, “Eisenhower revisionism,” 100.
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When Eisenhower took office in 1953 he was immediately faced with the
challenges o f the cold war. Throughout his two terms Eisenhower was forced to adapt to
political changes within the Soviet Union, the advent of the hydrogen bomb, the
development o f ICBMs, and the dangers o f radioactive fallout. Constantly facing new
threats and fears in a rapidly changing technological world, Eisenhower and his advisors
often had to rethink certain security issues and make critical decisions.33 One tool which
Eisenhower used to help him in his decision making process was civilian ad-hoc
committees. Reaching back to the Progressive era, there is a long tradition of relying on
civilian experts, and Eisenhower was certainly more in touch with the progressive wing
o f the Republican party. So although Eisenhower was not the first president to call upon
outside advisers, his presidency is unique in that he asked for civilian expert advice on
many occasions to deal with sensitive issues of national security. While scholars agree
that Eisenhower used experts on several occasions, there is no scholarship which
systematically analyzes their use or their usefulness in national security planning. J‘l

43 There have been few dissertations done in recent years that incorporate science or technology with
foreign policy as evidenced by the annual U.S. Foreign Affairs Doctoral Dissertation lists. However, the
literature on the role o f science in foreign policy is growing. For example, Kurkpatrick Dorsey’s, The Dawn
o f Conservation Diplomacy: U.S.-Canadian Wildlife Protection Treaties in the Progressive Era, (Seattle:
University o f Washington Press, 1998) integrated science and scientists during the Progressive era with
environmental foreign policy issues like wildlife treaties. Walter LaFeber integrated technology and foreign
policy, paraphrasing William Seward in observing that the spoils o f empire went to those countries who
were technologically advanced. See LaFeber, “Technology and U.S. Foreign Relations,” Diplomatic
History, 24 (Winter 2000), 1-19. O f course there has been much written on the impact the atomic bomb has
had on diplomacy. Important examples include Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and
Potsdam, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965); Gregg Herken, The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb
in the Cold War, 1945-1950, (New York: Vintage, 1981); Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima
and the Origins o f the Arms Race, (New York, Vintage, 1987; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival:
Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, (New York: Random House, 1988); and David Alan
Rosenberg, “Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy,” in The National Security: Its
Theory and Practice, ed. Norman Graebner (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 123-195.
34 In general, there has been more written on science advising than on general civilian advising. One
exception to this is David Snead, The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War, (Columbus, OH:
Ohio State University Press, 1999) which examines in detail the origins and legacies o f the Gaither
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Immerman recently wrote, “Eisenhower unquestionably valued civilian input But
why he did so is less clear.”35 This study attempts to explain why Eisenhower used
civilian committees as part of his decision-making process in national security planning
and why he stopped using them. There are three examples o f civilian committees which
highlight Eisenhower’s decision-making process, his devotion to the ‘Great Equation,’
his strategic thinking, and his response to the rapid changes brought about by scientific
and technological advances in weapon development and national security.36 Those
examples are the Solarium Exercise (1953), the Killian Committee (1955), and the
Gaither Committee (1957).37
Civilian committees allowed Eisenhower to do a number o f things. First, he could
leam from the committees. Eisenhower was not an expert on all things, and the
technological advances being made during the Cold War called for expert advice in the
fields of science and technology. Second, if he could include outsiders, including
Democrats, in the decision-making process, his policies would have a stronger footing.

Committee and argues against the conventional wisdom that it was not an important report that Eisenhower
used in policy making. Gregg Herken has written extensively on the use of expert, and in particular
scientific, advising in nuclear arms policy in his books Counsels o f War (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1987) and Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advisingfrom the Atomic Bomb to SDI (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Bruce Smith, The Advisers: Scientists in the Policy Process,
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992) looks more at the scientific community’s institutional
relations with government. Also see Robert Gilpin and Christopher "/right, eds., Scientists and National
Policy-Making, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964); James Killian, Jr., Sputnik, Scientists, and

Eisenhower: A Memoir o f the First Special Assistant to the President fo r Science and Technology
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977); George Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House: The Private Diary o f
President Eisenhower’s Special Assistantfo r Science and Technology, (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1976).
35 Immerman, review o f The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War, by David Snead, H-Net
Reviews, November 2000, <http://www2.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/>.
36 Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Robert Cutler, defined the term civilian not
in contrast to military personnel, but rather as a short cut expression for the rather lengthy definition of
“persons not holding Federal government office.” See Cutler Address at the Compton Memorial Dinner,
MIT, 1/4/56, EL, AWF, Administrative Series, Box 11, “Cutler, Robert 1956-57 (4),” 6.
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By allowing critics to serve on committees, Eisenhower made them complicit in the
decision-making process, giving his policies more weight Third, if Eisenhower did not
agree with the committee’s recommendations, he could claim he had had an open-mind
and had carefully considered the recommendations, but ultimately found them
unpersuasive. In fact, the success o f a civilian committee depended in part on how well
its recommendations reflected the ideas o f the ‘Great Equation’ and the elements of
Eisenhower’s strategic thinking. If a civilian committee recommended a path that
differed with Eisenhower’s thinking, the President Eisenhower rejected it out of hand.
Finally, Eisenhower could craft the committees to shape a desired outcome.
My thesis is that using civilian committees was an integral part of Eisenhower’s
decision-making process as long as Eisenhower controlled the groups. They brought to
the NSC deliberations a “fresh, frequently changing civilian point of view.”38 They
allowed the president and his national security staff to hear all sides of a debate. They
served as educators and often recommended innovative solutions to national security
problems. They served without being burdened by political or interservice rivalries. And
Eisenhower used them deliberately. When the Gaither Committee did not operate within
the rules Eisenhower had come to expect from these committees, he reevaluated the
usefulness o f such committees and decided against their use. The press leaks and
campaigning by Gaither Committee members for the report made it difficult for
Eisenhower to use the committee’s report as he had intended. He lost control of the

37 The official name o f the Killian Committee, chaired by James Killian, was the Technological Capabilities
Panel. The official name of the Gaither Committee, chaired by Rowan Gaither, was The Security Resources
Panel.
38 Letter Lay to Coller, 7/25/55, EL, WHO OSANS A, NSC Series, Administrative Sub series, Box 4
“Consultants-NSC July 1954-Aug 1956] (4).”
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process, became suspicious of the service of civilians, and ultimately left office warning
the public about the danger o f public policy becoming “captive o f the scientifictechnological elite.”39

The Solarium Exercise
One clear example o f how Eisenhower used a civilian committee to craft a
desired outcome is with the Solarium Exercise, the focus of Part One o f this disseration.
When Eisenhower entered the presidency, he inherited from President Harry Truman
high budget deficits and a foreign policy which seemed to lack any cohesion. He also
inherited his own campaign promises for a roll-back policy and a balanced budget.
Feeling that the Truman administration fell short o f its potential and having to reconcile
his own campaign promises, Eisenhower needed to do four things when he came to
office. He had to reevaluate Truman’s policy of containment, bury the idea of a roll-back
policy, reduce the high defense spending that the Truman administration had embarked
on with NSC 68 and the Korean war, and create a national security policy that reflected
the ‘Great Equation’ and his strategic thinking.
To accomplish these tasks, Eisenhower established the Solarium Exercise, which
created three small, separate task forces. Each task force had a specific policy line to
argue - like a debating club meeting the needs o f national security. In regards to a
national security policy, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles preferred a
harder line against the Soviets —either roll-back or what he called drawing the line —
whereas Eisenhower was drawn to the political and economic policy o f containment as

39 Eisenhower, “Farewell Address,” Public Papers o f the President, 1960-61.
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George Kennan had defined it in the late 1940s. The Solarium exercise was set up to
debate the merits o f those options.
Eisenhower wished to set up “some teams o f bright young fellows” who would
act like a “good advocate tackling a law case” to evaluate all policy alternatives in their
financial and strategic roles. Each team was to argue one alternative “with a real belief
in it.” Eisenhower believed that with such a presentation, the NSC would be “qualified to
come to a decision.”40 Wishing to return to Kennan’s original containment policy, this
exercise allowed Eisenhower and his staff to reevaluate the present strategy of
containment, the feasibility of roll-back, and craft a national security policy based on
Eisenhower’s thinking.
The Solarium exercise did just those things. Since Eisenhower placed Kennan as
chair of Task Force A, which was assigned to argue for a containment policy, he
guaranteed the results would be more in line with the original definition. The report
presented by Task Force A reflected Eisenhower’s strategic thinking and, as one historian
noted, “Eisenhower could have written the report himself.”41 Furthermore, Eisenhower
insisted that General Andrew Goodpaster serve on Task Force C so as to have a
reasonable voice on the committee. By contributing to the selection of the committee
members, Eisenhower stacked the deck so that the results of the exercise reflected his
strategic thinking. The group worked without leaks and stayed within its given
parameters. As Kennan had said, not all the members liked being boxed into a specific

40 Memorandum on Solarium Project, 5/8/53, EL, WHO NSCS, Executive Secretary Subject File, Box 15,
“Project Solarium (3).”
41 Immerman, “Confessions o f an Eisenhower Revisionist,” 338.
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line to argue, but all did so, and with skill and eloquence.42 It was this kind of discipline
Eisenhower looked for in such committees.
Eisenhower oversaw the final membership and his deliberate choices for task
force members and their narrow assignments predetermined the outcome, an outcome
Eisenhower desired. Using the civilian committee also allowed Eisenhower to appear to
have looked at all sides o f the debate. By selecting civilians, some of whom were
Democrats, and highly respected military men to serve on the Solarium task forces,
Eisenhower made them complicit in his decision-making. The Solarium Exercise, in
conjunction with recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided the
foundation for the policy paper NSC 162/2 which outlined Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’
strategy for the cold war. Although NSC 162/2 was continually modified and updated
throughout his tenure, it established in Eisenhower’s first year the strategic thinking that
dominated the administration’s national security policy.

The Killian Committee
In Part Two of this dissertation, the threat of surprise attack and strengthening
American continental defense are the focus. NSC 162/2 recognized that American
nuclear superiority would not last and that, when it eroded, the world situation would
change. As the last paragraph said, “The foregoing conclusions are valid only so long as
the United States maintains a retaliatory capability that cannot be neutralized by a
surprise Soviet attack. Therefore, there must be continuing examination and periodic
report to the NSC in regard to the likelihood o f such neutralization of U.S. retaliatory

42 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 20.
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capability.”43 As the threat of surprise attack mounted, Eisenhower was forced to
confront the problems o f continental defense.
Continental defense was all but ignored in the Truman administration. In
addition, the threat o f surprise attack was real. Since Pearl Harbor, the American public
had been left aware that the shores o f America were vulnerable. The dawning o f the Cold
War and atomic age only added to the feeling of vulnerability. As weapon technology
advanced, concern over the threat o f surprise attack grew. Surprise attack was not limited
to American shores which were protected by the Navy, but rather, Detroit could be the
next Pearl Harbor and, as such, a continental defense system was needed. An early
warning system, anti-aircraft guns, interceptors, and data processing facilities were the
new necessities for national security.
Eisenhower spent a year reviewing various reports on the state of continental
defense and had a number of small committees studying the problem. Eisenhower's NSC
approved two policy papers on continental defense by 1954. Both said continental
defenses were completely inadequate and needed to be strengthened. Both papers
stressed the urgency of the situation in light of the August 1953 Soviet testing o f a
thermonuclear device. But, neither policy paper offered any specific solutions.
The Science Advisory Committee, which had been established in 1951 and was
hardly ever used by Truman, was eager to apply science and technology to the problems
o f national security. As Dr. Lee DuBridge, chairman o f the Science Advisory Committee
and president of the California Institute of Technology, saw it, it was the technological
advances in weapon systems that had created the heightened risk o f surprise attack, and a

43 Report to the NSC, 162/2, 10/30/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:596.
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“scientific inventory, evaluation, and synthesis of these new developments” was needed
for policy makers to make the most of the new technologies. In short, “the bearing o f
science and technology on the problems of surprise attack required an immediate and
comprehensive examination.”44
Eisenhower agreed and asked the Science Advisory Committee to establish a
group o f experts to study how science and technology could be applied to guarding
against a Soviet surprise attack. Eisenhower asked James Killian to chair the committee.
Killian was the president of M.I.T., and under his leadership the committee was
successful in improving national security. By giving the Killian committee a specific
mandate —to apply science and technology to guard against surprise attack - they
tackled the problems facing continental defense and offered specific suggestions which
made the most efficient use o f the military and budget. In other words, their suggestions
fit into the New Look established by NSC 162/2. Also, placing James Killian as chairman
was wise. Killian and Eisenhower shared many of the same beliefs, and Killian, having
forty participants to oversee, was a master administrator o f scientists.
Like the Solarium Exercise, the Killian Committee worked without leaks and
presented a report which reflected Eisenhower’s strategic thinking. Presenting its final
report to the NSC and the president in March 1955, the committee recommended an
acceleration o f the ICBM and IRBM programs, an extended early warning line and, most
important, the U-2 spy plane. There was no better protection against surprise attack than
hard intelligence as to Soviet capabilities and intentions, and the U-2 provided that In

44 Letter DuBridge to Arthur Hemming, 5/24/54, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 104, “World
W a rm (l).”

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

short, the recommendations o f the committee were implemented, widely embraced, and
greatly strengthened continental defenses in America. In addition, the exercise healed
some wounds inflicted by the Robert Oppenheimer affair.43 The end results o f the
exercise were two fold: specific programs that fit within the New Look were made and
implemented and some bridges between the administration and the scientific community
were mended after the Oppenheimer affair.

The Gaither Committee
Part Three of the dissertation looks at another concern stemming from
thermonuclear weapons: fallout. While the Eisenhower administration was working on its
New Look, the American public, cultural critics, and some scientists were growing more
concerned over the threat o f fallout, not only from a nuclear exchange between the two
superpowers, but also from atmospheric testing. As the dangers of radioactive fallout
became more known there were growing complaints that the administration was taking a
“spotty approach” to the problem of shelters.
During the debates on continental defense, civil defense was left to state and local
authorities. The Federal Civil Defense Administration argued for better early warning
systems which the federal government was able to provide, but both Truman and
Eisenhower were skeptical about spending federal money on a national shelter program.
Eisenhower felt deeply that the Federal Government need only play a leadership role in
civil defense and that the individual citizen was responsible for his or her own protection.

45 Robert Oppenheimer had been the director o f the Manhattan Project and had his security clearance
stripped away in early 1954 by the Atomic Energy Commission, which severely limited his ability to do
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He believed that Federal money spent on shelters would be better spent on other
programs. In addition, Dulles strongly objected to such passive defenses as shelters and
believed they might even send the wrong message to the Soviets.
However, in early 1957, the FCDA gave its annual report in which it
recommended spending over $32 billion dollars on a national shelter program. Shocked
at the recommendation by his conservative FCDA director, Eisenhower decided to look
at the problem further. He called upon another civilian committee to look into the matter
and gave it a specific mandate —to determine the relative merits o f passive defenses like
shelters versus active defenses like continental defense. In other words, the President
wanted to know whether money spent on a national shelter system would be better spent
on active defense measures. The last thing Eisenhower wanted to come out of the study
was a series of detailed recommendations for changing American defense programs.
Eisenhower had little involvement in the committee process. He would accept its
conclusions if the report agreed with him that the Federal Government should not finance
a national shelter program. If the report differed from that, Eisenhower could claim he
had had an open mind, looked at the options, but found the conclusions unpersuasive.
Either way, Eisenhower’s mind was made up on the issue. However, the committee went
too far, and the contents o f the final report were leaked to the public, making it difficult
for the President to control the process.
Rowan Gaither, who chaired the RAND Corporation, asked his friends at RAND
how to organize the group. Gaither was convinced by his associates at RAND that a

research and angered most o f the scientific community. The most comprehensive account on the subject is
Philip Stem, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).
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broader mandate needed to be pursued so as to not miss the real issue of defending the
United States against surprise Soviet attack. Convinced that a complete analysis of civil
defense could not be achieved without investigating the entire American defense policy,
the members of the committee asked Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs, Robert Cutler, to allow the committee to expand its mandate to
reevaluate the entire defense program. Cutler, regretful afterwards, gave them his
permission.
What began as a modest study o f civil defense ended up spreading like a cancer,
with over 80 participants, each coming to the project with preconceived ideas about the
direction o f continental defense —primarily that America was at great risk. For example,
the committee asked Paul Nitze, a long time critic o f Eisenhower’s ‘New Look’ strategy,
to join and help write the final report. To add to the convictions o f many members that
the U.S. was vulnerable, the Soviets launched a man-made earth satellite in October.
Sputnik confirmed the worst fears o f the committee and the final report indicated that the
United States was in the gravest danger in its history. The report was not what
Eisenhower wanted in scope or tone.
The final report recommended defense spending on both passive and active
defenses which totaled $44 billion, well above Eisenhower’s $38 billion budget The
costs would be great, but well within the means o f the country according to the report.
The risks in ignoring their recommendations would be, in their words, “unacceptable.”
The recommendations in large part did not reflect the strategic thinking of the President.
It recommended a national shelter program and fought for a limited war capability.
However, that alone was not what caused the committee to fail in Eisenhower’s mind.
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What soured Eisenhower to civilian groups after the Gaither report was the lack of
anonymity the members displayed and their persistence in trying to make policy by
exploiting the fears of the public.
After the report was presented to the NSC, the contents o f the report were leaked
to the press, many committee members began to lobby for the implementation o f the
report, and there were Congressional demands that the report be released. Eisenhower
was unable to quietly put the report away in a file cabinet. In the past he had been able to
use a committee’s report to make it complicit in the policy-making process or reject a
report while claiming to have looked at all sides. The publicity of the report, and the fact
that some committee members wanted to assume more power and influence than they
had, made it more difficult for Eisenhower to control the process. The experience left
him to conclude that the entire exercise proved, in his words, “definitively the unwisdom
of calling in outside groups.”46

46 Memorandum o f Conversation with President, 12/26/57, EL, JFD Papers, WH Memorandum Series, Box
5, “Meetings with the President 1957 (1).”
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THE DEBATING CLUB MEETS NATIONAL SECURITY NEEDS:
THE SOLARIUM EXERCISE (1953)
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CHAPTER ONE

THE THREE C’S:
CONTAINMENT, COST CUTTING, AND THE “CHANCE FOR PEACE”

“The issue of Soviet-American relations is in essence a test o f the over-all worth
of the United States as a nation among nations. To avoid destruction the United States
need only measure up to its own best traditions and prove itself worthy of preservation as
a great nation.”1This challenge, written by George Kennan in 1947, inspired a generation
o f public servants to support their country during the Cold War. After defeating the
totalitarian regimes of Germany and Japan in World War II, Americans felt invincible
and righteous in their desire to spread to the peoples of the world the democracy and
freedoms their Constitution guaranteed. Standing in their way was the Soviet Union.
Despite being wartime allies, relations between the two countries quickly deteriorated
into a Cold War in part because of Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe and in part
because of the hard line the Truman Administration took against the Soviets. Harry
Truman had to fight a cold war against the Soviets while balancing American post-war
economic needs. To do that, he followed a policy of containment first proposed by

1 George Kennan, “The Sources o f Soviet Conduct,” in American Diplomacy, (Chicago: University o f
Chicago Press, 1984), 128.
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Kennan which emphasized political and economic maneuvering. Although containment
was successful in the short term, the Soviet detonation of an atomic bomb in 1949, the
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, and Truman’s authorization for developing a
hydrogen bomb that same year resulted in a redefinition o f containment by Paul Nitze.
Nitze militarized containment, which resulted in higher defense budgets and a more
dangerous Cold War.
Dwight Eisenhower entered the presidency on January 20, 1953 in the midst of
this Cold War and on the eve o f the thermonuclear revolution. He inherited from Truman
high budget deficits, massive military spending, a nuclear arms race, and a foreign policy
which seemed to lack any cohesion. Eisenhower first prepared to maintain peace,
practicing a policy that avoided any war, since even limited war, he believed, would
inevitably lead to a general nuclear war.2 In addition to avoiding world destruction,
ensuring American fiscal solvency was equally essential for Eisenhower’s national
security policy. Eisenhower wanted to bring the budget within reasonable limits not
because, as he explained, there was “any belief that we can afford relaxation of the
combined effort to combat Soviet communism,” but because a strained economy over the
long haul would weaken American strength, require government economic controls, and
ultimately ruin America’s “free” economy.3 The “Great Equation” was an idea that
Eisenhower never lost sight of, and, throughout his tenure, he placed great importance on
a sound economy, strong military, and high public spirit. Finally, he sought to ease Cold
War tensions heightened during the previous administration. Feeling that the Truman
2 Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear War, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998), 69.
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administration fell short of its potential, Eisenhower reevaluated national security policy
while calling upon the Soviets to take a chance for peace.

An Unlikely Alliance
World War II began on September 1,1939 when Hitler’s army invaded Poland.
Bound by a Non-Aggression Pact signed earlier that year, the Soviet Union aided
Germany in her conquest o f Poland by invading the country from the east. It seemed an
improbable marriage, but Nazi Germany and Communist Russia were for a time allies.
Hitler, however, wished to conquer all of Europe and invaded the Soviet Union in June,
1941 forcing the Soviet Union to join forces with the British. In trying to explain the
unlikely alliance between Great Britain and the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Winston
Churchill remarked that he had only one goal: the destruction of Hitler. Therefore, he
explained to a friend, “I f Hitler invaded hell I would make at least a favorable reference
to the Devil in the House of Commons.”4 Speaking to the British people, Churchill, a
long time anti-Bolshevik advocate, said “any man or state who fights against Nazidom
will have our aid...It follows therefore that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia
and the Russian people.”5 United States President Franklin Roosevelt felt the same way.
Explaining the significance o f the fight against Hitler, Roosevelt said in his Arsenal of
Democracy fireside chat in December 1940, “Never before, since Jamestown and
Plymouth Rock has our American civilization been in such danger as now....If Great

3 Letter Eisenhower to General Alfred Gruenther, 5/4/53, EL, AWF, DDE Diaries, Box 3, “December 52July 53 (3) ”
4 Winston Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 3 “The Grand Alliance,” (New York: Houghton Mifflin,
1950), 370.
5 Ibid., 371-372.
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Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa,
Australia, and the high seas....It is no exaggeration to say that all of us...would be living
at the point of a gun.”6 With the Soviet Union joining the British in June 1941, Roosevelt
extended over one billion dollars in American aid under the Lend-Lease program to
Russia in the autumn o f 1941 to ensure it’s survival.7 By his audacious gamble, Hitler
had converted suspicious ideological rivals into unlikely military allies.
After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, President Woodrow Wilson refused to
recognize the communist nation. He worked to defeat communism, in Russia and at
home, committing U.S. troops to fight in Russian from 1918 to 1920 and authorizing the
Attorney General to investigate and deport suspected communists during the Red Scare
o

of 1919. Wilson viewed the new government in Russia as the antithesis to American
liberal-capitalism and V. I. Lenin’s call for the proletariat to rise up and overthrow its
oppressors as dangerous. As historian John Lewis Gaddis explained, “The events of
1917-18 created a symbolic basis for conflict between communism and capitalism by
setting the self-proclaimed objectives of the United States and Soviet Russia against one
another in the most fundamental way.”9 This ideological difference between the two
powers did not create immediate conflict, but it did reemerge as a central source of
tension during the Cold War.

6 Franklin Roosevelt, Papers o f the President 1940, December 29, 1940.
7 Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945, (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1965), 40.
8 For a further account on Wilson’s actions abroad see Walter LeFeber, The American Age, VoL 2, 2nd ed.,
(New York; Norton, 1994), 310-313. For a further account on the Red Scare see David Kennedy, Over
Here: The First World War and American Society, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 278-79,
288-92.
9 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1997), 6.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

28
Thinking it strange that the United States did not recognize the world’s largest
nation, Roosevelt was the first president to recognize the Soviet Union, establishing
diplomatic relations with Moscow in 1933.10 However, charges of Communist influence
in the New Deal and rumors of the slave camps, famines and purges in Russia under
Joseph Stalin only reinforced the average American’s suspicions of the Soviet Union. In
fact, it took a wave o f propaganda after the Nazi invasion o f Russia to convince
Americans to support Stalin. Mission to Moscow, written by Ambassador Joseph Davies
and produced by Warner Brothers in 1943, excused Stalin’s actions and proclaimed that
the Soviet regime was based “on the same principle of the ‘brotherhood of man’ which
Jesus preached.”11And Time magazine honored Stalin as its Man o f the Year in 1943,
featuring him on the cover as a clear-eyed man of determination portrayed as almost
God-like, descending from the heavens. Although American perception of Stalin
temporarily shifted during the war, Roosevelt still had a challenging time negotiating
within the Grand Alliance.
The one shared goal of the Grand Alliance was the defeat of Hitler. From there,
agendas differed between the three.12 Roosevelt believed that the Soviet Union could be
manipulated by kind treatment and ironically spent more time fighting with Churchill
than with Stalin. He also placed winning the war above all else, putting post-war
planning on the back burner.13 When it came down to working out the details of the post-

10 Roosevelt formally recognized the Soviet Union against the wishes o f American labor and his own State
Department. For a full account see Thomas Maddux, Years o f Estrangement: American Relations with the
Soviet Union, 1933-1941, (Tallahasee, 1980), 17.
11 Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since
1776, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 154.
12 Ibid., 155.
13 Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945, (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1965).
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war world at Yalta in February 1945, it was clear the Allied forces would defeat Hitler
soon. Victory in the Pacific was not as certain and Roosevelt came to Yalta seeking
Stalin’s help in the Pacific war. Stalin finally agreed to help in the Pacific war in return
for Manchuria and Mongolia and an occupation zone in northern Korea. The issue of
Poland was also resolved at Yalta by redrawing its borders, recognizing the communist
Lublin Poles as the legitimate government, and securing Stalin’s promise to honor free
elections in that nation. Stalin also agreed to guarantee all Eastern European countries
the right to choose their governments and leaders in free elections. Although Roosevelt
was criticized for “giving away” Poland and the rest o f Eastern Europe, the Red Army
and Communist partisan forces in Eastern Europe held control of almost all o f this
territory. Churchill wanted the Allied forces under Eisenhower to continue pushing east
to stop the Red Army from acquiring more territory, but Eisenhower ordered General
Patton to pull back, letting the Russians liberate Czechoslovakia, eastern Germany, and
Berlin. As such, when the war was over, Stalin had retained all the lands he grabbed
under the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, the Polish borders he desired, and much of
northern Asia.
Despite the concessions Churchill and Roosevelt made to Stalin at Yalta,
Roosevelt believed an American controlled United Nations and his own personal hand
could solve problems related to these issues as they arose. As the historian James
McGregor Bums wrote, “Holding only weak hands in the great poker game of Yalta,
Roosevelt believed he had won the foundations o f future peace. It was with hope and
even exultation that he and his party left Yalta for the long journey home. Above all he
left with confidence that, whatever the problems ahead, he could solve them through his
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personal intervention.” 14 It was not that Roosevelt thought he could charm Stalin, it was
that Roosevelt believed he could outwit Stalin, as Walter Lippmann observed, but outwit
him within the framework of cooperation.15 Therefore Roosevelt viewed the survival of
the Grand Alliance as vital to post-war peace, a view his successor did not hold as dear.

The Haberdasher From Missouri
Despite President Roosevelt’s best efforts to ensure longevity o f the Grand
Alliance after the war, any chance of cooperation between the United States and the
Soviet Union disappeared on April 12,1945 when Roosevelt died from a massive stroke.
Harry S Truman, a former haberdasher from Missouri and the Vice Presidential
compromise for the 1944 election, took a different approach towards the Soviet Union
after he took office. Taking a harder line towards the Soviets than Roosevelt, and priding
himself on being a no-nonsense, telling it like it is guy, Truman placed a plaque on his
desk in the Oval Office which read “The buck stops here!” Relying on Roosevelt’s
advisors immediately after taking office, who urged a more forceful approach towards
the Soviets, Truman steered American participation in the Grand Alliance away from the
conciliatory nature Roosevelt had cultivated. One of the more infamous exchanges
between Truman and Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov illustrates this point When
Truman harshly reprimanded Molotov for Soviet violations o f the Yalta agreement in
Poland, Molotov complained to Truman that he had “never been talked to like that in my
life.” Truman, unmoved, responded, “Carry out your agreements and you won’t get

14 James McGregor Bums, The Crosswinds o f Freedom, (New York: Knop^ 19S9).
13 LeFeber, The American Age, 442.
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talked to like that.”16 But despite Truman’s outward appearance, he knew that he had a
formidable task ahead of him in ending World War II and dealing with the Soviets. “Boys
if you ever pray, pray for me now,” Truman asked a group of reporters after taking office.
“I don’t know whether you fellows ever had a load o f hay fall on you, but when they told
me yesterday what had happened, I felt like the moon, the stars, and all the planets had
fallen on me.” 17
Truman knew little about foreign policy in general and Roosevelt’s war policies
in particular. Roosevelt had made no attempts to include the Vice President in any policy
discussions. As Truman wrote in his diary on April 12th, “I knew the President had a great
many meetings with Churchill and Stalin. I was not familiar with any o f [it.]” 18 Truman
certainly did not know about the massive government project to develop an atomic
weapon, code-named the Manhattan Project. After a brief Cabinet meeting after the
swearing in, Secretary of War Henry Stimson stayed behind to tell Truman little more
than that the project existed. It was not until another meeting between the two men on
April 25th that Truman was given the details. Truman agreed to continue the policy
decisions set in motion by Roosevelt and authorized the use o f the bombs used on Japan
in August 1945, bringing the world into the atomic age.19
Truman certainly hoped that American atomic superiority would keep the Soviets
in their place and believed that, in the words of historian Martin Sherwin, the bomb

16 Harry S Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, Year o f Decisions, (Garden City,NJ: DoubleDay, 1956), 80-82.
17 Truman, Year o f Decision, 19.
18 Robert Ferrell, ed., O ff the Record: The Private Papers o f Harry S Truman, (New York: Harper and
Row, 1980), 16.
19 Martin Sherwin, A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins o f the Arms Race, (New York: Vintage
Books, 1987), 150, 160-163.
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would “convince Stalin to be more cooperative.”20 Although Truman saw atomic
weapons as a diplomatic tool, during his presidency, he did not believe that atomic
weapons were in the same category as any other weapon, including biological or
chemical weapons. He stated publicly in 1953 that “atomic weapons [were] in a moral
category separate from so-called conventional weapons and perhaps separate from
biological and chemical methods o f warfare.”21 He believed atomic weapons murdered
civilian populations “by wholesale” and understood the gravity of a decision to use
atomic weapons.22 However, Truman did not dismiss entirely the use o f atomic weapons
and conceded that there were certain circumstances in which the use o f atomic weapons
might be authorized. He never specifically outlined what those certain circumstances
might be, leaving it purposely vague.
Historian S. David Broscious explains this apparent paradox by looking towards
Truman’s early interest in international controls over atomic energy. Truman hoped that
an international agency might eliminate the threat of atomic war while promoting peace.
Yet, as the Cold War progressed and international cooperation over atomic energy
seemed impossible, Truman was willing to use atomic weapons to ensure world freedom
and democracy in the face o f Soviet aggression. Truman primarily relied on the deterrent
value o f American atomic superiority, banking on Soviet unwillingness to risk war with
an atomically superior United States. Once the Soviets successfully tested an atomic
bomb o f their own in August 1949, Truman’s fundamental beliefs dictated that
20 ibid., 8.
21 S. David Broscious, “Longing for International Control, Banking on American Superiority: Harry S
Truman’s Approach to Nuclear Weapons,” in John L. Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, Jonathan
Rosenberg eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.
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development of the hydrogen bomb begin in order to ensure the deterrent value of
nuclear weapons.23 “As you know,” explained Truman at a Blair House meeting, “we
have made every effort to obtain international control of atomic energy. We have failed
to get that control- due to the stubbornness and inferiority contrariness o f the Soviets. I
am of the opinion we’ll never obtain international control. Since we can’t obtain
international control we must be strongest in atomic weapons.”24 Truman’s legacy,
therefore, was in part to immerse American national security policy into a continuous
arms race with the Soviet Union.
Truman was not wrong to think a meaningful international control agency was
futile. According to Russian historian Vladislav Zubok, Stalin never trusted America’s
good intentions to establish international control over atomic weapons. Suspicious of
America, Stalin also believed that Truman was practicing atomic diplomacy right from
the beginning with Hiroshima, trying to blackmail the Soviet Union. This was
particularly evident, in Stalin’s mind, with the Bikini tests in 1946 when American
officials decided to invite Soviet observers to the atomic tests at the Bikini atoll in July.
The Kremlin viewed the invitation as “another attempt at atomic intimidation of the
USSR, and,” according to Zubok, “the veterans of the Soviet atomic project believe this
even today.”25
Rather than deter Stalin, America’s atomic monopoly energized the Soviet atomic
program which began in earnest after World War n. Unable to afford committing

22 Ibid., 17,20.
23 Ibid., 20-21, 36-38.
24 Statement by President Truman at a Meeting at Blair House, Washington, 7/14/49, FRUS, 1949, 1:481.
25 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Stalin and the Nuclear Age,” in John L. Gaddis et al., Cold War Statesmen, 45, 52,
61.
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resources to an atomic program during the war and strapped with devastating losses after
the war, the decision to commit tremendous resources to an atomic program was not one
that Stalin made quickly. It was not until the Americans became an atomic power that the
costs and risks seemed worth while to Stalin.26 Once the atomic program began
however, Stalin defined it as a “patriotic deed,” and elevated the role of science and
scientists in the Soviet Union to the high stature that the scientific community enjoyed
for decades." It was this elevation of science in Soviet society that captured the attention
of many Americans in the fall o f 1957 after the Soviets beat the Americans to space with
the launching of Sputnik I.
Regardless of whether the Soviets had or did not have the atomic bomb, Stalin
was not eager to engage in a war with the United States immediately. But Stalin firmly
believed that war would occur eventually. As Zubok explained, “For Stalin, the peace
after World War II was merely a transition period before the start o f another war.
However, he wanted to delay this war until the USSR had built up its strength.”28 Atomic
weapons did not deter Stalin. It may have made the prospect of this future war horrifying,
but atomic weapons did not negate the chances o f a future war. Since it was inevitable
that the peace was only an interim between wars, Stalin’s security policy was based on
preparedness for war at all times.29 Stalin’s security strategy was also based on post-war
plans drawn up in January 1944 by Ivan Maisky, commissioned to look at post-war
reparations. He wrote that “our specific goal” was to create a post-war world that assured
Soviet security in Europe and Asia “for a durable term” so that the Soviet Union might
26 Ibid., 43,45.
27 Ibid., 48.
28 Ibid., 60-61.
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tcbecome so powerful that it would not have to worry about any hostile strategy in Europe
and Asia,” and so that Europe might “become socialist, thereby excluding the very
possibility of generating war in this part of the world.”30 Zubok pointed out that Maisky’s
report reflected the primary goal of Stalin for dominance in Eurasia. Maneuvering
through the end o f the war in ways to achieve this dominance, the Soviet Union appeared
ready to carry out Maisky’s recommendations. This was not lost on one American
serving in Moscow.

Defining Containment I: Kennan
After studying at Princeton, George Kennan chose a career in the Foreign Service.
His fluency in the Russian language and knowledge of Russion literature, culture, and
history, coupled with his previous foreign service assignments in Eastern Europe, made
his assignment as counselor to the American embassy in Moscow from 19xx to 19xx
nearly inevitable. While serving in Russia, Kennan developed a loathing for Bolsheviks,
Marxism, and Communism. Fearing the susceptibility of Europe to Communism if
Germany did not remain strong, Kennan opposed the Allied strategy of Nazi Germany’s
unconditional surrender. Believing Germany was the key to a balance of power in
Europe, checking the Communists, Kennan saw the destruction of Germany as an
opening for Soviet expansion. By the summer of 1944, after the Allies had opened up a
second front and were racing the Soviets towards Berlin, Kennan expressed this concern
when he said that the “jealous eye o f the Kremlin can distinguish, in the end, only vassals
and enemies; and the neighbors o f Russia, if they do not wish to be one, must reconcile
29 Ibid., 40.
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themselves to being the other.”31 To Kennan, the Soviets desired a sphere of influence,
and, without Germany to challenge them, they would proceed to realize that goal. In fact,
Soviet plans for the postwar developed during the war agreed with Kennan’s analysis.
The Soviets saw no threat to their power in Europe or Asia. The United States was not a
threat either, as it was assumed America would retreat back into its traditional
isolationist policy.32 Kennan continued to emphasize the need for a strong Europe,
particularly a strong Germany, in the post-war years.3j
Needing to reevaluate its own policy, the State Department requested that Kennan
submit an evaluation o f recent Soviet policy. On February 22,1946 Kennan sent an 18
page, 8,000 word “Long Telegram” to the State Department. Its timing was perfect. As
Kennan himself said, had it been sent six months earlier it would have received “raised
eyebrows and lips pursed in disapproval. Six months later, it would probably have
sounded redundant.”34 What it sounded like to Truman, according to Gaddis, was
“precisely the intellectual justification needed for [a] reorientation of policy” in light of
recent events.35 Communist-led regimes had taken hold by early 1946 across Eastern
Europe despite Stalin’s promise at Yalta to hold free elections. The Soviets also seemed
to be probing in Greece, Turkey, Iran, China and Korea. In addition to Soviet expansion,
Stalin proclaimed on February 9,1946 that cooperation between the West and the Soviet
Union was impossible; a week later, twenty-two Soviet spies involved with the

30 Ibid., 41.
31 Quoted in Walter Hbcon, George Kerman: Cold War Iconoclast, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1989), 22.
32 Zubok, “Stalin and the Nuclear Age,” 41.
33 See Task Force A conclusions in Chapter Two.
34 Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins o f the Cold War, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1972), 304.
35 Ibid.
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Manhattan Project were arrested in Canada. Truman responded to these events by
confiding to Admiral Leahy on February 20 that he was unhappy with the existing policy
of appeasing the Russians and was determined to assume a stronger position at once/6
Furthermore, Senator Arthur Vandenberg and Secretary of State James Bymes indicated
the need for a more aggressive foreign policy the following week. Even Winston
Churchill expressed grave concern over current policy, warning a group of Americans in
a March 5 speech of an “iron curtain” descending upon Eastern Europe. By mid March
most Americans did not trust the Communists and believed U.S. policy towards Russia
was “too soft.”:>7 Kennan’s policy of containment was the tougher policy the State
department needed.
“At [the] bottom o f Kremlin’s neurotic view o f world affairs,” Kennan wrote, “is
traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity....And [Russian leaders] have
learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival
power, never in compacts and compromises with it.”38 In addition, Kennan explained that
negotiation with the Soviets was impossible because Stalin exploited capitalistic themes
to justify his oppression at home. A truce with the West would undermine his totalitarian
rule. The Soviets also sought to expand wherever they found weakness. If, for example, a
Persian government became “friendly” towards the Soviet Union, Moscow might ask for
a Russian port on the Persian Gulf. Colonial areas were also susceptible to Communist
schemes of weakening the colonial power to create “a vacuum which will favor

36 Ibid.
37 “A February poll showed that only one third o f Americans now trusted the Communists, and 60 percent in
a March poll thought U.S. policy toward Russia “too soft.” McDougall, Promised Land, 161.
38 Incoming Telegram to Secretary o f State from George Kennan, 2/22/46, NA, RG 59, Records o f the
Policy Planning Staff 1947-63, PPS Members Chronological File, Box 48, “George Kennan Speeches,” 5-6.
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conmnmist-Soviet penetration.”49 But, Kennan assured the American policy makers, the
Soviet Union was inherently weak and could be checked with American mobilization.
They would back down in the face of force. But since the Soviets were not looking for a
military confrontation with the West immediately, they sought to undermine Western
power covertly, through efforts to “disrupt national self-confidence, to hamstring national
defense, to increase social and industrial unrest, [and] to stimulate all forms of
disunity.”40 Certainly the Soviets, Kennan wrote, sought to disrupt the United States in
that way and concluded there could be no permanent modus vivendi with the Soviets.
They worked without fixed plans, took no unnecessary risks, and were impervious to
logic of reason. They were, however, “highly sensitive to logic of force.”41 If the West
were to confront the Soviets with “strong resistance” at any point, Kennan believed the
Soviets would back down. They could be contained because they were still the weaker
force. Furthermore, they could be contained through an “intelligent and really
constructive program.”42 That is, through economic and political initiatives that
undermined Soviet propaganda. Since the Soviets were weak and did not seek immediate
confrontation with the United States, Kennan concluded the Soviets were not a direct
military threat to American security. It was important, therefore, not to overspend on a
military build-up which would jeopardize the “health and vigor of our own society.”
Much depended, said Kennan, on our “courageous and incisive measure to solve internal
problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, moral and

39 Ibid.,
40 Ibid.,
41 Ibid.,
42 Ibid.,
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community spirit.” To achieve this at home would be “a diplomatic victory over Moscow
worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiques.”4'’
Kennan’s telegram was widely read and praised throughout the national security
policy circles. Its conclusions that Russia could not be negotiated with were startling and
flew in the face of American policy to organize the postwar world in their vision
established in the various wartime conferences.44 Yet, while it was startling, Kennan’s
policy was appealing because it explained the actions of Stalin while placing the blame
for the Cold War squarely on the Soviet Union. In the words of historian Melvyn Leffler,
Kennan’s analysis “provided a unifying theme to U.S. foreign policy,” a theme which
identified the Kremlin as the enemy which could not be negotiated with and therefore
had to be contained.45
Truman made containment an official policy through his Truman Doctrine. After
the British announced their inability to support any longer Greece or Turkey, two
countries which faced Communist pressure, Truman took heed and addressed Congress
on March 12,1947. Truman divided the world into two ways of life. One way was “based
upon the will o f the majority” and guaranteed freedoms, the other way was based “upon
the will o f a minority forcibly imposed upon the majority,” relying on terror and
oppression.46 He told his audience that it was up to the United States to support those
people who were free but fighting against the pressures of the second way of life, like
those in Greece and Turkey. One “only had to glance at a map,” Truman explained, to
43 Ibid., 17.
44 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Knew, 193-194.
45 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance o f Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold
War, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 108.
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see the strategic importance of those countries to the stability of the Middle East. He
suggested that the United States send economic aid and civilian and military personnel to
ward off the Communist advances and secure freedom in Greece and Turkey. To fail in
this leadership role, Truman warned, would “endanger the peace of the world” and “the
welfare of this Nation.”47 The Truman Doctrine was a success in that it mobilized
Americans in general and Congress in particular to support a policy of economic and
material aid to contain Soviet aggression on a global scale. In the same spirit of
containment through economic aid, the Marshall Plan was implemented in 1948, aiding
Western European recovery so that it would be less vulnerable to Communist overtures.
The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan both reflected the essence of
Kennan’s definition of containment, a policy based not on militarization, but on
psychological, economic, and diplomatic strategies. Kennan’s policy was intended to
instill a sense o f self-confidence in countries threatened by the Soviets and to instill that
same self-confidence in the United States. It was also based on what Gaddis called “the
ability of national leaders to make and maintain rational distinctions between vital and
peripheral interests, adversary capabilities and intentions, negotiations and appeasement,
flexibility and direction.”48 For the most part, Truman exhibited that rational ability to
balance economic solvency at home with the needs of national security.49 However, as
world events quickly deteriorated in 1949, pressure to expand the definition of

46 Harry Truman, “The Truman Doctrine, 1947,” in Thomas Patterson, Major Problems in American
Foreign Relations, Vol. H, 4th ed., (Boston: DC Heath, 1995), 259-261.
47 Ibid.
48 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f Postwar American National
Security Policy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 88.
49 For an excellent account o f how Truman’s budgets reflected this rational ability and his desire to keep
defense spending down see Michael Hogan, A Cross o f Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins o f the
National Security State, 1945-1954, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 289-293.
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containment to include militarization increased from within the State Department.
American policy was about to take an even more aggressive turn.

Defining Containm ent EE: Nitze
On January 31, 1950, Truman directed the secretaries of State and Defense “to
undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these
objectives on our strategic plans, in light o f the probable fission bomb capability and
possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union.”30 Masterminded by Paul
Nitze, a trained economist and young blood in the State Department, the resulting NSC68 was a departure from Kennan’s conception of containment.31 Written to shock the
Truman administration into dismantling the $13.5 billion defense spending ceiling and to
militarize Kennan’s policy of containment, Nitze’s NSC-68 succeeded with a little help
from his friends and the Soviets.
By late 1949, Truman faced severe pressure from more militant-minded officials
to increase defense spending. Cautious about overspending on defense at the expense of
domestic programs, Truman fought over the budget each year.52 However, events in 1949
strengthened the arguments for increased military spending. The Communist victory in
China and the Soviet detonation o f an atomic bomb indicated to many that the Americans
were losing ground in the Cold War. Senator Stuart Symington, for example, warned that

50 The President to the Secretary o f State, January 31, 1950, FRUS, 1950, 1:141-142.
51 For further information on Nitze, see Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center o f Decision,
(New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989); Strobe Talbott, The Master o f the Game: Paul Nitze and the
Nuclear Peace, (New York: Knopf 1988); David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the
Cold War, (New York: HarperCollins, 1990).
32 For who and why Congressmen and the press opposed Truman’s budget cuts see Hogan, Cross o f Iron,
285-291.
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the Soviets’ atomic capability threatened ;ithe survival of the United States” and
Secretary o f State Dean Acheson complained that “During the last six to nine months
there had been a trend against us which, if allowed to continue, would lead to a
considerable deterioration in our position.”33 Acheson was at odds with Truman over the
direction American policy should take. Acheson argued that an even tougher line had to
be taken against the Soviets, which included increased military preparation. By the end of
1949 Kennan, who was head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, disagreed
strongly with Acheson’s policy of strength over diplomacy. Acheson accused Kennan of
having lost his appetite for standing up to the Soviets.34 Frustrated, Kennan decided to
resign from the Policy Planning Staff. In his final memo to Acheson, he reiterated that
containment could be successful as a political policy and pleaded not to alter
containment into a military policy.33 Acheson ignored Kennan’s pleas and replaced him
with Paul Nitze, a man who passionately shared Acheson’s views. Acheson called Nitze
“a joy to work with because o f his clear, incisive mind,” and the two were in sync as soon
as Nitze entered the State Department.36
As historian Michael Hogan said, “Every bone in Nitze’s body ached with
suspicion o f the Soviet Union.”37 Despite the fact he had only been involved in national
security matters since early 1949, Nitze was considered one o f the leading military
specialists in the State Department. He had never been to the Soviet Union, nor had he
any formal training in Soviet affairs like his predecessor, but he had worked in
53 Symington and Acheson quoted in Hogan,/} Cross o f Iron, 292.
54 LeFeber, American Age, 504-505.
55 Draft memorandum by Kennan to Acheson, 2/17/50. FRUS, 1950, 1:160-167.
56 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department, (New York: Norton, 1969),
373.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43
Washington since 1940 and observed the destruction o f the atomic age first-hand,
surveying the rubble o f Hiroshima and Nagasaki as a member of the U.S. Strategic
Bombing team surveying A-bomb damage.58 Yet he deeply believed that the Soviets
would stop at nothing to achieve world domination. Stalin was simply another Hitler. In
his own words, Nitze believed the chance of war with the Soviets was great and that '“the
antipathy of slavery to freedom explains the iron curtain, the isolation, the autarchy o f the
society whose end is absolute power.”59 It did not matter to Nitze that the CIA concluded
that predicting Soviet intentions with certainty was impossible or that Soviet experts
George Kennan and Charles Bohlen believed the Soviets were not seeking immediate
war with the West.60 For Nitze, and Acheson, the need to gain the upper hand again
against the Soviets was never greater. In February alone, Alger Hiss and Klaus Fuchs had
been accused o f as Soviet spies; Mao Tse-tung, the communist leader o f China, had
signed a treaty with the Soviets; and Republican Senator Joseph McCarthy accused the
State Department of being riddled with communists. Acheson and Nitze were keenly
aware that a change in policy was needed and they were ready to put pressure on Truman.
The drafting o f what became NSC-68 was a long tedious process, something
Acheson called “a difficult pregnancy” in his memoirs.61 Headed by Nitze, the small
57 Hogan, A Cross o f Iron, 294.
58 Nitze came to Washington as an aide to the Wall Street businessman, James Forrestal, as part o f six
special administrative assistants to Franklin Roosevelt who were assembled in an attempt to rebuild FDR’s
relations with the business community. Since then, Nitze held various jobs in Washington, helping to write
the Selective service Act o f 1940, helping Nelson Rockefeller in the Office o f the Coordinator o f InterAmerican Affairs, and helping to write the final report on the Pacific W ar for the U.S. Strategic Bombing
Team. After the war, Nitze accepted an offer from Will Clayton to join the State Department as deputy
director o f the Office o f International trade Policy. See Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 3-81; Callahan,
Dangerous Capabilities, 94-98.
59 Record o f Eighth Meeting o f PPS, 2/2/50, FRUS, 1950, 1:142-143.; A Report to the President Pursuant
to the President’s Directive o f January 31, 1950, FRUS, 1950, 1:240.
60 Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, 99, 137.
61 Acheson, Present at the Creation, 373.
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committee organized to review basic national security consisted of like-minded people
who rejected the defense spending ceilings placed by Truman.62 Drafts o f the paper
emphasized the views Nitze held o f the Soviet Union as aggressive, oppressive and
determined to achieve world domination. Whereas Kennan had stressed that military
preparedness had to be only sufficient enough to check the Communists at the key
industrial centers to maintain the balance of power, Nitze argued that American
preparedness levels had to be high enough to check the Communists at all points along
the perimeter. In other words, Kennan saw containment only applying to the five
industrial regions of the world - the United States, Great Britain, the Rhine valley, the
Soviet Union, and Japan. Nitze enlarged that geographical limitation to include any
region which faced Communist threats. Nitze also warned that the Soviets had not sought
war with the West because they had no assurances of winning. Nitze estimated that by
mid-1954, what he labeled the date of maximum danger, a Soviet arsenal of at least 200
atomic bombs would exist, enough to devastate the United States. Adding to the danger
was the stark fact the Soviets were devoting a greater percentage o f their economy to
defense spending. Whereas the United States spent 6.5 percent of its GNP on the
military, the Soviet Union was spending 13.8 percent of its GNP. And where the United
States spent 13.6 percent of its GNP on defense related investments, the Soviets allocated
25.4 percent for the same purpose. The American economy was capable o f spending
more, insisted Nitze. By taking a page from World War EL, Nitze reminded his audience
that when operated at levels of full efficiency, the American economy “can provide
enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption.” If the people were
62 Hogan, A Cross o f Iron, 295.
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educated about the threat the Soviets posed to their freedom and democracy they would
embrace any sacrifices necessary. Finally, NSC-68 advocated the need for greater atomic
capabilities and a stronger conventional force to counter the current inadequacies o f the
military. Instead of demobilizing, the nation had to break tradition and maintain a
powerful armed force despite the lack of a hot war. In short, the message o f Nitze’s paper
was one of panic and build-up. Kennan had stressed patience and emphasized the
American upper-hand, Nitze stressed action and a time of maximum danger6j While
Acheson mostly approved o f the paper, drafts were circulated for comment.
Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, former director of the Manhattan Project and current
Chairman of the General Advisory Committee of the United States Atomic Energy
Commission, was the first outside consultant asked to review a draft of NSC-68.
Oppenheimer had mixed reviews. He was sympathetic to the dangers o f the Cold War but
critical of both the role atomic weapons played and the portrayal of the Soviet-American
conflict as black and white. Oppenheimer asked if the paper might “present a
recognizable picture to the average citizen of the Soviet Union,” so that the comparison
was not “one between jet black and pure white.” Nitze did not think that was the
impression given, but over the years Nitze would hear that criticism again and again.64
Dr. James Conant, President o f Harvard University and also a member of the General
Advisory Committee, was the next outside consultant to review the paper. Conant was
more critical than Oppenheimer of many sections. In sentiments similar to those that
Eisenhower would express as President, Conant wondered if the consequences of

63 A Report to the NSC, NSC 68, 4/14/50, FRUS, 1950, 1:234-292.
64 Record o f the Meeting o f the State-Defense Policy Review Group, Monday, February, 27, 1950, FRUS,
1950, 1:168-175.
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winning World War in might be the loss of American freedom. He suggested that a
reevaluation of the risks o f defending Europe be made, as well as the risks of a policy of
“restoring freedom” to the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union itself. Conant
believed that rather than a policy o f rollback, the United States ought to try to live “with
the Soviet Union on tolerable terms,” while avoiding war.63 Although Oppenheimer and
Conant were the only two outside consultants who had criticism o f the drafts, it is, as
historian David Callahan remarked, “Perhaps as significant as who the review group
consulted [was] who they ignored.”66 Neither George Kennan nor Charles Bohlen,
America’s two leading experts on the Soviet Union, were asked their opinion, and the
two certainly had opinions.
Kennan and Bohlen were both familiar with what Nitze was writing. In fact,
George Kennan admitted that one o f the reasons he left the Policy Planning Staff at the
end o f 1949 was his disagreement with Paul Nitze and the assumptions of NSC-68.67
Bohlen thought Nitze’s assessments of Soviet intentions were way off the mark, and he
argued that the internal situation in the Soviet Union was the single most important factor
in Soviet foreign policy and NSC-68 ignored that reality.68 The policy also seemed to
reject Kennan’s assertion that the Soviet Union was a cautious power which was not
actively seeking confrontation with the United States. But Bohlen and Kennan’s views
went unheeded and the final draft was presented to Truman on April 7,1950.

65 Record o f the Meeting o f the State-Defense Policy Review Group, Thursday, March 2, 1950, FRUS,
1950, 1: 176-177.
66 David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, 109.
67 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” Princeton University Mudd Library, Woodrow Wilson
School, Box 93, folder 10, 18.
68 David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, 110, 137.
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President Truman was initially skeptical of the report, and, since the House was
currently in the middle o f tearing up Truman’s “skimpy” defense budget for FY51, he
asked a subcommittee o f the NSC to review the report from a budgetary point of view.
Truman was not alone as concerns rang through the State Department that NSC-68
required a “full time mobilization of the economy,” and “a gigantic armament race.”69
The subcommittee moved slowly against its enormous task of estimating the cost of
implementation o f the report, and Truman was in no rush. Still at an impasse, Nitze and
Acheson finally saw NSC-68 implemented with the Soviet-backed North Korean
invasion o f South Korea on June 25,1950. The aggressive nature o f the Soviet threat
seemed to be proved. It was the kind of event that proved that the authors of NSC-68
were correct in their assessment that the United States needed a new defense policy, and
Truman finally approved their report in September. The final version of NSC-68
downplayed much of the cold war rhetoric that had dominated earlier drafts and instead
concentrated on the question o f how much money would be appropriated to what
programs. Nitze did not see all of his recommendations approved, but spending did
increase for civil defense, psychological warfare, stockpiling o f atomic weapons,
assistance to NATO countries, combating domestic communist subversion, and military
personnel.70
Nitze and Acheson had succeeded in writing a shocking report in order to
implement their vision o f American defense. With the Korean war raging on for the
remainder o f his term, Truman was unable to keep military spending in check. By the
1952 election, the American people were immersed in a Cold War defending the
69 Quoted in Hogan, A Cross o f Iron, 302.
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American way o f life against the dangers of Communism and spending whatever it cost.
It seemed that defeating the Soviets superseded more traditional concerns over inflation,
deficits, and government controls. In this transformation, a coherent policy got lost.
Truman was successful in waging the Cold War between 1946 and 1950 following
Kennan’s policy through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Berlin airlift, the
creation of NATO, and rebuilding Germany and Japan. After the Korean war broke out
and NSC-68 took hold by 1950, Truman’s policy became, in the words o f historians
Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, “much more confused and much less coherent.”71
It became impossible to balance the objectives of NSC-68 with budgetary realities.
Europe was secure, but NSC-68 had expanded American commitment globally and
places like Iran, Indochina, Guatemala, and Egypt looked vulnerable. Eisenhower, an
active participant in the fight against the Soviets during the Truman administration, saw
the positive legacy o f containment and wished to extract that from the muddled
confusion that plagued the last year of the Truman administration.72 As Bowie and
Immerman explained, Eisenhower’s task as president was to “clear away the confusion,
in order to develop a coherent strategy to maintain a secure peace on a basis sustainable

70 A Report to the NSC, NSC 68,4/14/50, FRUS, 1950, 1:234-292.
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“retired” (as a five-star general he was on active duty for life by law) in February 1948. That June he became
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by the United States and its allies for the long haul.”73 It was up to the new president to
redirect American policy so that defense needs did not jeopardize the “health and vigor
of our own society” that Kennan spoke o f in 1946.

The “Long Haul”
Long before Eisenhower entered office, he held major reservations about the
Truman defense policy, fearing that the high costs would place an unbearable burden on
the nation’s fiscal health. Eisenhower wrote after the election that a defense policy must
be sustainable over the long haul, something he did not see Truman’s policy achieving.74
Eisenhower believed that the costs of a defense policy had to be weighed against the
strain it would put on the economy. High deficits would stifle growth and cause inflation.
Not naive to the dangers the Soviet Union represented, Eisenhower nevertheless wanted
to achieve a balance between a strong military able to meet the Soviet threat and a sound
economy. 75 His ‘Great Equation’ required as much.
Eisenhower inherited a situation which made that balance difficult. Truman’s
1952 budget saw a $4 billion deficit, and the estimates for FY53 and FY54 projected
deficits of $5.9 billion and $9.9 billion respectively. It was projected that an estimated
$81 billion of authorizations to spend government funds had to be raised from future
revenues, and most of the programs had already been started and could not be easily
readjusted- In addition, tax revenue estimates by the Truman administration appeared
high and tax revenue was expected to fall by about $2.1 billion in FY54 and $5.9 billion

73 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 40.
74 Samuel Wells, Jr. “The Origins o f Massive Retaliation,” Political Science Quarterly, 96(1981), 40-41.
75 Robert Ferrell,ed., The Eisenhower Diaries, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1981), 209-13.
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in FY55. In short, without any reductions in expenditures by the Eisenhower
administration, deficits over the next four years could be as high as $37 billion, making
any tax reductions impossible.76 Deficits that high were unacceptable to Eisenhower and
he sought to reduce the deficit problem immediately.
Eisenhower believed he could achieve this in part through defense cuts that
targeted waste and duplication. In talking to his speech writers during the campaign,
Eisenhower told them, “I know better than any of you fellows about waste in the
Pentagon and about how much fat there is to be cut.”77 Cutting fat was a key part of his
presidency. For example, while campaigning, he promised to turn in the Presidential
yacht, Williamsburg, which he thought was an unnecessary luxury. Explaining to a friend
a few months after the election, he felt that “the very word ‘yacht1 created a symbol of
luxury in the public mind that would tend to defeat some of the purposes I was trying to
accomplish.”78 The Navy did not wish to relinquish any possessions but, despite its
protest, the Williamsburg was decommissioned shortly after he assumed office.79 For the
same reason o f committing to “an Administration of economy,” Eisenhower gave up the
Presidential quarters in Key West and “kept only the little camp in the Catoctins,”
renaming it from “Shangri-La” to “Camp David,” because the former name was “just a
little fancy for a Kansas farm boy.”80 Giving up a yacht and presidential retreat was a

76 Notes on the Fiscal Problem and Tax Program prepared by Dodge, 5/20/53, EL, WHO OSS, L. Arthur
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(New York, 1975), 28.
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start, but the real lard was in the Defense budget. However, before slashing defense,
Eisenhower needed to establish the framework on which to build what he promised in the
campaign: a Cold War strategy which was “unified and coherent.”81
President-elect Eisenhower went to task immediately after the election. On his
return trip from Korea in December, Eisenhower had his close advisors meet with him
aboard the CJSS Helena to discuss the budget, first State o f the Union address, and
national defense. John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower’s nominee to be Secretary of State, led
the discussion on national defense, assessing the Soviet threat as one which would
“extend our resources and our patience and divide us internally by mounting a series o f
local actions around the world at times and places of their choosing.”82 Foreshadowing
his Massive Retaliation doctrine, Dulles believed that the appropriate response was for
the U.S. to “seize the initiative” and “beat him [the Soviets] at his own game.”83 Whether
Eisenhower was ready to accept the risks involved with such action was not the issue at
this series o f meetings. Rather, Eisenhower immensely enjoyed the dialogue and debate
the Helena trip inspired among his advisors. Remarking that he had the “most
satisfactory conference o f his life” on board the Helena, Eisenhower revealed that the
meetings went as he had planned.84 Eisenhower designed the trip to introduce his staff to
each other so that they might feel comfortable in free exchanges and debates and learn to
work as a team. As historians Bowie and Immerman explained, Eisenhower believed that

81 Letter Cutler to Eisenhower, 12/27/52, EL, AWF, Administrative Series, Box 10, “Cutler, General Robert
1952-53 (5).”
82 Summary o f J.FD . remarks at meeting with Eisenhower, et. al., 12/11/52, John Foster Dules Papers,
Princeton, Mudd Library, Subject Series, “S.S. Helena Notes,” quoted in Bowie and Immerman, Waging
Peace, 84.
83 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 84.
84 Cabinet Minutes, 2/25/53, EL, WHO OSS, Cabinet Series, Box 1, “C-2 (2) February 25 and March 6
1953.”

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

52
“only if he was exposed to vigorously articulated competing diagnoses and prescriptions,
and only if he received candid information and advice, could he make the sound and
informed decisions on which a consistent and coherent national strategy depended.”83
Eisenhower also saw the Helena retreat as a way to have his advisors fully understand
and back the decisions being made so that he could “efficiently mobilize and orchestrate
the resources necessary to implement the decisions over an extended period o f time.”86
The Helena trip allowed Eisenhower to set the stage for a reevaluation of national
security policy with the enthusiastic support of his staff.
Upon his return, Eisenhower drafted a memorandum for discussion with the
Senate leaders on December 30 in which he expressed the administration’s first objective
to be a balanced budget. To cut waste, reorganizing the Defense Department also had to
be a priority. Running the Pentagon like a business, to avoid costly duplications and to
achieve maximum efficiency, made sense to Eisenhower and certainly explains his
appointment o f Charles Wilson, president of General Motors, as Secretary o f Defense.87
However, reorganization alone would not produce the defense cuts that Eisenhower
desired. A major revision in strategy was also needed. As Defense Secretary Wilson
stated in a February 24,1953 meeting of the NSC, either a major overhaul in the “basic
objectives” of the nation’s national security policy or a slower implementation of the
Truman budget was needed as there was “no possibility” for the S5 billion cut that
Secretary o f the Treasury George Humphrey insisted had to be made in order to balance
the budget. Eisenhower replied to the secretaries’ remarks that talking in generalities was
85 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 85.
86 Ibid.
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irrelevant as “the decisions could be made only when the Council had the facts before it
and could see precisely what was involved.”88 The next day the NSC met again and
Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, explained
in his review o f basic national security policy that “if major reductions in the budget were
to be made they would have to be made in the large programs o f the Department of
Defense and the Mutual Security Administration.” The President agreed, but wanted a
further breakdown on where duplication occurred and whether there were avoidable
costs. He was clearly disturbed by the inability o f the Bureau of the Budget and the
Pentagon to reach similar projections in the budget. Without cooperation between the
two offices, Eisenhower complained, the NSC would be paralyzed. He insisted that “his
Administration had got to get the right answer on these problems.”89 He was not about to
slash the budget or military preparedness arbitrarily, putting American national security
at risk. To get the answers, Eisenhower proposed to bring together a panel of experts of
“distinguished Americans” to review basic national security policies and report their
findings to the NSC.90
The Council agreed to establish a seven man ad hoc committee of civilian
consultants to the National Security Council to “study and advise the Council on basic
national security policies and programs in relation to their costs.” Establishing this sort of
committee was something Eisenhower had promised to do during his campaign. In a
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September 1952 speech, Eisenhower proposed “at the earliest possible date next
year... [the creation of] a commission o f the most capable civilians in our land to restudy
the operations of our Department of Defense” in regards to the “most economical way to
fill the demonstrated needs of the nation.”91 After being in office for only one month,
Eisenhower had his committee.
Chairing the group was a Texas Democrat and attorney, Dillon Anderson.
Anderson could hardly refuse to serve when Eisenhower told him that the committee,
which was “being sought on a matter o f national urgency,” would “be o f great help to me
and to the Council in dealing with a very serious and basic national issue.”92 Choosing
Anderson to chair the group allowed Eisenhower to point to the group as a bipartisan
committee, proving the President’s willingness to hear all sides. The other members
represented a broad range o f professionals and academics, creating a diverse, wellrespected group. Business, finance, education, science, and even labor were all
represented.93
Senator Joseph McCarthy, who was in his third year of hunting for suspected
communists in the government, seized upon a Washington Post report announcing the
establishment o f this advisory council in March. The paper reported that a “group of
business, labor, and educational leaders” had been named as consultants to the NSC to
91 Eisenhower address in Baltimore, Maryland, 9/25/52, EL, AWF, Speech Series, “Sept 15, 1952-Sept. 25,
1952,” quoted in Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 101.
92 Letter Eisenhower to Anderson, 2/27/53, EL, AWF, Administrative Series, Box 10, “Cutler, General
Robert, 1952-53 (5).”
93 James Black, president o f Pacific Gas and Electric, Eugene Holman, president o f Standard Oil o f New
Jersey represented business and finance. Charles Thomas, president o f Monsanto Chemical Company,
represented the scientific community as a member o f the Science Advisory Committee. David Robertson,
president o f the Brotherhood o f Railroad Firemen and Enginemen, represented labor. John Cowles, a
Midwestern newspaper publisher, and Deane Malott, president o f Cornell University, rounded out the
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“provide more civilian direction of the nation’s defense program to end stop and start
military planning.”94 It went on to say that the group was to be briefed by “key
government agencies” including the CIA and was likely to have “intimate association
with the Administration’s deepest cold war secrets.”95 As the list of consultants was
printed in the article, it did not take Senator Joseph McCarthy long to investigate the
names. Contacting the White House, an anonymous caller from McCarthy’s office
expressed grave concerns over the participation o f David B. Robertson on this civilian
advisory board since Robertson was “unfit to have access to such security information,
owing to personal weaknesses.”96 After Cutler briefed the NSC on the phone call,
Eisenhower told Cutler that what advice was solicited from consultants was the
President’s business alone. Eisenhower warned, “If Senator McCarthy proposed to take
on the National Security Council, he was taking on the President.”97 McCarthy was
notified o f the President’s position by phone, and, with the matter closed, Robertson
remained a member.
The group assembled on March I and Cutler explained that the task before them
was not so much determining the strengths or weaknesses of the Soviet military' threat,
but rather “a judgment as to American capabilities and desires as a people.”98 The
consultants then met for three weeks with various heads of departments and carefully
examined the nation’s defense posture. When Cutler called the group back to the NSC on
group. Letter Dr. Lee DuBridge to Cutler, 3/19/53, EL, WHO OSANSA, Special Assistant series, Subject
Sub series, Box 7, “ Science and Research- General (l)|March-April 1953].”
94 Seven Named as Security Council Aides, Washington Post, 3/12/53, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series,
Administrative Sub Series, Box 4, “Consultants-NSC [Feb-March 19531 (1).”
95 Ibid.
96 Memorandum ofDiscussion at the 141“ Meeting o f the NSC, 4/29/53, EL, AWF, NSC Series, Box 4
“ 141“ Meeting ofNSC, 4/28/53.”
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March 31 to give its final report, the committee had concluded that the United States had
“bitten off more than we can chew.”99 Anderson, speaking for the consultants, confirmed
what Eisenhower believed, that there was much duplication among the three services and
that excess spending would continue “until there was a clarification of the role and the
mission of the three Services.” In addition, the consultants believed that “the grave fiscal
situation” was in part due to the very general basic security objectives and that national
security policy “ought to be re-examined with the greatest care.” Specifically, the
consultants criticized the “profligate” use of military manpower, recommended the
government be more selective in research and development projects, place scientific
programs o f the Department of Defense under an Assistant Secretary, and reduce
American commitments to “shore up the whole non-Soviet world.” As Anderson
explained, the Mutual Security budget needed to be scaled downward and assistance to
other countries be based on “concrete defense implications and results,” since it was
“impossible to purchase the loyalty and friendship o f other nations.” In short, an
“immediate reappraisal o f our world commitments” needed to be made.100
Eisenhower agreed with the consultants as to the dangers a high defense budget
posed to the economy, but he was hesitant just to slash funding for developing policies
and programs. Rather, Eisenhower suggested, the Administration needed to make a move
towards balancing the budget over time instead o f making drastic cuts to balance it
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now.101 Eisenhower’s unwillingness to look only at the financial side of the problem was
reflective of his deep belief in the ‘Great Equation,’ which said that military security
could not be sacrificed for a balanced budget, or vice versa. Each side had to be brought
into balance or overall security would be lost. Debate continued throughout the meeting
as to the fine points of howto achieve the balanced budget. The end result was NSC
149/2, “Basic National Security Policies and Programs in Relation to Their Costs.”
Drafted by the Policy Planning Board three days after the meeting with the
civilian consultants, NSC 149 reflected the Civilian Consultants’ concern for a balanced
budget, but rejected their recommendations for drastic military cuts. The NSC report
began by stating, “The survival o f the free world depends on the maintenance by the
United States o f a sound, strong, economy. For the United States to continue a course of
Federal spending in excess of Federal income will weaken and eventually destroy that
economy.” 102 In response to Eisenhower’s concerns about the timing o f balancing the
budget without drastically cutting vital programs, it went on to say, “As rapidly as is
consistent with continuing our leadership in the free world, and barring an emergency,
the United States will annually balance its Federal expenditures with its Federal
income.” 103 So although Eisenhower had help from outside experts in stressing the
necessity for a strong economy, he still prudently maintained a strong military against
external threats.
By allowing a diverse group, which included Democrats, to participate as civilian
consultants, they became part of the decision-making process. If he accepted their
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conclusions, they were directly involved in the final decision. If he rejected their
conclusions, he could say he had had an open-mind to all sides, but ultimately found their
argument unpersuasive. Eisenhower was able, even if he had his mind made-up, to use
the process to paint a picture of an open-minded leader who wanted to build a team
consensus through educated debates within the NSC. So even though Eisenhower had a
clear vision as to how he wished to run the country, his decision-making process allowed
him to operate not as a dictator or closed-minded military officer, but as the team captain
and democratic leader he had the reputation for being. Civilian advisors complimented
this process well.
With the approval ofNSC 149/2 on April 29, 1953, Eisenhower believed that he
had a policy covering both the external threat of the Soviet Union and the internal threat
of over spending - a side of the equation he thought Truman’s policies had not
considered.104 As C.D. Jackson said, the meeting’s conclusions reflected
“not...retrenchment or cuts, but [a] competent, positive, efficient, forward-moving
program.” 105 It reflected the ideas behind the Great Equation. There were more budget
cuts and more reviews of national security policy to be made, but with NSC 149/2,
Eisenhower had a framework to maintain the nation’s military and economic strength
while planning for the long haul.

The Chance for Peace
Joseph Stalin died on March 5, 1953, immediately prompting Eisenhower to
reevaluate the US position towards the Soviet Union. In a Cabinet meeting the next day,
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Eisenhower commented that it was striking what had not been done in preparation for
Stalin’s death by the Truman administration. Although there had been talk about what to
do if Stalin died since 1946, the president remarked the “net result of 7 years is zero.
There is no plan, there is no agreed upon position.” 106 Eisenhower decided to bring in
C.D. Jackson, his special assistant for psychological warfare, to write a speech which
Eisenhower could aim towards the Soviets.107
Jackson went right to work, seeing it as a great opportunity to create discord
inside the Soviet Union while rallying the peoples of Eastern Europe around an American
'Vision.” However, the speech, which Jackson wrote with MIT professor Walt Rostow,
mentioned a reconvening of the Council o f American, Soviet, British, and French
Ministers which had not met since 1949. The speech proposed that at such a meeting, the
Americans would be willing to discuss measures to end the Korean War, unify Germany
and end the Austrian occupation, and discuss arms control.108 Eisenhower and Dulles had
major reservations towards these overtures. An aggressive initiative before the corpse
was even cold, Dulles feared, would only serve to unite the Soviets. And calling for a
Council meeting without first settling on a negotiating posture with our allies would
certainly result in disaster. Eisenhower agreed with Dulles, but was still drawn to
Jackson’s assertion that Stalin’s death was a great opportunity to do something
dramatic.109 After all, the obvious way to reduce defense spending was to reduce the
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tensions o f the Cold War. Eisenhower suggested that the speech be rewritten to reflect
“the simple theme o f a higher living standard for all the world,” a theme Eisenhower
hoped would have “universal desire,” and which reflected part of his ‘Great Equation. ’110
But neither Jackson nor Rostow could produce a speech which satisfied Eisenhower.
To complicate matters, Georgi Malenkov, the newly appointed chairman of the
Soviet Council o f Ministers, used his eulogy at Stalin’s funeral as a stump for his own
peaceful overture on March 15. Malenkov, in essence, beat Eisenhower to the punch,
delivering a speech which called for the two superpowers to reach a detente. He
proclaimed that the two countries’ disputes should “be decided by peaceful means, on the
basis of mutual understanding.” 111 Eisenhower, upset that he had not given his speech
before Malenkov, realized a speech focusing on a higher standard of living was no longer
appropriate.112 He had to deliver more substance.
Eisenhower turned over the task to his speech writer Emmet Hughes. Hughes
recalled the meeting with a passionate Eisenhower in late March. Eisenhower explained
to Hughes that he wanted to tell the people of the world that money and resources ought
to be spent on butter, not guns. “The jet plane that roars over your head,” he said to
Hughes, “costs three-quarters of a million dollars. That is more money than a man...is
going to make in his lifetime. What world can afford this sort o f thing for long? We are
in an armaments race. Where will it lead us? At worst, to atomic warfare. At best, to
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robbing every people and nation on earth of the fruits of their own toil.” 113 Eisenhower
wanted Hughes to produce a speech which assumed that Malenkov was a reasonable man
with whom the US had serious differences to iron out. It seemed to Eisenhower that,
although there “was no ground to anticipate a basic change in Soviet policy toward the
Western powers,” there was ground to hope that the new Soviet leaders were realizing
that a larger share o f their nation’s resources had to be distributed to the people, raising
standards of living and squelching internal discontent. Some kind of modus vivendi might
be possible.114 Hughes went to work with the assistance o f Paul Nitze from the State
Department’s Policy Planning Staff (PPS), whom Dulles, who was not persuaded by
Eisenhower’s point of view, appointed to the task.113
Immediately the two ran into obstacles as Nitze, speaking for the PPS, objected to
nearly every section o f the speech drafted by Hughes. As Nitze complained to Dulles
about the lack o f progress being made, Dulles became convinced that no speech could be
given that would serve U.S. interests and he had objections with every draft.116
Eisenhower was furious with the State Department’s unwillingness to seize this great
opportunity for what it was: to test the new Soviet government’s intentions. At one point
Eisenhower exploded in frustration, “I don’t know what I’ve got State Department
advisors for.” 117 Aware that the substance of the speech would be continuously debated,
Eisenhower decided to oversee the writing of the final draft himself. He rejected Dulles’

113 Hughes, The Ordeal o f Power, 103-105.
114 Memorandum Discussion at the 139th Meeting ofNSC, 4/16/65, EL, AWF, NSC Series. Box 4, “139th
Meeting ofNSC, 4/8/53.”
113 Memorandum by Bonbrightto Smith, 3/18/53, FRUS 1952-54, 8:1133-34.
116 Memorandum for Hughes, 4/10/53, EL, JFD Papers, Chronological Series, Box 2, “April 1-31, 1953
(3)”

117 Emmett J. Hughes Papers, Princeton, Mudd Library, Diary entry for April 11, 1953, “Diary Notes 1953,”
quoted in Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 118.
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objections and wrote a speech that was moderate and sincere. A few days before
delivering the speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors on April 16,
Eisenhower gave the speech the title “The Chance for Peace.”
Eisenhower recorded later that the proposals he set forth in the speech “were
deliberately specific.. . . I felt it wise to put the nation’s deepest aspirations in the record,
where they could be examined and studied by all the world, including the Russians.”118
Examined it was. The speech was translated into 45 languages and broadcast throughout
the free world. Even Pravda gave the speech a six-column article on the front page and
included a complete and accurate translation of the speech.119 In the speech, Eisenhower
called for the Soviets to back their peace offering with specific deeds such as releasing
POWs held since 1945, concluding the Austrian treaty and reunification of Germany, “an
honorable armistice” in Korea, and the “full independence of the East European nations.”
The United States, in turn, would sign an arms limitation treaty and accept an
international agency under the supervision of the UN to control atomic energy.
Eisenhower went beyond specific, rather old-hat, demands. He took this opportunity to
preach to the world fiscal responsibility in regards to the Cold War:
Every gun that is made, every warship launched,
every rocket fired, signifies, in the final sense, a theft from
those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and
are not clothed. This world is not spending money alone. It
is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its
scientists, the hopes o f its children. The cost o f one modem
heavy bomber is this: a modem brick school in more than
thirty cities. It is two electrical power plants...lt is two fine,
fully equipped hospitals. We pay for a single fighter plane
with a half-million bushels of wheat. We pay for a single
118 Eisenhower, Mandate fo r Peace, 148.
119 Memorandum Discussion at 141st Meeting o f the NSC, 4/29/53, EL, AWF, NSC Series, Box 4 “ 141st
Meeting ofNSC 4/28/53 ”
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destroyer with new homes that could have housed more
than eight thousand people. This is not a way of life at all,
in any true sense. Under the cloud of threatening war, it is
humanity hanging from a cross of iron.120

Eisenhower concluded by promising to devote a percentage of savings induced from an
arms reduction treaty to a fund for world aid so that the “monuments to this new kind of
war would be these: roads and schools, hospitals and homes, food and health.” 121 The
President explained these overtures in his memoirs. Reflective of the spirituality part of
the ‘Great Equation,’ he believed that to be an effective leader of the free world, the
American people and their government “should always . . . display a spirit of conciliation
without appeasement, confidence without arrogance,” and, most important, demonstrate
a leadership “based on honesty of purpose, on calmness and inexhaustible patience in
conference.”122 In these ways he hoped to influence allies and potential enemies.
Not surprisingly, the Soviets never did bite at Eisenhower’s proposals. Certainly
much o f the speech was pure propaganda. However, as biographer Stephen Ambrose
observed, the tone was “reasonable and moderate [and] Eisenhower’s sincerity so
apparent” that the speech did outline early on in the administration central issues in
Eisenhower’s thinking.123 Although suspicious o f the Soviets, he was willing to negotiate
on certain terms. He deeply believed a continued arms race would strangle the fiscal
health, and ultimately the democratic freedoms, o f the United States.

120 Address “The Chance for Peace” Delivered Before the American Society o f Newspaper Editors, 4/16/53,

Public Papers o f the President, 1953, (US Government Printing Office, 1960), 179-188.
121 Ibid.
122 Eisenhower, Mandate fo r Change, 148.
123 Ambrose, Eisenhower, 326.
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The first three months of the new administration were indeed productive and set
the tone for the next eight years. Eisenhower reevaluated the policies outlined in NSC-68
to formulate a more balanced national security policy. He set the wheels in motion to
fight for budget restraints in military spending, a fight that would continue every year he
was in office. And Eisenhower made a grand gesture of peace towards the Soviets,
demonstrating his sincerity in working towards a world which did not have to fear
nuclear annihilation. With this framework in place, Eisenhower was ready to call upon
some of the most respected minds of the day to work out a national security plan which
reflected his strategic thinking and the ‘Great Equation.’
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CHAPTER TWO

TALK ABOUT ‘LIBERTY’ DOESN’T STOP PEOPLE FROM BECOMING
COMMUNISTS: ORGANIZING A NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

In an exchange between Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles on national
security planning on May 8, 1953, Dulles argued that it was vital that America obtain a
success somewhere in the world to stop the momentum of the Soviet Union, even if that
meant risking war. His argument, thought Eisenhower, seemed to reflect the radical
thinking of Paul Nitze and NSC-68. Eisenhower repeated his “Chance for Peace”
message to Dulles, reminding him that the Untied States ought to rely less on pure
military might and more on “improving the standards o f living in the other countries as
the way to gain true indigenous strength.” When people saw “freedom and communism
in their true lights,” Eisenhower went on, the successes would come in Eastern Europe
and the rest o f the world. Dulles quipped back that “talk about ‘liberty’ doesn’t stop
people from becoming communists,” but a persistent Eisenhower informed Dulles that
“It’s men’s minds and hearts that must be won.”1
While campaigning in the fall of 1952, Eisenhower explained that “as a nation
everything we say, everything we do...will have its impact in other lands; it will affect the

1Memo on Solarium Project, 5/8/53, EL, WHO NSCS, Executive Secretary Subject File, Box 15, “Project
Solarium (3),” 1-3.
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minds o f men and women there.”2 The May exchange reflected the thinking of his ‘Great
Equation’ - not only were military preparedness and a balanced budget necessary to
security, so was a sense of spirituality and moral leadership. This was similar to George
Kennan’s original containment policy. Kennan too believed that the preservation o f
liberty and the spread o f ideas, not simply a military build-up, would thwart
communism.3 However, Dulles argued for a stronger military message to the Soviet
Union under the guise o f Eisenhower’s rollback campaign pledge. Needing to reconcile
these different points o f view to keep his campaign promise o f adopting a “unified and
coherent” Cold War strategy, Eisenhower suggested a debate between a variety of
strategic plans, carefully thought out in terms o f risk and costs by a handful of
distinguished outside consultants. He carefully oversaw the membership selection for the
subsequent Solarium Exercise and was able to predetermine an outcome he desired. The
end result was a basic national security policy in NSC 162/2 that defined his strategic
thinking.

Reorganizing the NSC
“One of my first responsibilities,” recalled Eisenhower, “was to organize the
White House for efficiency.”4 Calling the Truman NSC nothing more than a “shadow
agency,” Eisenhower immediately focused attention on creating a more dynamic and

2 Letter Cutler to Eisenhower, 12/27/52, EL, AWF, Administrative Series, Box 10, “Cutler, General Robert
1952-53 (5).”
3 Draft memorandum by Kennan to Secretary o f State Acheson, 2/17/50, FRUS, 1950, 1:160-161.
4 Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate fo r Change, 1953-1956. (New York: Double Day and Co., 1963), 114.
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efficient NSC.3 To cany out the reorganization, Eisenhower turned to his Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs, General Robert Cutler.
Cutler was a good friend o f Eisenhower and had a keen mind and sharp wit. One
friend described Cutler as “a raconteur, par excellence, of risque stories, which he does
best with a scotch and soda in hand.”6 An intellectual with a flair for writing, Cutler
graduated cum laude from Harvard in 1916 and Harvard Law in 1922 and was the class
poet of the undergraduate class. By the time he was 23, he had published two novels
about love. As he said once, “What else would a boy of twenty write about?”7
A veteran o f both World Wars, Cutler served as a Special Assistant to Secretary
o f War Stimson and received the Distinguished Service Medal and the Legion o f Merit
during WWH. During the Truman Administration he served as a deputy director o f the
Psychological Strategy Board on the NSC. In 1952, he pressed Eisenhower to run for
president and Eisenhower asked him to act as his personal assistant on NSC affairs
during the campaign and write some o f his speeches. After winning the election,
Eisenhower asked the Boston lawyer to serve in the administration, helping him to
reorganize the NSC. Cutler was reluctant to take the job, deeming his “talents unworthy
o f his position.”8 Cutler was being modest. His talents were well suited for the position,
beginning with his exceptional organizational skills.9 As president of the Old Colony
Company o f Boston, he was an experienced leader and knew how to run an efficient

5 Anna Kasten Nelson, “The ‘Top o f Policy Hill’: President Eisenhower and the National Security Council,”

Diplomatic History, 7 (Fall 1983), 308.
6 Letter to Admiral Gallery, 1/28/58, EL, Evan Aurand Papers, Box 3, “Cutler, Robert [limited war].”
7 Letter Cutler to Eisenhower, 12/27/52, EL, AWF, Administrative Series, Box 10, “Cutler, General Robert
1952-53 (5),” 3; Robert Cutler, Ho Time For Rest, (Nev.' York; Little Brown, 1965), 67.
8 Letter Cutler to Eisenhower, 12/27/52, EL, AWF, Administrative Series, Box 10, “Cutler, General Robert
1952-53 (5),” 1.
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team. He had experience in Washington with the Truman NSC and he spent months
campaigning with Eisenhower, learning Eisenhower’s views on national security. In
short, Cutler was exactly what Eisenhower was looking for.
Once Eisenhower took office, Cutler went to work on reevaluating the structure
and function o f the NSC. Since its formation in 1947, suggestions had been made to
improve the function of the NSC, and Eisenhower strongly believed it could be further
improved.10 Eisenhower envisioned a forum in which ideas could be discussed freely by
both statutory and invited members, and then developed into an organized policy paper
for Council consideration.11 It was vital, in Eisenhower’s mind, to have an efficient
system for national security planning because the volatility and rapid weapon
advancements of the Cold War forced the president to rely on “the vital studies, advice,
and counsel that only a capable and well-developed staff organization can give him.” 12
Eisenhower admitted that “organization cannot make a genius out o f an incompetent,”
but, he went on to say, “organization makes more efficient the gathering and analysis of
facts, and the arranging of the findings of experts in logical fashion. Therefore
organization helps the responsible individual make the necessary decision, and helps
assure that it is satisfactorily carried out.”13 It was creating this efficient and organized
system that kept Cutler busy for the next two years.

9 Nelson, “The T o p o f Policy Hill,’” 309.
10 Memorandum Lay to Acheson, 4/19/50 and Memorandum Nhze to Acheson, 1/19/51, NA RG 59,
OCB/NSC 1947-63, Box 105, “NSC-Admin 1950-54.”
11 Memorandum o f NSC Discussion, 2/17/54, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:631.
12 Quoted in Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, Waging Peace: Haw Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring
Cold War Strategy, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 83.
13 Eisenhower, Mandate fo r Change, 114.
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After returning from Korea in early December 1952, Eisenhower appointed his
brother, Milton Eisenhower, Arthur Flemming and Nelson Rockefeller to study how to
make executive operations more competent. This President’s Advisory Commission for
Government Organization (PACGO) interviewed various Washington staff members and
presented its report to Eisenhower and his senior staff at their January 12th and 13th pre
inaugural retreat at his Commodore Hotel headquarters. Cutler, after being introduced as
Eisenhower’s appointee as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, outlined for
the audience the history of the NSC and the future role the Council, and Cutler in
particular, would play. Armed with the PACGO recommendations, Cutler than solicited
Truman NSC veterans to create study groups to report back to him their
recommendations.14 For example, Paul Nitze, Director of the Policy Planning Staff,
recommended that the PPS continue, as it was an “important element in the State
Department contribution to the formulation of national policy.” 15 After reviewing all the
reports and testimonies, and using his own personal experience on the NSC, Cutler
presented his final report for reorganization on March 16, 1953.
In accordance with Eisenhower’s wish for the NSC to function on a parallel with
the Cabinet in importance and accessibility, Cutler submitted recommendations to
overhaul the NSC into a fine-tuned advisory board on national security affairs.16Noting
that the NSC had two functions, a policy-planning function and a supporting staff
function, Cutler recommended that the supporting staff be a permanent staff which would
not change with changing administrations so that it could “furnish both a necessary

14 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 85-88.
15 Memorandum Nitze to Smith, 2/12/53, NA RG 59, OCB/NSC 1947-63, Box 105, “NSC-Admin 19501954,” 4.

R e p ro d u c e d with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

70
continuity in highly sensitive matters and also maximum staff assistance to the policy
makers.” 17 The policy planning function was to be made up of the highest security
advisers to the President and a Planning Board. The Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs was to act as executive officer at the Council meetings and, as part o f the
administration, would serve at the president’s pleasure.
To keep the Council meetings efficient and productive, Cutler suggested that the
number o f formal Council members be limited to eight. One of those permanent
members was to be the president himself. Truman rarely went to Council meetings,
which had been a serious weakness of the NSC according to former Secretary of State
IS

George Marshall. Eisenhower, on the other hand, attended over 90 per cent of the
meetings, and, when he was not there, he had his “bright, quick, ...loyal and cooperative”
Vice-President Richard Nixon preside over the meeting.19 In addition to the participation
by the president, the Treasury Department and Bureau of the Budget were brought in to
the fold Headed by George Humphrey and Joseph Dodge respectively, both men were
staunch fiscal conservatives.20 The presence of Humphrey and Dodge reflected the
importance the budget played in Eisenhower’s national security planning.21

16 Cutler, No Timefo r Rest, 295.
17 Memorandum for the President, 3/16/53, NARG 59 OCB/NSC 1947-63, Box 105, “NSC-Admin 19501954,” ii.
18 Marshall said that Truman was “not a leader, a force at the table to bring out discussion.” Quoted in
Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 87.
19 Robert Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries, (New York: Norton, 1981), June 1, 1953 entry, 242.
20 In all, those who were to regularly attend Council meetings were: President, VP, Secretaries o f State,
Defense, Treasury, Director of Defense Mobilization and the Director for Mutual Security. Report by the
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 3/16/53, NA RG 59, OCB/NSC 1947-63, Box 105, “NSCAdmin 1950-1954,” 5, 7.
21 Dodge was a Detroit banker and Humphrey the president o f the Mark Hanna Company o f Cleveland, a
“far-flung conglomerate.” Humphrey and Eisenhower became close friends. Eisenhower biographer Stephen
Ambrose wrote o f their relationship: “They were almost exactly the same age, had the same horror o f deficit
financing, and shared a love for hunting and fishing. At their first meeting, Eisenhower grinned at the balding
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In addition to the regular members, the president could invite any Government
officials he deemed appropriate. As it became obvious the NSC was a valuable and
important tool for Eisenhower, many government officials sought an opportunity to
attend the meetings and an invitation extended by the President was never refused.22
Civilians without departmental responsibilities were not to be invited, but civilian ad-hoc
consultants or committees were to be called upon “in order to bring the Council
deliberations a fresh, frequently-changing civilian point of view and to gain public
understanding of national security problems through the use of civilians of stature.”23
Cutler understood the role Eisenhower saw for civilian consultants within the NSC.
While campaigning, Eisenhower had stated his desire to see the membership o f the NSC
include “civilians of the highest capacity, integrity, and dedication to public service, who
have no other official duties.”24 And in fact, one of the first things Eisenhower had Cutler
do once in office was to organize the ad hoc group of Civilian Consultants in February
1953 which advised Eisenhower and the NSC on the budget and national security
policy.25 Civilian consultant groups like that one were utilized “to good effect” thirteen
times by the NSC during Cutler’s tenure and proved invaluable to Eisenhower.26
Cutler rejected suggestions to place a few well qualified civilians on the
Council’s permanent membership. He did so on two counts. First, keeping attendance
small was important to Cutler to ensure a forum for vigorous, frank, fruitful discussion.

Humphrey, stuck out his hand, and said, ‘Well, George, I see you part your hair the same way I do.’”
Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President, (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1990), 290.
22 Cutler, No Time For Rest, 295.
23 Report by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 3/16/53, 6.
24 Letter Cutler to Eisenhower, 12/27/52,2.
25 See Chapter One for discussion on this committee.
26 Cutler, No Time fo r Rest, 298.
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Explaining that the "pow-wow element” of a meeting was invaluable, Cutler believed
“that element disappears when over a certain number of persons sit about the Council
Table... [and] people do not discuss and debate; they remain silent or talk for the
•sn

record.” Second, and more important than attendance, Cutler worried about permanent
civilian members being “Nesters” - elder statesmen whose views would be theoretical.
With nothing but time to think, these members would not be privy to the daily march of
world events faced by department heads. Therefore their views might not hold up to
current realities, but, because of their stature, their views might dominate Council
meetings. For Cutler, the essence o f the NSC was to bring Eisenhower the views of the
men who would be canying out his national security policies in a “give-andtake,...questioning and being questioned” forum.28 “Nesters” had no permanent place.
Instead, their most efficient use was through ad-hoc committees. These committees had
access to relevant classified documents and departmental briefings to bring the
consultants up to speed, and such committees could objectively research a specific issue
o f national security without being clouded by department agendas or rivalries.
Cutler also sought efficiency by recommending the Council meet every week at a
specific time.29 This enabled the regular members to plan their schedules around the
weekly meeting. By instituting a regular meeting time, seeing that the president attended
each meeting, and keeping attendance small, Cutler was able to work out some of the
major problems faced by the Truman NSC. George Marshall, in recalling the Truman

27 Cutler Address at the Compton Memorial Dinner, MIT, 1/4/56, EL, AWF, Administrative Series, Box 11,
“Cutler, Robert 1956-57 (4),” 6.
28 Ibid., 6-7.
29 Report by the Special Assistant for National Security Aflairs, 3/16/53, 7. Eisenhower’s NSC met every
Thursday morning.
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years, complained iliai it was too “evanescent,” anu ihai ihc meetings were “o f busy men
who had no time to pay to the business before them, and not being prepared, therefore
took refuge in non-participation or in protecting their own departments.”30 Cutler
eliminated these inefficiencies. He made it clear that the NSC was strictly an advisory
body and every member ought to come to the meetings prepared. To help with
preparation, Cutler placed great weight on the Planing Board of the Council.
Cutler recommended renaming the “Senior Staff’ of the Truman NSC to the
“Planning Board”. A small group made up of the Special Assistant to the President and
one person each from the departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Office of Defense
Mobilization (ODM), and the Director for Mutual Security, the Planning Board had the
difficult task o f anticipating and identifying “problems and situations affecting the
security objectives, commitments, and risks o f the United States.”31 They were then to
take action, analyzing the situation and drafting a policy paper for the Council members
to consider. Unlike the Truman policy papers that offered no alternatives, the Policy
Board’s papers identified all possible alternatives and discussed all differences for
Council consideration.32 In order for the Board to accumulate all this information, it was
imperative that the Board members be as prepared as the Council members. Cutler
explained that each Board member had to be “prepared promptly to state to the Board the
views of his department,” in order for the Board to function efficiently.33 In addition, the
duty to the Board o f each member overrode all other duties while maintaining a sufficient

30 Quoted in Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 87.
31 Report by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 3/16/53,10.
32 Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 87.; ibid., 10.
33 Report by the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, 3/16/53,12.
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degree of activity within his department “so as to be capable o f representing its views.”54
Certainly Cutler saw the Planning Board as the life line o f the Council, providing an
invigorating forum for some o f the top government officials to meet at least twice a week
to make vital contributions to the policy-making process.35 Eisenhower agreed.
The day after Cutler’s presentation, Eisenhower sent him a letter approving the
recommendations and requested that Cutler forward to him the names recommended to
be members of the Planning Board so that he could finalize their appointments and get
the Board functioning immediately. Eisenhower explained to Cutler that he placed “great
emphasis on the selection o f men of high caliber for these positions, able to devote plenty
o f time to their Planning Board functions; for thereby the Council will be better able to
operate promptly and effectively.”36 As Eisenhower viewed it, the Planning Board did the
thinking for the Council members; thinking that they did not have time to do on their
own. Therefore, Eisenhower recommended to his Council members that they “should
therefore appoint individuals in whom [they] have complete confidence.’” 7 He also told
them he wanted “new faces” who were not associated with the policies o f the Truman
administration because he, and the members of his administration, “were all trying to
take a new look at existing policies and programs.”38 Getting the freshest faces o f the
highest character on the Planning Board was the key to efficient policy making and one
step towards establishing a New Look for Eisenhower’s foreign policy.

34

Ibid., 19.
35 In 1953 alone. Cutler presided over 120 meetings o f the Planning Board.
36 Letter Eisenhower to Cutler, 3/17/53, NA, RG59, OCB/NSC 1947-63, Box 105, “NSC-Admin 195054.”
37 Memorandum o f 137th Meeting o f the NSC, 3/19/53, EL, AWF, NSC Series, Box 4, “ 137th Meeting o f
the NSC 3/18/53,” 6.
38 Ibid.
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By Apnl, the NSC was reorganized into an effective advising council. Dulles
commended Eisenhower a few years later for “building a team which was so harmonious,
which was so imbued with principles, and which had so good a backlog o f forward
thinking, as embodied in NSC papers.”39 One o f its first papers, NSC 149/2, produced the
first step towards a new national security policy. Although satisfactory to Eisenhower for
the short term, the more fiscally conservative Republicans, led by Senator Robert Taft,
wanted to see more cuts, and many Democrats thought the cuts were too deep, severely
undermining American security. Eisenhower, barely three months into his first term, was
past the honeymoon period.

Facing Political Pressures
NSC 149/2 approval in April 1953 was a success in Eisenhower’s mind.40 It did
not, however, please everybody and caused political headaches for Eisenhower in the
next few weeks. Republican Senator Robert Taft was one of the loudest critics. Taft, the
leader of the conservative wing of the Republican party and Eisenhower’s competition
for the Republican nomination in 1952, had urged Eisenhower during the campaign to
make budget cuts a priority, particularly in defense.41 Taft wanted the last Truman
budget, submitted for $78 billion, to be cut by at least $8 billion. As Senate Majority
leader, Taft was concerned that Secretary of Defense Wilson did not share his views on
defense cuts. Frustrated, Taft said in February that the administration “must make drastic

39 Memorandum o f Conversation with the President at Fitzsimmons Hospital, Denver, 10/11/55, EL, JFD
Papers, WH Memorandum Series, Box 3, “Meetings with the President, 1955 (2).”
40 See Chapter One for a discussion on drafting NSC 149/2.
41 Glen H. Snyder, “The ‘New Look’ o f 1953,” in Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1962), 389-90.
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economies forthwith...! give tlicrxi uiiiil abuui. May first to make the recommendations
which will bring about a substantial reduction.”42
When the new policy was introduced to the Republican legislative leadership on
April 30, Taft criticized NSC 149/2 for not implementing the budget cuts he felt were
necessary. Taft worried that Eisenhower’s new budget looked just like Truman’s and that
public perception would be that the Administration was not reversing the Truman trend
of increased spending. Such a perception, Taft believed, was disastrous for the
Republican chances in the 1954 Congressional elections. “With a program like this...,”
Taft yelled at Eisenhower, “you’re taking us down the same road Truman traveled. It’s a
repudiation of everything we promised in the campaign.”4" Eisenhower defended his
position, reminding Taft and his group that America’s defense posture could not be
sacrificed for an unobtainable budget. Although Eisenhower was committed to a
balanced budget, he was not going to just slash budgets at the expense of national
security. Eisenhower tried to explain to Taft that NSC 149/2 was the first step towards
the goal o f providing a strong defense within a strong economy. Taft suggested that a
complete reevaluation of national security be made in order to achieve more cuts for the
FY55 budget. The next day, Eisenhower wrote in his diary that the meeting with the
legislative leaders had resulted in “one of the worst days I have experienced since
January 20.”44
Political pressure was not only mounting from the right, but from the left as well.
Taft and other fiscal conservatives wanted to slash the budget dangerously while many

42 Robert Taft to Edmund Lincoln, 2/26/53, Box 1145, Robert Taft Papers, quoted in James Patterson, Mr.
Republican: A Biography o f Robert A. Taft, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), 590.
43 Ibid., 600.
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Democrats feit any budget cut was dangerous to national security, and the administration
was keenly aware of such Democratic assertions.43 Although initially after the 1952
election it seemed that bipartisanship in foreign policy would take hold, the honeymoon
was short lived. Eisenhower’s Defense Reorganization message of April 30, 1953
repeated his goal of maintaining a strong defense without sacrificing a sound economy.
Yet, his proposed defense budget for FY54, at $5.1 billion below Truman’s, provoked
loud opposition by leading Democrats in the House and Senate. Led by Stuart Symington,
these Congressmen were all airpower advocates and worried that Eisenhower’s proposed
cuts in the Air Force budget would result in a bomber “gap” between the two
superpowers.46 Many others felt Eisenhower was not delivering on his campaign
promises for a better foreign policy. One Democrat explained to C.D. Jackson that he had
voted for Eisenhower because he thought “we would get more foreign policy than under
Truman and Acheson. Up to now,” he continued, “I honestly feel that it is less foreign
policy. How much longer should I wait?”47 Jackson was not very sympathetic, but he
understood the perception the public had o f Eisenhower, which he believed to be a basic
misconception. He recognized that Eisenhower rarely initiated leadership, but instead
looked for his “alert, energetic staff to bat things up to him,” for him to approve and
lead.48 It was time for Eisenhower’s staff to bat something new up to him and find a way

44 Ferrell, ed. The Eisenhower Diaries, May 1,1953 entry, 235-236.
45 Douglas Foyle, Counting the Public in: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy, (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1999), 157.
44 Gary W. Reichard, “Divisions and Dissent: Democrats and Foreign Policy, 1952-1956,” Political Science
Quarterly, 93 (Spring 1978), 53-55. (51-72) Reichard cites the Yalta Resolution and the Charles Bohlen
nomination as two examples o f early bipartisanship. The other Congressmen joining Symington in his
criticism o f Eisenhower’s budget were: Henry Jackson (WA), Richard Russell (GA), and John Stennis (MS)
in the Senate, and John McCormack (MA), George Mahan (TX), and Melvin Price (IL) in the House.
47 July 8, 1953 entry, EL, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 68, “Log-1953 (3).”
48 Ibid.
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to reconcile political pressures over the budget and national security. In early May
Eisenhower and his key national security aides did just that and formulated a way to
reevaluate basic national security policy using the newly reorganized NSC and “teams of
bright young fellows.”49

A Meeting in the Solarium Room
On the afternoon of Saturday May 2, Allen Dulles, Bedell Smith, Robert Cutler,
and C.D. Jackson all met at John Foster Dulles’ to discuss issues regarding national
security.50 Dulles had prepared a remarkable presentation for his guests, leaving his
listeners still and silent in their chairs for over an hour.51 Insistent that the President hear
Dulles’ ideas, Cutler arranged to have the same cast o f characters, plus George
Humphrey, meet with Eisenhower on Friday, May 8 in the Solarium room of the White
House.52 The general purpose of this off the record meeting was to discuss SovietAmerican relations. Dulles was not optimistic about those relations and remarked that it
was “difficult to conclude that time is working in our favor.”53 He saw few exceptions in
the world where Soviet influence and penetration were not formidable. West Germany
might fall to communism, devastating NATO. South America, much o f Africa, the
Middle East, and Asia were also vulnerable. “In the world chess game,” Dulles
concluded, “the Reds today have the better position.”

49 Memo on Solarium Project, 5/8/53, EL, WHO NSCS, Executive Secretary Subject File, Box 15, “Project
Solarium (3),” 1-3.
50 Allen Dulles was the Director o f the CIA; Walter Bedell Smith was the Under Secretary o f State.
51 5/2/53 entry, EL, CJD. Jackson Papers, Box 68, “Log-1953 (1);” Cutler, No Time For Rest, 308.
52 5/8/53 entry, EL, CX>. Jackson Papers, Box 68, “Log-1953 (1);” ibid.
53 Memorandum on Solarium Project, 5/8/53. The following discussion is from this document.
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With the mere survival o f Western civilization at stake, Dulles was disgusted with
the attitude of the “old people” shattered from the war who were unwilling to face Soviet
aggression. These leaders were “willing and glad to gamble on time bringing about a
solution,” so that they might live out their days in peace. Dulles believed their hope was
that the “Soviets, like Ghenghes Khan [sic], will get on their little Tarter ponies and ride
back whence they came.” Not wishing to emulate this weak position, Dulles argued that
the United States had to demonstrate to the world a different approach, an approach
based on strength and defiance. The present course the United States was following was
“a fatal one” as it was based on a defensive position. Instead of “always worrying what
the Soviets will take next,” and risk losing the support of Congress and the public as the
Soviets nibbled away at the world, Dulles suggested three alternative courses.
On a grand scale, the Americans might draw a line around the current Soviet
sphere of influence and threaten that if one more country were to fall to communism
outside that perimeter, a global war between the United States and the Soviet Union
would result. On a lesser scale, that line might be limited to an area, such as Asia. If a
country over the line were to fall to communism, the Americans might only threaten
“measures o f our own choosing,” reducing the risk of global war. A third alternative was
“to restore the prestige o f the West by winning in one or more areas a success or
successes.” Some possible successes might be found in Korea, Hainan, Albania, Hungary,
Bulgaria, or Czechoslovakia. All such actions would undoubtedly disturb the Kremlin,
which was the goal, despite the fact American allies would likely “shudder, [and] wish to
draw back.” Dulles conceded that perhaps the allies were right and that there “is no other
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possible course than to wait and see,” but he believed the Administration had a
responsibility to “appraise the alternatives and see if there is net some different way.”
The President agreed that these alternatives ought to be examined further,
although he cautioned that “we cannot live alone” and needed the support of allies.
Furthermore, any path chosen had to be accepted by the allies and Congress as right.
Eisenhower also challenged Dulles to think beyond material strength in winning the Cold
War and to consider the alternative o f improving the standards of living throughout the
world “as the way to gain true indigenous strength.” Winning the hearts and minds o f the
people by showing them “freedom and communism in their true lights” was as important
in this struggle as guns. It was to this that Dulles remarked that talking about ‘liberty’ did
not stop people from becoming communists.
Humphrey also agreed that American policy had to be reevaluated, as the present
policy was “sapping our strength” and would lead to disaster and the American people
turning on the Administration. Eisenhower agreed that the present financial burdens
being placed on national security policy could not continue. To evaluate all policy
alternatives in their financial and strategic roles, Eisenhower wished to set up “some
teams o f bright young fellows” who would act like a debating team or a “good advocate
tackling a law case.” These teams were to argue one alternative “with a real belief in it”
and present their case in terms of “goal, risk, cost in money and men and world
relations.” Eisenhower believed that with such a presentation, the NSC would be
“qualified to come to a decision.” Such an exercise allowed Eisenhower and his staff to
reevaluate the Truman strategy o f containment and the feasibility o f rollback. It also
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provided an excellent opportunity to educate his national security staff and build them
into the team players Eisenhower desired.
The end result o f the exercise did not radically change previous policies, but it
served a vital purpose. By giving a small committee a narrow assignment and by
choosing specific members to participate, Eisenhower had an opportunity to use a
civilian committee of diverse backgrounds to create an outcome he desired but which he
could point to as being made by his entire team. Instead of acting alone and announcing a
return to the earlier Truman policy of containment, Eisenhower used a civilian
committee to participate in the decision-making process and to educate and persuade his
NSC. Therefore, the proposal made by Eisenhower was unique. It was also widely
embraced by the rest o f the room. Named for the room they met in, Project Solarium
began immediately.

Organizing the Task Forces
A working committee made up of Cutler, Allen Dulles, and Bedell Smith worked
out the details based on Eisenhower’s three assignments.54 On May 13, Cutler briefed the
NSC about Solarium.55 The task groups were to meet and work at the National War
College under the cover that they were there to participate in the College’s First National
War College Round-Table Seminar on “Cold War and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1953-1963”
to be held June 9-10-11. Security was vital to Eisenhower. He did not want to have
details of the exercise leaked to the press, and, in fact, no one did find out about the

54 Memorandum for the Record, 5/9/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:323.
53 Memorandum of the 144th Meeting o f NSC, 5/14/53, EL, AWF, NSC Series, Box 4, “144th Meeting o f
NSC, 5/13/53.”
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project despite the tact the task forces worked there for over a month.36 They were to
have access to all pertinent intelligence reports, estimates and other classified material.
They were to approach their task “in the same spirit that an advocate works up a case for
court presentation,” and they were to play “Devil’s advocate” in the plenary sessions,
offering criticism to the other task groups.57 Eisenhower approved the final membership
selections by mid-May, and the Task Forces assembled at the War College the second
CD

week o f June. The final presentations needed to be completed, ready for presentation to
the NSC by mid-July.
The alternatives decided upon for the task groups to argue stemmed from the
current Truman policy of containment, Dulles’ “grand and lesser scale” alternatives of
drawing the line, and Eisenhower’s campaign promise o f rollback. To draft the exact
terms o f reference for each alternative, Cutler, Smith and Allen Dulles appointed a
committee, chaired by General James Doolittle.59 The Doolittle committee proposed a
fourth task force to argue the desirability of a preventive war with the Soviets in light of
recent nuclear weapon development and increasing U.S. vulnerability to surprise attack.
This Alternative “D” was postponed by Cutler’s working committee. However, it is

5,5“Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History with General Andrew Goodpaster, Robert Bowie, and
Ambassador George Kennan,” 2/27/88, Princeton University, Mudd Library, Woodrow Wilson School, Box
93, folder 10, 3.
57 Administrative Instructions, Task Force Operations, Project Solarium, n.d„ EL, WHO NSCS, Executive
Secretary Subject File, Box 15, “Project Solarium (3).”
58 Memorandum to Secretaries o f Defense, State and the Director of Mutual Security, 5/22/53, EL, WHO
NSCS, Executive Secretary Subject File, Box 11, “General Papers (Col. Bonesteel);” Letter Cutler to
Kennan, 5/26/53, EL, JFD Papers, Subject Series, Box 6, “Kennan, George 1-0-1.” For a complete
membership list for the Solarium Exercise see Appendix A.
39 Memorandum for the Record by Cutler, 5/15/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:325. Also on the committee were
Robert Amory, Jr., Lt. General L. L. Lemnitzer, Dean Rusk, and Admiral Leslie Stevens.
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doubtful Eisenhower ever would have seriously considered such a policy that was, in his
mind, suicidal.60
Task Force A’s job was to defend the policy that had been in effect, with
modifications, since 1948. Sticking with the NSC 149/2 fiscal requirement of bringing
the Federal budget into balance as quickly as possible without sacrificing national
security, Task Force A had to argue a position that maintained armed forces to defend the
United States and to protect “vital areas of the free world,” continuing to help build up
the free world. The U.S. was to oppose continued Communist expansion by the Soviets
or Chinese and “exploit the vulnerabilities of the Soviets and their satellites.” Most
importantly, the policy had to avoid general war. The end goal of such a policy was to
eliminate the Soviet threat to the United States and, with the exception of the fiscal
modifications of NSC 149/2, was the same policy outlined by previous policy papers
beginning with NSC 20. It did not seek to destroy the Soviet system through war, but
rather relied on the strategic thinking put forth by Kennan in 1946 in which he suggested
containing Soviet power until such time when their system decayed from internal
weaknesses. This policy assumed time was on the side of the free world, unlike Dulles’
dire predictions.61
The assignment given to Task Force A mirrored the strategy Eisenhower leaned
toward. Since it was reflective o f Kennan’s policy thinking, it made sense to ask the
former State Department member to chair the committee. Kennan, who had been
Ambassador to the Soviet Union before Eisenhower’s new appointee Charles Bohlen

60 Memorandum Armory to Bowie, 7/8/53, NA, RG 59, OCB/NSC 1947-63, Box 122, "Solarium Project.”
61 Attachment to Memorandum for the Record by Cutler, 5/15/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:325.
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took his place, was happy to serve on the Task Force but had some concerns. Writing to
Cutler on May 25, Kennan complained that he had not heard from President Eisenhower
regarding his resignation from the Foreign Service, which he submitted in January. Since
Bohlen was the new Ambassador, Kennan wanted some confirmation as to his present
status. Furthermore, Kennan was clearly annoyed that John Foster Dulles had no position
to offer Kennan in the State Department or Foreign Service. As such, Kennan was to
retire that summer under a provision in the Foreign Service Act of 1946. “This is,”
Kennan wrote Cutler, “to my knowledge, the first instance in which this legislative
stipulation, designed to enable the Government to disembarrass itself of unsatisfactory
career ambassadors, has been invoked...Mr. Dulles must, I am sure, have had serious
reasons for taking this attitude toward me.”62
Cutler assured Kennan the next day that it was an oversight that the President had
not acknowledged his resignation as Ambassador and that Eisenhower very much wanted
Kennan to participate in the Solarium Project. As far as Dulles was concerned, he
believed that Kennan’s retirement had been agreed to by both o f them since Kennan had
told Dulles in January that he “did not consider [himself] available for reassignment in
the Foreign Service and requested that [he] be permitted to retire as soon as the necessary
arrangements could be made.”63 Dulles had told Kennan that he was happy to have
Kennan remain available to the Government as a consultant as his “special talents,
particularly in relation to Russian matters,” would most certainly be called upon by the

62 Letter Kennan to Cutler, 5/25/53, EL, JFD Papers, Subject Series, Box 6, “Kennan, George 1-0-1.”
63 Letter Dulles to Cutler, 6/1/53; Letter Dulles to Kennan, 4/6/53, EL, JFD Papers, Subject Series, Box 6,
“Kennan, George 1-0-1.”
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Administration.0-*Regardless o f the misunderstanding between Dulles and Kennan,
Kennan was ready and eager to chair the task force.65 Interestingly, the Doolittle
committee also suggested Paul Nitze for membership on Task Force A. Nitze declined to
participate, citing prior commitments and enjoying a month o f relaxation before
assuming what he expected to be a permanent job in the Pentagon.56 Robert Cutler,
however, told Kennan that Nitze would be available from time to time should Kennan
need him.67 He never did.
Since each task force was arguing a unique line, the knowledge and experience of
the individual members was just as important as the classified reports and departmental
briefings they would receive, and members with specific qualifications were selected
since their specific insights were extensively relied upon.68 For example, with Task Force
A arguing containment, the Doolittle committee recommended that the members have an
“intimate understanding of the past policies and actions of the United States, the rest of
the free world, and o f the U.S.S.R, and broad gauge political, military, economic, and
psychological planning for the future.”69 Task Force A accomplished that

64 Ibid.
65 Letter Kennan to Cutler, 5/25/53.
66 After Nitze was replaced by Robert Bowie on the Policy Planning Staff Nitze ran into Charles Wilson in
April and accepted a position in ISA but asked for a month’s vacation before work in early June. This may
explain why Nitze declined to be on the task force when asked in May. For a further account of Nitze’s
joining the Pentagon see David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities: Paul Nitze and the Cold War, (New
York; Harper Collins, 1990), 150-152. Nitze cited prior commitments to Cutler in Letter Cutler to Kennan,
5/26/53, EL, JFD Papers, Subject Series, Box 6, “Kennan, George 1-0-1.”
67 Letter Cutler to Kennan, 5/26/53, EL, JFD Papers, Subject Series, Box 6, “Kennan, George 1-0-1.”
68 Report to the National Security Council by Task Force A, 7/16/53, NA, RG 59, State Department
Participation in OCB/NSC, 1947-63, Box 129, “Solarium Project,” i.
69 Personnel Recommendations for Task Force “A,” EL, WHO NSCS, Executive Secretary Subject File,
Box 11, “General Papers (CoL Bonesteel) ”
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Under Kennan5s leadership were men Kennan considered fortunate to have
around him.70 Colonel George Abe Lincoln, a long-time friend o f Eisenhower who had
retired to a life o f academia, was asked to join Task Force A for his experience as a
military planner and economist.71 Rear Admiral H.P. Smith provided military planning
experience and expertise in foreign military matters. The economist and Congressional
relations expert C. Tyler Wood participated on Task Force A, and rounding out the group
were Colonel C. H. Bonesteel and War College students John Maury and Captain H. S.
Sears.72
The policy line assigned to Task Force B was a synthesis o f Dulles5 grand and
lesser scale alternatives in which the task group had to “determine the areas o f the world
which the United States will not permit to become Communist, whether by overt or
covert aggression, by subversion o f indigenous peoples, or otherwise.55Whether the “line
drawn” was to be on a grand scale which risked global war, or the line drawn was to be
on a lesser scale, which might only risk a regional war, was to be worked out by the task
group. Although both alternatives risked war, the response of the United States to Soviet
aggression across the line was stated only as “measures of our own choosing,55which
included the option of an offensive war.73
To head Task Force B, Air Force Major General James McCormack was selected
over the Doolittle committee5s recommendation of Admiral Leslie Stevens. McCormack
had extensive experience as a military and political planner, as well as being an expert on

70 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 3.
71 For more biographical information on Abe Linclon, see Chapter 6.
71 Personnel Recommendations for Task Force “A;” Minutes of the 155th Meeting of the NSC, 7/16/53,
FRUS, 1952-54,2:395.
73 ibid., 326.
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atomic and new weapons. Russian expert and military planner Major General John
Deane was recruited for Task Force B, and Foreign Service political planner James
Penfield was called back from London to serve because of his experience in the Far East,
Soviet sphere, and Great Britain.74 The rest of the group consisted o f Philip Mosley, the
director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, Calvin Hoover, and, from the
War College, John Campbell and Colonel Elvin Ligon. These men were selected for their
“sound political and military judgment” in regards to the Soviet Union and the free
world, their knowledge of communist reactions and methods and o f American military
capabilities to wage general war, and their “ability to evaluate the economic capability of
the United States and the rest of the free world.”75
Task Force C was also a Dulles alternative and resembled the policy enunciated
during the campaign for rollback. Task Force C had to seek viable actions to “restore the
prestige o f the West by winning in one or more areas a success or successes.” The policy
did not outline a course for global war, but nor did it say that global war was to be
avoided. Psychological and covert warfare could be used instead of guns and tanks, but
the goal o f the policy was to gain a sense o f victory in the West to inspire the free world
and discourage the communist world.76
Having the difficult task of arguing for a policy o f rollback, Task Force C
required members who had “imaginative military, political, psychological and subversive
planning experience” as well as superior experience on Soviet-Communist actions and

74 Personnel Recommendations for Task Force “B,” EL, WHO NSCS, Executive Secretary Subject File,
Box 11, “General Papers (Col. Bonesteel);” Minutes o f the 155* Meeting, 395-396; Telegram to Embassy in
London, 6/2/53, NA, RG 59, OCB/NSC, 1947-63, Box 122, “Solarium Project.”
75 Personnel Recommendations for Task Force “B,” EL, WHO NSCS, Executive Secretary Subject File,
Box 11, “General Papers (Col. Bonesteel);” Minutes o f the 155* Meeting, 395-396.
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reactions including the military situations in Korea and Soviet satellite areas, and the
“ability to evaluate the economic resources required to follow such a course.”77 Although
the recommended head o f the Task Force was public servant James McCloy, Vice
Admiral Richard Conolly was finally approved for the job. Foreign Service member and
Russian expert G. Frederick Reinhardt agreed to be a member, being called back from
the American Embassy in Paris.78 Lieutenant General L. L. Lemnitzer, who had recently
returned from Korea, brought to the group his vast experience in foreign affairs. Colonel
Harold K. Johnston was asked along with Leslie Brady and Kilboume Johnston from the
War College. Finally, since Task Force C was to write out a plan that was to reverse the
momentum of Soviet aggression, a difficult task, Eisenhower called upon his friend
Andrew Goodpaster to sit on Task Force C. Described as a “brilliant military planner
with extensive background in international affairs,” Goodpaster was the man Eisenhower
believed could thoroughly evaluate the option of rollback.79 Since Goodpaster did not
have any prior association with the policy of rollback, Cutler explained to him that
Eisenhower “wanted somebody with some common sense” who would see to it the Task
Force “didn’t go completely off in their analysis.”80
Starting work at eight in the morning and breaking only for lunch and dinner and
the occasional exercise hour in the afternoon, the groups worked on until midnight each

76 Ibid.
77 Personnel Recommendations for Task Force “C,” EL, WHO NSCS, Executive Secretary Subject File,
Box 11, “General Papers (Col. Bonesteel).”
78 Ibid.; Letter Reinhardt to Smith, 5/28/53, N A RG 59, OCB/NSC, 1947-63, Box 122, “Solarium Project.”
79 Ibid., Minutes o f the 155th Meeting, 395-396.
80 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 10. Eisenhower’s respect for Goodpaster was summed up
when he told Sherman Adams that he “would ask nothing more than for my son to grow up to be as good a
man as [Goodpaster] is.” See Sherman Adams, First Hand Report, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961),
53.
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day for the next five weeks.81 The task forces were privy to all available intelligence
information and were briefed, not always objectively, by key department officials. For
example, Dulles visited the task forces while they were sequestered in the War College.
He wanted to discuss with the group their shared assumptions and to discuss the
“ultimate purpose o f the safeguarding of our security.”82 The CIA representative briefing
the group made the case for a more aggressive policy as he saw the Soviet threat in much
harsher terms than the task forces did.83 Ultimately, though, the task forces relied heavily
on the individual knowledge and experience of its members to reach their conclusions.
Eisenhower had requested that the groups meet to coordinate their presentations
so as to avoid a lot o f duplication.84 As directed, the task groups met at a plenary session
on June 26 to allow each chairman to summarize the main line his group was arguing.
Kennan accepted the general framework o f the most recent NSC policy paper on basic
national security, NSC 153/1, which had just been completed on June 10th. However,
Kennan did promise to question the wording of NSC 153/1 in regards to the Soviet threat
as it seemed to commit the U.S. to the global containment of NSC 68. But, like NSC 68,
Kennan argued that the economy could withstand increased and prolonged military
expenditures. General McCormack explained that Task Force B defined its position as a
rigid and completely unilateral policy. It was also the most economical one, costing less
than Alternative C and being more efficient than Alternative A since “the military forces
will be conserved as being the best forces to wage general war” guaranteeing a “greater

81 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 13.
82 Ibid., 11.
83 Ibid., 17.
84 Memorandum for the Record, 6/23/53, El, WHO NSCS, Executive Secretary Subject File, Box 11,
“General Papers (Col. Bonesteel).”
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cohesion in the defense effort”83 Admiral Conolly admitted that his task force was not as
far ahead as the other two seemed to be. However, Task Force C was not going to present
a policy of reducing Soviet strength at the cost o f general war. Instead, military
deterrence and political warfare would be the tools to rollback the Soviet Union. The
economic cost of such a policy was not calculable. Like Kennan, Conolly accepted the
general framework of NSC 153/1, but made clear that whereas Task Force A was trying
to carry out the peace aims of NSC 153/1, Task Force C was carrying out the war aims of
that document86 With the basic parameters defined by the three chairmen, the task forces
went back to work on their final drafts. As they were working away at the War College,
Cutler was making arrangements for the special NSC meeting which would hear the final
reports.
On June 25, Cutler sent a memo to Wilson instructing him that the NSC had
planned to hold two special meetings which Eisenhower wanted the newly-appointed
Joint Chiefs o f Staff and the Secretaries o f the Army, Navy, and Air Force to attend.87
Eisenhower felt that the Joint Chiefs, some of whom were not to be sworn in by those
dates, had to attend these meetings in order to assume their responsibilities with the
utmost efficiency.88 The first meeting on July 14 covered FY55 budget concerns and U.S.
military objectives. Eisenhower explained to the Joint Chiefs that he wanted them to take
a tour of the major military institutions in order for them to be thoroughly educated with

85 Notes Taken at the First Plenary Session o f Project Solarium, 6/26/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:388-393.
“ ibid.
87 Telephone call Eisenhower to Wilson, 5/11/53, EL, AWF, DDE Diary, Box 4, “Phone calls- FebruaryJune 1953 (1).” On May 12, Eisenhower appointed an entirely new group to the JCS to take effect on June
30 and August 15. His appointments were: General Matthew Ridgeway, Chief o f Staff for Army, Admiral
Robert Carney, Chief Naval Operations; General Nathan Twining, Chief o f Staff for Air Force; Admiral
Arthur Radford, Chairman o f die JCS. See FRUS, 1952-54, 2:326-327.
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the entire military establishment. Eisenhower then ordered them to use that information
to take a “completely new, fresh survey o f our military capabilities in light o f our global
commitments.”89 Specifically, Eisenhower wanted the Joint Chiefs’ view on how best to
deploy American troops to find “the most effective employment of available national
resources to insure the defense o f our country for the long pull which may lie ahead.”90
The Joint Chiefs’ report was combined with the reports given at the second meeting, “an
extraordinary” meeting, on the 16th, which heard the conclusions from Project Solarium.
The synthesis of these reports resulted in NSC 162/2, or Eisenhower’s “New Look”.
The NSC meetings were an ideal way to educate everyone involved in policy
making and get them on board with the administration and, in addition to the Joint Chiefs
and permanent members being in attendance, key cabinet members, relevant assistant
secretaries, planning board members, and all military superiors were asked to join. In all,
thirty-nine people, excluding task force members, attended the all day meeting.
Eisenhower wanted such an extensive audience that day so that they could all hear the
background, arguments, and conclusions so that they were prepared to get on board and
support Eisenhower’s final decisions regarding security policy. The special NSC meeting
on the 16th was the perfect opportunity to educate all the people who were to be involved
in national security planning for the long haul.91
Being given two hours for their presentation and maximum time for questions, the
task forces presented their conclusions to the President and the National Security council

88 Memorandum Cutler to Wilson, 6/25/53, EL, AWF, Administrative Series, Box 10, “Cutler, General
Robert 1952-53 (5).”
89 Editorial Note, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:394.
90 Memorandum to the Secretary o f Defense, 8/8/53, EL, WHO NSCS, Disaster File, Box 11, “NSC 162/2
( 1) ”
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on M y 16, 1953. With only short breaks between each presentation and time for lunch,
the meeting lasted all day.92

Task Force A’s Report
The conclusions of Task Force A understandably reflected Kennan’s views.
Although he was not happy about having been prescribed a specific line to argue, his
report defended his original proposal o f containment to Truman outlined in NSC 20/4.93
Drafted in 1948, NSC 20/4 argued that American defense spending and preparedness had
to be sustainable over the long term, so as not to disrupt American economic stability.
Therefore, the level o f preparedness had only to be sufficient to meet “immediate
military commitments.”94 Kennan’s group also maintained that NSC 153/1 presented a
suitable policy which could provide a framework for success.95 As such, Task Force A
defined its mission as threefold: to preserve a level of preparedness to secure the United
States and to assist in the defense o f the free world; to continue economic and military
assistance to the free world; and to continue the containment policy of political,
economic, and psychological exploitation o f the Soviet Union and its satellites through
means which would avoid war.96 Eisenhower could have written that mission himself.
Although the basic assumptions of NSC 153/1 were accepted by the task force,
improvements needed to be made for the United States to assume the strategic offensive.

91 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 19-21.
92 Memorandum for the Record, 6/23/53, EL, WHO NSCS, Executive Secretary Subject File, Box 11,
“General Papers (Col. Bonesteel).”
93 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 4.
94 NSC 20/4,11/23/48, FRUS, 1948, 1:663-69.
95 Notes Taken at the First Plenary Session o f Project Solarium, 6/26/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:388.
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Regaining flexibility and achieving better integration and implementation were key areas
to be improved. In assessing the Soviet threat, Task Force A accepted that the political
leadership in Moscow was dedicated to the destruction of western capitalism and had the
military strength to carry out their aims. However, the report rejected the idea put forth in
NSC 68 that the Soviets were on the verge of waging war against the United States and it
described the U.S. position vis-a-vis the Soviets as sounder and more powerful. However,
the Soviet control over Eastern Europe prohibited any chance of seeking the restoration
o f normal relations and stability in Europe as a whole. Additional countries were most
likely to come under the control of communism through overt or covert Soviet action and
soon the Soviets would possess enough nuclear capability to inflict serious damage on
the United States. American priorities, in light of this threat, had to be assuring U.S.
security against the Soviet military threat, preventing the expansion of communism and,
if possible, reducing the area under Soviet control, particularly in China.97
In addition to the Soviet threat, Task Force A saw the developing world and the
rising discontent and resentment against the West as important areas to address. Although
seen as separate from the Soviet threat, the instability in the Third World was being
exploited for communist gains, and the United States had therefore to avoid policies
which stressed only wartime objectives or that war was inevitable. To nurture a sound
relationship with the Third World, the United States had to create a stable and reliable
policy that stressed the positive elements of strengthening the free world through Western

96 Summaries Prepared by the NSC Staff o f Project Solarium Presentations and Written reports, n.d., FRUS,
1952-54, 2:399.
97 Ibid., 400-401.
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leadership/0 It was vital to evaluate thoroughly each decision to aid a colonial power
since the United States was being increasingly viewed, particularly in Asia, as
imperialist, which played into the hands of the Communists."
Kennan succeeded in getting his views on Germany incorporated into the report.
Claiming that “the future of Germany is, in a large part, the determinate to the future of
Europe,” Kennan argued the United States needed a more plausible negotiating stance
over the question o f reunification.100 Unhappy about the current American position which
gladly accepted a Soviet withdrawal from East Germany but refused to reciprocate in
kind, Kennan believed such a position offered nothing to the Soviets, eliminating any
possibility for negotiation. Kennan wanted to see a position which “would have put the
onus o f holding out against German unification more on the Russians and less on us.” 101
The Task Force also identified France as weak and “at the root o f many of most serious
problems faced by the U.S. in Europe.” 102 Indeed the United States needed to support its
allies when necessary, but, to improve this situation, it was recommended that the United
States quietly shift responsibility back to France and cease bailing “her out of perennial
crises.” 103 However, the Task Force did not recommend stepping away from Indochina.
Rather, the report stated bluntly that Communist control in that area “would critically
endanger U.S. and free world security interests.”104 The United States had to regain the

98 Ibid., 401-402.
99 Ibid., 408.
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military initiative in the region, recognizing that defense of Indochina against
communism was “a crucial front in the struggle” to contain communist advances.
To contain communism in Asia, the Task Force recommended that political and
economic pressure continue to be placed on Communist China, being sure to avoid
military confrontation. Such pressure should include refusing to recognize China and
continued trade embargoes until the two sides reached a peaceful settlement o f the Korea
and Indochina situations. Promising to protect Formosa and its islands and securing the
freedom o f South Korea should also continue, as should the rebuilding of Japan as a
Western ally. Japan, it was recommended, ought to be “a main bulwark of the free world
in the western Pacific.” 105 To achieve that, Japan’s trade would have to grow with the
West, and possibly with Communist China too.
In the rest of the world, stepping up economic aid to India and Pakistan was the
wisest course. Continued economic aid to the Middle East via the World Bank, so as to
“allay local suspicions o f direct American interference,” was recommended, particularly
in the resettlement of the Arab refugees from Palestine. Being more impartial and
objective in dealing with the Middle East ought to be coupled with a “clear willingness to
assist where needed and when asked.” Finally, it was suggested that establishment of the
Middle East Defense Organization ought to be held off until the area matured
politically.106
In line with the policy of containment, Task Force A insisted that the United
States continue to develop an international order through active participation in the

105 Ibid., 408-409.
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United Nations and continue to attempt to convince the Soviets “of the fallacy of the
fundamental concepts upon which their policies are based.” 107Reducing the Soviet
ability and intent to use its power against the West was essential through overt or covert
operations. The United States also had to begin thinking about negotiations with the
Soviet Union. It was inevitable that some agreements would be made between the two
powers in the future and it was important that there be “an effective stance with the
relation to the problem o f negotiation,” so that the United States did not appear to be the
people “who want the cold war to continue.” 108 A policy had to be in place, therefore,
that would allow successful negotiations without sacrificing American security.
Not surprisingly, Kennan wrote most o f the report’s sections on political policy,
history and philosophical thoughts. Other members took the lead on issues regarding
government expenditures and military preparations. But all were willing, as Kennan
reflected back, to “stand by the statements made in the paper.”109
In short, the thesis o f Task Force A’s report was that America was not doing badly
in the Cold War vis-a-vis the Soviets. Believing that the free world held the upper hand,
Kerman’s group argued that the only significant danger to U.S. security was atomic war
and so long as the U.S. maintained superiority in this field, the Soviets would be deterred
from war.110 The American economy was able to withstand the necessary military
expenditures and, if containment was followed, eventually the Soviet system would
disintegrate.

107 Ibid., 4io.
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Task Force B’s Report
The course prescribed to Task Force B was, in its words, “unprecedented in the
history of U.S. foreign policy in that it is a clear and unmistakable commitment to wage
general war under certain specific conditions.” 111 Those conditions were Communist
expansion beyond defined lines drawn, and made public, by the United States. Task
Force B argued for a continuous line to be drawn around the Soviet Union, extending
from the current line drawn in the NATO area and the western Pacific. Then, a clear and
open statement by the United States was to be made to the Soviets explaining the policy
and the American commitment to uphold the policy, and, should the Soviet-Communists
take aggressive action across that line, the United States would take all necessary action
against the Soviets.112 Task Force B stressed that this policy of promised general war
against further Soviet aggression would actually reduce the likelihood that such a war
would occur.113
The policy was strictly unilateral and would be carried out only against armed
aggression, not against “trifling border incidents.” The framers accepted many of the
tenets o f Task Forces A and C, but added the new premise of threatening “general war as
the primary sanction against further Soviet Bloc aggression.” 114 As such, it was necessary
that the United States maintain a constant military force capable o f carrying out a general
war. In essence, this was a simple policy of deterrence, promising to throw the full force
of American military power at the Soviets in hopes of deterring further aggression.

111 Report to the National Security Council by Task Force B, 7/16/53, NA, RG 59, State Department
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However, the members o f Task Force B made clear that they perceived this as a support
policy to existing approaches, not as a replacement. There was much flexibility, they
thought, with such an approach.113
Contrary to Task Force A, Task Force B concluded that the Soviet threat was
more dangerous to the free world if unchecked.116 It also criticized previous attempts by
the United States to check Soviet aggression at the periphery. The task force believed a
new approach was needed to ensure successful containment of the Soviet Union. If the
Soviet Bloc advanced militarily beyond its present borders, general war would be
assumed. If indigenous Communist forces seized power in a country outside the Soviet
Bloc, the United States reserved “freedom o f action” to “re-establish a situation
compatible with the security interests of the United States and its allies.” 117 The task
force argued that such a policy would reduce the likelihood of war by acting as a
deterrent.
There were other advantages with Alternative B. Subversion o f free countries
would be more difficult for the Soviets since such action would be viewed as “crossing
the line drawn” and therefore risked war. Expansion of Communist China would be
deterred as the policy extended beyond just the Soviet Union, but to any communist state.
And, with the clearly defined role of the U.S. military, the economic development and
maintenance o f the military would be more efficient. Military expenditures were not
likely to decrease, but with Alternative B they would level out. Since the American
military was not to commit to peripheral wars, expenses accrued during a Korean-like

114 Summaries, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:412-423.
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conflict would be eliminated. Most importantly, Task Force B agreed with Task Force A
and C in that whatever the cost for national security, the American economy and
American people had to bear the burden. Simply put, Task Force B said, “whatever the
evils o f inflation, whatever the economic problems involved in efforts to control it, these
cannot be weighed in the same scales with the great danger to our national survival.” 118
The Task Force acknowledged that, no doubt, the Soviets’ response to Alternative
B would be a defensive posture. However, the Task Force concluded that it was unlikely
that the Soviet economy would or could improve to a level sufficient enough to challenge
a United States operating under plan B. The United States ought to have the upper hand
for the foreseeable future. And since the Soviets risked destruction in a general war if
they chose to expand, Alternative B seemed the most effective deterrent. Finally, the task
force insisted that for the deterrent to work, the United States had to announce publicly
the terms o f Alternative B and “drive home the point that the U.S. stands solidly behind
its proclamation,” perhaps through a Joint Resolution in Congress. Furthermore, the
support of American allies was important, although the policy was not subject to a veto
by the allies or United Nations.119

Task Force C’s Report
The members o f Task Force C agreed that the policy alternative described in their
report offered “major returns and advantages as a basic policy.” 120 Narrowing the lines of
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action for a rollback policy down to political pressure and covert action, Task Force C
rejected the option of any military action which might lead to war between the United
States and Soviet Union.121 This rejection of reckless military actions was likely the
result of “moderates” like General Goodpaster on the committee. Instead, they defined
their mission as one which created the “maximum disruption and popular resistance
throughout the Soviet Bloc,” to accelerate the liberation o f their nations.122 Ending the
Iron Curtain, destroying Communist influence in the free world, and crippling the Soviet
capability for war were the general aims of Alternative C. Reducing Soviet expansion
was not enough. Alternative C prevented any Soviet expansion. It proposed to do so
through cold war, avoiding a general war.123 In short, Task Force C rejected the
willingness of Task Force B to threaten and declare war.
Time had been working against the United States, and Task Force C perceived a
bigger Soviet threat than the other two groups.124 Arguing that hanging on to the status
quo was not enough, the U.S. had to weaken “Soviet power and militancy, before the
Soviets cross the threshold o f ability to inflict critical damage on the U.S.” 122 As the Task
Force saw it, that threshold was about five years.126 However, the group did reject the
idea of a date of maximum danger. Instead, they calculated when the Soviets might
conceivably possess enough atomic weapons to do considerable harm to the United

121 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 13.
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States, but they never labeled that a time of “maximum danger” like NSC 68.127 Certainly
they recognized an increased danger due to the nuclear age, but believed the Western
values and political system would be the stronger system in the long run.128
To strengthen the Western system, which rested on the “essential dignity and
worth o f the individual in a free society,” a “climate of victory” had to be created through
“political action a n d . . .paramilitary, economic and covert operations.”129 To do this,
Task Force C proposed numerous courses of action to follow. Educating the American
people about the nature o f the Soviet threat was important to securing public support for
the necessary costs of building a stronger military establishment. Utilizing every aspect
of American technological and industrial strength was vital to stay ahead of the Soviets.
Exploiting favorable positions through diplomacy and negotiations would improve the
American political position. Limitation of long-term political commitments was needed
to guarantee American initiative and freedom of action. The policy called for a disabling
o f the Communist apparatus in the free world, including outlawing the Communist Party
in the United States. Finally, covert action was important to the disruption of the Soviet
system and the United States was to seize every opportunity to discredit and confuse the
enemy. Such action should create a climate of victory and lure “doubting nations to our
side.”130
As American allies were most likely to oppose such aggressive action, Task Force
C suggested that the “full scope of the plan would be revealed to them only gradually as

127 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 11.
128 Ibid., 18.
129 Summaries, FRUS. 1952-54, 2:417; Report to the National Security Council by Task Force C, 77.
130 Summaries, 418.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

102
successes were won.” 131 However, Task Force C fully supported present commitments to
NATO and recognized that the allies were essential in consolidating the strength o f the
free world. In Europe, Task Force C called for a united and rearmed Germany fully
integrated into the European community. At a minimum, a rearmed West Germany loyal
to the West and a neutralized East Germany would be acceptable. France had to be firmly
told that delays in mutual security interests would no longer be accepted. In particular,
the Task Force urged the United States to “feel less constrained to subject its actions
outside the scope of the NATO commitment to the veto of NATO partners, specifically
France and the United Kingdom.” 132 However, foreign aid had to continue to the
American allies “for as long as the cold war continues.” 133
Strengthening the American military posture, offensively and defensively, was
key to carrying out the objectives outlined in Alternative C. Since Task Force C
envisioned the need for a greater military establishment, a basic system o f universal
military training and service was suggested, as was stockpiling equipment reserves,
increasing scientific and technological research and development, accelerating
improvements in continental defense, and strengthening the atomic program. Deploying
additional troops to sensitive areas and preparing for early mobilization o f
reinforcements could also strengthen the military’s position. Weakening that position
through disarmament discussions and restrictive regional pacts had to be minimized.134
Elsewhere in the world, Task Force C agreed with Task Force A on a number o f
points. The policy argued for Japan was essentially the same, and both agreed that a
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communist defeat in Indochina was vital. Task Force C sought to establish a closer USFrench military collaboration in Indochina. It also sought to use Nationalist Chinese
forces to retake the island of Hainan and conduct military operations against Communist
China. A strict embargo was to remain against Communist China and the country was not
to be seated in the United Nations “or any other international body.” 135
Just as important as military strength was propaganda and covert operations. Task
Force C maintained that there were two deficiencies preventing propaganda and covert
successes. First was the “lack o f a national strategy to end the cold war by winning it.”
Second, the U.S. lacked a central command post to oversee that resources were properly
committed to wining the cold war.136 The Task Force concluded “Containment is sterile
as a continuing policy.” 137 Instead o f waiting for the Soviet Union to disintegrate, Task
Force C actively sought an end to the cold war on American terms and prevented any
further substantial Soviet aggression. The United States could not continue to live with
the Soviet threat and had to destroy it.138 In fact, Task Force C predicted that by 1965 the
Soviet satellites would be freed, “or in such a state of disaffection with the U.S.S.R. as to
constitute a serious weakness rather than strength in the Soviet bloc.” 139
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You Can’t Get There from Here: Combining the Reports
At the end o f their presentations, Eisenhower remarked that he had “never
attended a better or more persuasively presented staff job.”140 “Beautifully presented,”
Eisenhower wrote in his notes, they “all seemed to believe” in their alternative.141 C.D.
Jackson called it a fascinating performance, one which demonstrated “real brains” and
thoughtful execution.142 The Task Forces had taken their assignments seriously and
thoughtfully. What was so impressive was that each Task Force stayed on course within
its given parameters. As Kennan had said, not all the members liked being boxed into a
specific line to argue, but all did so, and with skill and eloquence. It was this kind of
discipline Eisenhower looked for in such committees.
After praising the Task Forces for a job well done, Eisenhower made a few
observations. He noted that the argument in Alternative B for a global war as a defense of
freedom was “almost [a] contradiction in terms.”14j Global war was, as he saw it, a no
win situation. “The only thing worse than losing a global war was winning one,”
Eisenhower told the group, because “there would be no individual freedom after the next
global war.” 144 Eisenhower also warned that any national security policy that asked the
American people to bear more than they were willing would result in government
controls, the loss o f more o f the individual liberty the government was trying to protect,
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and ultimately the creation of “a garrison state.”145 If, therefore, the U.S. adopted a
national security policy which required increased expenditures and increased taxes,
“there must be a vigorous campaign to educate the people...and our allies.”146 Kennan
later remembered that Eisenhower had a total grasp on what had been presented and had
a “mastery of the subject matter and a thoughtfulness and penetration that were quite
remarkable,” leaving him to conclude that Eisenhower was a “much more intelligent man
than he was given credit for being.” 147
Eisenhower also remarked that he thought there were “many similarities in the
three presentations ”148 For example, he noted that there were elements of Alternative B
in Alternative C .149 Also, the recommendations for covert operations and psychological
warfare within Alternative C appealed to Eisenhower, who had had a long predisposition
for such actions.150 Believing that the United States and Western Europe were safe from
Soviet attack, Eisenhower was convinced of the argument that the periphery was
susceptible to subversion. As such, Eisenhower “indicated that there was still more for
the Task Forces to do.”151 He ordered the three groups to agree upon the best features of
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each report and create a unified report to be used as a basic national security policy.152
Not an easy task.
The task groups were exhausted and resisted Eisenhower’s request153 Explaining
that “the essential differences o f approach between Task Forces A and C cannot be
reconciled,” the Task Forces did not see how a synthesis could be achieved.154 Cutler
briefed Eisenhower on the Task Forces’ resistance and Eisenhower was obviously
disgusted. He told Cutler to work something out that he believed was reasonable.155 On
Sunday, July 26, John Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles, C.D. Jackson, Cutler, and Beedle
Smith all met to decide how to start on integrating the reports into a national security
policy. It was finally decided that the first step was for Cutler to write some kind of paper
to present to the NSC.156 Cutler worked on writing summaries of the three reports, in
conjunction with task force members, to be presented to the Council as a basis for
discussion at their upcoming July 30 meeting.157
At the July 30 NSC meeting, Cutler distributed his two page memorandum which
served, in his words, “as an admirable kick-off for an hour’s discussion.”158 The first
page summarized the arguments o f each Task Force. The second page proposed a “new
basic concept” to serve as a jumping off point for a committee to draft a new basic
national security policy. This new concept was to accomplish five tasks: 1) build a strong
offensive capability, continental defense capability, and mobilization capability; 2)
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secure loyal allies in Europe and Asia; 3) limit future foreign aid; 4) make a public
statement that should the Soviets cross beyond their present borders, they risked general
war with the United States, and; 5) selectively reduce Soviet power and influence in its
satellites and in the free world. Cutler also noted that a “climate of victory,” discussed by
Task Force C, should be sought in the near future to “bolster the morale and strength of
the free world,” part o f Eisenhower’s ‘Great Equation.’ Some of the aggressive actions
suggested by Task Force C against the Soviet satellite and the subsequent increased risks
o f general war would be acceptable. Task Force A had placed the risk o f general war
extremely high if such aggressive action were taken, but Cutler’s memo said that the risk
o f war was “less grave at the present moment than” Task Force A had surmised.159 After
the memo was distributed, Eisenhower observed that the “new concept” was, in effect,
creating a Task Force D - a committee to prepare a report based on the other three
reports.160
After much discussion, Eisenhower approved that the Planning Board, not a new
task force would draft a new basic national security policy using the Solarium reports as
a starting point. Using the Planning Board had the obvious advantage of allowing
representatives from the other departments to be included in policy making. Those Task
Force members who were able to stay on in D.C. worked with the Planning Board.161 In
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addition to Planning Board members and task force members, Wilson insisted that the
newly appointed Joint Chiefs of Staff have an opportunity to comment162
However, it was clear from the meeting on the 30th that the final policy
conclusions would not be easily decided. Questions arose as to the status of Greece and
Turkey, and the Middle East in general, as those areas were not addressed in Cutler’s
memo. Secretary Humphrey immediately had problems over the implied military build
up of the memo and asked if a less expensive means of carrying out policy might be
achieved. Eisenhower repeated his position that security was not going to be arbitrarily
sacrificed for the economy and reminded Humphrey that “it was part of our policy to
build up our capability for action.” 163 Debates as to how the new policy would address
situations like the one developing in Guatemala and in the Middle East, particularly with
Iranian oil, indicated that the Planning Board had a formidable task in front o f it.
The next day, Cutler modified his two page memo to reflect the Council’s
discussion. The new “Points for Consideration in Drafting New Policy,” now had six
tasks outlined: 1) build a strong offensive capability, continental defense capability and
mobilization capability at the “lowestfeasible cost;" 2) secure loyal allies in Europe,
Asia, and the Middle East; 3) limit future foreign aid; 4) determine i f there was a line o f
no aggression which the Soviets could not cross without risking general war with the
United States; 5) selectively reduce Soviet power and influence in its satellites; and 6)
use means other than the military to eliminate Soviet power and influence in the free
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world.104 It was this memo that the Planning Board was to use to draft policy. Dulles,
however, made clear to his man on the Planning Board, Robert Bowie, that the July 3 1st
“Points for Consideration” memo was only to be used as a guideline, not as a binding
position paper.165 Regardless, the final policy paper, NSC 162/2, closely reflected the
goals o f Cutler’s memo which, in turn, reflected the ‘Great Equation’ and the strategic
thinking o f Eisenhower - build an effective deterrent force though nuclear weapons,
protect second-strike capabilities through continental defense, and rely on means other
than general or limited war to win the Cold war.
Robert Bowie had been selected by Dulles in April to replace Paul Nitze as
director o f the Policy Planning Staff affective May 28.166 Dulles thought highly o f the
Harvard Law professor, thinking he was well qualified for the position.167 Cutler later
commented that Bowie was “one o f the best minds I had ever come in contact with.” 168
Bowie, as director of the PPS, was also the State Department’s representative on the NSC
Planning Board, a combined position which Dulles called “one of the most important
assignments there is.” 169 Bowie went right to work coordinating the drafting of the new
policy paper.
As Bowie saw it, the Planning Board did not have to devote lots o f time to the
policy suggestions of Alternative A since it argued along lines of current policy. The
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broad question for the Planning Board was whether or not to adopt any o f the positions
held by Alternatives B and C.170 Bowie observed that the three Solarium reports had
many similarities. All agreed that the United States needed allies for any long term
security objectives and should cultivate strong relations with current allies. All agreed too
on the central importance of American policy toward Europe, especially Germany,
France, and Britain. They also agreed that it was vital to avoid a general war with the
Soviet Union. Each group stressed strengthening current continental defense systems for
security and retaliation options. And, finally, all concluded that current defense levels
probably needed to be increased and that the necessary increases could be withstood by
the economy and the American people.171
In addition, despite outward appearances, all three reports seemed generally to
portray the threat from the Soviet Union in essentially the same way, rejecting the idea of
a date of maximum danger and focusing on Soviet atomic capability. But few, according
to General Goodpaster, really believed that the Soviets “would undertake an aggressive
use o f force against us.” 172 Certainly this was a different perspective than the authors of
NSC 68 had. The danger all three perceived was in the American relationships with her
allies, particularly with France, which was seen as weak, and with Germany, which the
Soviets still threatened.173 The Planning Board used these similarities as a base for its

169 Letter Dulles to Griswald, 4/7/53, EL, JFD Papers, JFD Chronological Series, Box 2, “April 1-31, 1953
(4 )”
170 Procedure for NSC Handling o f “Solarium” Project, Bowie to Dulles, 7/29/53, NA, RG 59, OCB/NSC,
1947-63, Box 122, “Solarium Project.”
171 Memorandum from Bowie, 7/18/53, RG 59, Records o f the PPS, 1947-53, Working Papers, Box 66,
“Review o f Basic National Policy, NSC 153-162, June-Aug 1953.”
172 “Project Solarium; A Collective Oral History,” 16.
173 Ibid.
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policy paper, but it also incorporated the JCS report which Eisenhower had requested
back in early July.

The Joint Chiefs of Staffs Contribution
After intensive study on board the Navy’s yacht Sequoia in early August, the Joint
Chiefs were ready to submit their conclusions to Wilson on August 8. The August 8
memorandum, which was signed by all four Chiefs o f Staff, concluded that U.S. troops
were over committed in the peripheries. To rectify this situation, the report recommended
that priority be given to defending U.S. continental borders first, that American troops be
withdrawn from overseas, and that “a clear, positive policy” regarding nuclear weapons
be put forth.174 The report was discussed at the NSC meeting on August 27. Making clear
that the report was unanimous, but only based on their individual experience and not on
staff supported research, Admiral Radford explained to the Council that a redeployment
o f troops was needed. Acknowledging that such a concept would require the full
cooperation o f American allies, he also explained that Congressional cooperation was
needed too since deficit spending would continue for the estimated two years it would
take to implement.175 However, the Joint Chiefs estimated that their policy would be less
expensive than current policy once the initial changes were made. Humphrey called the
report “terrific” and said it was “the most important thing that had happened in this
country since January 20.”

17 6

Naturally Humphrey was enthusiastic over the report’s

174 Memorandum to Wilson, 8/8/53, EL, WHO NSCS, Disaster File, Box 11, “NSC 162/2 (1).”
175 August 27/53 NSC Meeting and Memo to Wilson, 8/8/53, both in EL, WHO NSCS, Disaster File, Box
11, “NSC 162/2(1).”
176 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 160lh Meeting o f the NSC, 8/27/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:447.
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financial conclusions, but others, less concerned about budgetary reductions, questioned
the report.
Dulles and Nixon were both concerned about the maintenance o f overseas bases.
Dulles assumed that the Joint Chiefs advocated a foreign policy that protected those
bases, but worried about redeployment of troops. Radford assured the group that although
it was desired that large numbers of U.S. personnel be brought home, the bases would
continue to operate in a state of effective readiness with indigenous personnel taking over
many tasks American personnel currently performed. Available trained reserves were
almost used up, Radford explained, and it was time for the American allies “to supply
more men for the task of common defense.” 177 Radford agreed with C.D. Jackson’s belief
that such a large redeployment o f American troops was going to be interpreted abroad as
America retreating back to her fortress. However, Radford said that the problems of
America’s present deployment o f troops was just as serious a problem and that it was a
question of balancing “one evil against another.” 178 Regardless, Dulles had grave
concerns over public opinion overseas and cautioned against rapid implementation of the
policy without first consulting the NATO allies.179
Since the biggest impact o f withdrawing troops would be felt in Korea, Japan, and
Central Europe, Dulles stressed the need for a strong deterrent in atomic and air power to
insure the security of these areas. Radford agreed, stating that tactical and strategic use of
atomic weapons should be used in the event of a major conflict. America was spending
vast sums o f money on these weapons and it was high time that the public taboo on using

177 Ibid., 445-446.
178 Ibid., 448.
179 Ibid., 450.
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them be removed.180 General Twining agreed fully with everything Radford had outlined.
Admiral Camey seemed uncertain about many issues and General Ridgway was
completely opposed to replacing American troops with allied forces. “If NATO got any
inkling of the content of this new concept,” Ridgway warned, “the NATO powers would
almost certainly construe it as an abandonment, and the consequences would be
terrifying.” 181 By the end of the meeting, despite the fact the report had been signed by all
four Chiefs, it seemed clear that the Joint Chiefs’ report was not accepted unanimously
and further work had to be done, particularly by the Psychological Strategy Board in
terms of public relations and the Planning Board in terms of the Solarium project.182

NSC 162/2: “The New Look”
As the Planning Board worked on drafting the new national security policy, it
became evident that there were three major areas of disagreement among the
participants: the budget, redeployment of troops, and the use of atomic weapons. In the
final policy paper, all three were the subjects of compromise.
The budget dispute was reduced to two sides, defined by Cutler as Side A and
Side B. Side A recognized the Soviet threat as the primary threat to the United States and
insisted security needs must prevail over concerns about the economy, in a continuation
of the Truman policies. Side B identified a dual threat to the United States —an external
threat from the Soviets and an internal threat from a weak economy. A balance between
meeting both threats was called for by Side B. Humphrey and Dodge enthusiastically

180 Ibid., 446-447.
181 Ibid., 454.
182 Ibid., 452-453.
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supported Side B while Wilson criticized their position. Dulles too rejected any policy
that called for a balanced budget at whatever cost, which he believed Humphrey and
Dodge advocated. Furthermore, Dulles wanted to know why defense was always the
target o f budget cuts and questioned why $2 billion continued to be spent a n n u a lly on
agricultural price supports. Conversely, the JCS advocated a policy that called for a
strong military posture at whatever cost. Eisenhower was not sympathetic to that policy,
saying that “we could lick the world if we were willing to adopt the system of Adolf
Hitler.” 183 In the end, the final policy paper, NSC 162/2, reflected the ‘Great Equation.’ It
included a weak economy as a threat to national security stating that a “strong, healthy
and expanding U.S. economy is essential to the security and stability o f the free
world.”184 But, it also included elements o f Side A, stating that America must “meet the
necessary costs of the policies essential for its security.” 185
The issue of redeploying troops was also defined by Side A and Side B. Side A
was a reflection of the Planning Board’s position and rejected a major redeployment
from Europe and Asia, but would consider a study on partial redeployment. Side B
believed that, with Allied understanding and support, redeployment o f American
personnel ought to be carried out within the next few years.186 Side B reflected the policy
set forth by Admiral Radford and the JCS in their earlier report, a report that Eisenhower
had remarked was “a crystallized and clarified statement o f this Administration’s

183 Memorandum o f Meeting at the 165* Meeting o f the NSC, 10/7/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:514-519.
184 Report to the NSC, 162/2, 10/30/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:593-594.
185 Ibid.
186 Memorandum o f Meeting at the 165th Meeting o f the NSC, 10/7/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:526.
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understanding o f our national security objectives since World War II.”187For
Eisenhower, whose strategic thinking renounced the policy of limited war, there was no
need for a large deployment of American servicemen in Europe or Asia. Radford
reiterated his support for Side B, and Dulles agreed that the position seemed sound. But
as before, he still worried about public opinion abroad and the reaction of NATO allies if
they were to find out this policy too soon. Eisenhower agreed that the key phrase in Side
B was “with the understanding of our Allies.”188 Humphrey argued for immediate
redeployment to save costs, but Eisenhower, Dulles and Radford cautioned against hasty
actions that could seriously undermine the European coalition. Again, Eisenhower placed
greater emphasis on all sides o f the ‘Great Equation,’ rather than on just the budgetary
side. In the end, the issue of redeployment of troops went unresolved in the final NSC
162/2 policy paper. There was unanimous agreement that the U.S. was over committed
and needed a redeployment o f troops. However, the policy also stated that “any major
withdrawal o f U.S. troops from Europe or the Far East would be interpreted as a
diminution o f U.S. interest in the defense o f these areas and would seriously undermine
the strength and cohesion o f the coalition.” 189 So although troops ought to be redeployed,
NSC 162/2 left the timing of when they would be called home vague.
The issue o f atomic weapons had been debated at length in early 1953 in a
Korean context, but no resolution was ever finalized. Dulles and Nixon inquired into
their use at the NSC meeting with the Joint Chiefs on August 27, and Admiral Radford
had taken a strong position for their tactical and strategic use. The issue arose again

187Eisenhower was in Denver during the NSC meeting with the JCS on August 27 and was briefed by
Cutler. See: Memorandum by Cutler, 9/3/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:456.
188Memorandum o f Meeting at the 165th Meeting o f the NSC, 10/7/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:526.
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during NSC 162 discussions. Wilson suggested in mid-October that the Council decide
upon what kind of shift in emphasis from conventional weapons to atomic weapons they
were willing to make before the Joint Chiefs came up with a “new look” for American
military strategy. Humphrey argued for a settlement on the issue, saying that “only their
[atomic weapons] use on a broad scale could really change the program of the Defense
Department and cut the costs o f the military budget.” 190 Wilson put it more bluntly when
he asked, “Do we intend to use weapons on which we are spending such great sums, or
do we not?”191 Eisenhower and Dulles were rather quiet on the issue, but American
nuclear capability was a key part of the President’s strategic thinking. Eisenhower did not
intend to use the weapons he was spending such great sums on, but he did want the
symbolic power they held. Historian Richard Immerman explained that nuclear weapons
held for Eisenhower a deterrent value through Massive Retaliation, but that the President
was aware that that deterrent was unsuitable for combating subversion. Instead,
Eisenhower used “nuclear saber rattling” as a way “to get and keep Moscow’s
attention.” 192 Therefore, building a nuclear offensive was the key to deterrence, but that
nuclear offensive was not something Eisenhower intended to use.
The previous draft to NSC 162/2 stated that the United States required “a strong
military posture, with emphasis on the capability of inflicting massive retaliatory damage
by offensive striking power.” The Joint Chiefs, with the exception o f Radford, wanted

189 Report to the NSC, 162/2, 10/30/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:593.
190 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 166111Meeting o f the NSC, 10/13/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:547.
191 Memorandum ofMeeting at the 165th Meeting o f the NSC, 10/7/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:533.
192 Immerman, “Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist,” 340. For a discussion on Massive retaliation,
see Chapter 5.
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the phrase ‘with emphasis on’ replaced with ‘to include.’193 As historian Saki Dockrill
pointed out, the difference between ‘emphasis’ and ‘include’ was critical. ‘Include’
implied a military posture that resembled NSC 68. ‘Emphasis’ reflected a significant
break from NSC 68. Although Eisenhower saw the debate over the words as academic,
he preferred ‘emphasis,’ which more accurately reflected his thinking.194 Cutler
suggested noting in the final draft the Joint Chiefs’ dissent, but Eisenhower said no,
reminding Cutler that the JCS were merely his advisers, it was he who made the
decisions.195 In the end, the use of atomic weapons was not clearly defined, in part,
because only Eisenhower could decide when to use them.196
With the major debates taken care of, NSC 162/2 was finally approved on
October 30,1953. The final assessment was that there was little chance the Soviets
would deliberately attack the U.S., but war through mistake or miscalculation could not
be ruled out. If an attack did occur, the Soviets had an ability to inflict serious damage on
the United States. As such, it was estimated that an arms race would continue indefinitely
between the two countries to improve power positions. Although the United States would
not initiate war, in the event o f hostilities, atomic weapons were available for use just
like other munitions. NSC 162/2 also accepted massive retaliation and the military force
necessary for that, but also argued for flexible mobile forces to punish aggression short of

193 Memorandum by the JCS to Wilson, 10/27/53, 563.
194 Said Dockrill, Eisenhower's New Look National Security Policy, 1953-61, (New York: St. Martin’s,
1996), 41.
195 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 168th Meeting o f the NSC, 10/29/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:573-574.
196 Beedle Smith explained that the purpose o f the paragraph in NSC 162/2 concerning atomic weapon use
was primarily to give the military the go ahead to make plans based on availability o f atomic weapons, but
that the paragraph did not imply atomic weapons would be used in the case o f any hostilities. Only the
President was to decide on what action to take against hostilities. See Memorandum Smith to Eisenhower,
12/22/53, EL, WHO NSCS, Executive Secretary Subject File, Box 5, “#19 Policy re: Use o f nuclear
weapons (file #1) (1).”
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massive retaliation. In addition to the massive atomic capability, continental defense and
an adequate mobilization base were required for national security.197 Increasing research
and development was crucial as was the development o f an intelligence system.198 These
recommendations would be further pursued by the Killian Committee a year later.
A theme repeated in Cutler’s memo and the Solarium task force reports for strong
allies capable o f defending the continent was repeated in NSC 162/2. America was not
capable o f meeting the cost o f defense without allied help, and the report stated bluntly
that “in the interest of its own security, the United States must have the support of
allies.” 199 The policy called for building a “strong, united stable Germany,” but in the
end, Kennan did not see any o f his German recommendations implemented.200 Yet, his
Task Force’s suggestions on negotiation were used. The policy recommended keeping
open all possibilities o f negotiating with both the Soviet Union and China on whatever
issues may be possible.201
Insightfully, the document predicted that even though the Soviet-China alliance
was firm, in the future China might go off on her own and strain its relationship with the
Soviets. Elsewhere in Asia, the policy towards Japan outlined in Alternative A was
included as was the promise to protect the security of the off-shore islands and Korea.
Bilateral and multilateral agreements had to be maintained until Japan could assume a

197Report to the NSC, 162/2, 10/30/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:590-591.
198 Ibid., 582.
199 Ibid., 591, 583.
200 Ibid., 592.
201 Ibid., 594.
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leadership role.202 Furthermore, NSC 162/2 stated, as had the task forces, that Indochina
was o f great strategic importance and would be protected.203
Looking towards the “uncommitted areas of the world,” NSC 162/2 recognized
that many third world nations were antagonistic to the West, but nevertheless aid had to
be dispersed to attempt to help them in political and economic growth. “Although largely
undeveloped,” the report stated, “their vast manpower, their essential raw materials and
their potential for growth are such that their absorption within the Soviet system would
greatly, perhaps decisively, alter the world balance of power to our detriment.”204
Committing aid to these areas was therefore essential, as Task Force A had
recommended. Along the same line, in a passage practically straight out of Alternative A,
NSC 162/2 stated that in the face of the Soviet threat, the United States and its allies had
to “ always seek to create and sustain the hope and confidence o f the free world in the
ability of its basic ideas and institutions not merely to oppose the communist threat, but
to provide a way of life superior to Communism.”205 In other words, talking about liberty
just might stop people from becoming communists after all.
Foreign aid was another area which could assist in the fight against SovietCommunism without using the military. Cutler’s policy memo had recommended
limiting foreign aid, and the question was debated in Council meetings. Foreign aid was
always an area where Congress looked to make budget cuts, but Eisenhower believed that
with foreign aid, “the United States is getting more for its money than in any other”

202 Ibid.,
203 Ibid.,
204 Ibid.,
205 Ibid.,
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area/00 In the end, NSC 162/2 agreed to limit foreign aid, but continue it “according to
the calculated advantage o f such aid to the U.S. world position.”207
Finally, NSC 162/2 recognized that American nuclear superiority would not last
and that, when it eroded, the world situation would change. As the last paragraph said,
“The foregoing conclusions are valid only so long as the United States maintains a
retaliatory capability that cannot be neutralized by a surprise Soviet attack. Therefore,
there must be continuing examination and periodic report to the NSC in regard to the
likelihood o f such neutralization of U.S. retaliatory capability.”208 National security
needs continued to be reevaluated through Eisenhower’s tenure and NSC 162/2 was not
the last basic national security policy. NSC 162/2 was a blueprint for the kind of national
security policy that Eisenhower desired, accurately reflecting the three sides of the ‘Great
Equation:’ building a spiritual resolve while meeting the Soviet threat without severely
undermining the economy.209
But the document did not end Eisenhower’s battles over the budget. After
Eisenhower’s Defense Reorganization message of April 30, Stuart Symington and other
Democrats criticized the Eisenhower budget for its substantial cuts in the Air Force
budget. Now, with NSC 162/2, Democrats were unable to criticize the role of the Air
Force as the “New Look” gave primary emphasis to that branch. However, although
airpower was given a greater piece of the budget pie, overall defense allocations were
reduced, concerning many Democrats. As historian Gary Reichard explained, the New

206 Letter Eisenhower to Gruenther, 5/4/53, EL, AWF, DDE Diaries, Box 3, “December 1952- July 1953
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207 Report to the NSC, 162/2, 10/30/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:593.
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Look appeared to Democrats like Albert Gore, Hubert Humphrey, Herbert Lehman, Mike
Mansfield, and A.S. Mike Monroney to “represent an unsafe overemphasis on air-atomic
power and a penny-pinching approach in general.”210 The battle would continue as
Eisenhower sought a way to achieve a “bigger bang for the buck,” looking to the
Technological Capabilities Panel in early 1954.

NSC 162/2 did not look all that different from what was in existence before the
Solarium project. What made it different was that it had what Kennan called a “greater
stamp of presidential approval” than before.211 NSC 162/2 reflected the views held by
Kennan and his containment policy. The flexibility offered in Kennan’s conclusions fit
well with Eisenhower’s desire for a policy which was not “frozen to certain positions in
advance of events.”212 Even though it seemed like Eisenhower favored a more Kennanlike approach from the May 8th Solarium Room discussion with Dulles, the subsequent
Solarium Exercise allowed Eisenhower to get respected civilian outsiders, as well as his
national security staff, to participate in the development of the administration’s first basic
National Security paper and be part of the decision-making process. By stacking the deck
through membership selection and narrow assignments, Eisenhower was able to re
examine containment, bury rollback, and build a team consensus for his ‘NewLook.’
Eisenhower supported the general aims o f containment, but felt like they had
been clouded by NSC 68. The Solarium Exercise allowed for a general reexamination of
policy which was important. Eisenhower needed to take a close look at the Truman

210 Reichard, “Divisions and Dissent,” 55.
211 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 5.
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policies which had been established to deal with the Soviet threat As Kennan said,
Eisenhower could not just say because ‘Truman and Acheson though that this was the
way things ought to be;... I accept all of this automatically.”213 Since Eisenhower had a
responsibility to evaluate the old Democratic system to find its strengths and weak points,
Solarium allowed him to do that and bring it to the American people as his own.
In addition to making containment his own, the Solarium Exercise allowed
Eisenhower to bury the campaign pledge for a rollback policy. NSC 162/2 did use some
o f the rhetoric from Task Force C to enhance political containment by adding covert
action. Since the Soviets had firm control over their satellites which would be difficult to
break, NSC 162/2 called for “overt and covert measures to discredit Soviet prestige and
ideology.”214 Overall, however, the primary goal of Alternative C, rollback, had been
buried as a policy option even though Alternative C never advocated military action
General Goodpaster and Robert Bowie both agree that burying rollback was one of the
goals Eisenhower had for the Solarium Project.215
Finally, the Solarium Project clarified the general outlook of the new
administration and, as Kennan said, prodded “a lot of people in the Washington
bureaucracy, military, and civilian, into taking a new look at things we had been trying to
do, and see whether they could not improve on our previous performance.”216 For
example, the conclusions of Task Force C, which did not advocate the use o f force, was
helpful for Dulles in combating some o f the talk and proposals coming out o f the

212 Memorandum Discussion at 149th Meeting o f the NSC, 6/11/53, EL AWF, NSC Series, Box 4, “ 149th
Meeting ofNSC 6/9/53.”
213 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 19.
214 Report to the NSC, 162/2, 10/30/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:595.
215 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History,” 13-14, 22.
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Pentagon, and the absence of radical ideas involving the dangerous use of force allowed
Eisenhower to avoid force for eight years.217 Ultimately, the Solarium Project was
characteristic o f Eisenhower, who liked to have, in the words of Goodpaster, “very
thorough, comprehensive evaluations made, targeted ultimately on specific options and
018

specific lines o f policy.”" By having experts evaluate a specific question and report
back on it to the NSC, Eisenhower was able to have his top policy makers hear the key
arguments, recommendations, and background. This approach allowed everyone around
Eisenhower to understand the policy line and get behind him when he said this is the way
•

•

•

i

it is going to be.

219

Reflecting back on his military service, Eisenhower set straight away to
reorganize the National Security Council into an efficient advising body. Using that
forum, he established an ad-hoc committee of brilliant men to act as a debating team to
reevaluate national security policy. The committee took its tasks seriously and stayed
within the parameters of its assignment. The result was a remarkable and unique exercise
in American national security history, giving Eisenhower his “new look” in foreign
policy. However, as NSC 162/2 accurately predicted, the nature of the Soviet threat
continued to change. With nuclear weapon development and the increasing possibility of
surprise attack, Eisenhower turned to another committee of bright young fellows to
evaluate how American superiority in science and technology could be harnessed for the
enhancement o f national security.

216 Ibid., 8.
217 Ibid., 14.
218 Ibid., 10-11.
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CHAPTER THREE

“GONE ARE THE DAYS WHEN MADNESS WAS CONFINED”:
CONTINENTAL DEFENSE AND THE THREAT OF SURPRISE ATTACK

Protected by two vast oceans on either side, the United States had little fear of
surprise attack throughout her history until December 7, 1941 when the Japanese
delivered a devastating blow on Pearl Harbor. The attack on Pearl Harbor left a vivid
imprint that the shores o f America were vulnerable. The dawning o f the Cold War and
atomic age only added to the feeling of vulnerability.1As weapon technology advanced,
concern over the threat o f surprise attack grew. Once the Soviet Union had long-range
bombing capabilities, surprise attack was not limited to American shores. Rather, any
strategic city could be the next Pearl Harbor and, as such, a continental defense system
was needed. An early warning system, anti-aircraft guns, interceptors, and data
processing facilities were the new necessities for national security. In addition, with the
successful testing of a Soviet hydrogen bomb just months after the Solarium exercise had
been completed, an enemy weapon stockpile that recently had seemed modest was now,

1 In reference to a meeting which set up the Technological Capabilities Panel in 1954, CIA member Richard
Bissell said that “this was at a time when the Pearl Harbor surprise attack was still very much on everyone’s
mind.” Quote from an interview with Bissell by Burrows in William Burrows, Deep Black: Space Espionage
and National Security, (New York: Random House, 1986), 69.
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as one presidential advisor observed, “potentially devastating.”2 Not only was surprise
attack a threat, but by 1953, with the thermonuclear revolution, the consequence of war
was terrifying - rather than face just defeat and surrender a nation could now face
extinction/
In part to prevent a surprise attack from happening again, the Truman
administration established the CIA, but spent little effort on securing a strong continental
defense program.4 Believing that American nuclear superiority was a strong enough
deterrent and plagued by inter-service rivalries, Truman left office in 1953 without a
clear national security policy and an inadequate continental defense program.5 Faced
with growing concern over the thermonuclear revolution, surprise attack, and a deficient
continental defense, Eisenhower had to balance the needs for a strong defense with his
Great Equation. As he saw it, the American people faced a terrible threat, for which there
was no response without imposing ever-greater controls on the economy and American
freedom. “We had been trying,” explained the President, “to have our cake and eat it at
the same time.”6 The challenge was to devise methods to meet the Soviet threat without
adopting controls that would transform America into a garrison state. It was a tall order
in light of the devastating implications of the nuclear age. It certainly seemed to many by
1953 that the words o f poet Martyn Skinner rang true:

2 Letter DuBridge to Flemming, 5/24/54, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Subject Series, Box 104,
“World W a rm (1),” 1.
3 H.W. Brands, “The Age o f Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Security State,” American
Historical Review Vol. 94 No. 4, (October 1989), 964.
4 Dwayne Day, John Logsdon, Brian Latell, eds., Eye in the Sky: the story o f the Corona Spy Satellites,
(Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), 29.
5 In February 1953, the Policy Planning Staff concluded that American continental defense was totally
inadequate and in February 1954 the NSC concurred, particularly in light of recent Soviet thermonuclear
capabilities. See FRUS, 1952-54,2:231-234; 611-624.
6 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 163"* Meeting o f the NSC, 9/24/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:469.
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Gone are the days when madness was confined
By seas or hills from spreading through Mankind.7
Eisenhower took a hard look at continental defenses during the first year of his
administration. The NSC, in addition to a handful o f ad-hoc study groups, evaluated the
new needs for national security and concluded time after time that American defenses
were inadequate. Furthermore, advances in technology complicated strategy and a
comprehensive defense program. By early 1954 Eisenhower was confronted by growing
concerns over surprise attack and was still without specific programs that could promise
protection against a Soviet air attack.

Strategy and Surprise in the Nuclear Age

The advent of the nuclear age brought with it changes in strategic thinking and
concerns over deterrence, surprise attack, preventive war, and continental defense. Harry
Truman was the first president to have to think about atomic strategy. President Truman
first learned a few details about the atomic bomb at a meeting with Secretary of War
Henry Stimson and the director of the Manhattan Project, General Leslie Groves, on
April 25,1945. During the meeting Stimson raised a number of notable points about the
atomic bomb. First, Stimson conveyed to Truman the power the bomb had to destroy a
city in a single blow and theorized that this weapon might destroy modem civilization.
He also conceded that the United States would not be able to hold on to an atomic
monopoly indefinitely and that it was up to America to demonstrate moral responsibility

7 Martyn Skinner, Letters to Malaya, Vol. It (London: Putnam, 1941). Quoted in James Killian, Sputnik,
Scientists, and Eisenhower, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), 52.
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and leadership to prevent world disaster. Stimson was also aware o f the potential the
bomb had in a surprise attack, explaining to Truman that in the future an adversary could
employ the bomb “suddenly and with devastating power.”8 The bomb might also end the
current war. Taking this all into account, Truman authorized its use.
August 6, 1945 signaled the end of World War II as the Japanese city of
Hiroshima fell victim to the world’s first atomic weapon. A war which began with Polish
cavalry fighting valiantly against an invading German army ended with the technological
revolution of atomic power. While the advent o f the nuclear age left the world in awe, it
left policy makers searching for answers to a seemingly deadly riddle. Once the United
States lost its atomic monopoly in 1949 the question arose whether any employment of
nuclear weapons could be sufficiently controlled to ensure the success of political
objectives. Was a nuclear strategy even possible or merely a contradiction in terms?9 As
the Cold War and nuclear weapons escalated throughout the decades, both U.S. and
Soviet policy makers continually had to evaluate and reformulate their respective nuclear
strategies. The United States proceeded on a course largely determined by pragmatic
considerations o f each administration and the dicta of a legal, commercial, and
democratic society. The Soviet Union relied on its more formulaic military doctrine to
guide strategy, which was shaped by its imperial, bureaucratic, and autocratic
traditions.10 Although influenced by different criteria and values, both powers’ primary

8 S. David Broscious, “Longing for International Control, Banking on American Superiority: Harry S
Truman’s Approach to Nuclear Weapons,” in John L. Gaddis, Philip Gordon, Ernest May, Jonathon
Rosenberg eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy since 1945, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999),16.
9 Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution o f Nuclear Strategy, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), xviii.
10 Fritz Ermath, “Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought,” in Derek Leebaert, ed., Soviet
Military Thinking, (Boston: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 68.
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aim was to establish some real strategic nuclear balance which would successfully
prevent a nuclear world war but be sufficient enough to win a general war if war was not
prevented. That meant developing a reliable military force capable of both deterring war
and delivering a massive retaliatory blow if war occurred.
Although the United States and Soviet Union formulated and implemented
strategy differently, ‘strategy’ may be defined in universal terms. General von Clausewitz
was the first to define strategy, as relative to war, in the early nineteenth century. He saw
war as a violent extension of politics which had to be constantly conducted with
sensitivity to the political objectives at stake.11 Strategy, to Clausewitz, was merely the
use of battles to forward the aim of policy. Although this definition served many of the
generals o f World War II well, it was not appropriate to a nuclear age. Strategist Basil
Liddell Hart offered a more meaningful definition when he defined strategy as “the art o f
distributing and applying military means to fulfill ends of policy.” 12 In essence very
Clausewitzian, this definition was useful in that it recognized the role of the political
sphere in deriving strategic objectives while using military means to fulfill those
objectives. Both the United States and Soviet Union, throughout the Cold War, broadly
defined strategy in this way, as can be seen with Eisenhower’s various NSC policies.
Eisenhower used military power, primarily in terms o f nuclear superiority, in order to
carry out the political aims of containment set forth in NSC 162/2.
Although Liddell Hart’s definition spoke o f “distributing and applying military
means,” many strategists worked from the premise that the very nature of the modem

11 Benjamin Lambeth, “How to Think About Soviet Military Doctrine,” Rand Corporation, February 1978,
5-6.
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military force had made it increasingly difficult to employ it to secure political objectives
forcibly. In other words, the destructiveness of nuclear weapons made it difficult to
actually use them to ensure political objectives. Instead, it became vital to know how to
use military force persuasively and how to manipulate the influence of nuclear arms on
nations during peace. Thomas Schelling, a strategist associated with the RAND
Corporation, associated this manipulation with putting the fear of God into one’s
opponent. Schelling warned, however, of the dangers of such a strategy since there
existed a level o f uncertainty.13 Yet, although it would seem that there was no foreseeable
route by which the Soviet Union and United States would become engaged in a nuclear
war, that in itself did not negate the possibility of war. As a result, Schelling reasoned, if
war did occur, it would “result from a process that [was] not entirely foreseen.” 14 In other
words, deterrence might not work.
Bernard Brodie, Schelling’s peer at RAND, pointed out that deterrence as a
strategy, which tries to create in the opponent’s mind “a feeling compounded of respect
and fear,” could “overshoot the mark.”15 For the United States, the situation was
particularly perilous. Brodie argued that it was possible to make the opponent fear its
aggressor too much with deterrence. The opponent, or the Soviet Union, could interpret

12 B Ji. Liddell Hart, Strategy: The Indirect Approach, (London: 1968), 334 quoted in Freedman, Evolution,
xvii.
13 The Soviets, recognizing both the dangers and advantages o f uncertainty, managed to manipulate the
uncertainty o f the U.S. to their great advantage between 1957-1962.
14 Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
15 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 392-397.
Brodie, Schelling and Albert Wohlstetter were three men associated with RAND who dominated the newly
emerging field o f “strategy” which historian Marc Trachtenberg called “a new field [in the 1950s] with a
distinct intellectual personality.” Trachtenberg credits these men, and a handful o f others, with creating
“enormously influential” ideas and styles o f analysis that “became the sophisticated way o f approaching
nuclear issues in the United States.” See Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1991), 3.
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American over-readiness to react as aggressive intent.10 Such was the case when Stalin
viewed the American atomic monopoly as reason enough to push ahead with a Soviet
atomic program and, in 1954, the Soviets viewed the decision by NATO to authorize
nuclear weapons as Western aggression in Europe.17 To people like Soviet Defense
Minister Nikolai Bulganin, such measures were proof of the West’s plan for surprise
attack. “We cannot assume that the imperialists are spending enormous material
resources and vast sums of money on armaments merely to frighten us,” he reasoned.
“Nor can we reckon on the humaneness o f the imperialists who, as life has shown, are
capable of using any weapons o f mass destruction.”18
Bulganin was only partly right. Although the United States was the only country
to use the ultimate weapon o f mass destruction, the atomic bomb, on another country, the
large atomic stockpile was meant only to frighten, or deter, the Soviets. Although both
the United States and Soviets agreed that the definition of deterrence was that of
restraining hostile action by the threat of severe punishment, deterrence became for
America the only meaningful objective of strategic nuclear forces; therefore Truman
concentrated efforts on atomic superiority as the ultimate deterrent Truman saw an
atomic stockpile as the only means to deter aggression. And, if the enemy should attack,
despite the threat o f American atomic stockpiles, retaliation was considered America’s
best hope of defense and such a retaliation would require a large stockpile. The result

16 Brodie, Strategy, 392-397. This was John Foster Dulles’ fear if the federal government sponsored a
massive civil defense shelter program.
17 See Chapter One and Vladislav M. Zubok, “Stalin and the Nuclear Age,” in John L. Gaddis et. al., Cold

War Statesmen.
18 Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1967), 19-25.
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was a policy o f atomic superiority under President Truman.17 Deterrence was only one of
many objectives for the Soviets. They continued to be occupied by the need for survival
in war should deterrence fail, concentrating efforts on continental and civil defense, for
example, while the United States all but ignored such precautions.20
For example, Stalin knew of American plans for aerial attack on the Soviet
Union, and often copies o f National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) prepared by the CIA
were handed to Stalin. “It is important to understand,” historian Vladislav Zubok
explained, “America planned to drop atomic bombs on the Soviet Union to defend
Western Europe. But Stalin saw those plans as a threat to destroy him in a surprise attack,
just as Hitler had sought to do.”21 To deter such an attack, Stalin took measures to
improve Soviet defenses around Moscow when he established a Third Chief Directorate
o f the Council Ministers in 1950 to design a defense for the capital.22 The group
suggested two rings o f radar and missile bases around the city designed to prevent even
one American bomber from penetrating. Construction began in 1952.23
While Stalin looked at improving continental defenses as a deterrent and Truman
relied on nuclear superiority, both sides worried about surprise attack and were
concerned that a massive surprise attack would be the opening shot of any war.24 Calling
upon recent history, many believed that war would start with another Pearl Harbor and

19 Freedman, Evolution, 33-34; 40-42.
20 Ermath, “Contrasts in Strategic Thought,” 55-58. For a history o f civil defense in the U.S. see chapter 6.
21 Vladislav M. Zubok, “Stalin and the Nuclear Age,” in John L. Gaddis et. al., Cold War Statesmen, 58.
22 Even though the United States did not have the air power in 1950 to strike the Soviet Union with its B-36
bombers, the next generation o f bombers, the B-47, had a range to strike their perimeter.
23 Zubok, 58.
24 N ot everyone was convinced that the atom bomb would give an overwhelming advantage to the surprise
attack in the debate during the late 1940’s. Strategist Bernard Brodie noted: “The element of surprise may
be less important than is generally assumed. If retaliation has to be accepted no victory is worth it.” Brodie
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that once the Soviets got the bomb, they would use it without warning.25 Paul Nitze for
one believed the Soviets were planning a surprise attack on the United States. In a
February 1950 Policy Planning Staff meeting with Secretary of State Dean Acheson,
Nitze concluded that the threat o f Soviet aggression was high and “considerably greater
than last fall.”26 It was also the Joint Chiefs’ opinion that the Soviet army was capable of
starting a major attack from a standstill, thereby not giving the West any warning time to
mobilize.27
A March 1950 State Department draft statement o f possible courses of action in
regards to the present world crisis remarked that “the advantages of the initiative and of
surprise are so great that a continuation of present trends may lead either the USSR or the
U.S. to seriously consider the advisability of a preventive attack,” and if the Soviets beat
the U.S. in obtaining hydrogen weapons, “the risks of decisive pressure or an attack
against the U.S. will be greatly increased.”28 These themes carried over into NSC 68
when Nitze wrote: “when it [the Soviet Union] calculates that it has sufficient atomic
capability to make a surprise attack on us, nullifying our atomic superiority and creating
a military situation decisively in its favor, the Kremlin might be tempted to strike swiftly
and with stealth.”29 Concern over surprise attack continued into the 1950s. According to
a 1953 report by a Special Subcommittee on the Soviet Union’s net capability to inflict

suggested that it was more likely, if both sides had bombs in quantity, that a non-atomic war would be
fought. Brodie, Absolute Weapon, 74, Brodie quoted in Freedman, Evolution, 43.
25 Buhite and Hamel, “War for Peace,” 370.
26 Record o f the Eighth Meeting (1950) o f the PPS, 2/2/50, FRUS, 1950, 1:142-143.
27 Ibid.
28 Terms o f Reference, 3/1/50, NA, RG 59, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Subject
Files o f the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Aerospace, 1950-66, Box 1.
29 A Report to the NSC by the Executive Secretary, 4/14/50, NSC 68, FRUS, 1950, 1:234-292.
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harm on the United States, the element of surprise was believed to be “the strongest
weapon in the Soviet arsenal.”30
Stalin disagreed, although he too had concerns about an American attack on the
Soviet Union. Stalin did not believe the element o f surprise could determine the victor in
war, nor that it was the strongest weapon in his arsenal.31 He did fear an American strike
on Soviet soil, as shown by the defense ring around Moscow. However, discussion about
surprise attack as part of military doctrine was not allowed under Stalin’s reign. It was,
however, taken up with passion after his death.
Stalin had been hailed as the “greatest military genius of modem times,” but his
critics claimed that his policy “hindered the development o f military-theoretical
thought’” 2 With his death in March 1953, Soviet military development was cut free from
the rigid autocracy of Stalin’s dictatorship. ” Debate on nuclear weapons and the
likelihood of war erupted after Stalin’s death in March 1953.34 By the mid-1950s,

30 Report o f the Special Evaluation Subcommittee o f the NSC, 5/18/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:337.
31 Stalin believed war’s outcome could only be determined by ‘’permanently operating factors” which were:
the stability of the rear, the morale o f the army, the quantity and quality o f divisions, the armament of the
army, and the organizational ability o f the commanders. Transitory factors like surprise or technological
advances in weaponry (the atomic bomb) could not change the essence o f war. As Stalin saw it, despite
Germany’s surprise attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, Hitler still succumbed to defeat because o f inferior
permanently operating factors. For more on Stalin and Soviet military doctrine see Herbert Dinerstein, War

and the Soviet Union: Nuclear Weapons and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking,
(New York: Praeger, 1962), 6-10; Raymond Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age, (New York:
Praeger, 1958), 60-65.
32 Major General Pukhovsky, 0 sovetskoi voennoi nauke (On Soviet Military Science), Voenizdat, Moscow,
(Nov. 16, 1953), 84-85 quoted in Garthoff, Soviet Strategy, 61.
33 For a discussion on the philosophies and uses o f the dialectic b Soviet doctrine see Harriet Fast Scott and
William Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formation, and Dissemination, (Boulder, CO :
Westview Press, 1988), 28. For discussion on the legacy o f Stalinist stagnation see Garthoff, Soviet
Strategy, 61-63.
34 David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 3638. At the end o f that year, the Ministry o f Defense ordered that “nuclear weapons and the particular
features o f preparing, conducting and securing an operation and combat b conditions o f the use o f such
weapons” should be studied. As a result, the General Staff Academy revised its research and teachbg
program radically. Red Star, the newspaper o f the Ministry o f Defense, began publishbg articles on the
subject o f nuclear weapons. Exercises were held to study possible anti-nuclear defense procedures, b early
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discussion rising from the decisiveness of the nuclear blow reintroduced surprise as a
determining factor in war.35 Soviet theorists believed a decisive advantage might be
obtained by an initial attack that could destroy the opponent’s armed forces, industry, and
urban centers, which put an unprecedented emphasis on the importance of surprise/6
Likewise the Soviets believed, just as many Americans had, that the advantage could be
had if they could detect a planned surprise attack early enough to mobilize their defenses.
So, as Herbert Dinerstein pointed out, “from a defensive as well as from an offensive
standpoint, the importance o f the factor of surprise had grown greatly in Soviet eyes.’° 7
By the mid-1950s, Soviet leadership warned the Soviet people that they must not
be caught unaware in a surprise attack. Gone were the Stalinist ideas that strategic
surprise was an unreliable, transitory factor which would not ultimately affect the
outcome o f war. Instead, a new military doctrine emerged based on the premise that a
future war would take the form of a sudden, brief nuclear exchange between the United
States and Soviet Union. This doctrine stated that the advent of nuclear weapons and jet
aviation enhanced the role o f surprise in war, making surprise attack a real and dangerous
possibility.38
O f course, Soviet military doctrine, particularly when discussed in the public
arena, emphasized not a Soviet first strike, but a surprise nuclear strike by the

195S, Marshall Zhukov, the new Minister of Defense, gave a speech calling for a more thorough study on
the effects o f nuclear weapons on the conduct o f war.
35 Scholars Harriet and William Scott affirmed that “the possible consequences o f a surprise nuclear strike
were a major motivating factor for developing a new military doctrine” after Stalin’s death. See Scott, Soviet
Military Doctrine, 55.
36 Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union, 11.
37 Ibid.
38 Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party, 21-25.
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imperialists against which they had to defend.H ow ever, if the Soviets were fortunate
enough to discover surprise attack plans from the imperialists then the Soviets would
have to respond with “pre-emptive blows at all levels- strategic, operational, and
tactical.”40 Such talk of preventive war measures was not limited to the Soviet Union.
Proposals for a preventive war against the Soviet Union were common among
some circles in America.41 The JCS recommended to Truman in September 1945 a first
strike against the Soviets if deterrence were to fail, and the Strategic Air Commander,
General Curtis LeMay, confided to government advisors in 1957 that he was going to
“knock the shit out of them,” as soon as his intelligence told him the Soviets were
preparing for war.42 Eisenhower too gave a “fleeting thought” towards preventive war
after the Soviets tested a hydrogen bomb in 1953. Writing to Dulles he asked whether or
not “our duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at the most propitious
moment that we could designate.”40

39 Scott, Soviet Military Doctrine, 55.
40 Joseph Nogee and Robert Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, Fourth ed., (New York:
Macmillan Publishing, 1992), 125.
41 JCS recommendations in FRUS, 1946, 1:1160-65, found in Buhite and Hamel, “War for Peace,” 372-373.
Some military officers, politicians, journalists, and political scientists advocated preventive war through
1945-1955. For example, General Leslie Groves, Senator Stuart Symington, the Alsop brothers and political
scientist George Eliot all recommended preventive war at one point. Even Truman contemplated it during
the Berlin and Korean crises. Bernard Brodie said that preventive war thinking was the “prevailing
philosophy” during the late 1940s and early 1950s at RAND and the Air War College. For more on
preventive war see, Russell Buhite and William Christopher Hamel, “War for Peace: The Question of an
American Preventive W ar against the Soviet Union, 1945-1955,” Diplomatic History, 14 (1990), 367-384
and Marc Tractenberg, History and Strategy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 21.
42 LeMay was speaking to Robert Sprague and Jerome Weisner o f the President’s Commission on Civil
Defense. Interviews with Jerome Weisner and Robert Sprague, “War and Peace in the Nuclear Age,”
Program #3, Public Broadcasting System, Winter 1989, quoted in Buhite and HameL, “W ar for Peace,”
374n. David Rosenberg also documents LeMay advocating preventive war. See David Alan Rosenberg, “A
Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End o f Two Hours:” Documents on American Plans for Nuclear War with
the Soviet Union, 1954-55,” International Security, Vol. 6 (Winter 1982), 13.
43 Memorandum Eisenhower to Dulles, 9/8/53, EL, Eisenhower Diary, August-September 1953, folder 2,
Box, 3, quoted in Buhite and HameL, “War for Peace,” 381. Even scientist Isidor I. Rabi spoke o f preventive
war and said “we should be prepared to follow through” with it. MIT, AC4, Cambridge-New York Meeting
o f the Science Advisory Committee, 3/10/54, Box 195, “Science Advisory Committee, 1954.”
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However, improved Soviet retaliatory capabilities by the early 1950s limited any
advantages to be gained by a preventive war, and preventive war was officially
eliminated as a policy option in 1954 with NSC 5440, “Basic National Security Policy,”
which stated “the United States and its allies must reject the concept of preventive war or
acts intended to provoke war.”44 Yet, preventive war was never really a viable option for
the United States because the American national psychology and system o f values
prohibited it from engaging in any form of preventive war 43 Truman himself said “we do
not believe in aggression or preventive war. Such a war is the weapon o f dictators, not o f
free democratic countries like the United States.”46 Unable to strike first, the United
States’ strategy had to rely on cutting down any advantage the enemy might derive from a
first strike and attempt deterrence against a first strike without “overshooting the
mark.”47 In other words, a strong continental and civil defense program had to be coupled
with a strong offensive capability. To complicate the situation, policy makers were
continually faced with new technology changing the basic conditions of war month to
month.48
For example, before 1953 doubt resided over whether or not nuclear warheads
could ever be miniaturized enough to be placed atop o f long-range missiles. By early
1954 American scientists had solved the problem. The NSC was informed that the

44 Draft Statement ofPolicy Prepared by the NSC Planning Board, NSC 5440, 12/13/54, FRUS, 1952-54,
2:806-844.
45 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 392-397. Not
only does American national psychology and values prohibit the U.S. from launching a surprise attack
against its enemies, but so does the “form o f Government and [its] constitutional processes” as Freedman
noted in Evolution, 36.
46 Harry S Truman, Memoirs, vol. 1, Years o f Trial and Hope, (Garden City, NJ: DoubleDay, 1956), quoted
in Buhite and Hamel, “War for Peace,” 382.
47 Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age, 392-397.
48 Ibid., 17.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

138
Soviets were probably not far behind and some intelligence reports indicated that they
were even ahead o f U.S. technology.49 Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
technology multiplied the fears of surprise attack. The renowned mathematician John
Von Neumann of the Atomic Energy Commission explained to the NSC exactly what
ICBM technology implied: a reduction in warning time of an incoming Soviet missile
attack to fifteen minutes with almost no possibility of interception. Furthermore, the
missiles were relatively cheap at about one million dollars each, and Von Neumann
believed the Soviets could produce many o f them.50 Although Von Neumann could not
say when the Soviets would have ICBMs, CIA estimates predicted a Soviet Union with
ICBM capabilities by the early 1960s.51 It was clear that the nuclear age, with its rapid
technological advances, threats of surprise attack, and promise of world devastation had
unleashed, a certain sense o f madness. With the madness no longer confined, American
policy makers had to focus attention on a continental defense program that could protect
America from nuclear annihilation.

A Slow Start
Despite concern about Soviet attack during the Truman Administration, little was
done to strengthen continental defense. When the Department of Defense was organized
in 1947, it began preparing for a continental air defense system. Even though the
Department o f Defense recognized the need for a continental defense system of

49 Brands, “Age of Vulnerability,” 975. See also John Prados, The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence
Analysis and Soviet Strategic Forces, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 57-63.
30 Memorandum o f discussion at 258th NSC meeting, 9/8/55, EL, NSC Series, taken from Brands, “The Age
of Vulnerability,” 975.
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interceptors, early warning radar, and anti-aircraft artillery, appropriations were not made
to meet the development demands o f such a system.52 Inter-service rivalries played a
large part in prohibiting the development of a cohesive continental defense program. The
army wanted to see deterrence through a universal military training program which
would dramatically increase manpower. The air force saw technological advances in
aircraft design as most important to continental defense, and the navy wished to play a
pivotal role in protecting America’s shores and offering mobility in the seas.53 With such
different views on how best to defend America, development of a continental defense
program got off to a slow start.
NSC 68 did recognize in 1950 that the defense of U.S. borders against air attack
was important, but it did not outline steps to improve such defense. By the end of
Truman’s term the NSC agreed, by adopting NSC 139, that an early warning system
which could provide three to six hours of warning should be developed “as a matter of
high urgency.”54 Without such warning times, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) could
be crippled and any defense measures in place could be paralyzed. If SAC had even just
two hours warning it could deploy 65 percent of its forces. Therefore, detection of Soviet
intentions was vital and improved intelligence and early warning systems needed.55
Despite the rhetoric in NSC 68 and NSC 139, it was clear that the Truman
Administration was preoccupied with offensive stockpiling o f atomic weapons while

51 General Considerations for NSC, n.d., EL, WHO NSCS, Special StafFFile Series, Box 1, “Basic National
Security Policy 1953-54 (1).”
52 Memorandum by Paul Nitze and Carlton Savage o f the Policy Planning Staff 5/6/53, FRUS, 1952-54,
2:318.
53 Buhite and Hamel, “War for Peace,” 371-372.
54 Report to the NSC by the NSC Planning Board, NSC 5408,2/11/54, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:615.
55 Report o f the Special Evaluation Subcommittee o f the NSC, 5/18/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:332-349.
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ignoring continental and civil defenses.36 While it was recognized that early warning and
air defense systems were sparse and inadequate, steps were not made to improve
continental defense under Truman.57 There were, however, a number of studies on
continental defense initiated during Truman’s tenure that were left for Eisenhower to
take up.
As Eisenhower took office, three documents were presented to him which, taken
together, identified continental defense as what one State Department staffer called “the
Achilles heel o f American national security.”58 Those three documents were NSC 141,
the Project East River report, and the Panel of Consultants on Disarmament report. NSC
141, a special study for the NSC, warned about American vulnerability against a Soviet
attack. Presented on January 19,1953, NSC 141 declared that in light of Soviet atomic
capabilities, additional resources had to be committed to American continental and civil
defenses. It estimated that current continental defenses provided only a 15 percent
effectiveness against Soviet attack, possibly allowing 85 percent of the atomic bombs in
a Soviet air attack to reach their target. The report concluded that to continue continental
defense measures on their present course involved critical risks, particularly in light of
projected Soviet nuclear capabilities by 1954-55 to deliver a critical blow to the United
States.39
Project East River had been commissioned by the government two years earlier to
study civil defense. Sponsored by the Department of Defense, the National Security

56 Report by the Panel o f Consultants o f the Department o f State to the Secretary o f State, January 1953,

FRUS, 1952-54, 2:1083.
57 Memorandum by the Executive Security of the NSC to the President, 11/5/52, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:165.
58 Memorandum by Carlton Savage o f the Policy Planning Staff 2/10/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:231-232.
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Resources Board, and the Federal Civil Defense Administration, the project’s objective
was to “determine the optimum combination of non-military measures which may be
taken to minimize the effects of attack by atomic, biological, chemical and other
weapons on the population and industry of the United States.”60 The study was conducted
by nearly one hundred civilian experts including scientists, educators, businessmen, and
government representatives. Their final report stressed the need for military measures to
help in civil defense, specifically with an early warning system that would detect an
attack at least 2,000 miles off the continental borders. The report estimated that, without
some warning, 25,000,000 casualties would result from a Soviet air attack. In addition to
an early warning system, interception systems were imperative as local civil defense
measures could not deal with a 100 percent penetration. The report explained that local
civil defense was set up to only handle “leakage through the defensive net.” In all, the
report had 246 recommendations on how to improve continental defense.61
The Panel o f Consultants on Disarmament, chaired by Robert Oppenheimer,
consisted o f scientists, educators, and the director of the CIA.62 It too concluded that
current levels o f continental defense loomed as the most important problem of national
security, stating that “no problem has forced itself upon us more insistently and regularly,
in the course o f our work, than that o f the defense o f the continental United States.”60 It

59 Report to the NSC by the Secretaries o f State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security, NSC
141, 1/19/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:209-222.
60 Letter E.T. Dickinson and James Wadsworth to Eisenhower, 01/27/53, EL, WH Central Files,
Confidential File, Box 16, “Civil Defense (1).”
61 Memorandum by Carlton Savage o f the Policy Planning Staff 2/10/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:231-232.
62 The five member panel was Vannevar Bush, John Dickey, Joseph Johnson, Robert Oppenheimer, and
Allen Dulles. See Report by the Panel o f Consultants o f the Department o f State to the Secretary of State,
January 1953, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:1056-1058.
63 Report by the Panel o f Consultants of the Department of State to the Secretary of State, January 1953,
FRUS, 1952-54, 2:1083.
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criticized the current “preoccupation” with building a stockpile of atomic weapons and
neglecting to give equal balance to continental defense measures. The Panel concluded
that “there is every reason to proceed with greatly intensified efforts o f continental
defense,” in part because not only can strengthened continental defense protect the
United States against attack, it also acts as a deterrent from attack.64
In early February, a Policy Planning Staff memorandum reflected that these three
reports pointed to the urgency of the matter, particularly in light of future Soviet nuclear
weapon development and ICBM technology.65 In light of the conclusions of NSC 141,
Project East River, and the Panel of Consultants, Paul Nitze and Carlton Savage of the
Policy Planning Staff concluded that “continental defense has become imperative for the
United States as a consequence of the threat posed by the Soviet development of atomic
weapons.”66 Critical o f the lack of preparation taken towards continental defense, the two
identified four reasons for such neglect: Americans underestimated Soviet technological
abilities to enter the atomic age sooner than expected; Congress and the Executive did
not fully appreciate the danger the Soviets posed and therefore did not allocate the
appropriate funds for continental defense; Americans relied too heavily on a massive
offensive capability to protect the United States; and a reluctance to divert resources
away from an offensive capability to a defense at home which might not protect as
promised. To rectify the situation, Nitze and Savage looked to the recommendation made
by the most recent policy statement on the subject, NSC 149/2, which suggested that
continental defense receive “an increased emphasis.” Agreeing with NSC 149/2, Nitze

M Ibid., 1084.
65 Memorandum by Carlton Savage o f the Policy Planning Staff, 2/10/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:231-232.
66 Memorandum by Nitze and Savage o f the Poiicy Planning Staff 5/6/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:318-323.
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and Savage said the main problem was “how to do this under the budgetary limitations
laid down in NSC 149/2, limitations which include among other points a reduction in
manpower and resources for the air force,” limitations which Eisenhower wanted to stick
to.67
Shedding some more light on the problems o f continental defense for Eisenhower
to consider early in his administration was the Edwards Committee. Created by an NSC
directive on January 19,1953 to look into Soviet capabilities to “inflict direct injury on
the United States up to July 1955,” the committee was chaired by retired Lt. General
Idwal Edwards.68 The Edwards Committee studied Soviet capabilities to harm the U.S.
through direct military means, as well as through sabotage or clandestine military means.
Studying the initial phase of war, or when it was assumed the Soviets’ atomic or nuclear
stockpile was likely to be unleashed, the Committee utilized reports from each of the
agencies represented by its members and had full access to relevant classified reports.69
The committee reported its conclusions to the NSC on May 18th.70
The Committee assumed that the Soviet Union had the ability to launch an air
attack without warning and stated that the element o f surprise was its strongest weapon
against the United States. A decisive Soviet surprise air attack, the report estimated,
would paralyze industry, destroy between 24-30 percent of U.S. bombers with atomic
delivery capability, and cause between 9 and 12.5 million civilian casualties. If, however,

67 Ibid., 320-321.
6S Memorandum by the Chairman o f the Special Evaluation Subcommittee o f the NSC to Lay, 5/15/53,
FRUS, 1952-54, 2:329-330.The members of the Special Committee with their affiliation were: Lt. Gen.
Idwal Edwards, Chairman; Lt. Gen. Harold Bull (CIA); W. Barrett McDonnell (ICIS); Maj. Gen. Robert
Webster (JCS); Lish Whiston (EC).
69 Draft Directive Prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence, nd, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:207-208.
70 The report was known as NSC 140/1.
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the United States was able to detect the slightest evidence of an impending attack,
damage figures might be cut in half. An early warning system was therefore vital to
counter a Soviet attack, and the report concluded that SAC needed at least two hours
warning to be effective in countering a Soviet attack.71 The Edwards Committee also
listed a number of deficiencies in regards to continental defense and, to discuss them
further, Edwards came back to the NSC on June 4th.
At that meeting Eisenhower commented that it seemed, based on Edwards’
report, that the likely bases the Soviets might use for an attack were those on the
Chukotski Peninsula, across the Bering Straits from Alaska. Eisenhower therefore
suggested that air defense and warning systems ought to be set up specifically in Alaska.
Edwards agreed, but reminded him that low-flying Soviet planes could break any radar
net. Eisenhower then suggested flight radar and reengineered SAC to improve radar
efficiency, but Edwards believed to achieve those results SAC would have to be on 24hour alert, a costly operation. At this, Eisenhower suggested that perhaps the report gave
too much credit to Soviet pilots’ abilities to navigate long distances and actually make it
to their target. “Anyone who had ever ridden with Soviet pilots could vouch for this
incompetence,” Eisenhower told the group.72 Edwards had no reply, but it was clear
Eisenhower viewed Soviet technical capabilities differently from their actual capabilities.
Poor Soviet navigation and radar nets aside, the most obvious way to guard
against attack was to use intelligence to pre-determine an impending attack, giving U.S.

71 Report o f the Special Evaluation Subcommittee o f the NSC, 5/18/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:328-349. The
report said one hour was not enough time, but two hours would allow Strategic Air Command to disperse
65% o f its force and six horn's warning would result in an 85% dispersal.
72 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 148th Meeting o f the National Security Council, 6/4/53, FRUS, 195254, 2:369.
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forces time to react. Allen Dulles, however, saw little that could be done to foresee a
Soviet attack, despite his brother’s insistence that an impending attack simply could not
be hidden. The Edwards Committee had not made specific recommendations for
improved intelligence, but Edwards, and everyone else in the room, concluded that
should the Soviets attack the United States it would be out of desperation and “not an
exercise o f military judgm ent”73
But whether the Soviets attacked out of desperation or n ot the stark fact was that
the United States had no sound continental defense program. In fact, that month Acting
Secretary of Defense Roger Kyes worried about a NSC paper ordering the “acceleration”
of an early warning system since the Department o f Defense had not definitively decided
such a system was feasible.74 Considering too that a recent report had indicated
“difficulties and delays in the creation of such a system,” the Council decided that the
paper would substitute “emphasize” instead of “accelerate” in regards to an early
warning system.73 The end result was that NSC 153/1 emphasized the “development of a
continental defense system, including early warning, adequate to prevent disaster and to
make secure the mobilization base necessary to achieve U.S. victory in the event of
general war.”76 O f course the Department of Defense favored a warning system; Kyes
merely wished for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the whole problem of continental

73 Ibid., 369.
74 Memorandum Discussion at the 149111Meeting o f the NSC, 6/11/53, EL, AWF, NSC Series, Box 4, “ 149th
Meeting of NSC, 6/9/53.” The NSC paper was NSC 153 which was a restatement o f basic national security
policy which synthesized four previous policies, including NSC 149/2 which had been approved on April 29,
1953. NSC 153 was presented on June 8, 1953. See FRUS, 1952-54, 2:370-371.
75 Memorandum Discussion at the 149* Meeting o f the NSC, 6/11/53, EL, AWF, NSC Series, Box 4, “ 149th
Meeting of NSC, 6/9/53.” The recent report was the Kelly Report, named for its chair, Mervin Kelly o f Bell
Laboratories.
76 Report to the NSC by the NSC Planning Board, NSC 5408, 2/11/54, FRUS, 1952-54,2:615.
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defense before accelerating a specific program.77 Eisenhower thought the whole situation
required a review by an ad-hoc committee to take up the deficiencies laid out by the
various reports so that a continental defense program could be defined and accelerated.
Also, such a group might suggest concrete ways to implement an improved continental
defense without breaking the bank, a theme Eisenhower never lost sight of. The
subsequent Continental Defense Committee, established in June, gave its report in midJuly.78

The Continental Defense Committee and NSC 159/4
With the various reports and memos passing over Eisenhower’s desk stating the
inadequacies o f continental defense, it was time for some concrete action to be taken.
The first official policy paper on continental defense by the Eisenhower Administration
was NSC 159/4, approved on September 25, 1953. It was a synthesis of three separate
reports on continental defense, the first being the 80-page report from the Continental
Defense Committee.79
Chaired by the retired L t General Harold Bull, the Continental Defense
Committee consisted of one representative each from the Department o f Defense, the

77 Memorandum Discussion at the 149th Meeting o f the NSC, 6/11/53, EL, AWF, NSC Series, Box 4, “ 149th
Meeting ofNSC, 6/9/53.”
78 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 148th Meeting o f the National Security Council, 6/4/53, FRUS, 195254, 2:370.
79 The Continental Defense Committee report was submitted as NSC 159 on July 22,1953. A 33-page
report by the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal
Security was submitted as NSC 159/lon August 14. A 7 page JCS report was submitted as NSC 159/2 on
September 1. The NSC Planning Board wrote NSC 159/3 based on the other three reports which was
adopted, after revisions, as NSC 159/4. See FRUS, 1952-54, 2:465-466n.
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ODM, the FCDA, the ICIS, and one scientific consultant.80 Convening in early June, the
committee reviewed all previous studies that had been made on continental defense. It
issued its 80-page report to the NSC, recorded as NSC 159, on July 22,1953. The report
cited the American stockpile of atomic weapons as the most effective deterrent against a
devastating Soviet attack, just as Truman had maintained. The report stressed that the
stockpile had to be maintained for its defensive, as well as offensive, value. However,
should deterrence by atomic superiority fail, the report concluded that present continental
defense systems were not adequate to “prevent, neutralize or seriously deter the military
or covert attacks” by the Soviet Union.81 In particular, there were no assurances that the
current continental defense program could protect industry or the federal government
from failing - unacceptable risks, in the committee’s eyes, for national survival.
However, the report conceded that a totally impenetrable continental defense system was
unrealistic in light of current technology and recommended that long-term, fixed
programs not be adopted. Rather, short-term solutions offered the most flexibility and
O')

security. “ Continental defense had to remain modem. Although the report offered the
same observation - that continental defense was inadequate - as the previous reports had
offered, the Continental Defense Committee recognized that a total defense shield was
unrealistic both technically and financially, that technology was changing too fast to
implement long-term defense programs, and that American nuclear technology offered

80 Members were: Lt. General Harold Bull, Retired (chairman), Maj. General Frederic Smith, Jr. (Defense);
William Elliot (ODM), Justice Chambers (FCDA), W. Barrett McDonnell (ICIS), S. Douglas Cornell
(scientific consultant), and Hugh Farley (Executive secretary). Enclosure B o f NSC 159 Report, 7/22/53,
NA, RG 59, Policy Planning Staff 1935-62, Box 8, “Continental Defense (NSC 159 series)(NSC
Memoranda).”
SI NSC 159/4, 9/25/53, FRUS 1952-54,2:478-479.
82 Ibid., 478-479.
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the best defense if coupled with an unproved continental defense able to protect industry
and the federal government
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also had concerns about the current continental defense
program and submitted a report to Secretary Wilson at about the same time. In i t the JCS
concluded that “Soviet long range objectives remain unchanged and are aimed at the
overthrow of democracy. The Soviet [sic] now has the capability of an atomic attack
against Continental United States of serious though intermediate magnitude, and this
capability can be expected to increase.”83 Responding to the various inadequacies laid
out in previous reports, in August the Joint Chiefs submitted a coordinated plan for the
defense o f the continental United States. Stating that “in order to prevent a disastrous
surprise attack in force prior to the formal declaration of war, the armed forces must be
prepared to engage and defeat the enemy by establishing and maintaining effective
defense forces.”84 They recommended a coordinated effort by the services and an Early
Warning System to be completed by December 1955. It seemed that the inter-service
rivalries were abating and an Early Warning System might proceed. They also warned
that while there was a great preoccupation with a Soviet air or missile attack, the Soviets
were also capable o f launching a surprise attack on the United States via submarines or
by concealing an atomic device in the hold o f a cargo ship.85 What shape that Early
Warning System was to take, however, remained unclear.
Using information from the JCS report, the Continental Defense Committee
report, and comments made by a civilian ad-hoc group asked to review a report on

83 Memorandum to Wilson, 8/8/53, EL, WHO NSCS, Disaster File, Box 11, “NSC 162/2 (1).”
84 JCS 1899/53, “A Coordinated Plan for the Defense o f Continental United States,” 8/5/53, NA, RG 218,
Box 61, “381 U.S. (5-23-46) sec. 25.”
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Continental Defense programs being prepared by the NSC, the NSC Planning Board
wrote the first comprehensive policy paper on continental defense.86 The report took up
the question o f structure o f an early warning system, particularly in light of the recent
Soviet demonstration o f nuclear capabilities. The August 12th detonation of a
thermonuclear device in the Soviet Union created new concerns and made many o f the
observations in previous continental defense reports obsolete. NSC 159/4 was the first
report presented in light of the Soviet explosion.
The policy paper indicated that Soviet thermonuclear capabilities had placed a
premium on deterring war, improving U.S. intelligence, a ready offensive force, a
reliable inceptor force, improved civil defense measures, and an early warning system.87
For an early warning system the Planning Board looked to strengthen the defense lines in
Canada by recommending seaward extensions o f the southern Canadian defense line.
However, Admiral Radford, speaking for the JCS, had serious concerns about such an
extension and worried that programs were going to be approved by the NSC that might
tie the hands o f the JCS and prevent the formulation of an over-all military program.
Specifically, Radford complained that a seaward extension required a perfect

85 Ibid.
86
Eisenhower had asked for the assistance o f a civilian committee in July, 1953 in order to get some
objective thinking from people who were “not burdened with departmental responsibilities.” They met in
August, but held their report until after the JCS had taken office and the Bull Committee report had been
given adequate review. Eisenhower called their comments to the NSC “fresh and objectiveC utler echoed
Eisenhower’s remarks, saying that the consultants’ conclusions helped identify key points at just the right
time and both agreed that undoubtedly the Council would be using civilian consultants again. The members
were: James Phinney Baxter m , President ofWilliams College; James Black, President o f Pacific Gas and
Electric; Alan Gregg, Former V.P. o f Rockefeller Foundation; David McDonald, President o f United Steel
Workers; Arthur Page, retired from AT&T. See, Letter Cutler to McDonald, 7/15/53, EL, WHO OSANSA,
NSC Series, Administrative Sub series, Box 4, “Consultants- NSC [July-September] (3);” Memorandum for
Baxter et.al., 7/22/53, Box 4, “Consultants- NSC [July-September] (3);” Letter Eisenhower to Page,
9/25/53, Box 4, “Consultants-NSC [July-September] (3);” and Letter Cutler to Page, 9/26/53, Box 4,
“Consultants-NSC [July-September] (3).”
87 NSC 159/4, “Continental Defense,” 9/25/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:479.
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performance by the men who operated the defense line 24 hours, 365 days of the year,
indefinitely. Such performance was unrealistic. Furthermore, the military simply did not
have the manpower to man such an extension. Radford further feared that efficiency
would deteriorate as radar operators became bored with doing the same repetitive job “in
some such dreary waste as northern Canada.”88
Arthur Flemming, Director of the ODM, made the radical suggestion of using
women to solve the manpower problem. C.D. Jackson suggested lowering the restrictions
to join the military. “A soldier with flat feet or dandruff,” Jackson offered, “might be
completely competent to operate a Nike.”89 Harold Stassen, Director of Foreign
Operations Administration, suggested improving scientific and technological study in
high schools and developing more automated devices to help the military. Eisenhower
reminded his audience that the main goal was a minimum military establishment, not a
larger one. Defense had to be adjusted to survive and increasing manpower to develop a
perfectly impenetrable defense was not realistic.90 In the final report, the seaward
extensions, in addition to the Southern Canadian early warning line, were approved and
were to be “completed with all deliberate speed.”91 The southern seaward extensions
were to extend to Hawaii and the Azores and use the “minimum number of ships and
aircraft determined by the JCS to be necessary to meet the threat and enemy capabilities
at any given time.”92 A Northern Canadian early warning line was to be developed if

“ Memorandum o f Discussion at the 163rd Meeting o f the NSC, 9/24/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:468.
89 Ibid., 470.
90 Ibid.
91 NSC 159/4, “Continental Defense,” 9/25/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:483.
92 Ibid., 484.
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future reports recommended the program. At the very least, an early warning line which
provided two hours warning was to be in service immediately.
In addition to an early warning system, the recent Soviet thermonuclear test
placed a higher premium on an interceptor system that would prohibit Soviet bombers
and submarines from ever reaching their targets. Eisenhower agreed that the two most
important elements in continental defense were the seaward extension o f the Southern
Canadian line and a fighter interceptor program.9j To address the issue, the final report
agreed with the conclusions o f the Continental Defense Committee in that fighter
inceptor forces had to be “kept effective in ensuing years in phase with the other military
programs...and with developing Soviet capabilities.”94 Keeping fighter interceptor and
anti-aircraft forces in high readiness and implementing a semi-automatic air control
center and low-frequency (Lofar) detection system for submarines as soon as possible
were the recommended courses of action.
In other areas, NSC 159/4 again agreed with the Continental Defense Committee
that continuity of the federal government was vital for national survival. In light o f Soviet
thermonuclear capabilities, measures were adopted to develop new emergency dispersal
plans that had a wider dispersal of government facilities and improved communication
links. For the rest of the public, civil defense measures were largely left to local
communities with the Federal government looking into more research and public
education programs. The best help for civil defense was early warning, an area the

93 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 163rd Meeting o f the NSC, 9/24/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:471.
94 NSC 159/4, “Continental Defense,” 9/25/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:483.
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government was actively involved in improving.50 The best help for overall continental
defense was improved intelligence, but NSC 159/4 offered no suggestions except to say
that knowing Soviet intentions and capabilities was “essential.”96
Finally, the report emphasized economy. It opened by saying that “the survival of
the free world” depended upon the United States maintaining strong military and non
military forces to deter war or win one should deterrence fail and a “sound, strong
economy, capable of supporting such strength over the long pull.”97 Eisenhower
reiterated the point in a NSC meeting discussing the report when he said the defense
program had to be adjusted “to something with which we can live for a long time.”98 He
did not want to burden the American people with high military costs that would destroy
the American way of life. Certainly it was true America faced a terrible threat. NSC
159/4 concurred with the JCS assessment that, despite overtures towards peace coming
out of the Soviet Union, there was no reason to believe the Soviets had altered their basic
hostility towards the free world.99 But, Eisenhower stressed that this threat had to be met
in a way that did not create a garrison state through government controls in place because
of the costs involved in security.100 In addition, Eisenhower felt that too often these
reports overestimated the ability of the Soviets to launch an attack upon the United
States. The reports took into account the estimates of Soviet capabilities, but not the
obstacles and difficulties the Soviets would encounter in such an attempt. With that said,

95 Ibid.,486-489; Memorandum o f Discussion at the 163rd Meeting of the NSC, 9/24/53, FRUS, 1952-54,
2:471.
96 NSC 159/4, “Continental Defense,” 9/25/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:482.
97 Ibid., 477.
98 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 163rd Meeting o f the NSC, 9/24/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:470.
99 NSC 159/4, “Continental Defense,” 9/25/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:480-481.
100 Memorandum of Discussion at the 163rd Meeting o f the NSC, 9/24/53, FRUS, 1952-54,2:469.
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it was vital to find an appropriate continental defense system that would balance security
with fiscal responsibility.101
NSC 159/4 received final approval on September 25,1953 and signified, as the
many reports before it had, that America had an inadequate continental defense program
in place to defend against an air attack from the Soviet Union. However, NSC 159/4 also
got the ball rolling for improved programs. Its purpose was to fix the timing and
guidelines to govern continental defense programs. At the very least, it gave greater
emphasis to the problem. Even the overall statement on basic national security, NSC
162/2, adopted at the end o f October, reflected this concern, calling for a strong posture
with an effective continental defense.102
One area which governed continental defense development that NSC 159/4
stressed was a cooperative relationship with Canada. No continental defense system
could be successful without Canadian help. NSC 159/4 acknowledged that agreements
with Canada had been initiated, but stated that there had to be established a “common
appreciation of the urgency and character of the threat to U.S.-Canadian security.” 103
Furthermore, the report recommended exploring means to induce Canada to take up a
leadership and financial role in continental defense. To help move things along,
Eisenhower talked to a Joint Session of the Canadian Parliament on November 14, 1953.
He promised his audience that the United States and Canada “can and will devise ways to
protect our North America from any surprise attack.” 104 Acknowledging that the “basic

101 Ibid., 469; 471.
102 Report to the NSC by the NSC Planning Board, NSC 5408, 2/11/54, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:615
103 N SC-159/4, “Continental Defense,” 9/25/53, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:482.
104 Address Before a Joint Session o f the Parliament of Canada, 11/14/53, Public Papers o f the President,
1953, 767-775.
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threat o f communist purpose still exists,” Eisenhower explained that security plans had to
now take into account the Soviet capability to employ atomic attack. In suggesting that
the United States and Canada were equal partners, he said, “defense of our soil presents a
challenge to both our peoples. It is a common task.” Eisenhower complimented the
permanent Joint Board on Defense on working “assiduously and effectively on mutual
problems” and stated that now was the time for action “on all agreed measures.” 105
Calling upon a greater sense of duty in this Cold War, Eisenhower told the
Canadian audience, “In common with others o f the free world, the United States does not
rely on military strength alone to win the peace. Our primary reliance is a unity among us
forged o f common adherence to moral principles. This reliance binds together in
fellowship all those who believe in the spiritual nature of man, as the Child of God.” 106
And giving a head nod to recent Soviet thermonuclear capabilities, Eisenhower poured
on the rhetoric telling the people that, “Beyond the shadow of the atomic cloud, the
horizon is bright with promise. No shadow can halt our advance together. For we, Canada
and the United States, shall use carefully and wisely the God-given graces of faith and
reason as we march together toward it - toward the horizon o f a world where each man,
each family, each nation lives at peace in a climate of freedom.” 107 It was up to
Eisenhower to see to it that the problems outlined in NSC 159/4 were addressed so that
each nation might live in peace.

105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
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Evaluating Continental Defense Again: NSC 5408
In his annual budget message to the Congress in January 1954, Eisenhower
addressed the problem o f continental defense. He explained that expenditures for
continental defense were expected to be “greater than ever before in our history” and that
the funds available in the Department of Defense budget to expand the system of
continental defense “will provide improved early warning of enemy attack and the men
and equipment to resist any such attack.”108 This greater emphasis on continental defense
was, of course, reflected in the recent NSC 159/4 policy paper. However, NSC 159/4 was
written only a month after the Soviet thermonuclear detonation, and it was important to
keep continental defense up-to-date and modem in light o f changing Soviet capabilities.
As such, improving upon the fine work done in NSC 159/4, a continued review of
continental defense based on the latest intelligence estimates led to a second policy paper
on continental defense, NSC 5408.
Submitted to the NSC on February 11 ,1954, NSC 5408 was intended to
supersede NSC 159/4.109 It bluntly stated the recurring mantra that current continental
defenses were completely inadequate and that such defense was a necessary element of
American defenses.110 It also repeated the two basic tenets stressed in NSC 159/4 and
NSC 162/2: the need for a strong military posture balanced with a sound and strong
economy that could withstand the long haul. But, it emphasized in financing continental
defense, “full-weighf ’ had to be given to the facts o f the thermonuclear revolution and

108 “Annual Budget Message to the Congress: Fiscal Year 1955,” 1/21/54, Public Papers o f the President,
1953, 120-121. (79-192)
109 NSC 5408 was given final approval on 2/17/54. See Memorandum o f Discussion at the 185111Meeting of
the NSC, 2/17/54, FRUS, 1952-54,2:624-633.
110 Report to the NSC by the NSC Planning Board, NSC 5408, 2/11/54, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:612.
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the increased capabilities o f the Soviet Union. Noting the importance of over-all military
strength, NSC 5408 warned that too much attention had been given to “peripheral
defense, offensive capabilities, and mobilization bases,” and not enough attention to the
element of continental defense.111
Agreeing with previous conclusions that the Soviet Union still sought world
domination, NSC 5408 placed a great emphasis on technological research and
development and improved intelligence capabilities. Again citing Soviet thermonuclear
capabilities, NSC 5408, unlike NSC 159/4, required that adequate support for basic and
applied research and development be given to weapons development, particularly ICBM
development, because “technological superiority” was “essential” in light o f Soviet
developments.112 In the same vein, improved intelligence capabilities to determine Soviet
intentions and capabilities were equally essential. However, NSC 5408 did not provide
specific recommendations on either front. Developing the necessary technological
systems would be a task handled later by an ad-hoc civilian committee.1b
As with NSC 159/4, early warning lines and interceptor systems were the key
components to continental defense. “The recent Soviet thermonuclear test,” the policy
paper explained, “brings home that it is essential with all practicable speed substantially
to augment the capability to destroy attacking aircraft and submarines before reaching
their targets.” 114 As such, fighter interceptors and anti-aircraft forces were elevated from
“being in a high state of readiness in two years” as stated in NSC 159/4 to “being in a

111 Ibid., 612; 615.
112 Ibid., 617.
113 That committee was the Technological Capabilities Committee chaired by James Killian. See Chapter 4.
114 Report to the NSC by the NSC Planning Board, NSC 5408,2/11/54, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:620.
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high, state of readiness with all practicable speed’ inNC 5408.113 It was also essential
that these systems be kept modem and flexible enough to “keep pace with anticipated
increases in Soviet capabilities.” In addition to quickly improving flight interceptor and
anti-aircraft forces, continuation o f the Southern Canadian early warning line and
seaward extensions were recommended. Noting the obvious, NSC 5408 stated that “the
longer an effective advance warning of enemy attack on the continental United States,
the more successfully can many military and non-military measures be carried out.” 116
In regards to the Southern Canadian early warning line, Dr. Lee DuBridge,
chairman of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization
(SAC-ODM), recommended that it be installed immediately, as the technology was
ready. He said there was no reason to fear that the technology would become obsolete
due to technological advances and there should be no further delays. Although
Eisenhower still expressed concerns over the technology becoming obsolete, he decided
that indeed the Southern line should be installed immediately and was impressed by
DuBridge’s comments.117 A Northern Canadian early warning line was still to be given
attention pending further review.
In other matters, NSC 5408 continued to place civil defense in the hands of local
and state governments, offering only public education and further research. As with NSC
159/4, plans to ensure a functioning federal government during war were to be kept
current and industry was to be protected. The continuity of industry was seen as

115 Ibid., 617. Emphasis added.
116 Ibid., 619.
117 Concurrently, there was a joint American and Canadian committee surveying the Southern Canadian line
and developing the military criteria to implement the line. Memorandum o f Discussion at the 185th Meeting
o f the NSC, 2/17/54, FRUS, 1952-54,2:627.
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important because o f the lessons learned during World War II: a strong industrial force
capable of maintaining high output during war was vital for victory. Taking into account
all of the recommendations, NSC 5408 was indeed what Arthur Flemming called “a fine
document” 118 NSC 5408 had further approval that summer when the Council stated that
American military and non-military continental defense programs outlined in NSC 5408
should be “accelerated...to the fullest extent deemed feasible and operationally desirable
and give to these programs very high priority, having in mind that it is estimated that the
Soviets will reach a high capability for strategic nuclear attacks by July, 1957.”119
The work done by the NSC in the first year of the Eisenhower Administration was
impressive. NSC 159/4 and 5408 both placed continental defense as a priority when the
Truman Administration had failed to do so. But, as required by the changing nature of
continental defense needs, the NSC continued its work. As was often the case, the NSC
relied on outsiders to keep the Council abreast o f changing needs. One individual proved
enormously helpful to the NSC in regards to continental defense throughout the 1950s.
He was Robert Sprague.

A Lone Civilian Takes up the Cause: Robert Sprague
Robert Sprague, an electronics manufacturer and owner of Sprague Electric
Company o f North Adams, Massachusetts, worked closely with the Eisenhower
Administration on continental defense. Eisenhower considered Sprague for under

118 Ibid., 627.
119 Council decision was in NSC 5422/2, approved on August 7, 1954. Quoted in Report o f Robert Sprague
(NSC Consultant) to the NSC on Continental Defense, 11/24/54, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series,
Subject Sub series, Box 3, “Continental Defense, Study o f [Robert Sprague], 1953-54 (12).”
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secretary o f the Air Force in 1953, but Sprague declined.120 In October 1953,
Massachusetts Senator and Chair of the Armed Forces Committee, Leverett Saltonstall,
asked Sprague to work as the special consultant on Continental Defense. Sprague visited
Strategic Air Command and was personally briefed by General Curtis LeMay. He gained
access to more classified material on the subject than any civilian or government official.
Admiral Radford reminded Sprague during a briefing on weapons systems that, “while a
limited number o f officers and officials of the government have had segments of this
information in connection with their official duties, few have had it in its entirety,” and,
as such, Sprague had a “great responsibility.” '21 Sprague was well aware and served
dutifully. He reported to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 18, 1954 and
subsequently the report was sent by Robert Cutler to the chief o f each agency having an
interest in continental defense. Eisenhower told Saltonstall afterward that the country
“was fortunate” to have citizens like Sprague who worked with such thoroughness and
effectiveness. Sprague, as Eisenhower saw it, “rendered a real service to his country.”122
Sprague’s report on continental defense reiterated the fact that the atomic age had
made American security more vulnerable. It reasoned that even if the Soviets planned a
general war in Europe, the Soviets had to plan to cripple American retaliatory abilities by
destroying the planes and bases of SAC and urban-industrial areas to prohibit quick
recovery. The principal problem facing SAC was enough warning to get the bombers

120 David Snead, The Gather Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War, (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1999), 52-53.
121 Memorandum for the Record by Radford, 12/17/53, NA, RG218, Box 37, “381 (Continental
DefenseX1953).” Sprague was given, over the course o f his service to Senator Saltonstall, numerous top
secret reports and documents from the DoD, Army, Air Force, CIA, NSC, AEC, and RAND including the
Kelly Report, aircraft data, weapons systems data, CIA estimates, and Strategic Air Command data.
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airborne. Therefore, Sprague recommended expanding early warning radar, strengthening
anti-aircraft defenses around SAC bases, and increasing the number and quality of flight
interceptors.123 But, on the whole, Sprague concluded that current continental defense
systems represented “a reasonable although minimum effort.” 124 Acting Secretary of
Defense Kyes remarked that Sprague’s conclusions were a “welcome endorsement [of
the Administration’s continental defense system] by an intelligent outsider competent to
make a judgment.”125 The report contained twenty four recommendations of which only
two were found by the NSC to be invalid - direct warning to key executive Federal
personnel and increasing the number o f daytime fighters. Five recommendations had
“qualified validity,” and the remaining seventeen were all valid.126 Certainly Sprague’s
report served a useful purpose, but Sprague himself modified his conclusions just three
months later.
Alarmed by the recent Soviet thermonuclear tests of devices with one megaton
forces, Sprague felt it necessary to brief members o f the Senate Armed Services
Committee to amend his previous conclusions. Meeting with Senators Saltonstall, Robert
Byrd, and Styles Bridges, as well as Admiral Radford, Sprague explained that although
he previously reported that continental defenses were reasonable, he now believed that
the entire matter needed to be reevaluated to see that there was a “speed up in completion
of present and proposed continental defense programs and an increase in the quantity and

122 Letter Eisenhower to Saltonstall, 3/30/54 and Memorandum Cutler to Eisenhower, 3/31/54, EL, AWF,
Administrative Series, Box 10, “Cutler, Robert 195-55 (4).”
123 Report on Continental Defense to the Senate Armed Services Committee by Robert Sprague, 3/18/54,
EL, AWF, Administrative Series, Box 33, “Sprague, Robert C. Material.”
124 Memorandum for the Secretary o f Defense, 6/23/54, NA, 218, Admiral Radford Files, Box 36, “381
(Continental Defense)(June-December 1954).”
125 Memorandum ofDiscussion at the 185lh meeting o f the NSC, 2/17/54, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:627.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

161
quality of defense weapons.” 127 Sprague estimated that the Soviets, by mid-1957, would
have the ability to cause “unacceptable damage” to the United States and that the United
States had three options: build an un-penetrable defense system, deliver a first strike, or
live in mutual fear o f atomic attack. Admiral Radford was skeptical of Sprague’s report,
commenting that his conclusions were as black as could be and were based on
evaluations that were likely to change. Furthermore, Radford insisted that America could
not afford to adopt a “maginot line” concept.128Radford reported his concerns to Wilson
while Sprague continued to work on continental defense.
As a result of Sprague’s work for the Senate, he was called upon by the NSC in
June 1954 to serve as a consultant to the Council on continental defense. Sprague was
appointed as a NSC consultant on June 18,1954 and his main responsibility was to
deliver progress reports twice a year to the NSC on the state of continental defense.129 He
gave his first report on July 1,1954. In it he recommended that several programs outlined
in NSC 5408 be accelerated and he requested the Net Capabilities Evaluation
Subcommittee estimate the over-all damage the Soviets might inflict on the United States
during a surprise attack in three years. Specifically, after evaluating the Department of
Defense comments on continental defense, Sprague recommended that the Canadian
early warning line, the Hawaiian end of the Pacific seaward extension, and the gap-filler
programs be accelerated to be compete by July 1957. Synchronizing the simultaneous
completion of these three systems, instead of prolonging some to 1958 or 1959 as

126 Evaluation o f the Sprague Recommendations, n.d., EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Subject Sub
Series, Box 2, “Study o f Corn. Defense by Robert Sprague [Feb 26, 1954].”
127 Memorandum for the Secretary o f Defense, 6/23/54, NA, 218, Admiral Radford Files, Box 36, “381
(Continental Defense)(June-December 1954).”
128 Ibid.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

162
originally planned, would greatly strengthen continental defense.130 In early November
the Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee reported on Soviet capabilities and
indicated many gaps in continental defense, including American vulnerability to lowaltitude attack.131 With that information Sprague delivered his second progress report to
the NSC on November 24.
Again, he saw the threat from the Soviet Union as greater than ever before
because o f the thermonuclear revolution. Seeing that the Soviets would likely have a
significant stockpile o f bombs and long-range bombers in a few years, Sprague worried
about American defense capabilities being adequate. In addition, harmful radioactive
fallout was a new element introduced by megaton thermonuclear weapons which
threatened civilian populations. These new factors, Sprague said, “enormously increase
1
the threat to our national survival in the event of a Soviet surprise attack.” * Eisenhower
was grateful for Sprague’s excellent services and told Sprague that his report reflected
“how deeply and painstakingly” he had delved into his subject and complimented him on
his “remarkable comprehensive knowledge” in the vital area of continental defense.Ij;>
Sprague continued his reviews of continental defense, reporting to the NSC as a
consultant. Yet, while Sprague was conducting his reviews, the continental defense
program was still hindered by what Admiral Radford identified as technical

129 Editorial Note, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:698.
130 Report o f Robert Sprague (NSC Consultant) to the NSC on Continental Defense, 11/24/54, EL, WHO.
OSANSA, NSC Series, Subject Sub series, Box 3, “Continental Defense, Study of [Robert Sprague], 195354 (12).”
131 Their report is known as NSC 5423.
132 Report of Robert Sprague (NSC Consultant) to the NSC on Continental Defense, 11/24/54, EL, WHO,
OSANSA, NSC Series, Subject Sub series, Box 3, “Continental Defense, Study o f [Robert Sprague], 195354 (12).”
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developments and limited manpower.134 The country still needed specific programs that
could take advantage o f its superior science and technology and work within
Eisenhower’s Great Equation and New Look. No one could deny by 1954 that continental
defenses needed to be improved. The question now was how.

A year after the Solarium exercise the United States faced the growing possibility
that the Soviet Union could launch a decisive surprise attack. The thermonuclear age had
begun and rapid technological changes such as warhead miniaturization and ICBM
systems made the world a dangerous place. Even though general thermonuclear war was
generally considered insane, most agreed with the State Department’s assertion that “a
situation o f war by miscalculation or otherwise cannot be excluded.”135 The
thermonuclear revolution, the full significance of which was only now beginning to be
comprehended, necessitated an examination o f security policy. As Eisenhower explained,
“due to the destructiveness o f modem weapons and the increasing efficiency o f longrange bombing aircraft, the U.S. has reason, for the first time in its history, to be deeply
concerned over the serious effects which a sudden attack could conceivably inflict upon
our country,” and priority had to therefore be concentrated on maintaining the “capability
to deter an enemy from attack and to blunt that attack if it comes - by a combination of
effective retaliatory power and a continental defense system of steadily increasing

133 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 225th Meeting o f the NSC, 11/24/54, FRUS, 1952-54, 2:801; Letter
Eisenhower to Sprague, 11/30/54, EL, WHO, OSANSA NSC Series, Administrative Sub series, Box 4,
“Consultants-NSC [July 1954-August 1956] (4).”
134 Memorandum for the Secretary o f Defense, 6/23/54, N A 218, Admiral Radford Files, Box 36, “381
(Continental Defense)(June-December 1954).”
135 General Considerations for NSC, n.d., EL, WHO NSCS, Special Staff File Series, Box 1, “Basic National
Security Policy 1953-54 (1).”
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effectiveness.”00 Certainly the programs outlined in NSC 5408 improved continental
defenses, but the programs could not prevent an attack. These views were ultimately
shared by private consultants like Robert Sprague. What was needed now was a
comprehensive examination of how science and technology might be used to advance
continental defenses. To take up such a study, Eisenhower turned to the Science Advisory
Committee.

136 Letter to the Secretary o f Defense on National Security Requirements, 1/5/55, Public Papers o f the

President, 1955, 2-6.
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CHAPTER FOUR

FINALLY A PROJECT WORTHY OF ITS METTLE: THE SCIENCE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE APPLIES TECHNOLOGY TO NATIONAL SECURITY

In March 1954 Eisenhower met with some of the nation’s leading scientists
serving on the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization (SACODM) to discuss his concerns about the problems of surprise attack and continental
defense. Dr. Lee DuBridge, chairman of the Science Advisory Committee and president
of the California Institute of Technology, seized the opportunity presented to SAC-ODM
by Eisenhower to undertake a study on surprise attack. As DuBridge saw it, it was the
technological advances in weapon systems that had created the heightened risk of
surprise attack, and policy makers need a “scientific inventory, evaluation, and synthesis
of these new developments” to make the most of the new technologies “with a minimum
of delay.” 1 DuBridge identified the new hydrogen bomb as the obvious example o f how
new technology had heightened the necessity to look at the problems of surprise attack.
Believing that “the bearing o f science and technology on the problems of surprise attack
requires an immediate and comprehensive examination,” DuBridge proposed that the
Science Advisory Committee establish a short-term, but full-time group to undertake

1 Letter DuBridge to Arthur Flemming, 5/24/54, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 104, “World
War HI (1).”
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such an evaluation.2 DuBridge was successful in convincing Eisenhower to establish an
ad-hoc group through the Science Advisory Committee to report back to him and the
NSC.
The resulting Technological Capabilities Panel (TCP) continued the trend of
successful civilian advising for the Eisenhower administration. Although the TCP was
bigger than the Solarium exercise, under the chairmanship of James Killian the group
was well organized into three manageable sub-panels. The first looked into striking
power and recommended the rapid development o f ICBMs and IRBMs. Panel two took
on continental defense and recommended extending the distance early warning line
(DEW), reducing the vulnerability of Strategic Air Command (SAC), and developing an
Antiballistic Missile program (ABM). The third panel drastically improved American
intelligence through its recommendation of a high-altitude reconnaissance plane, the U-2.
Presented in March 1955, the overall report made a vital contribution to national security
at a moment in time when the thermonuclear revolution had introduced new dangers and
problems.
Like the Solarium exercise, the TCP report exhibited all the characteristics of the
Great Equation in that it strengthened the military through the most economically
efficient way and even addressed the need for the American people to be spiritually
centered, or as the report put it, to feel a “sense of urgency without despair.” The report
also fit into Eisenhower’s strategic thinking, placing a great emphasis on nuclear
offensive capabilities and a strong deterrent Finally, the TCP also tapped into the
expertise of some of the top American scientists, something the Solarium Exercise did

2 Ibid.
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not need to do. This opened doors for science advising that had been closed during the
Truman administration.

The Science Advisory Committee: A Brief History
During the Eisenhower years, science advised to government. Scientific and
technological advice had been provided to the government via the Office of Scientific
Research and Development (OSRD) during World War II under the leadership of Dr.
Vannevar Bush. After the war, the OSRD was abolished but various proposals were made
to Truman as to its replacement. It was not until the outbreak of the Korean war that
Truman had William Golden, an investment banker familiar with scientific and military
affairs, review the role science and technology should play in the government. Golden
interviewed over 150 scientists and engineers and concluded that another OSRD should
not be set up. Rather, he recommended to Truman the establishment of a President’s
Science Advisory Committee and the appointment of a full-time Scientific Advisor to the
President to provide the president with scientific information regarding military matters.
Golden had the support o f other leading members in the scientific community.
For example, James Killian, president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) and chair of a committee to review the Department of Defense’s Research and
Development Board (RDB) program, concurred with Golden’s suggestion that there was
a need for an Executive Office scientific advisor to act as a “sort of rallying point for the
scientists and who would have access to the President.’” Two other members o f the

3 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 62-63; Bruce Smith, The Advisers: Scientists in the Policy
Process, (Washington: Brookings Institute, 1992), 162-163.
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RDB, DuBridge and Detlev Bronk of Johns Hopkins, also supported Golden’s ideas.
Their support proved invaluable because they were also members of the newly formed
National Science Foundation.4 Initially, opposition to a presidential scientific advisor
arose from members of the NSF who were concerned that a Science Advisory Committee
or presidential advisor would limit appropriated funds to the Foundation whose mandate
was to sponsor research for national defense. DuBridge and Bronk were eventually able
to convince the Foundation to drop its opposition and concentrate its efforts on basic
research and fellowship pursuits.5
Golden took his recommendations to Truman and the president established a
Science Advisory Committee in April 1951.6 Dr. Oliver Buckley of Bell Labs, and near
retirement, was asked to serve, and accepted, as the President’s Scientific Advisor.7 As
James Killian recalled in his memoirs, Buckley did not have the drive or decisiveness by
this point in his career to build the new position into one of strength and importance. As a
result, Buckley reduced the position of scientific advisor to chairman of the Science
Advisory Committee. Further sabotaging the position of a President’s Scientific Advisor
was General Lucius Clay, who was the assistant to the director of the Office of Defense
Mobilization (ODM). He recommended that the Science Advisory Committee be placed
within the ODM and the presidential science advisor report to the president through the
director o f the ODM. Buckley’s reluctance to stand firm on Golden’s original proposal

4 The National Science Foundation was established in 1950 by President Truman in part to strengthen
American science and science education but was greatly under-funded.
5 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 63-64.
6 Membership included: Detlev Bronk, William Webster, Alan Waterman, Hugh Dryden, James Conant, Lee
DuBridge, Robert Loeb, Robert Oppenheimer, Charles Thomas, and James Killian. See Killian, Sputnik,
Scientists, and Eisenhower, 66.
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and Clay’s insistence that the Science Advisory Committee be moved from the White
House led to a weaker and less influential committee than Golden and Killian had
0

envisioned. In the face o f scientific and technological advances of the late 1940s,
science advising was not a priority in the Truman administration, despite the 1951
establishment o f the SAC-ODM.
The purpose of the SAC-ODM was to “be available to the Director of Defense
Mobilization and the President of the United States for advice in connection with the
application o f science to the national defense.”9 The Committee’s charter did allow it to
report directly to the president if the members felt it necessary, however that option was
never exercised during the Truman administration. As the members understood it, SACODM was created largely to study the problem of mobilization of scientists for defense
work. They were to “stand by” and have a plan ready in case complete mobilization was
needed, but had little other direction.10 To feel useful, the Science Advisory Committee
occasionally occupied itself with discussions about problems confronting the United
States which had some scientific content. Sometimes other groups sought the advice of
the committee.11 For example, in 1952, SAC-ODM invited members of Project East
River, who were studying the problems o f civil defense, to brief them on their findings.12
After hearing that briefing, the committee decided that the public needed more
information on possible types o f attack and various aspects of civil defense and a sub

7 Dr. Mervin Kelly o f Bell Labs was asked first, but declined. Killian, Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower,
63.
8 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 64-65.
9 Killian, Untitled Speech, n.d, MIT, AC4, Box 194, “Science Advisory Committee, 1952.”
10 Letter DuBridge to Cutler, 3/19/53, EL, WHO, OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Subject Sub series,
Box 7, “Science and Research- General (l)[March-April 1953].”
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committee was appointed by SAC-ODM to draft a letter to Truman to consider the matter
of public education.13 Although SAC-ODM had tried to take the initiative when it could,
the work of the Science Advisory Committee went mostly unused and, as Killian
remarked, the committee “languished in desuetude.”14
In May 1952, Dr. Buckley resigned as chairman upon the advice of his doctors.
He was replaced by Dr. Lee DuBridge who tried gallantly bit to no avail to elevate the
function and influence o f the Science Advisory Committee during the last months of the
Truman Administration.15 DuBridge strongly believed that, “the true situation regarding
atomic weapons, radar networks, the technical capabilities o f air force weapons and other
similar matters, [could] no longer be treated as merely technical details for they come in
the very heart of the decisions on national strategy which we make.”16 Frustrated by
Truman’s lack of interest in SAC-ODM and worried that “the mechanisms for providing
scientific advice at the highest levels in the government [had] been inadequate,”
DuBridge organized a meeting to discuss the future of the committee.17
Hosted by Dr. Robert Oppenheimer at Princeton’s Institute for Advanced Study,
the Science Advisory Committee met for three days in early November 1952.18 The
agenda included improving the effectiveness of applying science to defense and

11 Rather than offer its expertise to other groups, it was Dr. Buckley’s policy to wait for someone to seek
the advice o f the Committee. See Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 66.
12 Project East River is discussed in Chapter 3.
13 Summary o f Meeting No. 10 o f the Science Advisory Committee, 4/12/52, MIT, AC4, Box 194, “Science
Advisory Committee, 1952.” The subcommittee consisted o f Bronk (chair), Killian and Loeb.
14 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 66.
11 Ibid., 66.
16 Letter DuBridge to Charles Thomas, 3/19/53, EL, WHO OSANSA Special Assistant series, Subject sub
series, Box 7, “Science and Research- General (1) [March-April 1953],” 1.
17Letter DuBridge to Cutler, 3/19/53, EL, WHO OSANSA Special Assistant series, Subject sub-series,
Box 7, “Science and Research- General (1) [March-April 1953],” I.
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improving the use o f science and technology in policy making.ly It was felt that the
committee was called upon only to dispense advice to other advisors, not policy makers,
and that the National Security Council would benefit from a deliberative body such as the
Science Advisory Committee.20 Specifically, the Committee agreed that both the
Secretary of Defense and the National Security Council should be provided with better
scientific advice. It also recommended an advisor to the Secretary of Defense and a full
time staff member on the NSC who was a scientist or engineer.21 In light o f the on going
Korean war and the need for scientific advice for defense, it decided at the meeting that
they would not disband, but try to be more useful as a committee.22 They also adopted a
wait and see attitude towards the new administration. As early as June, the Committee
had held out hope that the fall election might bring about more opportunities for active
service.23 The decision to remain intact was, in Killian’s words, “prophetically wise, for
ultimately great responsibilities were in store for the committee.”24
Dr. Lee DuBridge was clearly excited about the new Eisenhower administration.
In particular, DuBridge hoped that science advising would receive a higher place as a
result o f Eisenhower’s efforts to reorganize the NSC and executive branch. To help this
along, DuBridge immediately set out to improve the function of SAC-ODM by

18 Meeting No. 14 Summary o f the Science Advisory Committee, 11/7-9/52, MIT, AC4, Box 194, “Science
Advisory Committee 1952.” It was at this meeting that those who had heard rumors warned Oppenheimer
he was about to come under attack. See Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 104.
19 Meeting No. 13 Summary o f the Science Advisory Committee, 9/12/52, MIT, AC4, Box 194, “Science
Advisory Committee 1952.”
20 Meeting No. 12 Summary o f the Science Advisory Committee, 6/15/52, MIT, AC4, Box 194, “Science
Advisory Committee 1952.”
21 Letter DuBridge to Charles Thomas, 3/19/53, EL, WHO OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Subject Sub
series, Box 7, “Science and Research - General (l)[March-April 1953].”
22 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 67.
23 Meeting No. 12 Summary o f the Science Advisory Committee, 6/15/52, MIT, AC4, Box 194, “Science
Advisory Committee 1952.”

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

172
contacting the newly appointed President’s Advisory Commission for Government
Organization (PACGO).2i DuBridge and Oppenheimer met with Nelson Rockefeller of
the PACGO who was “genuinely interested in” their recommendations and passed them
on to Eisenhower.26 DuBridge then wrote to Robert Cutler as he was reorganizing the
NSC. He outlined for Cutler some of the proposals SAC-ODM had come up with at their
November Princeton meeting. Telling Cutler that the Science Advisory Committee
believed important decisions had been made in the past without “adequate consideration
given to the technological situation which bore upon the decisions,” DuBridge stressed
the need for better scientific advising within the new administration.27 He rejoiced in the
fact that it seemed that Cutler’s ideas for the NSC reflected a greater need for a
deliberative process, something SAC-ODM also believed was necessary. DuBridge also
saw hope in Cutler’s inclusion of a member of the Science Advisory Committee, Dr.
Charles Thomas, on the recent Civilian Consultants Board set up under the chairmanship
of Dillion Anderson.* DuBridge complimented Cutler on the appointment and wrote to
Thomas, reminding him of the recommendations proposed at the Princeton meeting in
hopes to influence the reorganization direction of the NSC on scientific advising.29

24 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 67.
25 For more on PACGO see Chapter one.
26 Memorandum DuBridge to Members and Consultants of the Science Advisory Committee, 1/5/53, MIT,
AC 4, Box 195, “Science Advisory Committee 1953;” Memorandum DuBridge to Members and Consultants
of the Science Advisory Committee, 4/20/53, MIT, AC 4, Box 195, “Science Advisory Committee 1953.”
27 Letter DuBridge to Cutler, 3/19/53, EL, WHO OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Subject Sub series,
Box 7, “Science and Research - General (l)[March-April 1953].”
28 Letter DuBridge to Cutler, 3/19/53, EL, WHO OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Subject Sub series,
Box 7, “Science and Research - General (l)[March-April 1953].” For more on the Civilian Consultants see
Chapter One.
29 Letter DuBridge to Charles Thomas, 3/19/53, EL, WHO OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Subject Sub
series, Box 7, “Science and Research - General (l)[March-April 1953].”

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

173
DuBridge placed all of his effort to ensure scientific advising played a substantial
role in government policy, and that his efforts did not go unnoticed. Cutler followed up
on his suggestions as he knew that the new administration had to deal with problems
relating to atomic attack, chemical and biological warfare, continental defense, and other
problems which could benefit from scientific advice.30 Exploring how science advising
might help the NSC, Cutler had Strauss recommend some scientists who might serve as a
small committee of three to advise Cutler from time to time. Strauss recommended
Detlev Bronk, Karl Compton of MIT, and John von Neumann of Princeton.31 But, in the
end, no permanent committee was ever established. Cutler explained to DuBridge in a
meeting with Dr. Bush and ODM director Arthur Flemming, that the NSC did not need a
permanent scientist on staff because most NSC problems were not “technical.”32
Flemming disagreed and believed a scientific advisor was still necessary, but was unable
to convince Cutler or Eisenhower.
So despite DuBridge’s tremendous effort, SAC-ODM still languished. This was
due in part because, as historian Richard Damms explained, Eisenhower initially
preferred to seek scientific advice from “practical-minded businessmen,” like Strauss,
rather than from scientists like DuBridge, James Conant, or Oppenheimer, all of whom
advocated arms control and dissented on the building of the hydrogen bomb.33

30 Cutler called the suggestions appropriate and useful and invited DuBridge to meet with him, Dr. Bush,
Assistant Secretary o f Defense Kyes, and ODM director Arthur Flemming in May. Memorandum DuBridge
to Members and Consultants o f the Science Advisory Committee, 4/20/53, M U, AC 4, Box 195, “Science
Advisory Committee 1953.”
31 Strauss to Cutler, 4/23/53, EL, WHO OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Subject Sub series, Box 7,
“Science and Research - General (l)[March-April 1953].”
32 Memorandum to Members o f the Science Advisory Committee from DuBridge, 5/20/53, MIT, AC 4, Box
195, “Science Advisory Committee 1953.”
33 Richard Damms, “Eisenhower’s ‘Scientific-Technological Elite,’” Diplomatic History, 24 (Winter 2000),
62. James Conant was president o f Harvard from the mid-thirties to the mid-fifties and had worked on the
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Eisenhower also had concerns about Oppenheimer in general, saying to C.D. Jackson that
he “just didn’t feel comfortable with Oppenheimer” and worried about his “hypnotic
influence over small groups.”34 In addition, there seemed to be no reason to appoint a
President’s Science Advisor since AEC chairman Lewis Strauss had recently been named
Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy Matters.35 So, in matters of nuclear
technology, most of the advice Eisenhower received did not originate with Oppenheimer
and SAC-ODM, but with Edward Teller, filtering through the channel of the AEC via
Strauss.36 This trend left many in the scientific community doubtful about the role
scientific advising could play, particularly after the Oppenheimer affair.
Oppenheimer had been accused of being a security risk with his opposition to the
development of a hydrogen bomb and due to his past communist association. An AEC
“security hearing” was held in early 1954 which stripped Oppenheimer of all security
clearances, forcing him out of any government advising or government sponsored
research. James Killian remarked that “the Oppenheimer trial and its conclusions caused
many scientists to have deep misgivings about the Eisenhower administration...Not only
was there widespread feeling that a tragic injustice had been done to a man who had
served the nation loyally and brilliantly; there was also fear that elements in the lower

atomic bomb. See James Hershberg, James Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making o f the Nuclear

Age, (New York: Knopf, 1993).
34 Jackson to Henry Luce, 10/12/54, CD Jackson Papers, Box 66, “Oppenheimer,” quoted in Damms, 62.
35 Memorandum to Lay from Hugh Farley, 4/2/53, EL, WHO OSANSA, Special Assistant Series, Subject
Sub series, Box 7, “Science and Research - General (l)[March-April 1953].” Strauss coveted his position as
main science advisor to Eisenhower and resented it when Eisenhower did finally create the position o f
Special Assistant to the President on Science and Technology in 1957 and appointed James Killian. See
Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 38.
36 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 152. Edward Teller can be considered the father o f the
hydrogen bomb and fought hard for its development, much to the opposition and dismay o f Manhattan
Project director, Robert Oppenheimer. Both Teller and Strauss continued to advocate bigger bombs and

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

175
reaches of government, especially in the military, were not averse to destroying the
influence of those whose advice ran counter to their policies and views about national
defense.”37 Although this left a rift between the administration and the scientific
community, it also meant that Oppenheimer was no longer a member o f SAC-ODM
Furthermore, Conant had stepped down from the committee in early 1954, leaving SACODM void o f the two members Eisenhower was least comfortable with.38 SAC-ODM
was ready to be given a higher purpose in the summer o f 1954 when Eisenhower gave it a
project that Killian called “worthy of its mettle.”39

Establishing the Technological Capabilities Panel
In July 1954, Eisenhower directed SAC-ODM to establish a committee to study
how science and technology could be used to guard against surprise attack. The idea
grew out of Eisenhower’s own concerns about continental defense and surprise attack
and DuBridge’s perseverance. DuBridge had help from the ODM director, Arthur
Flemming. Flemming supported SAC-ODM and believed that it should remain intact.
Moreover, he understood the problem of not having scientific advising at top policy
levels and agreed with DuBridge’s contention that SAC-ODM could provide a valuable
service to the NSC and the President. Even though the suggestions o f the Science
Advisory Committee from their Princeton meeting were not adopted fully, DuBridge felt

opposed arms control and test bans throughout the 1950s. For more on Teller and the hydrogen bomb see
Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: Making o f the Hydrogen Bomb, (NY: Simon & Schuster, 1995).
37 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 223. For the best account on the Oppenheimer case see
Philip Stem, The Oppenheimer Case: Security on Trial, (NY: Harper Row, 1969). For a recent work on the
scientific community during the cold war and McCarthyism see Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age
o f Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).
38 Hershberg, James Conant, 568-569; Damms, “Eisenhower’s ‘Scientific-Technological Elite,”’ 62.
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Flemming would see to it that the Science Advisory Committee was affective.40
DuBridge and Flemming had their first real opportunity to elevate the Science Advisory
Committee in early 1954.
In early 1954, SAC-ODM met with Trevor Gardner, the Special Assistant for
research and development to Secretary of the Air Force, Harold Talbott. Gardner was
trained as an engineer and had worked on the Manhattan Project at the California
Institute o f Technology. He had been described as “intelligent, vigorous, somewhat
volatile, and impatient to make changes quickly.”41 He was deeply concerned about the
August 12,1953 Soviet testing of a 400 kiloton thermonuclear device and the advances
being made in warhead miniaturization. Aware of the work being done at RAND in
California which predicted that as much as eighty-five percent o f Strategic Air Command
could be destroyed by a Soviet air strike, Gardner agreed that the Soviets were not far
from developing weapons that could knock out SAC with a first strike. He lobbied for an
air force ICBM program and turned to his friend, DuBridge, for help. As one aide
recalled, Gardner met with DuBridge, cocktail in hand, and told him that SAC-ODM was
not worth “a good goddamn... You’re abnegating your responsibility to science and the
country, sitting on your dead asses in fancy offices in Washington, wasting your time and
the taxpayers’ money getting through a lot of goddamn motions on a lot o f low-level,
shitty exercises- all in the name o f science.”42 He suggested to DuBridge that the

39 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 67.
40 Memorandum to Members o f the Science Advisory Committee from DuBridge, 5/20/53, MIT, AC 4, Box
195, “Science Advisory Committee 1953.”
41 Herbert York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant's View o f the Arms Race, (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1970), 84.
42 Interview with Vincent Ford by Michael Beschloss, May 1985, quoted in Michael Beschloss, MayDay:
Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair, (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 73-74.
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committee ought to do a study on whether or not America had the “ability, or inability, to
meet” a surprise attack and that the study should be “the true story, not that shit
Washington is feeding the American people.”43 Roused by Gardner’s critique, DuBridge
agreed to set up a meeting of the SAC-ODM with Gardner on January 22 and 23.44
At that meeting, Gardner outlined his concerns over the problems posed by the
thermonuclear revolution. Particularly he wanted to see the development of new weapon
systems able to counter the Soviets ability to deliver a devastating first strike on the
United States. He also hoped research done by SAC-ODM might be able to lift what he
saw as “somewhat arbitrary budget ceilings” in the Department o f Defense.45 Gardner
urged DuBridge and his committee to discuss further how science and technology might
be applied to new weapon technology. To facilitate that, DuBridge set up rump sessions
o f the Committee members on the east coast and on the west coast to discuss the
questions raised by Gardner.46 DuBridge worked with committee members in Pasadena
while James Killian worked with members in Cambridge.47
Gardner met with the Cambridge group on March 10th. The session concluded
that two further problems needed to be discussed: “how to create a proper sense of
urgency of the problems posed by new weapons and how to increase the impact of
scientific developments in military planning and programs.”48 Some members o f the
committee worried that even if such a study was formed to answer those questions, the

43 Ibid.
44 Meeting of the Cambridge-New York Group of the Science Advisory Committee, 3/10/54, MIT, AC 4,
Box 195, “Science Advisory Committee, 1954.”
45 Ibid.
46 Telegram DuBridge to Killian, 2/11/54, MIT, AC 4 Box 195, “Science Advisory Committee, 1954;”
Letter E.R. Piore to DuBridge, 3/1/54, MIT, AC 4 Box 195, “Science Advisory Committee, 1954.”
47 Telegram DuBridge to Killian, 2/11/54, MIT, AC 4 Box 195, “Science Advisory Committee, 1954.”
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NSC would not be interested in hearing the findings. Killian believed that it was
irrelevant whether or not the NSC would be receptive. What was important was that
SAC-ODM did what it felt necessary, and a study which evaluated the effects o f new
weapons on deterrence and vulnerability to surprise attack was vital. Killian believed it
was vital because new weapons could no longer be seen as “purely military devices,” but
rather they were now “an essential element in the determination of national security.”49
As such, it reasoned that the NSC needed a “broad framework for making its policy
determinations,” a framework that SAC-ODM could provide. The group therefore
decided at the end of its meeting that the recommendation for a frill time group o f highly
competent individuals be established for a six to twelve month study on how to apply
science and technology to the problems of continental defense and surprise attack.30
In addition to the information they gathered from Trevor Gardner, David Beckler,
the Executive Officer of SAC-ODM, had asked C. D. Jackson to talk with them before
their meeting with Eisenhower. Jackson was happy to do so and briefed the group on the
Soviet Union and the work of the Operations Coordinating Board. Jackson even advised
the committee on a line they might take with Eisenhower.51 The meetings with Gardner
and Jackson allowed SAC-ODM to become more familiar with the needs o f the
government and to formalize their ideas on how science and technology could help
national security. The meetings also gave DuBridge a solid framework from which to

48 Meeting o f the Cambridge-New York Group o f the Science Advisory Committee, 3/10/54, MIT, AC 4,
Box 195, “Science Advisory Committee, 1954.”
49 Ibid.; Letter David Beckler to Killian, 3/19/54, MIT, AC 4, Box 195, “Science Advisory Committee,
1954.”
50 Ibid.
51 Log 3/18/54 and 3/26/54, EL, CD Jackson Papers, Box 68, “Log- 1954 (2);” Letter Beckler to Jackson,
3/18/54, EL, CD Jackson Papers, Box 95, “Speeches, Comments, Misc., 1954.”
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approach Eisenhower. Their timing was perfect since Eisenhower had spent the last year
hearing about the problems with guarding against surprise attack and the inadequacies of
continental defense in light of the thermonuclear revolution.
SAC-ODM met with Eisenhower on March 27,1954. Although their meeting was
brief, SAC-ODM made its mark on Eisenhower. As Eisenhower expounded upon the
grave dangers o f a surprise attack on the United States, he “voiced a hope that ways
could be found to reduce the probability and minimize the dangers of such an attack.’02
Eisenhower was also well aware that Trevor Gardner was not the only man bitter about
budget ceilings and that the military services, although in agreement on the need for an
early warning system, still fought for every penny for their own interests. He therefore
hoped that a study by unbiased civilians, untouched by service rivalries, could objectively
produce a “rational program of weapons development.’03 It was a golden opportunity.
SAC-ODM had wanted since its inception in 1951 to apply scientific and technological
solutions to the problems posed by the Cold War, and DuBridge was eager to see a study
group formed immediately.
DuBridge set out to convince Flemming to recommend that an evaluation of
science and technology on the problem of surprise attack be made by a “short-term, but
full-time group of highly competent individuals.”34 This group, as the Cambridge group
had recommended, could greatly educate the President, NSC, and other interested
departments. DuBridge recommended that the study group examine three specific areas:

52 Letter DuBridge to Flemming, 5/24/54, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Subject Series, Box 104,
“World War m ( l ) , ” 1.
53 James Killian, Jr., Oral History, Columbia University Oral History Project, 1969-1970, 19.
54 Letter DuBridge to Flemming, 5/24/54, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 104, “World War
III (I).”
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striking power, defensive power, and intelligence. He explained to Flemming that new
technology could strengthen national security through striking power only through “the
most advanced kind of creative technology and scientific thinking.”53 Specifically,
DuBridge focused on the questions raised by the thermonuclear revolution- the effects of
radioactive contamination, how to protect allies, and the implications of intercontinental
missile development The thermonuclear revolution also increased American
vulnerability to attack, and new technology had to be utilized to improve continental
defense. As DuBridge said, “a striking force cannot take off if it is wiped out in a surprise
attack.”36 Improving the early warning systems, interceptors, tactical nuclear weapons,
and protection of overseas bases could all improve overall defensive power. In addition,
the ultimate defensive power might come through improved intelligence since, as
DuBridge duly noted, “an attack is no longer a surprise if we know it is coming in
advance.”57 But, DuBridge estimated that the tremendous scientific resources available in
America were not being properly utilized to improve the nation’s information gathering
mechanisms. In short, such a study would improve military strength, policy making, and
harness scientific resources efficiently for national security.58
Impressed by DuBridge’s proposal, Flemming met with Eisenhower, Cutler,
Sherman Adams, and Secretary of Defense Wilson on June 21st in an off-the-record
meeting.59 Flemming then followed up that meeting with discussions with key personnel.

55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid.
39 Memorandum for Eisenhower from Flemming, 7/9/54, MIT Collection, AC4, Box 195, “SAC, TCP 1954March 1955;” The President’s Appointments, 6/21/54, EL, The President’s Appointments 1954 (JanuaryJune).”
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He spoke further with Wilson and the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Donald Quarles,
who was an engineer himself and had what Killian called a “clear and fast mind in
dealing with technical matters.”60 Flemming also shored up support for such a study
group from Allen Dulles and Lewis Strauss.61 Meanwhile, DuBridge had organized a
two day meeting of SAC-ODM to discuss developing this committee. To say that SACODM was enthusiastic is not overstating their mood and they believed their study would
be “of great value in many ways.”62 With the support of Wilson, Dulles, Strauss, and the
entire Science Advisory Committee, Flemming recommended to Eisenhower on July 9th
that the project be approved.63 On July 24th, Eisenhower signed off on it.64
Once again, Eisenhower turned to civilian experts, this time mostly scientists, to
examine an aspect of national security - how the United States might take advantage of
new science and technology to defend against surprise attack. In Eisenhower’s opinion,
“the needs of our country at this present instance require the best judgment we can
mobilize for a short term examination of the problems as it has been outlined.”63 To do
that, he mobilized the top scientists in the country to take a searching review of the entire
weapons development programs and he opened all doors to clear the way for the group to
get the relevant information it needed to be entirely successful. To lead such an

60 Killian, Oral History, 240.
61 Memorandum for Eisenhower by Flemming, 7/9/54 and Memorandum for Adams by Flemming, 7/21/54,
both in EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 104, “World War HI (1).”
62 The two day meeting was held on July 19 and 20. Letter DuBridge to Flemming, 7/21/54, MIT
Collection, AC4, Box 195, “SAC, TCP 1954-March 1955.”
63 Memorandum for Eisenhower from Flemming, 7/9/54, MIT Collection, AC4, Box 195, “SAC, TCP 1954March 1955.”
64 Memorandum for Flemming by Carroll, 7/26/54, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 104,
“World War HI (1).”
65 Letter Eisenhower to Killian, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 104, “World War HI (1).”
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ambitious study, the committee needed a competent, intelligent chair and DuBridge
immediately suggested his friend James Killian for the position.66

James Killian
By the time Eisenhower asked Killian to chair the committee which would bear
his name, Killian was already a master administrator of scientists and leader in the charge
for the mobilization o f science for national security. He was, simply put, a statesman of
science. He graduated from the Massachusetts Institute o f Technology in 1926 with a
bachelor o f science degree in business and engineering administration. With no other
degree in hand, James Killian stayed on at MIT, becoming its president in 1949. During
World War n, Killian carried heavy burdens in the administration o f MIT as the
executive assistant to the school’s president, Karl Compton. MIT, like many other private
institutions during the war, was transformed into one of the nation’s largest centers for
weapons research and development. Its Radiation Laboratory carried out one o f the most
impressive assignments of the war in its development of radar, a feat which Dr. Isidor I.
Rabi credited as invaluable. “Had it not been for radar,” Rabi remarked, “the Allies
would have lost the war.”67 MIT’s Dr. Vannevar Bush led a full assault in mobilizing
science during the war through his Office of Scientific Research and Development
(OSRD), developing over 200 weapons and contributing greatly to advances in medicine,
chemistry, and physics. The end result was that MIT benefited greatly from what

66 Letter DuBridge to Flemming, 7/21/54, MTT Collection, AC4, Box 195, “SAC, TCP 1954-March 1955.”
67 James Killian, The Education o f a College President, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985), 26.
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Winston Churchill called “The Wizard War,” and James Killian was responsible for the
administration of it all.
After the war, Killian continued to serve the country both at MIT and in
Washington. He first went to Washington in 1950 as a member o f both President
Truman’s Communications Policy Board and the President’s Advisory Committee on
Management. In 1951 Killian became the chairman o f the Army Scientific Advisory
Panel, staying until 1956. Also in 1951 Killian was appointed by Truman to the
President’s Science Advisory Committee.68 Yet while Killian was acclimating himself to
Washington, as President of MIT he was calling for the universities o f America to realize
“the position o f basic importance in our national life which our educational institutions
have come to occupy.”69
Immediately after World War II it became obvious that both education and
science were imperative to winning the Cold War. For example, one of the first
declarations made by the newly established United Nations commented explicitly on the
importance of education. The Constitution o f the United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organization, written in Nov, (1945), declared that “since wars begin in the
minds o f men, it is in the minds o f men that the defenses of peace must be constructed;
...that the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty
and peace are indispensable to the dignity o f man and constitute a sacred duty which all

68 Killian said the SAC-ODM had little to do and “was called on hardly at all by President Truman.” Killian,
The Education o f a College President, 325.
69 James Killian, “The University’s Responsibility to Science,” Chemical and Engineering News, (American
Chemical Society) vol.29, May 21,1951, M IT Collection 423 (Papers of James Killian, Jr.), Box 39, file
folder 21-1,2033.
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the nations must fulfill in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern.”70 Likewise, the vital
importance o f science to the winning of the Cold War was summed up by Dr. L. H.
Reyerson, professor o f chemistry at the University of Minnesota, when he remarked in
1957 that the United States was “engaged in a war o f a new type. Instead o f being fought
on the battlefields it is now being fought in the laboratories.”71 Whoever won the war in
science would win the Cold War. James Killian knew the importance of scientific
education to the preservation of American national security and he mobilized MIT
towards the cause of national security. As he explained in 1951 to the American
Chemical Society, “The university as we know it in America cannot withdraw behind an
ivory curtain in a time of crisis.”72 Killian therefore brought to Washington in the early
1950s a belief that in these times o f crisis no modem statesman could afford to be
scientifically illiterate and that no university could remain insulated from world events.
Science had won the world war and it was evident that science could help win the Cold
War.
In a January 1951 speech titled Ivory Towers and Bullets, Killian told his
audience that the need for well-educated men had never been so apparent. He said, “we
live in an age in which science and technology are vastly increasing man’s knowledge
and the tools with which he can be effective. Each increase in knowledge makes
additional demands on man’s understanding.”73 He went on to explain, “scientific

70 Constitution o f the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, November 16, 1945
as found at the Avalon Project at the Yale Law School, wysiwyg://10/http://yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/decade.
71 “Dept, o f State Memo of Conversation, October 10, 1957’ (Reyerson, Trytten, Heiter), NA, RG59,
Series 911.80-911.82, Box 5204.
72 Killian, “The University’s Responsibility to Science,” 2033.
73 James Killian, “Ivory Towers and Bullets,” Speech to Rochester City Club, January 13,1951. M U
Collection 423, Box 39, file folder 21-1,29-30.
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advance, an industrial society, an interrelated world, and a community of free men... are
interdependent. Together they open doors to the future which reveal vistas o f great
promise. But whether we advance in this direction depends on education.”74 Killian
believed that with the Cold War the educational work o f the colleges needed to be
strengthened. They needed to be strengthened in regards both to the students’ general
education and to “the community at large for increased opportunities for information and
discussion.”7:5 That meant that the universities had a responsibility to educate the public,
particularly in an era o f rapid scientific and technological advances. But James Killian
meant more than that. For Killian, a general education in all disciplines was vital to the
advancement of American society. Scientific specialization was of course necessary, but
Killian believed a more “Renaissance” education - one balanced in the sciences and the
humanities- was also necessary for the scientist to contribute fully to society. Just as the
diplomat could not afford to be scientifically illiterate, the scientist could not afford to be
isolated from the humanities. It was this strong belief in the role the university had to
play in educating able leaders in an era of Cold War that led Killian to establish several
new programs at MIT, including the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, the
Center for International Studies, the School of Industrial Management, and the Lincoln
Laboratory.76
Killian not only required his students to be prepared for the Cold War, he required
that the university support the national defense in the laboratory, or, as he put it, “to be
ready to undertake urgent defense projects for which [the university has] the appropriate

74 Ibid., 31.
75 Ibid., 42.
76 Killian, The Education o fa College President, 71-76; 199; 220-230.
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facilities and staff.” " Killian became convinced that this was an appropriate role for the
university through his experiences at MIT during WWII. In December 1950, shortly after
becoming president o f MIT, Killian was confronted by a request from the Air Force to
establish a major research project devoted to air defense. Killian’s agreement to proceed
was, as he himself wrote, “undoubtedly influenced by the knowledge that the Russians
had exploded an atomic weapon (1949), by the turn of China, under Mao Tae-Tung, [s/c]
to Communism, and by the tensions associated with the opening of hostilities in Korea
7R

(1950).” Furthermore, Louis Ridenour, head of the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board,
had convinced Killian that MIT had a responsibility to respond to a national need. Unlike
Harvard’s president, who had declared that the university should not become engaged in
classified research, James Killian and many others at MIT felt that they should meet the
needs of national security. As MIT physicist and associate director of the Lincoln
Laboratory Jerrold Zacharias remarked some years later, MIT did not believe that “the
safety o f the country should be sloughed off on somebody else because it’s dirty
work... .There is a need for an institution such as [MIT] to come to the aid o f its country
when it’s in trouble.”79 The end result o f MIT’s willingness to come to the aid of its
country was the establishment of the Lincoln Laboratory and the creation of the
mammoth Semiautomatic Ground Environment, commonly referred to as the SAGE
system, a computerized form of air defense which the military was counting on to
improve continental defenses.

77 Killian, “Ivory Towers and Bullets,” Speech to Rochester City Club, January 13,1951. MIT Collection
423, Box 39, “21-1,” 43.
78 Killian, The Education o f a College President, 71-72.
79 Ibid., 72 and Thomas Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus: The Story o f the Mammoth Projects, (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1998), 29.
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In developing SAGE, the Lincoln Laboratory worked closely with IBM. Killian
remarked that the cooperative effort between the Laboratory and IBM was “an
exceedingly important contribution to national welfare” and that “perhaps one of the
greatest American inventions is the technique for taking concepts and discoveries of
scholars in our universities and of implementing them industrially through the rapid
mobilization of engineering, managerial, employee, and financial skills, all to the end
that we produce some useful end result with a minimum expenditure of time.”80 In
addition to the Lincoln Laboratories, MIT was actively involved in many so-called
summer studies- studies various branches o f the military asked the nation’s scholars and
scientists to undertake.81 They were often done in the summer between semesters. In
reflecting back on the summer studies, Killian said they were “memorable and exciting
times when government, industry, and the universities” worked together in a “powerful
creative collaboration.”82 In short, with the summer studies, the Lincoln Laboratory and
the creation o f SAGE, Killian ensured that at least MIT did not fall behind an ivory
curtain during a time o f national need.
To educate the public and gain their acceptance of the idea of a continental air
defense system, Killian co-authored an article with the director of the Lincoln
Laboratory, Professor Albert Hill, for the November 1953 issue of the Atlantic Monthly.
The article, entitled, “For a Continental Defense,” was designed to increase awareness

80 James Killian, “Dedication o f IBM’s Kingston, NY Building,” November 2, 1956. MIT Collection 423,
Box 40, “22-1,” 2.
81 Some o f the numerous summer studies undertaken at MIT were: Project Hartwell, contracted by the navy,
which became “the bible o f undersea warfare;” Project Charles was contracted by the air force and created
SAGE; Project Lincoln was also an air force contract and created the Lincoln Lab. See Killian, Sputnik,
Scientists, and Eisenhower, 102-104; Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus, 23-30.
82 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 104.
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about the urgency created by the Soviets’ explosion o f nuclear weapons. Killian and Hill
also hoped to encourage the National Security Council to give continental air defenses a
higher priority and therefore submitted their article for review by Robert Cutler. Killian
and Hill got clearance for their article while at the same time convincing many in the
NSC to support a continental defense system.83 For Killian, educating the public was vital
to maintaining freedom itself. As he explained;
Adequate information today requires an organized approach whereby our
knowledge of political science, sociology, education, economics can be
brought in to round out the picture of the situation we face as a result of a
scientific and technological development For instance, if the public
learns about the destructive effects of the atomic bomb, and has no
related information, it is not well informed about the bomb at all. And a
badly informed man loses the capacity for constructive action which
alone gives freedom meaning. The same is true of any new development
Only when the picture is presented as a whole, can the layman, the
citizen who will make crucial decisions, feel that he can begin to deal
effectively with new problems which may accompany scientific
advance.84

For Killian, therefore, educating and gaining the support of the public, o f the average
citizen, was important. Eisenhower had the same opinions and he often spoke o f the need
to “educate our people in the fundamentals of these problems” in order to achieve the
“enlightened support of Americans and the informed understanding of our friends.”85
This likeness in thinking no doubt contributed to Eisenhower’s high regard for Killian in
later years. In addition, observers clearly appreciated Killian’s respect for the public. One
senator, for example, after hearing Killian speak, commented that Killian “doesn’t

83 Killian, The Education o f a College President, 74-75.
84 Killian, “Ivory Towers and Bullets,” 38-39.
85 Memorandum to Dulles from Eisenhower, 9/8/53, EL, AWF, DDE Diary, Box 3, “August-September
1953 (2).”
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require one to be a graduate of MIT to understand what he means.”86 This ability too of
Killian’s was certainly one of the reasons he was so highly regarded as the President’s
main spokesman on American science and technology after Sputnik in 1957.
Before Killian rose to his position as Science Advisor in 1957, Eisenhower asked
him to chair the Technological Capabilities Panel. Killian accepted with enthusiasm and
rightly noted that the President’s direct interest in the study gave the project an added
importance and urgency which would inspire SAC-ODM members.87 Important too to the
success of the committee was Killian himself. By the summer o f 1954 he had proved
himself an efficient administrator of scientists, had formed a deep belief that the
scientific community had a responsibility toward helping national security, was well
informed about the research and development going on in the area of continental defense,
and was part of an extensive network of scientists which he tapped to serve on his
committee.

Getting to Work
One o f the first things Killian set out to do was to establish a “small and highly
competent” steering committee.88 He called upon close associates to serve with him and
asked his personal friend Dr. James Fisk of the Bell Laboratories to serve as the deputy
chairman. Killian and Fisk then set up an impressive committee which included
DuBridge, James Doolittle, historian James Phinney Baxter, IE and Robert Sprague.

86 Vonda Bergman, “Vermonter in Washington,” Burlington Free Press, January 11, 1958. MIT Collection
423, Box 11, “Women’s National Press Club,” 1.
87 Letter Killian to Eisenhower, 8/9/54, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential Files, Box 104, “World War HI
(1).” Eisenhower had said to Killian that he was “keenly interested” in the project.
88 Letter Killian to Cutler, 8/19/54, MIT Collection, AC4, Box 195, “SAC, TCP 1954-March 1955.”
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Killian felt it “extremely important” to ask Sprague because o f his recent work for the
NSC on continental defense. Sprague was invaluable not only for his intimate
knowledge, but his presence would also eliminate having to go over the same ground
again that he had already covered.89 Cutler agreed that Sprague was one o f the best
informed men in America on the subject of continental defense but only gave Killian
permission to ask Sprague to participate as a Consultant to the steering committee. Since
Sprague’s current status was as a Consultant to the NSC, Cutler did not want to
jeopardize Sprague’s position and felt it best if he were not an official member of the
steering committee.90 Sprague himself saw no difference whether he was a consultant or
member o f the committee and enthusiastically accepted Killian’s offer.91
The steering committee met for the first time on September 13, 1954. Between
September and February the steering committee visited Strategic Air Command
headquarters, Tactical Air Command headquarters, Air Defense Command, and the Air
Research and Development Command. They met with various representatives from the
White House, ODM, State, CIA, AEC, FCDA, SHAPE, and the military services. In all,
the steering committee participated in over one hundred and thirty briefings, field trips,
meetings and conferences.92 Overall, the committee felt it had access to all relevant
information and that everyone involved was extremely helpful. For example, even Curtis
LeMay, the commander o f SAC who, as one committee member put it, was “the kind of

89 Ibid.
90 Letter Cutler to Killian, 8/30/54, MIT Collection, AC4, Box 195, “SAC, TCP 1954-March 1955.”
91 Letter Sprague to Killian, 9/1/54, MIT Collection, AC4, Box 195, “SAC, TCP 1954-March 1955.”
92 Report by the Technological Capabilities Panel, “Meeting the Threat o f Surprise Attack,” 2/14/55, N A
RG 59, Sub Files o f the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy and Aerospace, 1950-66, Box 1, “Killian
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person that you might think would be rather suspicious of a bunch of scientists probing
into strategic matters,” was really very “forthcoming and encouraging.”93
Killian admitted that the committee did face some resistance from the services at
first, particularly with the Air Force, because it was unusual for a weapons study with “no
holds barred” to be undertaken by a group completely outside the Department of
Defense.94 However, as the study progressed, the different services “began to cooperate
more fully, and in the end we had their enthusiastic participation.”93 Killian credited
Eisenhower’s sponsorship and firm support for the study as reasons why the services
fully cooperated. In fact, Eisenhower and Cutler often got personally involved in ensuring
that the group had access to all relevant information.96 Also helpful were Donald
Quarles, whom Killian called “an utterly reasonable person,” and the military advisors
assigned to the group who acted as consultants and helped facilitate the gathering of
pertinent information.97
Despite some initial suspicion from the services towards the study, the Killian
committee itself worked in an environment free from interservice rivalries. Eisenhower
constantly dealt with interservice rivalries which hindered the development of a rational
weapons program. Killian believed that one of the basic objectives Eisenhower had in

93 Killian, Oral History (interview with Beckler), 263.
94 Killian, Oral History, 240.
95 Killian, Oral History, 98.
96 When Killian and Sprague wished to know how a particular weapons system would work in the event o f a
sneak attack, Eisenhower agreed to their request for an oral briefing and further suggested that the men be
taken to a location to be shown just exactly how the system worked. See Conference in the President’s
Office, 12/22/54, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Sub series, Box 17, “TCP o f the
Science Advisory Committee, 1954-56 (3).”
97 Killian, Oral History, 15; 240; In the final TCP report, the Panel “gratefully” thanked the military advisors
who “rendered an invaluable service in arranging for briefings and inspections, in making available classified
material, and generally in paving the way for a close working relationship between the Armed Services and
the Technological Capabilities Panel.” See TCP Report, 186.
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establishing the Killian committee was “to try to find a group that could override these
rivalries in the Department o f Defense and look at the total problem objectively.”98
Killian was successful in organizing such a team of brilliant, dedicated scientists and
engineers who rose to the challenge.
Killian assembled a group of men who came in with fresh points of view and an
understanding o f physical science and technology that was unmatched. They rapidly
came to grips with weapons technology and made “original contributions to it” in a way
that men with a lesser mastery of science and technology could not do.99 Sprague later
commented that it was a thrill to work with such an intelligent group that was so
dedicated to the task at hand.100
Killian explained that the task at hand was to look for “what we called the big
jumps,” to match what the committee members knew about technology with what the
Department of Defense needed.101 To better manage that task, Killian divided the entire
study into three broad groups. The first panel was to study the overall offensive
capabilities o f the United States, or its striking power. The second panel was given
continental defenses, and the third panel oversaw the area of intelligence. Each panel,
like the steering committee, was given access to all relevant information, and each panel
participated in numerous briefings, field trips, and meetings.102 The group worked

98 Killian, Oral History, 19.
99 Ibid., 236.
100 Letter Sprague to Eisenhower, 5/19/55, EL, WH Central File, Confidential File, Box 104, “World War

m (1).”
101 Killian, Oral History, 16; TCP Report, v.
102 Specifically, the numbers o f briefings, field trips and meetings each panel participated in is as follows:
Panel 1:86; Panel 2: 50; Panel 3: 39. See TCP Report, 186.
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diligently and enthusiastically for six months, many o f the 42 members working full time,
reviewing existing military technology and studying new opportunities.103
Following the mandate handed them, the committee presented its final report on
March 17, 1955. Robert Cutler said of the NSC presentation that it was one o f the high
points in the record of the NSC during the Eisenhower administration,’04 because the
report accelerated the missile program in the United States, and strengthened the overall
strategic position o f the country. The report had what Cutler called “intrinsic
importance,” and did not preach desperation or despair.105 It did, however, stress a sense
of urgency. It concluded that the Soviets needed only two hundred bombs to severely
damage the United States to the point o f defeat and that those bombs would be delivered
via missiles within a few years. However, America needed only to seize the initiative
through superior technology to gain the upper hand.
To demonstrate to the President and NSC how it came to this conclusion, and to
help themselves construct a useful framework for their study, the Committee members
created a timeline which compared relative U.S. and Soviet military strength via their
weapons systems. Period I covered the present, late 1954 and early 1955, and stated that
the United States had an offensive advantage over the Soviets due to superior air-atomic
power through SAC and American atomic capabilities. However, at present, the United
States was also vulnerable to surprise attack because the early-warning system was not
reliable, air defenses were inadequate, and the Soviets seemed to be accumulating long-

103 Killian, Oral History, 98; Memorandum o f Discussion at the 241“ Meeting of the NSC, 3/17/55, FRUS,
1955-57, 19:63.
104 Cutler, No Time For Rest, 350.
105 Memorandum for Dr. Flemming from Cutler, 02/23/55, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing
Notes Sub series. Box 17, “TCP o f the Science Advisory Committee, 1954-56 (3).”
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range bomber capabilities.106Neither side could mount a decisive air strike against the
other, but the United States could mount an air offensive which would “inflict massive
damage and would probably be conclusive in a general war.” 107
Period II started inl956/57 and ended in 1958/60. This phase marked the apex of
American military superiority to Russia. “Our military superiority may never be so great
again,” the report claimed. This was because o f a continuing buildup of long-range
bombers and the “substantial numbers of multimegaton weapons”. Although both sides
would still be vulnerable to surprise attack, the American deterrent power would be
greatly increased and its military power relative to that of Russia “at its maximum.” The
result was that during Period II, the United States could mount a decisive air attack
whereas the Soviets could not.108
Period IE was defined as a period of transition from Period II to Period IV, during
which the Soviets would catch up to the United States in long-range bombing capabilities
and the development o f multimegaton weapons. The United States would still enjoy the
advantage, but Period HI would eventually give way to Period IV. This last phase was
estimated to begin within ten years and last indefinitely. An attack by either side during
Period IV would result in mutual destruction. Neither side could position an advantage
because “each country will possess enough multimegaton weapons and adequate means

i°6 -pep Report^ jq . it was estimated that the only Soviet long-range bomber, the TU-4 (the equivalent o f
the American B-29A), could only make a two-way mission from the Chukotski Peninsula in northern
Siberia, threatening only an arc passing through San Diego and Lake Superior, leaving southern, eastern and
central areas untouched. However, one-way missions could target most o f industrial America and it was
believed that the Soviets would embark on one-way missions if need be. See Decision on JCS 1924/76,
“Magnitude and Imminence o f Soviet Air Threat to the United States- 1957,” 10/30/53, NA, RG 218, Box
65, “CCS 350.09 USSR (12-19-49) sec. 5.”
107 TCP Report, 10. The report defined “decisive” as: (1) ability to strike back essentially eliminated; or (2)
civil, political, o r cultural life reduced to a condition o f chaos; or both (1) and (2).
i°s TCP Report, 11.
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o f delivering them...through the defenses then existing.” loy Furthermore, the element of
surprise would be irrelevant because either side would be able to retaliate and break
through the other country’s defenses. It was, said the report, a period “so fraught with
danger to the U.S. that we should push all promising technological developments so that
we may stay in Periods II and HI as long as possible.” 110
To delay the onset o f Period IV and maintain superiority over the Soviets, the
report outlined many aggressive defense measures using cutting edge science and
technology. Reporting on striking power, defensive power, and intelligence, the report
provided impressive recommendations, most of which were integrated into America’s
national security policies. Particularly important to the delay of Period IV was the
intercontinental ballistic missile. Whichever country obtained ICBM capabilities first
would enjoy considerable advantages over the other. If the U.S. could achieve that
technology before the Soviets, the report estimated that Periods II and m would last
longer. This sense o f urgency o f developing an intercontinental missile was fully
understood by the panel’s director, Marshall Holloway of the Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory.

The Killian Report: Striking Power
The task before the panel assigned to study striking power was to analyze the
“effects of new weapons developments on the power of our striking forces,” and the
group went to work on the feasibility o f ballistic missiles.111 There had been serious

109 TCP Report, 12.
110 TCP Report, 12-13.
111 Study on Surprise Attack, 8/25/54, N A RG 59, Box 87, “National Security ”
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questions as to the feasibility o f ballistic missiles, but, after meeting with the Department
of Defense’s Ballistic Missile Committee, which was chaired by the brilliant
mathematician John von Neumann of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, the
committee members came to the positive conclusion that they were obtainable. The panel
worked closely with von Neumann’s committee and was deeply impressed by its work
and director.112
Von Neumann had worked as a consultant on the Manhattan Project and
developed a computer which did all the calculations for the hydrogen bomb project at
Los Alamos. He was curious about everything and extremely intelligent There was no
one like him. When atomic physicist Enrico Fermi needed a calculator, von Neumann did
the math in his head. His abilities gave him a credibility among not only scientists and
engineers, but also among military officers and policy makers. He dedicated his talents to
technology of weapons of mass destruction. For example, when confronted with the
problems o f target accuracy o f the first generation ICBMs, his solution was to make a
bomb dirty enough so that if the missile missed its target, everything for miles would be
destroyed anyway.113 In early 1954, as previously mentioned, he testified to the NSC on
the miniaturization o f warheads and the possibilities o f an ICBM and he explained these
advancements to the members o f the Killian committee.114 The committee took von
Neumann’s conclusions, studied them, confirmed them and recommended that

112 Killian, Oral History, 17. Other prominent members o f the Ballistic Missile Committee included George
Kistiakovsky o f Harvard, Jerome Wiesner of MIT, and Clark Millikan o f Cal Tech.
113 Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, 112; York, Race to Oblivion, 85.
114 See chapter 3. The breakthrough that allowed ICBMs was that the nuclear warheads could be made
smaller and lighter which meant that the missiles themselves could be smaller and lighter. The Soviets,
conversely, did not have that technology and built big, cumbersome missiles substantial enough to launch
heavier warheads. See Killian, Oral History, 17.
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development of these ICBMs be given a high priority. In addition, due to the
complexities of the ICBMs, the committee recommended that the smaller ERBMs be
given the same priority as an insurance measure.113
Specifically, the report urged the NSC to “formally recognize the present Air
Force program for the development o f an intercontinental ballistic missile as a nationally
supported effort of highest priority.” 116 In addition to the continued development of an
ICBM which had a range of 5,500 nautical miles, the report recommended development
o f a ballistic missile with a nautical range of 1,500 nautical miles which could be
launched from the land or sea, as recommendation for strategic bombardment.117 This
emphasis on sea-based IRBMs directly led to the development o f the Polaris missile, a
submarine-launched missile system.
The Polaris missile came out o f the belief that a hardened, dispersed, and stable
deterrent was needed. The navy had been looking at various concepts including the
placement o f missiles on board surface vessels and proposals for underwater delivery
vehicles. However, the navy had been unable to reach any decisions relating to the
matter, and the Killian committee looked at the evidence for each concept and came to
the strong conclusion that a submarine-bome missile was the best solution.118
The Polaris missile system was a perfect fit for Eisenhower’s strategic thinking.
Preserving second-strike capabilities was an essential element of that thinking. In order
for a deterrent to be successful, the Soviets had to be convinced that the United States
had a retaliatory force capable o f both surviving a first-strike and imposing unacceptable

115 Killian, Oral History, 18.
us TCp Report, 37.
117 TCP Report, 38.
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damage by a second-strike. The Truman administration had not concentrated on this
element, but it was central to Eisenhower. A submarine launched missile was virtually
invulnerable and, as historians Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman pointed out, the
Polaris system assured “the existence of a secure second strike capacity for the rest of the
cold war.”119
Eisenhower, as well as his departments of State and Defense, also agreed with the
report’s assessment that it was vital to achieve ICBM technology before the Soviets in
order to keep the advantage.120 He recognized that the ICBM strengthened offensive
power and deterrent capabilities, fitting in with the strategic thinking of the New Look. A
combination of the ICBM, the Polaris system, and B-52 bombers would make any Soviet
attempt at a surprise attack impracticable. In addition, the relative low costs of the
technology was appealing as well. As such, he viewed U.S. development of its missile
systems as a matter of great urgency and ordered that research and development of the
ICBM and IRBMs be given the highest priority above all other programs.121 As Cutler
later recalled, the recommendations within the report for missile development, coupled
with the work done by the von Neumann Ballistic Missile Committee, resulted in the
government’s annual expenditures for missile research and development to increase from
a rate of a million dollars a year during the Truman administration to some billions of

118 Killian Oral History, 28; 234; Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 77.
119 Robert Bowie and Richard Immerman, Waging Peace, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 248.
120 The State Department and Defense Department concurred with the recommendations to make the ICBM
program a high priority and the State Department commented that a Soviet success with ICBM technology
before the U.S. would challenge the assumption o f American technological superiority and embolden the
Soviets. See Comments on the Report to the President by the TCP, 6/8/55, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC
Series, Policy Papers Sub Series, Box 16, “NSC 5522- TCP (1).”
121 Eisenhower approved NSC Action No. 1433-a, which gave ICBMs the highest priority, on September
13,1955. Two months later he accorded the IRBMs the same priority. See Memorandum for the NSC,
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dollars a year under Eisenhower. Cutler explained it was a matter of having to “catch up
for seven lost years.” 122
Although the report concluded that the ICBM and a defense against them required
vastly improved technology, the committee believed that its findings were “sufficiently
encouraging... to obviate the general prevailing feeling o f hopelessness in the face o f the
ICBM threat.”123 This was due in large part to their sound recommendations for
strengthening continental defense.

The Killian Report: Defensive Power
Led by Leland Haworth o f the Brookhaven National Laboratory, the second panel
was asked to study the technological developments which “permitted a practical early
warning system; fighting the air battle remote from our boundaries; use o f atomic
warheads in air defense; and radioactive contamination of our homeland.” 124 The
resulting study recommended an extension of the Defense Early Warning (DEW) line,
increasing the outward extension of the combat zone an additional 300 miles to protect
American borders, developing an air-to-air nuclear missile system, and not limiting
nuclear strategy because of possible radioactive contamination.125 Essentially the report
recommended a continuation o f the policies outlined in the continental defense policy
paper, NSC 5408. Defense power was to be strengthened through reducing the

9/16/55, EL, WHO NSC Staffj Disaster File, Box 42, “Science and Technology- Technological Capabilities

(2) ”
122 Cutler, No Time For Rest, 349.
123 TCP Report, 43.
124 Study on Surprise Attack, 8/25/54, NA, RG 59, Box 87, “National Security”
125 TCP Report, 38-39.
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vulnerability of the Strategic Air Command and enlarging the early warning system - two
programs which also strengthened second-strike capabilities.
While the panel on striking power emphasized missile technology, the defensive
power panel also agreed that nuclear weapons should be adopted as the major armament
for air defense forces.126 However, it was not ignored that manned bombers, and not
missiles, were currently the only delivery vehicle available to America and the Soviet
Union. Therefore, the panel on defensive power turned to reducing the vulnerability of
SAC. Since the vulnerability o f SAC was a major concern, the report suggested that the
present “unacceptable” ground vulnerability be reduced more rapidly than currently
planned by Department o f Defense programs. Bases should be hardened, aircraft should
be dispersed, and more bombers should be kept on continuing airborne alert. These were
the top priorities.127 Specifically, the report recommended that the NSC consider “three
possible countermeasures: (1) construction of additional bases as a top priority
emergency program; (2) institution o f an emergency dispersal program, in which more
airfields- including civilian ones- would be used; and (3) an increase in active defenses
by diverting anti-aircraft guns and guided missiles from defense positions around cities to
SAC bases.” 128
In discussing the report’s recommendations regarding SAC vulnerability,
Eisenhower remarked that there had not been “any Killian Committee to tell us the
Russian side of the story,” and he believed that “the Russians too have major problems to

126 Ibid., 40.
127 Killian, Oral History, 18.
128 TCP Report, 37; Memorandum o f Discussion at the 270th Meeting o f the NSC, 12/8/55, FRUS, 1955-57,
19:171.
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meet in this whole area.” 129 As such, he hesitated to spend large amounts o f money on
such immediate improvements and instead had to budget for the long haul. This was
typical o f Eisenhower to look beyond the technical capabilities of the Soviets and think
about their actual capabilities.130 The Department o f Defense and Joint Chiefs agreed in
theory with the report’s recommendation to reduce the ground vulnerability of SAC, but,
like the President, had concerns involving the problem of balance between the cost
effectiveness o f various measures. For example, the Defense Department explained that
on the one hand, “there is the

st and effectiveness of dispersal bases and active

defenses, and on the other hand there is the cost effectiveness of warning systems and
alert measures which would permit SAC to depart on offensive strike measures after
initial warning of enemy attack had been received and before their home bases could be
attacked.” 131 The question was could the country afford both dispersal o f SAC bases and
an early warning system. The Killian report recommended both.
The DEW line and additions of long-range and gap-filler radars to the U.S. and
Canadian radar nets were programs already in development that the panel endorsed. It
also urged that they be installed immediately, without waiting for refinements.132 It also
recommended new actions. Specifically, it recommended the extension of the DEW line
to Greenland across the Atlantic by way of Iceland to join the NATO warning system and

129 Ibid., 171-172.
130 In other words, as seen with his discussion with General Bull in Chapter 3, just because the Soviet Union
had the technical ability to build a long-range bomber, that did not mean they had the actual capability of
finding a qualified pilot to navigate. In this case, Eisenhower is thinking beyond the technical capabilities o f
the Soviet Union and considering whether or not they have the money, the manpower, or the materials to
compete.
131 Comments on the Report to the President by the TCP, 6/8/55, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy
Papers Sub Series, Box 16, “NSC 5522- TCP (1),” A-19.
132 TCP Report, 39.
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an extension from Hawaii to the Midway Islands.133 The JCS objected to the Midway
extension because repair and overhaul of aircraft would still have to be done on Hawaii,
increasing the time the aircraft would not be available for duty on the barrier line.
Although the Pacific extension was never adopted, the DEW was extended northward
and improved overall continental defense.
The report also suggested examining the feasibility of shooting down incoming
missiles with a defensive missile- an antiballistic missile (ABM). The Air Force
Scientific Advisory Board was exploring this topic and the Killian committee urged that
a full-time technical group be established to “carry out a rapid but thorough examination”
o f the program.134 As a result of this recommendation, the USAF Scientific Advisory
Board set up such a group with the approval of the Department of Defense, and, although
an ABM was never developed by the United States, it was given serious attention.135
Overall, the defensive panel made valuable suggestions for strengthening
continental defenses, and most of the recommendations made by this panel were
implemented at some point. Seen as totally inadequate when Eisenhower took office,
continental defenses continued to improve during his term, and the Killian report was the
impetus. Progress was also being made on continental defenses through the work of the
intelligence panel.

133 Ibid., 41-42.
134 TCP Report, 43. For more on the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board, see Thomas Sturm, The USAF
Scientific Advisory Board: Its First Twenty Years, 1944-1964, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1967).
135 Comments on the Report to the President by the TCP, 6/8/55, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Policy
Papers Sub Series, Box 16, “NSC 5522- TCP (1),” A-34.
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The Killian Report: Intelligence
Perhaps most useful to Eisenhower were the recommendations under intelligence.
Eisenhower had been deeply disturbed by the failure of intelligence at Pearl Harbor and,
during the early 1950s, the CIA had been unable to set up a spy network inside the Soviet
Union.136 Sound intelligence was therefore vital. Even the title of the intelligence section
indicated its vast importance to national security: “Intelligence: Our First Defense
Against Surprise.”137 The purpose of this section was to study “the application of
scientific techniques to improve our evaluation of technological advances in the U.S.S.R.
and to provide intelligence in other fields.”138 The group carried out its assignment well.
As Killian later recalled, the group displayed inventiveness and scientific ingenuity
which “enlarged the concept o f what the role of intelligence is in the world today,
viewing intelligence in its most constructive and benign sense as an instrument of
national policy.”139
Killian asked MIT lecturer and Cambridge friend Edwin “Din” Land to lead the
panel on intelligence. Land had dropped out of Harvard when he was a freshman to work
on filters for cutting the glare in cameras and telescopes. He established the Polaroid
Corporation to sell these filters. Historian Michael Beschloss explained how the Polaroid
camera came to be: “On a wartime trip to the Southwest, Land’s three-year-old daughter
Jennifer asked him why snapshots could not be produced right away. He went for a stroll

136 Ambrose, Eisenhower, 377.
137 Report by the Technological Capabilities Panel, “Meeting the Threat o f Surprise Attack,” 2/14/55, EL,
WHO, OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 16, “Killian Report- Technological Capabilities
Panel, Feb 55-May 56 (1),” 133. (The Intelligence Section of the TCP report was recently declassified by the
Eisenhower Library. Pages 133-152 are from the Eisenhower Library, not the National Archives.)
138 Study on Surprise Attack, 8/25/54, NA, RG 59, Box 87, “National Security.”
139 Killian, Oral History, 228.
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and worked out the basic design of an instant camera in his head. In 1948, his first
camera went on sale at the Jordan Marsh department store in Boston.”140
Land worked on various government projects while running Polaroid, including
guided missiles, infrared searchlights, anti-aircraft training devices and 3-D film for
aerial photography, and it was his work on the Killian Committee that gave him a leading
role in guiding American reconnaissance activities for the next three decades. Land was
dedicated to the work being done by the Killian committee and described the group’s
commitment: “We simply cannot afford to defend against all possible threats. We must
know accurately where the threat is coming from and concentrate our resources in that
direction. Only by doing so can we survive the Cold War.”141 Helping him was James
Baker, a Harvard astronomer and optic expert who had worked with Land on the
Reconnaissance Panel o f the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board since 1952.142 The two
designed a camera which could be used at high altitudes to deliver photographs covering
125 miles o f territory at high enough resolutions to distinguish between objects the size
of a basketball.143
The group was aware that the Soviets had the clear advantage in intelligence
gathering. Beschloss explained that, “in any five-and-dime, they [the Soviets] could buy
maps o f American bridges, factories, highways, ports, air bases, missile sites, atomic
testing grounds.”144 Therefore, the Soviets could accumulate vast amounts of information
concerning the United States, but American intelligence knew little about the Soviet

140 Beschloss, MayDay, 75.
141 Quoted in Dwayne Day, John Logsdon, Brian Latell, eds., Eye m the Sky: The Story o f the Corona Spy
Satellites, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1998), 29-30.
142 Sturm, The USAF Scientific Advisory Board, 151.
143 Burrows, Deep Black, 70-75.
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Union. In 1951, at a MIT summer study group, Land heard Air Force men like James
Doolittle explain the need for aerial reconnaissance on the one hand, while expressing
the belief that flying cameras deep into Soviet territory was a near impossibility on the
other hand. At the very least, these men thought, it would take ten years to develop such
technology. Land did not buy that and in 1954 he asked his group on intelligence to take
another look at aerial reconnaissance.145
At the same time, the Air Force and CIA were trying to figure out how to build an
airplane that could fly high enough over Soviet territory to be out of Soviet anti-aircraft
defenses. Since the outbreak of the Cold War, both the British and the Americans had
been trying to fly reconnaissance missions over the Soviet Union. In the late 1940s,
balloons were used, but more times than not they ended up in the hands of the Soviets
before making it to Japan where they were to be recovered by the West. By 1950,
American airplanes were flying over Soviet territory, but they could not penetrate deep
enough into the interior and were prone to being shot down by Soviet aircraft146 Kelly
Johnson, a legendary designer for Lockheed, had the perfect concept: a high altitude spy
plane capable o f flying above seventy thousand feet for as much as four thousand miles.
In April 1954 Johnson briefed a Pentagon group which included Trevor Gardner. Both
Gardner and Allen Dulles loved the concept and Gardner introduced Johnson to Land,
who thought Johnson’s concept was brilliant.147

144 Beschloss, MayDay, 75.
145 Ibid., 75.
146 For more on the beginnings o f aerial reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union see Beschloss,
MayDay, 76-80; Burrows, Deep Black, 59-60; John Prados, The Soviet Estim ate: US. Intelligence Analysis
and Soviet Strategic Forces, (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1986), 29-35.
147 Beschloss, MayDay, 78-79.
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When Land briefed Killian about the concept of a nigh-altitude reconnaissance
plane outfitted with the latest photographic and intelligence equipment, the two men
thought the idea was too important to wait until the final report was submitted to the
president and scheduled a meeting with Eisenhower. They met with Eisenhower in early
November and at the end o f the briefing Eisenhower gave his tentative approval with one
catch- the CIA would have full control of the program so uniformed servicemen of the
Air Force would not be flying the missions and so that the program did not become the
victim of interservice rivalries. By the end o f he month, the U-2 program was on its
way.148 Construction of the first U-2 prototype took only eighty-eight days and the first
flight over Moscow and Leningrad took place on July 4, 1956.149 Killian thought that
Eisenhower’s responsiveness to the innovated proposal was a clear demonstration o f the
President’s willingness to “act upon bold new ideas in the domain of technology.”150
The U-2 provided critical information to Eisenhower, giving him the upper hand
over the Soviets. As Eisenhower later recalled in his memoirs, the importance o f the U-2
was critical. He wrote, “The importance of the effort at the time cannot be
overemphasized. Our relative position in intelligence, compared to that of the Soviets,
could scarcely have been worse. The Soviets enjoy practically unimpeded access to
information o f a kind in which we were almost wholly lacking.”151 O f course the U-2
affair was an embarrassment for Eisenhower in the spring o f 1960, but the information

148 Ibid., 81-83; Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 82-83; Richard Bissell Oral History, Princeton,
John Foster Dulles Collection, 16.
149 Beschloss, MayDay, 365.
130 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 83.
131 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 545.
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the flights provided outweighed any political embarrassments.132 In fact, after the U-2
photographed the placement o f missiles in Cuba, both John F. Kennedy and McGeorge
Bundy said that that one piece of information from the U-2 program “fully justified all
that the CIA had cost the country in all its proceeding years.”153
In addition to the U-2, the panel’s report offered other important insights. First,
the report made a clear distinction between strategic warning and tactical warning.
Strategic warning was vital. It was the warning given while the attack is in its preparation
stage, before the bombers take off, before the subs are launched. If the United States had
strategic warning, it might deny the enemy the advantage of surprise. The tactical
warning of radar nets and early warning systems discussed in the previous sections were
well and good after the attack had begun, but what was needed, the report stressed, was a
strategic warning system that gave warning well in advance of an impending attack.154
Although the United States had enough information to “give a probably reliable
picture” o f Soviet strength, the report asked how one could really know if the Soviets
were planning a surprise attack. The reality was that the United States currently had
limited knowledge o f Soviet capabilities and even less about their intentions.155
Furthermore, just as American techniques in early warning have improved, it must be
assumed that the Soviet ability to confuse indicators had improved as well. As the report

152 On May 1, 1960, a U-2 flight flown by Gary Powers went down over the Soviet Union. Eisenhower,
presuming the pilot and plane had been destroyed, said publicly it was a weather plane that had gotten off
course. The Eisenhower Administration was caught in an embarrassing lie when the Soviets produced the
American pilot who confessed to espionage. President Eisenhower took full responsibility, but refused to
apologize for the flights, citing the Soviets had known o f the flights for years but had not protested. For a
complete account o f the U-2 affair see Michael Beschloss, MayDay: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2
Affair, (New York: Harper & Row, 1986).
1 3 Ray Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars, (Washington, D.C.: Acropolis Books, 1976), 197 quoted in
Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 83.
154 TCP Report, 135-136.
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remarked, “The Soviets are not amateurs in these techniques.”136 For these reasons the
report concluded that “there is a real possibility that a surprise attack might strike us
without useful, strategic early warning.” 157
To guard against surprise attack, there were ways to improve the chances that
strategic warning would work. The report figured that a larger attack would be easier to
detect than a small assault. If the United States could convince the Soviet Union that the
only way to achieve its aim was a massive assault, the success of strategic warning would
be greatly increased. Based on the theory that if the enemy thinks we are strong, then he
will need a bigger force which will be easier to detect, denying him surprise attack, the
report argued that keeping up a strong retaliatory arsenal would improve the chances o f
the Soviets planning a large attack.158 But, the report also conceded that the Soviets could
be bluffing and that the United States might be the victim of a major hoax. By this it was
meant that if the Soviets understood American intelligence techniques, the Soviets could
easily feed false information to develop a massive deception. That theory was not entirely
faulty as the Soviets did try to convince the world they had more strength than they
did.159

155 TCP Report, 135-136. Italics in original,

us TCp Reporti 136

157 TCP Report, 136.
us TCp Report> 137
159 The Soviet Union’s image o f having greater nuclear power than it really did was vital to its strategy.
Scholars Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush contended that “the attempt to deceive the West regarding
Soviet missile capabilities had a central place in Soviet policy.” They believed that despite the technological
know-how o f the Soviets to decrease the margin o f U.S. superiority, the Soviets chose to let the U.S. speed
ahead while they deceived the West as to their pace and scope with regards to the ICBM program.
Khrushchev took this route because he was certain the United States would not initiate war, but the result
left the Soviet Union lagging far behind the United States by the time o f Khrushchev’s removal in 1964. See
Horelick and R ush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy, 53-55, 105-106; and Holloway, Arms
Race, 43.
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The report also stressed that American strategists had to be careful about
assuming the only kind o f attack the Soviets would launch would be a long-range air
attack. To guard against a surprise in kind as well as timing, the report said, “it is only
realistic to be imaginative.”160 The Soviets had no “practical experience” with long-range
air attacks and if the Soviets’ aim was to merely neutralize America long enough to
conquer Western Europe, taking out SAC through a long-range bomber attack might not
be necessary. Soviet civil and active defense measures could absorb part of an American
strike, and as such, SAC did not need to be targeted. Instead, urban and industrial centers
in America would be more likely targets. So if the Soviets were not planning a long-range
air attack on SAC, the nation had to be prepared to defend against clandestine or sea
attacks. However, with all that said, the report agreed that a long-range air attack had to
be taken seriously and that with the advent of thermonuclear weapons, the Soviets’ plan
to absorb an assault from SAC might change as the civil and active defense measures of
the Soviet Union would be inadequate to absorb such destruction.161
The thermonuclear weapons also added another problem for the military and
political executive: “the problem of the total decision.” As the report explained, “no
executive can undertake the responsibility for altering the face o f our world unless he has
strategic and tactical information of the highest reliability.”162 A “clever enemy,” the
report believed, would take advantage of the total decision by creating ambiguity,
disrupting communications, “tantalizing our indicator boards.” It was therefore necessary
not only to provide sound intelligence, but also to prepare the executive and his staff for

160 TCP Report, 140.
161 t c p Report, 140-141.
162 j q , RgpQ,^ ]42 italics in original.
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the psychological strains o f making that total decision. Psychological rehearsals were
recommended to prepare for the total decision “in urgency, in conflict, and in
confusion.” 163
Satellites were another significant means to improve strategic warning on a
number of levels. First, sending a 5-25 pound satellite into a low orbit would provide
scientists with valuable information for the development o f ICBMs. The cost would be
modest and it would provide great prestige for the United States while establishing the
idea that space was open to all. Furthermore, such a satellite would not be a military
offensive as nothing could be launched or dropped from it, and yet it could develop into a
larger satellite capable of sending very high frequency radio and radar signals to offer
detailed and extensive reconnaissance coverage.164 The report suggested that the United
States “take the lead in the development of appropriate international agreements on the
freedom of space.”165
Finally, the report also envisioned a greater use of the computer for sorting and
categorizing intelligence information. The computer could limit human error and reduce
the needed manpower, giving a bigger bang for the buck. In addition, it could provide a
mechanism for research and analysis on intelligence, to be conducted. The nation did not
currently take advantage o f its scientific resources and needed to better utilize the top
scientists. It suggested establishing a new lab “where broad, fundamental research in
intelligence can be conducted.”166 The committee believed such a lab wo uld better take

163 T C p R e p o r t > 1 4 2

164 TCP Report, 146-148.
165 TCP Report, 148.
166 TCP Report, 145.
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advantage o f specialists in outside laboratories who currently contributed in limited ways
as consultants and contractors.
By emphasizing that the United States had to have the best informed government
in the world, the group believed that intelligence provided the necessary information
needed to reach sound decisions and “better cope with those occasional fantasies such as
those embraced by the military and by politicians with respect to such ideas as a missile
gap.” 167 The scope of the entire report was impressive and its recommendations were
widely embraced. Although the U-2 was certainly the crown jewel o f the report, the other
recommendations and analysis within the report propelled American intelligence to an
elevated level for the rest of the cold war.

Legacies of the Report: Rebuilding a Bridge
The Killian report strengthened American national security through building a
nuclear deterrent force and securing second-strike capabilities - the heart and soul of
Eisenhower’s strategic thinking. It also gave the President one of the most indispensable
pieces o f intelligence equipment in the U-2. Eisenhower was clearly thrilled with the
Committee’s work, telling Killian that he was “deeply grateful” for the contribution his
men made to national security. Speaking to Killian directly, Eisenhower said, “You have
once again demonstrated your willingness to respond to the nation’s needs despite your
heavy and continuing non-govemmental responsibilities.”168 To the other members o f the

167 Killian, Oral History, 229.
168 Letter Eisenhower to Killian, 4/5/55, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 104, “World War HI
( 1) ”
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Killian Committee Eisenhower expressed similar gratitude, thanking each of them for
their intensive work and service to the nation.169
Eisenhower held a deep respect for the group. Like the Solarium Exercise before
it, there had been no leaks and the panel members had worked without exhibiting any
desire to push through their projects. Eisenhower had a preoccupation with what Killian
called “the importance of keeping this classified study from leaking to the press or to
Congress,” and the fact that the group came through the study “without creating
suspicions or new concerns” had a real impact on the President.170 Killian himself
explained that the group understood that their report was meant only to be helpful and
that the members did not “express superior judgment in any sense.” In fact, they were
well aware o f the practical difficulties of many of their recommendations and had tried to
assist in recommending “the best conceivable defense.”171 It was this “passion for
anonymity” exhibited by the entire group that led Eisenhower to view the entire
committee as highly responsible and react so favorably to the group’s findings.172
In fact, the only mention of the group’s existence was made in an October press
release from the Office of Defense Mobilization which stated that Killian had been
appointed head of a committee of scientists who were to study “methods to mobilize
more effectively scientific resources in the event of an emergency.” 173 The implication
was that the group was studying personnel problems in the military, not weapons
systems. Since the final report contained highly sensitive and classified material,

169 Leners from Eisenhower to Fisk, Doolittle, Holloway, DuBridge, Sprague, Land, Baxter, and Haworth,
4/4/55, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 104, “World War III (1).”
170 Killian, Oral History, 20; 35.
171 Memorandum of Discussion at the 241st Meeting o f the NSC, 3/17/55, FRUS, 1955-57, 19:64.
172 Killian, Oral History, 36; 222.
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Eisenhower did not want the material leaked and was impressed by the committee
members’ respect for the classified nature o f the study.174
Not only did the Killian committee make an enormous contribution to national
security, it also built a bridge between the scientific community and the administration
that had been severely damaged by the Oppenheimer affair. After the atomic bombings
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists in America enjoyed a sense of prestige in society.
Historian Paul Boyer explained that atomic scientists had gone from “bomb makers to
political sages,” in part because the public perceived them as the masterminds behind
victory. After Hiroshima, their stature “grew to gargantuan proportions,” and many found
themselves in the public and political limelight.175 The scientific community enjoyed this
status for awhile, but the combination o f the political activities by scientists for a world
government and the rise o f McCarthyism damaged the scientific community’s
relationship with the government.176 The most serious break in confidence between the
scientific community and the administration occurred over the building o f the hydrogen
bomb. The scientific community was split over the need for such a bomb. Edward Teller
led the charge for the project while Robert Oppenheimer spoke for those scientists
opposed to the project. Teller, and his friend in the AEC, Lewis Strauss, wanted to
silence Oppenheimer, and Oppenheimer was ultimately denied the renewal for his
security clearance in a rather public hearing accusing him of communist associations.

173 Press release recorded in Killian, Oral History, 219.
174 Killian, Oral History, 220; 223.
175 Paul Boyer, By the Bomb's Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn o f the Atomic Age ,
(Chapel HHl: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1994), 47, 59-60.
176 See Boyer, By the Bomb‘s Early Light, Jessica Wang, American Science in an Age o f Anxiety:
Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold War, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999).
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After the Oppenheimer affair, there were clear tensions between scientists and the
administration. There were deep misgivings within the scientific community towards the
government and ambivalent feelings in the government with respect to the scientific
community.177 Repairing that damage was difficult. The success of the Killian committee
and work begun by Lee DuBridge, helped to repair the divide.
In organizing the Killian committee, DuBridge had hoped the study might
“provide a better relationship between government and the scientific community” while
elevating the role o f the Science Advisory Committee.178 Both DuBridge and Killian
hoped that they might convince Eisenhower of the valuable contribution scientists could
make to national security and mend the gulf that had been created. Killian in particular
wanted to “foster greater mutual understanding and trust between the administration and
the scientific community and prevent any larger rift in the govemment-science
partnership he thought so necessary for the national security and welfare.”179
Many in the scientific community had long wanted to educate Eisenhower on
points of view other than those of Strauss, whose only mantra seemed to be to build
bigger and more destructive weapons. While DuBridge and SAC-ODM advocated the
advancement of weapons technology, they also thought that the application of science
and technology could enhance continental defense and international arms control.
Eisenhower had recognized before establishing the Killian committee that science played
a vital role in the nation’s “security and growth,” and was increasingly being felt in

177 Killian, Oral History, 98.
178 Letter DuBridge to Flemming, 5/24/54, EL. WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 104, “World War
ffl (1) ”
179 Damms, “Eisenhower’s ‘Scientific-Technological Elite,”’ 60.
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foreign affairs.180 However, after the Killian report, Eisenhower had a deeper
appreciation for what science and technology could do. For example, the report began the
great strides made in space technology and weapons development, and Eisenhower
expressed the desire to see the military make “maximum use o f science and technology
in order to minimize numbers in men.”181 By early 1955, it was obvious to Killian that
there was clear evidence o f “eased tensions” and that relations were on the m end”182
Relations continued to improve and, by mid-1956 Killian felt that SAC-ODM was
being viewed by the administration as an appropriate advisory group in policy-planning
matters in its field. “I feel,” Killian told DuBridge, “that we have definitely gained in
establishing good contacts with Sherman Adams and Colonel Goodpaster.”183 That
success continued, more or less, throughout the decade. The establishment o f a
President’s Science Advisory Committee and a Special Assistant to the President for
Science and Technology inl957 helped strengthen that relationship. In his role as the first
Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Killian assisted the
administration in reassuring the American public about the country’s scientific and
technological strength following Sputnik. By 1959, Killian thought the committee was
working well and had established “good working attitudes and relationships with

180 Eisenhower, “Statement by the President Upon Signing Executive Order Strengthening the Scientific
Programs o f the Federal Government,” 3/17/54, Public Papers o f the President, 1954,336.
181 Sherman Adams, Oral History, Columbia University Project, 201; Eisenhower, “Letter to the Secretary
o f Defense on National Security Requirements,” 1/5/55, Public Papers o f the President, 1955, 2.
182 Killian to Bush, 3/22/55, Library o f Congress, Bush Papers, General Correspondence, Box 62, “Killian,
JJL, Jr.,” quoted in Damms, “Eisenhower’s ‘Scientific-Technological E l i t e , 73.
183 Letter Killian to DuBridge, 5/29/56, MIT, AC 4, Box 195, “SAC, 1956 ”
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Defense.”184 The whole experience, Killian believed, had served to enhance the morale
of the scientific community.185
By 1957, many in the scientific community viewed the improved relationship
between science and the administration as a direct result of Eisenhower himself and the
renewed sense the Science Advisory Committee felt. Writing to Eisenhower, the vicepresident for research at Bell Labs said, “You must know that in these last years you have
created a new spirit” and pattern o f interaction of science with society and the common
welfare. “Already the influence o f your Science Advisory Committee is forming a new
union of the finest intelligences with the best instincts for public service.”186 Even Killian
noted that since the committee completed their task, Eisenhower proved to be
“extraordinarily cordial to those people whom he knew in the scientific community.” 187
This repair to the gulf between the administration and the scientific community was an
important legacy of the Killian committee as science and technology continued to
advance national security.

What resulted from the Killian Committee was a comprehensive, well managed
report that stuck to its assignment and helped Eisenhower better understand how science
and technology could be used in national security. Killian explained that the committee
demonstrated how well intensive inter-disciplinary studies were to policy makers: “When
properly staffed such studies bring to the policy maker objective appraisals free of

184 Memorandum Killian to Andrew Goodpaster, 07/15/59, EL, WHO OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical
Subseries, Box 16, “Dr. Kitiakowsky (I).”
185 Ibid.; Killian, Oral History, 20.
184 Letter W.O. Baker to Eisenhower, 05/10/57, EL, WHO OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical Sub Series,
Box 23, “Science Advisory Committee (1).”
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departmental bias, fresh insights and innovative ideas which executive staffs find it
difficult to come by under the unremitting operating pressures to which they are normally
subjected.”188 The Committee rose above service rivalries, politics, and personal agendas
and delivered solutions that fit nicely into the New Look and complimented
Eisenhower’s strategic thinking. Many of the recommendations, like the missile
development and the U-2, provided national security with programs that were
economically cost efficient - a bigger bang for the buck. The report also secured a greater
role for science advising during the rest of the Eisenhower administration as it
demonstrated how science and technology could enhance American national security. In
every sense, the Killian Committee proved to be a success and furthered Eisenhower’s
confidence in civilian committees.

187 Killian, Oral History, 20.
188 Ibid., 28.
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PORTRAYING A UNITED STATES IN THE GRAVEST DANGER IN ITS HISTORY:
THE GAITHER REPORT (1957)
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CHAPTER FIVE

YOU WANT HOW MUCH FOR BOMB SHELTERS?
CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE FEAR OF FALLOUT

After the successes o f the Solarium Exercise and the Killian Committee,
Eisenhower had another opportunity to create a civilian study group to advise him on a
matter of national security in 1957. The advent of the hydrogen bomb brought not only
the concerns over surprise attack and continental defense discussed earlier, it also
brought concerns about civil defense and the effects of radioactive fallout. As the decade
progressed, the administration faced mounting pressure from Democrats, cultural critics,
and the public to change national defense strategy to better protect the population from
nuclear attack. The New Look and the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, seen by many as
fiscally irresponsible and potentially fatal, encouraged critics to charge the administration
with taking a spotty approach to the problem o f civil defense. In light o f increasing
pressures, and a Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) report which
recommended that the Federal Government spend $32 billion on a national shelter
program, Eisenhower wished to evaluate the relative merits o f passive and active
defenses. Passive defense measures were shelters, evacuation plans, and other civil
defense programs. Active defense measures were Strategic Air Command, an early
warning line, an offensive nuclear stockpile to work as a deterrent, and second strike
capabilities. Eisenhower favored active defenses over passive defense. Hoping to put the
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debate to rest, he agreed to have the Science Advisory Committee create another ad-hoc
group of civilians to evaluate whether Federal money should be spent on a national
shelter program or whether that money would be better spent on active defenses.

Facing Political Pressures
Eisenhower had to deal with criticism o f his New Look both outside and within
his administration. Each o f the Joint Chiefs continually fought against the defense
budgets laid out by the New Look, arguing that while the budgets for the other services
were adequate, the budget for his own service was completely inadequate. At one point
Eisenhower sent for Wilson and the Joint Chiefs and explained his defense budget and
acknowledged that each member would undoubtedly find some shortcoming. He told
them that they had to understand that he had to look at the total picture, including the
economy, and that the Chiefs needed “to get on the team.”1But they continued to supply
Eisenhower’s critics, particularly the Democrats in Congress, with statistics proving a
need for more money towards conventional forces. The Democrats did not need much
persuading, as they concentrated their criticism on the “Neanderthal fiscal views” o f
Eisenhower and Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, which allegedly endangered the
security of the country.2 In addition to the fiscal concerns of the Democrats, many in the

1 Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 376.
Ambrose explained that Eisenhower felt he was qualified to make slashes in the Pentagon’s budget because
as a military man he knew what could be cut without damaging anything. His great fear was that someday
there would be a president who was not “raised in the military services,” and he said “If that should happen
while we still have the state o f tension that now exists in the world, I shudder to think o f what could happen
to this country.”
2 Ibid.
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party were critical o f the Massive Retaliation policy outlined by John Foster Dulles in
1954.
The New Look emphasized slashing defense costs except for SAC and nuclear
weapons, protecting the deterrence and second strike capabilities which defined
Eisenhower’s strategic thinking. This approach allowed Dulles to shift foreign policy
towards a policy that “fit” U.S. needs as he defined them. In a January 12,1954 speech,
Dulles explained that what the Administration sought was “a maximum deterrent at a
bearable cost.’” A potential aggressor, (Dulles went on to say) “must know that he cannot
always prescribe battle conditions that suit him.”4 Instead of the United States being
forced to respond to Soviet aggression in places like Korea, Dulles said that American
policy would be to “respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.”5
Democrats responded to Dulles’ speech with alarm. Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee
believed that the new doctrine, coupled with the defense budget cuts, made World War
HI all but inevitable. Dean Acheson questioned the constitutionality of the new doctrine
since it was in effect proclaiming the ability to launch an instant attack without a
Congressional declaration of war. Charles Bowles argued that Massive Retaliation killed
any chance at meaningful arms control, and Paul Nitze complained that Dulles had a
“psychopathic urge to have a new policy.”6 Furthermore, critics o f massive retaliation

3 “Secretary o f State John Foster Dulles Explains Massive Retaliation, 1954,” in Thomas Paterson ed.,

Major Problems in American Foreign Relations, Vol. II, 4th ed., (Lexington, MA: DC Heath, 1995), 42345.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Gary W. Reichard, “Divisions and Dissent: Democrats and Foreign Policy, 1952-1956,” Political Science
Quarterly, 93 (Spring 1978), 56-57.
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argued once the Soviets had enough hydrogen weapons of their own, the policy would
cease to be credible, so other options had to be explored.7
Attempting to solidify some kind of unified foreign policy for his party, Dean
Acheson wrote in 1955 that Eisenhower’s policy of massive retaliation overemphasizing nuclear weapons - was wrong. What was needed instead was a “military
establishment capable o f meeting - we would hope jointly with our friends - force which
might be employed against our interests, without involving the world in nuclear
warfare.”8 In Acheson’s mind, Dulles’ policy was sure to lead to nuclear annihilation. To
prevent that he argued, a prepared conventional force was needed to fight limited wars.9
Paul Nitze embraced the idea o f limited war. NSC 68 had been based on the idea
o f building up conventional forces to fight globally and, by mid-decade, Nitze even
believed a limited nuclear war could be fought and won.10 Nitze outlined his “nuclear
thesis” in six points:
(1) the time is about here when massive retaliation
against the USSR would involve the loss o f a huge
portion o f the American population; (2) in such
circumstances, massive retaliation makes sense only as
a deterrent against the use o f nuclear weapons by the
USSR; (3) any other purpose for our nuclear offensive
and defensive capabilities is senseless in the absence of
an effective shelter program, and our intention to so use
them would not be credited by the enemy; (4) therefore,
the principal military support of our foreign policy must
be the capability for limited military operations; (5) in
time, the use o f nuclear weapons in limited military
7 Gregg Herken, Counsels o f Wear, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987),111.
8 Quoted in Reichard, “Divisions and Dissent,” Political Science Quarterly, 93 (Spring 1978), 64.
9 For an overview o f the origins o f limited war thinking see Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 4-11.
10 Nitze expounded upon those ideas as a participant in a study group sponsored by the Council on Foreign
Relations. See David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, Paul Nitze and the Cold War, (New York: Edward
Burlingame, 1990), 165.
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operations will face the same sort of stalemate now
faced in the general use of nuclear war, (6) this leaves
no alternative but to build up conventional military
strength.11
Nitze’s thesis minimized the long-term success that massive retaliation could have and
concluded that future wars with the Soviet Union would undoubtedly be limited
conflicts. To not advance American limited war capabilities seemed to Nitze
irresponsible.
The idea o f limited war was embraced not only by Democrats, but also by
members within the administration. For example, Captain Evan Aurand, Eisenhower’s
naval aide and Killian Committee participant, argued that “our capability for limited war
has been the chief victim o f the defense cuts,” and that the improper balance between
limited war capabilities and all-out nuclear war capabilities had to be rectified.12 Since an
all-out nuclear war would likely end in annihilation, Aurand concluded that limited wars
were “the only type o f armed conflict in which net gains to the free world can occur.”13
Also, many members in the State Department believed limited war capabilities needed to
be expanded. A paper for Dulles prepared by the Policy Planning Staff responding to
Sputnik stated that limited war capabilities had to be developed to a greater capacity.14
Eisenhower fervently disagreed.

11 The Nitze Nuclear Thesis, 11/18/57, NA, RG 59, Records o f the PPS, 1957-61, Box 181, “Draft o f
Papers/ Speech by PHN.”
12 Memorandum from Evan P. Aurand to Cutler, 08/14/57, EL, Evan Aurand Papers, Box 11, “Special
Folder (I).” For a description o f Aurand’s duties and relationship with Eisenhower, see Dwight Eisenhower,
Mandate fo r Change, (New York: DoubleDay, 1963), 262-263.
13 Memorandum from Evan P. Aurand to Cutler, 08/14/57, EL, Evan Aurand Papers, Box 11, “Special
Folder (1).”
14 Carlton Savage, “Some requirements for National Security,” 10/18/57, NA, RG 59, Records o f the Policy
Planning Staff, 1957-61, Box 128, “National Security,” 4.
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To Eisenhower, adopting a limited war capability and mentality was
irresponsible. Historian Campbell Craig explained that Eisenhower was adam ant about
not engaging in such war because he believed any war would eventually lead to general
war.15 Eisenhower was keenly aware that many strategists, like Nitze and even John
Foster Dulles, believed a limited war could be won. Eisenhower constantly tried to push
people away from this position because he believed a limited war, nuclear or
conventional, could not be won before it developed into a general war.16 Eisenhower
agreed with Clausewitz, who argued that a power will not surrender until it has used its
most powerful weapon, ergo a limited war would escalate into a nuclear war. “Imagine
the position of a military commander in the field,” Eisenhower said to his NSC. “His
radar informs him that a flock o f enemy bombers is on the point o f attacking him. What
does the military commander do in such a contingency? Does he not use every weapon at
hand to defend himself and his forces?”17 Eisenhower could not conceive of any military
commander surrendering before using every last weapon available.
Another critic o f Eisenhower’s New Look whose views were heard by and often
shared by the JCS was Albert Wohlstetter. Wohlstetter became a prominent member of
RAND during the 1950s and believed that the policy of massive retaliation and the
apparent complacency within the administration toward the Soviet threat was a sign of

15 Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War, (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998), 57.
16 Dulles made it clear as early as 1954 that he disagreed with Eisenhower’s “all or nothing” approach to
nuclear war. See Craig, Destroying the Village, 52.
17 Memorandum o f February 27, 1956 NSC discussion, FRUS 1955-57, 19:204, quoted in Craig, Destroying
the Village, 57.
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were vulnerable. Rather than assume that a Soviet attack would come as a massive airstrike, he visited the SAC bases and studied their vulnerability in terms of small,
unconventional, discrete attacks made by the Soviets. In other words, he assumed the
Soviets were intelligent enough to take advantage of American weaknesses. His
conclusions beyond the vulnerability of SAC were that a nuclear stockpile by both sides mutual deterrence - did not make war impossible or peace stable. The nuclear balance
was delicate and, as such, much more had to be done than the current administration was
doing to assure security.19
The President also faced criticism from what his Assistant to the President,
Sherman Adams, called “armchair strategists” who continually harped on Eisenhower in
the newspapers that he “did not really know what was going on, especially in Russia.”20
Adams recalled one day when the President was furious because a friend wrote to him in
a letter that it seemed the journalists Stewart and Joseph Alsop had made “what seemed
to him a sensible estimate of how Russia’s military strength surpassed that of the United
States.”21 Eisenhower shot back a reply which explained to his friend that a war in the
thermonuclear age could no longer be won and as such, comparative military strength
was no longer a vital issue - economic and spiritual strength were just as important.
Furthermore, he reminded his friend that, as President, he had access to information

18 Gregg Herken, Counsels o f War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 111-112; Trachtenberg,
History and Strategy, 17.
19 Wohlstetter published his views in a widely read article in the January 1959 issue o f Foreign Affairs called
“The Delicate Balance o f Terror.” See Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 17-21.
20 Sherman Adams, First H ard Report: The Story o f the Eisenhower Administration, (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1961), 413.
21 Ibid.
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from experts, tcclin iciaiis, consultants and. Various otlicr advisers wlio Inicw more aoout
Russia and its military strength than the Alsops did.”22 As convincing as Eisenhower’s
remarks were, such private letters to friends did little to silence what the journalists
published for the public to read.
Between the press, Wohlstetter, Nitze, the Joint Chiefs, and even Dulles, it
seemed, at times, that the only real support Eisenhower had for the New Look was from
himself.23 To complicate matters further for Eisenhower, the major heart attack he
suffered on September 24, 1955 while in Denver was perceived by many of his critics to
have slowed him down. The result o f all this was that the Democrats went on the attack
during the 1956 election.
The Democrats had nominated Adlai Stevenson again. Dean Acheson was never
impressed by Stevenson’s “soft style” and had even said Stevenson had a “third-rate
mind that he can’t make up” in the 1952 election.24 Although he personally liked
Stevenson and admired his “unparalleled facility with words,” Paul Nitze agreed that
Stevenson “lacked the toughness to deal” with the Soviets effectively.25 However,
Stevenson was their only chance to regain the White House and control foreign policy
once again- something both men wanted dearly. So, when they were asked to join a
think-tank established in early 1956 at the suggestion of Charles Bowles to formulate a

22 Ibid.
23 This is true particularly in regard to limited war capabilities. Marc Trachtenberg suggests that as early as
the end of 1954, Dulles was retreating from Massive Retaliation and by the end o f the decade the outgoing
Secretary o f Defense, Thomas Gates, felt America had a tine limited war capability. Trachtenberg wrote:
“Reading the documents, one sometimes gets the sense that Eisenhower himself was one o f the last true
believers. To him, even as late as 1960, a major U.S.-Soviet limited war was an absurdity.” Trachtenberg,
History and Strategy, 40-42.
24 Douglas Brinkley, Dean Acheson: The Cold War Years, 1953-71, (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992), 47.
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foreign policy alternative the Democrats might use in the upcoming election, they
accepted. Although they wrote the foreign policy section o f the platform the Democrats
adopted in August 1956, much of what Acheson had written was edited out not because
o f its substance, but because of its “venomous” language.26 Frustratingly for Nitze and
Acheson, it did not matter because Stevenson wanted to rise above the fray on foreign
policy and offered little criticism o f Eisenhower on the subject during the campaign.27
Stevenson lost. Within weeks of the election a Democratic Advisory Council - a
“kind o f cabinet in exile”- was established in an effort to launch what historian Gary
Reichard called a “united offensive on foreign policy during Eisenhower’s second
term.”28 Specifically, it was formed by Stevenson supporters hoping to offset the
tendency of Democrats to work with Eisenhower in Congress. Stevenson was convinced
that the Democratic Congress led by Lyndon Johnson in the Senate and Sam Rayburn in
the House had gone out o f its way to “protect the Eisenhower administration from the
consequences of its own folly.”29 The Democratic Advisory Council remained active
throughout the rest o f the decade, trying to position the Party for certain victory in
I960.30 Both Acheson and Nitze worked as enthusiastic members o f the Council.
Acheson was appointed chair o f the Council’s committee on foreign policy and Nitze the
vice chairman. Historian David Callahan wrote that “for the remainder of the 1950s,
Nitze and Acheson would be co-conspirators in a common cause: to undermine the

25 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: A t the Center o f Decision, (New York: Grove Weidenfeld,
1989), 160-161.
26 Brinkley, Dean Acheson, 48.
27 Reichard, “Divisions and Dissent,” Political Science Quarterly, 93 (Spring 1978), 66-68.
28 Reichard, “Divisions and Dissent,” Political Science Quarterly, 93 (Spring 1978), 69.
29 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 161.
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Eisenhowcr-DuUcS regime and return the Democrats to power.”3' Nitze had a chance
before the 1960 election to influence the direction of Eisenhower’s national security
policy as a member o f the 1957 Gaither Committee. As a member, Nitze brought to the
table, and subsequently to the final report, his and Acheson’s viewpoints on limited war
and massive retaliation.
This criticism o f the administration’s New Look and massive retaliation policy at
mid-decade was compounded by additional criticism towards the administration’s
complacency about civil defense as the fear of fallout increased throughout the decade.
For example, in 1956 the House Military Operations Subcommittee, chaired by Chet
Holifield, heard testimonies from doctors, scientists, engineers and public officials as to
the dangers of fallout and how to create a new national effort towards civil defense.
Included in this list was James Killian, who testified before the committee in February
1956. He stressed that there were research deficiencies in the civil defense program
including, among other things, the need to analyze the national policy on shelters.32 The
Subcommittee felt that the current civil defense program was not doing enough and
called for the development of a master plan and a federally financed national falloutshelter program.33 It seemed to some that the administration had taken a “spotty

30 During the 1960 election, the Council charged Eisenhower’s foreign policy o f having collapsed. See
Robert Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections: 1952-1960, (New York: New Viewpoints
Press, 1974), 206-207.
31 Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, 155.
32 Letter .Killian to David Beckler, 02/01/56, and Letter, Beckler to Killian, 02/02/56, MIT, AC4, Box 195,
“SAC, 1956.”
33 House Military Operations Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations, Civil Defense fo r
National Survival, Hearings before a Subcommittee o f the Committee on Government Operations, 84th
Congress, 2nd session, 1956, found in Allan Winkler, Life Under a Cloud: American Anxiety About the
Atom, (Chicago: University o f Illinois Press, 1999), 118.
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it was

time for action.

The Role of Civil Defense and Fears From Fallout
Civil defense took a back seat to the overall continental defense programs
throughout the Cold War period. No coherent national policy on civil defense ever took
hold despite increasing fears about nuclear attack and radioactive fallout. Truman and
Eisenhower both felt that the costs involved in passive defense measures such as blast or
fallout shelters were too high. Even John F. Kennedy, who received $207.6 million from
Congress to reinforce existing community shelters, quickly retreated from his proposal
for a five year shelter program designed to protect the entire population because of the
prohibitive costs. He instead continued Eisenhower’s policy of encouraging individual
citizens to take up a shovel and build home shelters themselves/5
Shelters were not the only form of civil defense. During the Truman
Administration, one focus of civil defense was on population and building dispersal. City
evacuations were also an option, but Truman never seriously considered a national
shelter program. Instead, civil defense during the atomic age took a rather playful tone,
with school children learning to “duck and cover” from a cute cartoon character, Bert the
Turtle. The message was simply that if you remembered to duck and cover in danger you
would be fine. An atomic blast was portrayed as a kind of inconvenience that could be
dealt with easily. Civil defense posters explained to the public that “an atomic blast is

34 Memoranda o f Discussion at the 318th meeting o f the NSC, 4/4/57, FRUS, Vol. XIX, 1955-57, 459-464.
35 Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 127; “A Message to You from the President,” Life, 09/15/61.
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something like a tornado, a fire and an explosion ail roiled into one,™ and to survive such
a blast, a family only needed to have a few first-aid items on hand.36
During the early Eisenhower years, evacuation became a centerpiece of the
Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). As the Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists
accurately observed, the focus shifted “from ‘Duck and Cover’ to ‘Run Like Hell.’”37
One benefit that the nation derived from this shift in focus was the 1956 Federal
Interstate Highway Act, which built the road system needed for massive evacuation
plans. It was one o f the few federal programs Eisenhower supported enthusiastically.38
The Eisenhower administration played around with various cost effective ideas to
protect the population, industry and government during a nuclear exchange. For example,
in a June 1953 NSC meeting, Val Peterson, director of the FCDA, suggested a policy to
reduce government expenditures on reducing urban vulnerability. Rather than the
government paying for the dispersal of installations to lessen their vulnerability, he
suggested that the Government insist that companies make arrangements to disperse
themselves. If they failed to comply, defense contracts might be withheld. Acting
Defense Secretary Roger Kyes immediately protested, saying it was wasteful and
impractical for companies to scatter the various component parts of their organization
and withholding defense contracts from those companies who could not comply, for one
reason or another, was dangerous. Responding to Peterson’s claim that “we could no

36 “Mummy, what happens to us if the bomb drops?” Civil defense poster in author’s possession from the
Eisenhower Library.
37 Mary Simpson, “A Long Hard Look at Civil Defense,” Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists, 12 (Nov. 1956),
346, quoted in Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 117.
38 The Federal National Highway Act was passed in 1956 and it was a program Eisenhower had been
interested in since taking a cross-country trip by Army convoy in 1919. Impressed by the German
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longer continue to pile up factories and populations in congested and exposed areas,”
Kyes said that “we have often set up facilities in remote areas which resulted in poor
production and very high costs.”39 At this point Eisenhower chimed in, explaining that
maximum security at the present time was needed, even if one had to give up some
efficiency of production. But, the President continued, this was a “many-sided problem”
which should not be oversimplified. “What we require,” Eisenhower said to both men,
was to show “that in all facets of our life we are proposing to use the power of the federal
Government to get people to do the sensible thing.”40 To have individual citizens and
local communities take responsibility was the central theme Eisenhower stressed in
regards to civil defense throughout his presidency.
In his January 1955 budget message Eisenhower said that for civil defense to
succeed, the American communities had to be willing to take civil defense planning into
their own hands and that “the Federal Government will not assume the responsibilities
which belong to local governments and volunteer forces.”41 The Federal Government’s
responsibility, explained the President, was simply to “provide warning of impending
attacks, and to stockpile medical supplies.”42 Again, in 1956, Eisenhower stressed that
survival in an attack rested mainly with the individual and community and that the

Autobahnen, Eisenhower felt a highway system “was an ideal program for the federal government to
undertake.” For more see Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President, 387.
39 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 149th Meeting o f the NSC, 6/11/53, EL, AWF, NSC Series, Box 4,
“ 149th Meeting o f the NSC, 6/9/53.”
40 Ibid. In a conversation with Cutler about whether or not Eisenhower should give a speech to the
American people encouraging them to take up civil defense, Eisenhower was not responsive to the idea and
told Cutler “it was curious that everybody thinks the Federal Government ought to spend the money to save
them from being killed. When the ordinary American citizen is in danger o f being killed, he should do
something about it himself...it was funny that everyone wanted him to tell them why they should get busy to
save themselves.” Italics in original. See Letter Cutler to Val Peterson, 05/06/54, EL, WHO OSANS A, NSC
Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 4, “[Civil Defense](3)[1953-57].”
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Federal Government had to remain in partnership with States and local authorities in
order to obtain more citizen participation and more vigorous efforts by State and local
governments. Eisenhower firmly believed that “civil defense can never become an
effective instrument for human survival if it becomes entirely dependent upon Federal
action.
Eisenhower wished the federal government during the 1950s to provide
leadership, assistance, and information, but little funding for civil defense. Surviving a
nuclear war ought to be largely left to the state, the community, and the individual.
However, as the dangers o f fallout were becoming more widely understood by mid
decade, evacuation made little sense and the public became increasingly vocal about the
need for a new national civil defense plan which included shelters. As one contemporary
noted, “some rural people have been pretty smug about civil defense being a city
problem, but now the radiation effects may be felt anywhere.”44 Fallout brought civil
defense into the public debate.
While the Eisenhower administration was working on its New Look, the
American public, cultural critics, and some scientists were growing more concerned over
the threat o f fallout from not only a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers, but
also from atmospheric testing. As historian Allan Winkler has pointed out, earlier
decisions about the development o f a nuclear program remained hidden from the public,

41 Dwight Eisenhower, “Annual Budget Message to Congress: Fiscal Year 1955,” 01/21/54, Public Papers
o f the President, 1954, 120-121.
42 Ibid.
43 Letter from Eisenhower to Val Peterson, 07/17/56, Attachment B o f the Civil Defense Legislative
Program forFY 1958, NA, RG 273, Box 44, “NSC 5709- Background Documents,” 28.
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but failout meant a national debate as officials and scientists had to deal with public
criticism.45 For example, in 1949 the public became aware of radioactivity from nuclear
weapons when David Bradley, a doctor and participant during the atomic testing in the
Bikini Islands, published No Place to Hide based on his experiences in the Pacific and
suggested that there was no defense against the bomb because of radioactivity. There was
simply no place to hide. His book remained on the New York Times best seller list for ten
weeks and sold over a quarter million copies.46
At first the public was enthusiastic about the American advances in weapon
technology and approved of the testing. In fact, one test in the Nevada desert was even
broadcast live in April 1952 47 However, the public’s confidence slowly eroded as
accidents became more frequent and popular culture began to dramatize the dangers of
fallout.48 The first prototype hydrogen bomb was tested on November 1,1952 at the
Eniwetok Atoll and that explosion left a crater a mile wide and 175 feet deep where the
island had been. The first deliverable hydrogen bomb test was equally shocking. The
March 1954 “Bravo” test in the Pacific resulted in one of the most widely publicized
effects o f fallout. Ninety miles away, the crew of a Japanese fishing boat called the Lucfcy
Dragon felt the explosion and saw the red fire ball rising from the sky. Unable to out-run

44 Peterson at the Conference o f Mayors, Washington DC, 12/2/54, quoted in Quotable Quotes from the
FCDA Administrator Prepared by the FCDA, 04/01/55, EL, Virgil Couch Papers, Box 2, “Civil Defense
Facts, Speaker Kits, 1955-56 (2).”
45 Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 84-85.
46 David Bradley, No Place To Hide, (Boston: Little Brown, 1948); Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 91.
47 Winkler, Life UnderaCloud, 91. Between 1951-1963, the United States conducted approximately 100
above ground tests in Nevada.
48 In May 1953, one test blanketed a small town in Utah with excessive amounts of radiation. Several
residents became HI and 42 sheep died. The ranchers said fallout was the cause o f their deaths, but the
government won the suit on the grounds the ranchers had not provided scientific testimony to support their
claim. Twenty five years later a new trial was ordered by a federal judge who said the government had
deliberately withheld vital information and distorted the frets. See Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 93.
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the cioud, they were coated by the radioactive fallout The fishermen became ill by the
end of the day and eventually one o f the crew members died. The crew o f the Lucky
Dragon garnered worldwide attention and the United States apologized to Japan and
compensated their fishing industry. But Lewis Strauss of the AEC forever denied fallout
had anything to do with the crew’s illness and said the boat was probably really a Russian
spy boat monitoring the tests.49
A few years later, Australian novelist Nevil Shute published On the Beach, which
was a best seller and made into a Hollywood movie two years later. On the Beach opens
after a nuclear war with the entire population o f the northern hemisphere dead because of
fallout The radiation was moving towards the southern hemisphere- towards Australia
where the story takes place. Eventually, the people of Australia develop radiation
sickness and begin to die. Shute’s message is simple. No one was safe and there could be
no winners in a nuclear war. Shute seemed to be calling for a ban on nuclear weapons.
His message was powerful.50
To keep the public calm, Eisenhower’s Cabinet met to discuss ways to discredit
the movie. They suggested telling the public it was scientifically inaccurate and fell into
the genre o f science fiction.51 The administration also handed out millions of pamphlets
throughout the decade like Facts About Fallout, which explained that there was no need
to panic. And Eisenhower himself, when the public was still largely unaware o f the facts,
told his AEC chairman in 1953 to keep the public confused as to fission and fusion.52
The FCDA also downplayed the dangers. In a stock speech for general audiences to be

49 Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 94.
50 Nevil Shute, On the Beach, (New York: Morrow, 1957).
51 Cabinet Paper, “On the Beach,” 12/7/59, EL
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used by FCDA officials, the public was told that “Fallout is a new and dreaded word in
our language but we should be grateful for i t ” Grateful because it alerted the public so
that they were willing and eager to leam. This alert and educated public was the “sound
basis for an effective civil defense.”53
Eisenhower, even if he kept the public confused at times, agreed that the public
had to be willing and eager to leam about civil defense measures they could take so that
they would be less prone to panic in the event o f a war. He believed that crisis might be
minimized if people at the local level learned to work together to have a plan during war.
For example, when talking to the Conference o f the National Women’s Advisory
Committee on Civil Defense in 1954, he told them they had to prepare themselves to be
ready to do even just the smallest routine action necessary during a war - first aid, helping
the wounded, helping to put out a fire. “There is,” he said, “so much that can be done to
remove the fear, the danger of panic from our lives.”54 Keeping the public calm had
always been key for Eisenhower’s strategy, as he refused to let panic dictate massive
spending on defense or a govemment-by-crisis mentality. However, as the dangers of
fallout became more known and political pressures were mounting, the President turned
to the FCDA to propose a reasonable civil defense plan.

52 Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 105.
53 Speech for General Audiences: Evacuation and Fallout, n.d., EL, Virgil Couch Papers, Box 2, “Civil
Defense Facts, Speaker Kits, 1955-56 (2).”
54Eisenhower, Message to the Conference o f the National Women’s Advisory Committee on Civil Defense,
Washington DC, 10/26/54, Quotable Quotes from President Eisenhower Prepared by the FCDA 04/01/55,
EL, Virgil Couch Papers, Box 2, “Civil Defense Facts, Speaker Kits, 1955-56 (2).”
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The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA)
The FCDA was established in 1950 by Congress to “provide a plan for civil
defense for the protection o f life and property in the United States from attack.”55
Eisenhower’s director for the FCDA was Val Peterson, the former governor of Nebraska
and someone Eisenhower had great respect for.56 One of the first reports Peterson saw as
director was the 1953 Project East River report57 Deeply impressed by the conclusions of
the report that civil defense had to be recognized as a “co-partner in the nation’s total
defense planning,” Peterson echoed Eisenhower’s belief that to maintain industry and
sustain the morale o f the people, civil defense had to be a joint effort between the Federal
government and local communities. Peterson explained: “Operationally, the problem is
almost entirely a local one in character. Logistically, and from the standpoint of
leadership, it is a Federal and state problem.”58 Peterson based this belief in part on a law
Congress enacted in 1951 which specifically stated that the “responsibility for civil
defense shall be vested primarily in the several States and their political subdivisions.”59
Although all forty-eight states had enacted some kind of civil defense law by 1953,

55 Civil Defense Legislative Program for FY 1958 Submitted to NSC, 01/03/57, N A RG 273, Box 44,
“NSC- 5709- Background Documents,” 2.
36 Eisenhower had originally tried to appoint Peterson in 1953 as ambassador to India. He found out in
preliminary meetings that if he did nominate Peterson, the two Nebraska senators would state the
nomination “personally objectionable,” not because o f Peterson’s character, but because o f his political
standing. Eisenhower was outraged and found Peterson a position which did not need Senate confirmation.
When Peterson’s political enemies were gone, Eisenhower appointed him ambassador o f Denmark in 1957.
See Eisenhower, Mandate fo r Change, 119.
37 See chapter 3 for more on Project East River.
38 Statement o f the Honorable Val Peterson, Administrator, FCDA Before the NSC, 3/31/53, N A RG 59,
OCB/NSC 1947-63, Box 125, “The Federal Civil Defense Program,” 2.
39 Public Law 920, enacted by the 81“ Congress, January 12, 1951. Quoted in ibid., 3-4.
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Peterson assessed that while some State directors had made definite progress, others had
done very little, instead expecting the Federal Government to do their job.60
Before Peterson took over the FCDA in 1953, the agency had placed shelters as
its top priority. Shelters made sense in an atomic age. Some Japanese living in caves near
Hiroshima had escaped the bomb, which convinced some Americans that shelters were a
feasible option.61 In fact, the FCDA had proposed a shelter program which would cost
approximately $1.8 billion. The costs were to be shared equally between the States and
Federal government, but Congress never approved the funding. Peterson believed the
time had come, in light o f the new technologies, to reevaluate the requirements for a
shelter program. Since the financing would be immense, shelters needed to be considered
in light o f the total security needs of the country. It seemed to Peterson that the original
shelter proposals would be inadequate to cope with the forces of the thermonuclear
revolution. No shelter designed to withstand a Hiroshima-type blast could withstand the
power of a hydrogen bomb. In short, Peterson did not believe a shelter program, in 1953,
was necessary. Evacuation plans replaced shelter plans. New technologies were
promising an early-warning system that would allow enough time to evacuate an area,
and Peterson urged the military to build an early warning system as a top priority. Give
the country an early warning system, he said, and “there may be no need for an expensive
shelter program.”62 In fact, he surmised that an early warning system would be less
expensive than initiating a national shelter program. However, as the decade progressed

60 Ibid.
61 “Shelters” Speech, ad ., EL, Virgil Couch Papers, Box 9, “Fallout Shelters, c. 1957,” 3.
62 Ibid., 7-10. For Peterson on early warning systems, see Chapter 3.
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and the dangers from radioactive fallout became a public concern, civil defenses had to
be re-examined once again.
Writing to Peterson in 1956, Eisenhower said that “an effective civil defense is an
important deterrent against attack on our country and thus helps preserve peace,” but that
“the destructive capabilities of potential enemies have been outpacing our non-military
defensive measures since the Federal Civil Defense Act was passed six years ago.”
Therefore, “our whole civil defense effort needs both strengthening and modernizing.”63
Eisenhower asked Peterson to re-examine civil defense. The immediate problem the
FCDA took on was developing a civil defense capability to assure national survival in the
event o f an enemy attack which utilized modem weapons.
Peterson had recognized by 1955 that his earlier dismissal of the need for shelters
was compromised by two factors. First, the greatly increased radiation hazard from
fallout from the new, higher-yield nuclear weapons had emphasized the need for fallout
shelters.64 And second, the military had not yet provided the accurate, reliable early
warning system that the FCDA needed for evacuation. As such, shelter construction had
been encouraged by the FCDA as early as February 1955, NSC 5509, “Status of United
States Programs for National Security as of December 31,1954.” In the report, the FCDA
said that shelters were necessary if evacuation of a city was unfeasible and that it was
urging the construction o f shelters by states. It was also supplying manuals and pamphlets

63 Ibid., 2; Letter from Eisenhower to Governor Val Peterson, 07/17/56, ibid., Attachment B, 26-28.
64 In the early years o f the hydrogen bomb, the AEC continually told the public, and government officials,
that there was nothing to fear from radioactive fallout. The AEC’s reassurances did not hold up as more and
more scientists came out about the hazards and the bombs became bigger.
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containing instructions on how to build home shelters for individual homeowners.65 The
need for shelters was recognized, but the organizing and building of shelters was left to
the States and individual citizens. The FCDA continued to issue such recommendations
until 1957, when it finally recommended that the Federal Government take on a larger
role.
In January 1957, the FCDA recommended in its annual report that the
government allocate $32 billion for the construction o f fallout and blast shelters to
protect the entire population from radioactive fallout.66 This was a shift in FCDA policy
in that it asked the Federal Government to assume most of the financial burden of a
national shelter program. This kind of proposal from the typically conservative Peterson
took Eisenhower by surprise. Comfortable with the advisory role the Federal Government
had played in the area o f civil defense, Eisenhower was not eager to allocate large funds
for shelters now.
The January report was based on the assumptions that the Soviet Union had the
ability to launch a nuclear attack on the United States by bombers and submarines and
that a “substantial number o f high-yield nuclear weapons would be successfully
detonated over targets” in the United States.67 In addition, it was assumed that within ten
years the Soviet Union would have ICBM capabilities. Despite current defenses such as
SAC and diplomatic policies designed to prevent a nuclear war, they alone could not
promise that a desperate enemy would not attack. Furthermore, the most recent estimates

65 NSC 5509, Part Five- The Civil Defense Program, 02/01/55, NA, RG 273, Box 36, “NSC 5509 (Parts 38),” 9.
56 Report to the NSC by the FCDA, Civil Defense Legislative Program, 1/3/57, NA, RG 273, Box 44, “NSC
5709- Background Documents,” 3-4.
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from the Net Evaluation Subcommittee (NES) predicted that an attack on the United
States within the next few years “might be o f such magnitude as to raise real questions of
/TO

our survival as a nation.’

Particularly, fallout raised serious concerns for the FCDA.

With a bomber attack and longer warning times, evacuation of cities was an
option. But as warning times shrank to just minutes with ICBMs, evacuation would no
longer be an option. Even if a city’s population could be moved, the people were not safe
from the radioactive fallout. Therefore, a nationwide shelter program was needed as
evacuation became more meaningless and predicting where radioactive fallout would fall
was impossible. The NES report estimated that 80% of the casualties in a mock attack
would come from fallout compared to only 20% casualties from blast and heat.
Therefore, shelters might save a substantial percentage of the population. Without the
shelters the FCDA report predicted that less than 10% of the population in a blast area
would survive under the currently inadequate civil defense program. Shelters would
increase that survival rate to 60%. Most important, the FCDA report estimated that the
millions o f additional lives saved through a national shelter program “could make the
difference between the survival o f the nation and its disintegration.”69 In a follow-up
report in March, the FCDA reinforced that notion, explaining the “very preservation o f
the Nation itself demands the protection that the [shelter] program will provide.”70
There was also a sense o f urgency for a national shelter program to begin
immediately so that it would be complete before the Soviets had operational ICBMs. To

67 A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense, NSC 5709, 03/29/57, NA, RG 273, Box 44, “NSC- 5709,”
Annex A, 1-2.
“ ibid.
69 Ibid., A-3.
70 Ibid., A-5, italics added.
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complete the shelters within eight years, it was suggested that other construction projects
currently in progress would have to be postponed in order to divert all resources to the
shelter program. The cost for such a program was going to be high and the report
admitted as much. During an eight year construction period, the report estimated the total
cost for blast and fallout shelters to be $32.4 billion. However, the report argued that
there were psychological and economic advantages to these shelters if they were
constructed to be useful in times of peace. Such suggestions included “underground
parking garages, community recreation centers, meeting places, and overflow classrooms
for schools.”71 Even new subways and tunnels could be built and used secondarily for
7

* ?

shelter use. Keeping with a long tradition of downplaying the dangers o f nuclear war,
the government continued to paint a rosy picture, hiding shelters in the form o f a
community center or subway. In addition, tax breaks and federal mortgage insurance
were suggested as incentives to individual homeowners to build shelters o f their own
which met FCDA guidelines.73
After reviewing the FCDA report and other related reports, the NSC Planning
Board reported in late March that it was unable to make a recommendation to the
Council and the President which would help them to take action on any shelter program.
The Planning Board said it was “deeply troubled by a number o f important

71 Ibid., A-3-4.
72 Ibid., A-5.
73 Ibid., A-3, A-12. The report estimated that these two incentives might eventually increase the number of
home shelters in existing dwellings to approximately 20%, plus an increase o f 25% in new home
construction by 1961. That would result in an estimated 44.5 million individuals being protected by home
shelters. These measures would not be the first time the government provided incentives to individuals
taking up the task o f civil defense. For example, civil defense volunteer workers were also allowed by the
IRS to deduct from their income taxes unreimbursed expenses incurred from their work. See Income Tax
Ruling on Expenses o f CD Volunteers, 11/2/55, EL, Virgil Couch Papers, Box 11, “Speeches by Virgil
Couch 1955-57 (1) ”
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considerations which apply both to the specific FCDA proposal and to the over-all
problem o f the protection of the civil population.”74 Those considerations included
determining the optimum balance between passive and active defense measures,
determining how well shelters could really protect, determining the economic impact o f a
national shelter program on the economy, and determining the political and
psychological implications o f a shelter program. To find answers to these questions, the
Planning Board recommended a series o f studies to be undertaken by appropriate
government agencies.75
The Planning Board’s recommendations included four specific studies pertaining
to shelters. One study was to be conducted by Defense, FCDA, ODM and the AEC on
significantly different shelter programs. Another study was to be made by the Council of
Economic Advisers on the broad economic effects and consequences of the various
alternative shelter programs covered by the above study. The third study was to be
completed by Treasury on the types o f Federal financial assistance to private industry and
individuals to stimulate the construction o f shelters under such alternative shelter
programs. The final study was to be o f a general and non-technical nature and to be based
in part on the above studies. It was to be established under the Science Advisory
Committee o f the Office o f Defense Mobilization and was to study “the relative value of
various active and passive measures to protect the civil population in case o f nuclear
attack and its aftermath, taking into account probable new weapons systems.”76 The

74 A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense, NSC 5709, 03/29/57, NA, RG 273, Box 44, “NSC- 5709,”
2.
75 Ibid., 2-5.
76 Ibid., 2-5; Informal Memorandum for Use at Meeting with Mr. Gaither, 06/27/57, EL, WHO SANSA,
NSC Series Briefing Notes, Box 8, “[Fallout Shelters](3) 1957-60.”
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Gaither Committee grew directly out of that fourth study the Planning Board
recommended.
Between January and March, the merit o f passive defense measures such as
shelters continued to be debated; debated to the point of suggesting at a presidential
luncheon that a “high level task force” of “extremely able people [be set up] to develop
the facts as to the civil defense measures which [were] both possible and feasible.”77 The
debate continued at an April NSC meeting which discussed the recent FCDA report.
Gordon Gray, director o f the Office for Defense Mobilization (ODM), accused the
administration, as well as Congress, of taking a “spotty approach” to the problem of
shelters and said the Science Advisory Committee of the ODM was “very willing” to take
on the study assigned to it by the Planning Board. Dulles complained about the cost of
any shelter program and dismissed the idea of passive defense measures over active
defense measures, which he felt were the best way to spend the country’s resources. The
Under Secretary o f the Treasury and the Acting Secretary of Defense agreed with Dulles
and the President admitted that he too, for the moment, “leaned toward Secretary Dulles’
views.”78
Peterson understood their hesitations. He agreed that any shelter program should
proceed slowly and deliberately and admitted that the total costs could not be known
because o f the many different cost components. For example, would food, bedding,

77 Memoranda Rockefeller to Adams and Brundage, 4/12/57, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC series briefing
notes, Box 4, “[Civil Defense] (1) 1953-57,” 1. This suggestion was from Nelson Rockefeller’s committee
on Government Organization for a Study o f Civil Defense Measures. It was not recommended by Cutler
primarily because he felt their proposal would duplicate other civil defense studies already under way by the
NSC. Those studies were the four outlined by the Planing Board. See Memorandum for the Assistant to the
President from Cutler, 04/24/57, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 17, “Civil Defense (6).”
78 Memoranda o f Discussion at the 3 18th meeting o f the NSC, 4/4/57, FRCJS, 1955-57, 19:459-464.
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water, or medical supplies be included in the costs? He also stressed the FCDA’s support
for dual-use shelters to off-set costs. With that said, however, Peterson told the Council
that “while he clearly realized the fiscal implications of a large-scale shelter program, no
one could tell him that the United States could not afford to spend $3.2 billion each year
for ten years for a shelter program if securing the shelter program really meant the
survival o f the United States in the event of a nuclear attack.”79 To that Eisenhower
commented that the traditional state of war was coming to an end and was being replaced
by a contest between death and survival. Whichever side could dig in and ride-out a
nuclear war would win. Yet some wondered if survival was worth it if the post-war world
was destroyed.80
After Eisenhower spoke, Admiral Radford added that the British had recently
taken up the question of passive versus active defenses. The British White Paper
reasoned that the country could not afford to build both “an elaborate passive defense
program” as well as a strong active deterrent program, and the White Paper came out
strongly in support of the active deterrent program.81 Eisenhower, admitting that the
matter o f shelters “was a very serious problem,” might have been hoping that by giving
the go-ahead to the Science Advisory Committee to study the relative merits of passive
verses active defenses, that the group would reach the same conclusions as the British
White Paper.82 This would allow Eisenhower to reject the FCDA’s shelter program based
on the recommendations o f an ad-hoc group of civilian consultants free from political
and inter-service rivalries. Should the group come back with a different point of view,

79 Ibid., 461.
80 Ibid., 462-63.
81 Ibid., 463.
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that shelters were wise and should be pursued, Eisenhower could reject their conclusions
as unpersuasive while maintaining that he had had an open mind to the problem as
demonstrated by his solicitation o f civilian advice. Either way, his decision could be seen
as one based on a comprehensive examination o f the facts and not one based on what his
critics called “Neanderthal fiscal views.” Eisenhower went ahead and approved the SACODM study.

Organizing the Gaither Committee
Influencing his decision may have been the suggestions he had recently heard
from Dr. Isidor Rabi, chairman of the Science Advisory Committee. Eisenhower knew
Rabi from Columbia and respected him immensely.83 The Science Advisory Committee
had not met with Eisenhower since its March 27, 1954 meeting setting up the Killian
committee, and, in a letter to the President, Rabi explained that the 1954 meeting was a
continued source o f inspiration to the Committee and that it was time to “renew” that
connection with the president in order to ensure the continued effectiveness of the
Committee.84 Eisenhower agreed that a meeting was a good idea because there were
O
f

“many points of interest to explore.’

Eisenhower met with the Science Advisory

Committee on March 29th. One issue discussed was shelters. Although Eisenhower did
not give outright approval to Rabi’s suggestion to organize “an intensive study of the

82 Ibid., 462.
83 Killian, Oral History, 20; 34-35. Killian wrote that Rabi was able to make suggestions and proposals to
Eisenhower “that were very influential in the ultimate advisory arrangement Eisenhower created.” Ibid., 35.
84 Letter Dr. 1.1. Rabi to Eisenhower, 3/23/57, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 23, “Defense
Mobilization, Office o f (4).”
85 Letter Eisenhower to Rabi, 3/27/57, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 23, “Defense
Mobilization, Office o f (4).”
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shelter program by a small group of experts drawn from the inside and outside of
Government,” Eisenhower did agree with Rabi that there was a need for a “broadly based
study in which personnel protection is examined” in relation to various factors.86 Those
factors included strategic concepts, advances in weapon systems, active defense
capabilities, the costs o f shelters and the relative values of their protection, and the
practicability o f protecting densely populated urban areas.87 The final committee that was
to undertake this broad based study, the Gaither Committee, did indeed incorporate these
factors.
Although the Science Advisory Committee was instrumental in the original
formation of the Gaither committee, SAC-ODM played no other role in the study except
to select the project director. James Killian was given the task of recommending a chair,
and he called upon his friends H. Rowan Gaither, Jr. and Robert Sprague to be co
directors. Killian knew Sprague from his work as a consultant for the Killian Committee
in 1954/55, and Sprague had established himself as an expert consultant on continental
defense throughout the decade. Killian knew Gaither from when Gaither worked with the
Radiation Laboratory at MIT during WWII.
Gaither was trained as a lawyer. During WWII, while practicing law in California,
he was asked by the Radiation Laboratory to serve as the associate director in charge of
administration - a kind o f liaison officer between the Lab and the military services. After
the war, he returned to law briefly before being asked to serve as the chairman of the
board for the RAND Corporation after it reorganized into a non-profit organization in

86 Informal Memorandum for Use at Meeting with Mr. Gaither, June 27, 1957, 06/25/57, EL, WHO
SANSA, NC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, “[Fallout Shelters](3) 1957-60.”
87 Ibid.
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1947.88 He served as chairman, with the exception of one year, from 1948 until his death
in 1961. He became chairman o f the board of the Ford Foundation in 1953.89 His
reputation as an administrator was mixed. One observer from the scientific community
called him an “outstanding executive and organizer,” but another observer from the
military said, “Mr. Gaither has certainly not had any impressive record as head of the
Ford Foundation, nor as head o f anything else.”90 Cutler and Gordon Gray, going on the
recommendation from Killian, endorsed Gaither’s appointment.91
Gaither was replaced by William Foster when he fell ill in August and was unable
to continue as chair of the Gaither Committee. Foster had served in many positions
within the Truman administration, including under secretary o f commerce and
administrator o f the Economic Cooperation Administration. Ultimately he was appointed
deputy secretary o f defense in 1951. From this post, Foster formed opinions as to the
weaknesses of Strategic Air Command and overall continental defenses, but, after
Eisenhower took office, he resigned and did not maintain strong ties to the new
administration. However, as executive vice president of the Olin Mathieson Chemical
Corporation, a company “very active in developing and maintaining ties with government
agencies responsible for the defense of the United States,” Foster remained connected to

88 RAND was a research and development outfit created during the war as part o f Douglas Aircraft for the
Army air force. After the war, Douglas and the Air Force agreed to spin it o ff into a non-profit organization.
For a complete history of RAND, See Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation: Case Study o f a
Nonprofit Advisory Corporation, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966).
89 Snead, Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War, 49-51.
90 Memorandum to Andrew Goodpaster from David Beckler, 05/08/57, EL, WHO OSS, Subject Series,
Alphabetical Subseries, Box 23, “Science Advisory Committee (1);” Letter, General Robert Wood to
Eisenhower, 12/30/57, EL, WH Central Files, Official File, Box 676, “OF-133-R” (Gaither Report).
91 Memorandum to Andrew Goodpaster from David Beckler, 05/08/57, EL, WHO OSS, Subject Series,
Alphabetical Subseries, Box 23, “Science Advisory Committee (1).”
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developing defense needs.y2 Although Foster took over for Gaither in August, his role
was nominal as Gaither had established the committee’s membership and direction well
before he stepped down.
On May 8, 1957 Eisenhower wrote to Gaither asking for his “active participation
in helping the Government come to grips with one of the most important and perplexing
problem areas affecting our future national security.”93 Gaither accepted “with a full
sense of the magnitude and urgency of this task.”94 Eisenhower assigned Cutler and Gray
to brief Gaither and organize the scope o f the study. The first briefing was on June 27 and
Cutler explained how the FCDA report, the Planning Board’s assessments, and Dr.
Rabi’s suggestions brought this study group into existence.95 He made clear that the
objective of the committee was to form a “broad-brush opinion” of passive and active
defenses in their relative value o f protecting the civil population. The committee was to
also understand that the threat to the U.S. was “in the years ahead.”96 In short, the
committee was to offer its opinion as to what active and passive defense measures were
to be the most effective in relation to their costs and protecting the civil population.
During the briefing, Cutler also stressed to Gaither what the committee was not to
be. He said that it should be “clearly understood that the Panel’s mission does not extend

92 Snead, The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War, 52.
93 Letter Eisenhower to Gaither, 5/8/57, EL, WHO OSS, Subject series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 23,
“Science Advisory Committee (1).”
94 Letter Rowan Gaither to Eisenhower, 05/15/57, EL, WHO OSS, Subject series, Alphabetical Subseries,
Box 23, “Science Advisory Committee (1).”
95 Also at the briefing were Deputy Secretary o f Defense Donald Quarles; Gordon Gray, W.Y. Elliott, and
Dave Beckler o f ODM; Jerome Wiesner and Col. Vincent Ford o f the Gaither Committee; two members
from the NSC staff and an Admiral from the Department o f Defense. Memorandum for File: Gaither Panel,
06/28/57, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, “[Fallout Shelters](3) 195760.”
96 Informal Memorandum for Use at Meeting with Mr. Gaither, June 27,1957, 06/25/57, EL, WHO,
OSANSA, NSC Series Briefing Notes, Box 8, “(Fallout Shelters](3) 1957-60.”
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to a detailed examination of national security policies and programs for the purpose of
recommending specific modifications in such policies or programs. No such study as was
made by the Technological Capabilities Panel is intended or desired.”97 In addition, the
Gaither committee was to be given the other studies called for by the Planning Board and
receive numerous briefings from the FCDA, ODM, AEC, CIA, Defense, and the Net
Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC. Cutler explicitly told Gaither that the purpose of
acquiring this information was not for suggesting detailed changes, revisions, or
modifications. The information was for assessing the relative merits of passive defense
measures compared to active defense measures. It was for answering the question: should
the Government spend money on shelters, or would that money be better spent on active
defense programs98
The Deputy Secretary o f Defense, Donald Quarles, had some concerns about the
scope of the Gaither committee’s mandate. Quarles worried that it was going to be
another detailed study like the Killian Committee, which the Department of Defense
would have problems implementing. Cutler assured him that it was not. The Gaither
committee was to study the relative value of various active and passive defenses designed
to protect the civilian population in case of war. It was not, Cutler said, “intended to
recommend detailed corrections, changes or modifications in what is being done or is
planned to be done.”99 They were not to suggest changes. “The last thing the President
wants to come out of this study,” Cutler explained, “is a series of detailed

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 Cutler to Donald Quarles, 06/20/57, EL, WHO, OSANSA, NSC Series Briefing Notes, Box 8, “[Fallout
Shelters](3) 1957-60.”
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recommendations for changing our defense program.”

inn

Quarles made sure Gaither

understood this.
During the June 27th briefing, Quarles told the group that the Gaither Panel would
not undertake another TCP-type study. Furthermore, he expressed to the group that the
committee was to “accept the validity o f our military Continental Defense programs
without getting into the ‘hardware business’ and without undertaking to recommend the
reorganization o f a Continental Defense System which takes 10 years to bring about in
the first place.”101 In short, Quarles told the group that its mission was simply to provide
the basis for a decision as to whether the Federal Government should provide- and tax the
people for it- shelter protection for the population in addition to the effective deterrent it
already provided. The question was, Quarles said, “whether our main effort should be to
deter the attack from occurring in the first place, or whether efforts should also be made
to protect the people if the attack should come.”102 Quarles ended by adding that he
personally rejected the latter viewpoint because he believed passive defense measures
would reduce the deterrent effect.
Gaither thanked Cutler for the briefing, saying that the meeting was most helpful
in providing a dimension for the study. He was appreciative of the “broad-context” set
down, which allowed him “to proceed with the selection of the kind of talent to be
recruited and with the organization of the Panel’s work.”103 There should have been no
doubt in Gaither’s mind as to the assignment handed to his committee after that briefing.

100 Ibid.
101 Memorandum for File: Gaither Panel, 06/28/57, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes
Subseries, Box 8, “[Fallout Shelters](3) 1957-60.”
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid.
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Cutler, Gray and Quarles all clearly outlined the scope of the study and emphasized that
the final report was not to repeat the work o f the Killian Committee. The group was
being asked a simple question. However, as Gaither proceeded to organize his committee
he sought to expand the committee’s assignment and the entire study grew like a cancer.

The thermonuclear revolution brought heightened concerns over radioactive
fallout from high-yield weapons. The Federal Government traditionally took a leadership
role, offering advice and information, but left the funding for civil defense up to states
and local communities. In 1957, the FCDA recommended that the leadership role of the
Federal Government expand to finance a national shelter program. Responding to
pressures from political opponents, cultural critics, and even from members within his
own administration, Eisenhower chose to use an ad-hoc group of civilian advisors to
evaluate the merits o f a national shelter program. Strongly opposed to federal funding for
civil defense measures that he believed the individual citizen ought to be responsible for,
Eisenhower wanted an outside group free from political labels to decide that federal
dollars would be better spent on active defenses rather than passive defenses. However,
with the Gaither Committee in place, committee members went to work in the spring of
1957, but fell far short o f fulfilling Eisenhower’s mandate.
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CHAPTER SIX

QUESTIONING THE WISDOM OF USING CIVILIAN COMMITTEES:
THE GAITHER COMMITTEE GOES TOO FAR

The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) 1957 annual report, which
called for the Federal Government to spend $32 billion over ten years on a national
shelter program, created a debate within the administration over the relative merits o f
passive versus active defenses. Out of this debate came the creation of another civilian
ad-hoc committee asked to examine the question of whether or not the country should
pursue both a strong active defense and a shelter program. The subsequent Gaither
Committee, however, was not as successful as the Solarium Exercise or Killian
Committee. In fact, the experience Eisenhower had with the Gaither Committee was so
poor that Eisenhower said that the entire exercise had proved “definitively the unwisdom
of calling in outside groups.” 1The reason for Eisenhower’s change of heart for a process
he had had such success with in the past was simple. The Gaither Committee had gone
too far.
The committee went too far on a number o f levels. First, the committee itself was
too large, growing to over eighty participants. These members were not, like the earlier
Killian and Solarium committees, broken down into smaller, manageable panels.

1 Memorandum o f Conversation with President, 12/26/57, EL, JFD Papers, WH Memorandum Series, Box
5, “Meetings with the President 1957 (1).”
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Second, one o f the primary authors of the final report was Paul Nitze, a man who did not
support Eisenhower’s New Look and was far from being able to operate above the
political fray. Third, the committee took its original assignment and enlarged it into a
study which evaluated the entire defense program. The decision to expand the original
mandate was made without Eisenhower’s knowledge. Unlike with the earlier
committees, Eisenhower did not have as close a working relationship with the Gaither
Committee and left Robert Cutler and Gordon Gray in charge o f overseeing the process.
Third, the committee presented an alarmist report which indicated that the United States
was in grave danger. The members wished to change Eisenhower’s security strategy, and
proposed substantial modifications, which did not compliment Eisenhower’s New Look
or Great Equation. Furthermore, even in spite of its enlarged mandate, the report did not
look at the problem of defense in its entirety. Rather, as John Foster Dulles noted, it dealt
only with segments o f the total problem, which led to complications.2 Ultimately, the
report failed to shift Eisenhower’s strategic thinking. Finally, the desperate tone and
criticism towards present defense programs found in the final report were leaked to the
press, which created a public outcry and led to members of Congress demanding the
report’s release. Eisenhower had been deeply impressed by the fact that both the
Solarium and Killian exercises had operated in complete secrecy. The Gaither Report
leaks infuriated the President. In addition, after the report was presented to Eisenhower
and the NSC, many committee members actively sought the implementation o f their
recommendations. As Eisenhower saw it, there was no “passion for anonymity” among

2 Memorandum o f Conversation with the President, 11/25/57, EL, JFD Papers, WH Memorandum Series,
Box 5, “Meetings with the President 1957 (1).”
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the Gaither Committee members as he had witnessed with the Killian committee. Certain
members were zealous in their effort to see the Gaither Report implemented thoroughly.
These members wished to make policy, but Eisenhower did not call upon civilian
committees to make policy. He used them to advise in policy. The result was that
Eisenhower never requested the use of a civilian committee to advise in national security
policy in the final three years of his presidency.

Selecting a Committee and Expanding a M andate
Selecting his committee and organizing its course of work was the next step for
Rowan Gaither. He worked with the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), which had
prepared a list o f 100 prospects to draw from, pending security clearances. Gaither
thought he could get a core group together by July 15 and be ready to roll by the first of
August.3
To start, Gaither worked with the ODM in establishing a steering committee and
advisory panel for the committee, which was officially called the Security Resources
Panel. O f the nineteen members that made up these two principal groups, only four had
served on either the Solarium Exercise or the Killian Committee: Robert Sprague, James
Phinney Baxter, General James Doolittle, and Jerome Wiesner.4 The two smaller
advisory groups within the Gaither Committee - the subcommittee of the Science
Advisory Committee and the Institute for Defense Analyses - had more experienced
members, such as James Killian, James Fisk, and Isidor Rabi for the SAC-ODM

3 Memorandum for File: Gaither Panel, 06/28/57, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes
Subseries, Box 8, “[Fallout Shelters](3) 1957-60.” There is no indication that Eisenhower had any hand in
preparing or approving this list.
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subcommittee, and General James McCormack and Albert Hill for the Institute for
Defense Analyses.3 Aside from these advisory committees, Gaither recruited another
sixty-seven consultants to provide advice and recommendations. Only three had past
experience on either the Solarium Exercise or Killian Committee.6
The consultants who were recruited were mostly drawn from engineering firms,
business institutions, and strategic think tanks like RAND and the Brookings Institute.
Although the scientific community was also represented, its presence was small
compared to the Killian Committee. In addition, the presence o f military advisors was
comparably smaller than what was found on the Solarium and Killian committees. This
deficiency is an important distinction between the three committees. The presence of
military minds on the Solarium task forces enabled Eisenhower to craft a national
security policy that reflected military realities in terms of capabilities and practical
strategies. The Killian Committee found itself in debt to its military advisors,
acknowledging that their service was invaluable.7 Without the sound advice from the
military, the Gaither Committee was left to overestimate Soviet capabilities and
underestimate American defenses.
Historian David Snead contended that the qualifications of some o f the advisory
and steering committee members - Killian, Rabi, Baxter, William Foster, and Robert

* For a complete membership list o f the Gaither Committee, see Appendix C.
5 Killian and Fisk directed the Killian Committee and Hill worked part-time on the Defensive Power panel.
McCormack chaired Task Force B on the Solarium Exercise.
6 Colonel George Abe Linclon, who ended up writing part o f the final Gaither report, had served with
George Kennan on Task Force A o f the Solarium Exercise. Dr. Richard Emberson and Dr. Brockway
McMillan were two scientists who served on the Defensive Power panel o f the Killian Committee.
7 The TCP Report, 186.
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Lovett - was “ample evidence o f the committee’s expertise” and high caliber.8 However,
Killian and Rabi played only very minor roles in the Gaither Committee and when Baxter
was asked to write the final report, he found the technical aspects too daunting to bring
together, despite being a Pulitzer Prize winning scientific historian, and asked another
member to write the report.9 In addition, neither Foster nor Lovett, who served as the
deputy secretary and secretary o f defense respectively in the last years o f the Truman
Administration, were strong supporters of Eisenhower, nor had they been asked to
participate in an advisory role before.
The committee was composed of experienced men, but many of those men were
what historian Richard Immerman called “alarmist critics” of the Eisenhower
administration.10 The participants came to the committee with preconceived ideas about
the absurdity o f massive retaliation, the vulnerabilities of Strategic Air Command, and
the belief that the present administration had become complacent about national security.
Those members who did not come to the table with these perceptions were quickly
convinced o f their truths. As a result of the members’ concerns, and the very size of the
committee, it was “virtually guaranteed,” explained historian Gregg Herken, “that they
would extend their charter to include a wholesale reassessment of the administration’s
military policy.” 11 One member who embraced this expansion was Paul Nitze.

8 David Snead, The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War, (Columbus: Ohio State University
Press, 1999), 48.
9 Baxter had been the official historian o f the Office o f Scientific Research and Development during WWII
and wrote Scientists Against Time, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1946), a history o f the OSRD.
10 Richard Immerman, review o f The Gaither Committee, Eisenhower, and the Cold War, by David Snead,
H-Net Reviews, November 2000, <http://www2Ji-net.msu.edu/reviews/>
11 Gregg Herken, Counsels o f War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 113.
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Nitze had been an outsider. He established himself as a well-known critic of the
Eisenhower administration, working diligently with the Democratic party to defeat
Eisenhower in 1956.12 He also had no love for Dulles. Dulles knew that Nitze had hostile
feelings towards him, explaining to a friend that “Paul Nitze felt a strong personal
hostility toward me ... because I had not kept him on as chief of the Policy Planning
Division, and he blamed me ... for his failure to get a high position in the Department of
Defense.”1J So when Gaither committee member Baxter learned of the new direction the
committee was to travel, and suggested that his good friend and strategy expert Paul
Nitze be asked to join their group, it was not an invitation extended by the White House.
It was, however, a golden opportunity for Nitze to try to shape national security policy
and he quickly became a full time participant.
However, the fact that the committee was composed of many members with
whom Eisenhower disagreed was not necessarily a liability. If the group should
recommend that America concentrate only on active defense measures, Eisenhower
could accept their report and claim that his critics were part of the decision-making
process. Should the group recommend that passive defenses be emphasized, Eisenhower
could claim he was open-minded about the problem and had asked a diverse group o f
civilian outsiders for their advice, but found their conclusions unpersuasive. This was,
after all, how Eisenhower liked to use civilian committees. What Eisenhower had not

12 Nitze himself wrote that he “spent long hours working on his [Stevenson’s] behalf in the presidential race
o f 1956.” See Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: A t the Center o fDecision, (New York: Grove
Weidenfeid, 1989), 160.
13 Memorandum o f conversation with General Draper, 12/1/58, EL, JFD Papers, General Correspondence
and Memo series, Box 1, “Memos o f conversation- General A-D (4),” 1.
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expected was that the group would take on an expanded mandate or that the report would
be leaked to the public.
After his June 27th briefing with Cutler, Gray, and Donald Quarles, Gaither asked
his friends at RAND how to organize the group. Albert Wohlstetter of RAND argued to
Gaither that a broader mandate needed to be pursued so as to not miss the real issue of
defending U.S. bomber bases against surprise Soviet attack. U.S. defenses were
vulnerable, argued Wohlstetter, because, according to RAND’s alarming figures, the risk
to the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack was low and the Soviet Union would have
500 ICBMs deployed by 1960, a number which would fatally compromise the U.S.
security within three years.14 Convinced that a complete analysis of civil defense could
not be achieved without investigating the entire American defense policy, the members
of the committee wanted to enlarge their task. In addition to being persuaded by
Wohlstetter, the committee took inspiration from the President himself.
The Advisory Panel and Steering Committee o f the Gaither Panel met with
Eisenhower on July 16.15 At that meeting, Eisenhower reportedly asked the panel, “If you
make the assumption that there is going to be a nuclear war, what should I do?” 16 Taking
their inspiration from there, Gaither and Foster approached Cutler for permission to
expand their inquiry into the overall defense program. In his memoirs Cutler explained
the consequences o f his approval: “The request seeming reasonable, I gave my assent
without foreseeing the result. The Committee was soon busying itself more about

14 David Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, Paul Nitze and the Cold War, (New York: HarperCollins,
1990), 167-168.

15 Memo for the Honorable Bernard Shanley, 07/15/57, EL, WH Central Files, Confidential File, Box 23,
“Defense Mobilization, Office of (5).”
16 Eisenhower quoted in Herken, Counsels o f War, 113.
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military than Civil defense matters....I had inadvertently ‘opened up’ the Council
procedures and processes in a way not intended.”17 Without Eisenhower’s approval, the
Gaither Panel began a study o f the entire American defense program.
What began as a rather modest study o f civil defense soon spread like a cancer.
As one member recalled, the project became “a caricature of government sprawl. Some
people wanted to go on a wartime footing. They worked themselves into a state of
hysteria. It was the establishment gone wild.” 18 To complicate matters, Gaither did not
divide the sixty-seven consultants into manageable panels assigned to examine one
aspect o f the assignment. For example, panels could have been established to study the
costs of shelters, the various types o f shelters, and the effectiveness of shelters in light of
high-yield weapons. Without a systematic way to direct the energy of these consultants,
the members were left to operate without any buffers.
The members decided early on not to “try for invention,” but rather work towards
synthesizing the numerous reports and studies “undertaken by large and experienced
groups” that were relevant to the group’s assignment.19 As such, the members o f the
group spent time with members of these various other study groups and became well
informed. Throughout July and August the Panel was briefed extensively by all the
relevant agencies.20 One important briefing was between Sprague and the commander of
Strategic Air Command, General Curtis LeMay.

17 Robert Cutler, No Timefo r Rest, (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), 354-355.
18 Spurgeon Keeny in an interview with John Newhouse, 07/9/87, quoted in John Newhouse, War and
Peace in the Nuclear Age, (New York, Knopf 1989), 119.
19 Letter from Steering Committee to Eisenhower, 11/7/57, in Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age
(The “Gaither Report”), 11/7/57, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), 9.
20 Security Resources Panel, Schedule of Briefings, 07/23/57, MIT, AC 4, Box 195, “SAC, Security
Resources Panel (Gaither Panel), 1957.”
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Sprague and Nitze had already been briefed by Wohlstetter about the vulnerability
of SAC. Wohlstetter thought that they were deeply affected by the dire portrait he had
painted. However, Wohlstetter thought the final nail in the coffin for Sprague in
convincing him that there had been no improvements in SAC since the Killian
committee’s recommendations over two years ago came when he met with General
Curtis LeMay, Secretary of the Air Force James Douglas, and Wohlstetter. In discussing a
recent Army study on air defense which concluded that neither SAC nor the nation was at
much danger o f being caught on the ground by a Soviet attack, Sprague asked
Wohlstetter why the discrepancies between the reports. Wohlstetter explained it had to
do with different estimates in how long the SAC bombers could get off the ground.
Sprague then asked if war broke out today, how long would it take for SAC’s forces to
become airborne. Douglas immediately said forty-five minutes. LeMay, who had not said
anything up to this point, took the cigar out of his mouth and said “Nine hours.”21
Sprague was convinced that reducing the vulnerability o f SAC had to become the highest
priority and indeed the final report reflected this view. In addition to this sobering news,
there was increasing evidence that supported the charge that the Soviets were surpassing
the United States in military technology.
In February 1955, Georgi Malenkov was ousted from the premiership in the
Soviet Union and replaced by Nikolai Bulganin. With Malenkov gone, Nikita
Khrushchev and Bulganin began to increase the military budget and took steps to
“remedy the disadvantageous impression o f the strategic balance that had been created by

21 Herken, Counsels o f War, 114.
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the intra-Party dispute.”22 One o f those first steps was to update the Soviet delivery
capabilities through new bombers. By the summer of 1955, Foreign Minister V.M.
Molotov declared that the Soviet Union had surpassed the United States. An impressive
air show on Aviation Day in July was to convey to the world a new conception of
strategic balance through the flybys of numerous bomber squadrons. Later it was
suspected that the Soviets did not really have the bomber force displayed, but were
merely flying the same squadron of bombers around in circles.23 Regardless, the display,
coupled with the Soviet acquisition of the hydrogen bomb and the rhetoric of Bulganin,
Khrushchev, and Molotov, led the West to estimate a rapid build-up of Soviet nuclear
capabilities. In fact, the CIA had reported in the fall o f 1957 that the Soviet Union was
embarking on a “crash” ICBM program.24 The U.S. response, concluded the Gaither
Panel, had to be a crash program for the American missile program. Thus the two main
tenets of the Gaither report had been formed: SAC had to be protected at all costs, and
nuclear superiority had to be maintained. Added to these two priorities was a strong
belief by Panel members that the U.S. also needed to increase its limited war capabilities.
In a memo to Cutler regarding limited war, Evan Aurand said “Several members
o f [the TCP] felt the need for consideration of the subject of limited war at the time, but
the problem presented to the Killian Committee was, o f course, restricted to that of an
all-out nuclear attack on the U.S..”25 The members o f the Gaither committee felt limited

22 Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet M ilitary and the Communist Party, (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1967), 27.
23 Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign P olity, (Chicago: University o f
Chicago Press, 1966), 18; 27-28.
24 SNIE 11-10-57, “The Soviet ICBM Program,” in Intentions and Capabilities, Donald Steury, ed.,
(Washington, DC: US Printing, 1996), 63.
25 Memorandum Aurand to Cutler, 8/14/57, EL, Evan Aurand Papers, Box 11, “Special Folder (1),” 1.
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war was too important not to consider. Paul Nitze, as previously mentioned, strongly
advocated limited war and even believed the U.S. could fight and win a limited nuclear
war.26 However, although he and co-author o f the final report, Abe Lincoln, felt strongly
about it, limited war was given short attention within the final report.
As the Gaither committee was wrapping up its study in the fall, the Soviets
launched Sputnik, a 184-pound man-made satellite, on October 4th. The launching of
Sputnik was a great coup over the West. James Killian observed that its success “created
a crisis o f confidence that swept the country like a windblown forest fire.”27 The
implications were frightening. It was clear that if the Soviets could launch a satellite, they
were close to having an ICBM that could realistically reach the United States. Although
the CIA had correctly estimated that the Soviets would launch a satellite in 1957, that
information was top secret, and Western shock over the Soviets beating the U.S. into
space with Sputnik gave rise to the feeling that the Soviets were indeed surpassing the
U.S. in nuclear superiority.28 From the impressive display at Aviation Day in the sum m er
of 1955 to the launching o f Sputnik in the fall of 1957, Khrushchev and his supporters
were well on their way to establishing a “missile-gap” myth which lasted until the
summer o f 1961 and helped John F. Kennedy in 1960.
Eisenhower was not as concerned about Sputnik as the public thought he should
be. In a news conference days after the launching, he said that the satellite did not raise

26 See chapter 5.
27 James Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1977), 7.
28NBE 11-5-57, “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Reid,” in Intentions and
Capabilities, Donald Steury, ed., 62.
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his “apprehensions...as far as security was concerned.”2VHowever, it raised the
apprehensions of the public and, when the Soviets sent up Sputnik II on November 3,
Eisenhower’s Gallup Poll rating fell sharply by twenty-two points.30 Historian Robert
Divine pointed out that the President’s one real failure with Sputnik was not addressing
the issues o f American opinion in a serious way.31
While Eisenhower was unconcerned about Sputnik and wished the public would
stop its panicking, the launching of Sputnik seemed to confirm the worst fears of the
committee members. Paul Nitze saw the Soviet success as a clear indication that
American foreign policy had to change. Nitze had been in Rome in early October to
attend a conference on transatlantic relations. While there, the launching o f Sputnik
shocked the world, and he and a British official outlined a policy approach they felt the
West should adopt in light o f Sputnik. Over a bottle of wine, they created a plan that
called for “an intensive effort on the part of the United States to increase both the
capability and credibility o f our strategic deterrent, to effect close collaboration between
the United States and its NATO allies in the development of adequate forces in
Europe.”32 Seeing as Nitze was no longer in the policy making circles o f Washington
anymore, it was unlikely the plan would become policy. Yet, upon returning from Rome
Nitze learned that the Gaither committee had asked James Phiney Baxter, the only
historian on the committee, to write the final report. Feeling that the task o f synthesizing

29 Eisenhower, Public Papers o f the President, 1957, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Press, 1958),
730.
30 Michael Beschloss, MayDay: Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and the U-2 Affair, (New York: Harper & Row,
1986), 148.
31 Robert Divine, The Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower's Response to the Soviet Satellite, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1993), 205.
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technical and military analysis was too difficult, Baxter turned to his friend Nitze to write
the final report. Here was his opportunity to submit his ideas to the President.
Nitze co-wrote the report with his friend, Colonel George “Abe” Lincoln. In his
memoirs, Nitze said that “Abe and I were mentioned as ‘project members’ at the back of
the report, which masked the fact that we shared importantly in shaping the substance of
the final version.”33 If Nitze was not a welcomed voice within the administration, Lincoln
was. Eisenhower had great respect for Lincoln. He described him as a man “of splendid
character” and as someone he admired personally.34 In fact, Eisenhower had wanted
Lincoln to take the position o f Assistant Secretary for Policy Planning in August 1957.
Lincoln accepted, but his nomination was rejected by the Foreign Relations Committee
on grounds the position called for a civilian, not a military man. Eisenhower thought
“many military officers had a thoroughly ‘civilian’ viewpoint just as many civilians had a
‘military’ viewpoint” and figured politics were behind the decision.35
Lincoln had served his country, however, before his participation in the Gaither
Committee. He had been a member of George Kerman’s Task Force A during the
Solarium Exercise and participated in a 1956 committee that reported to Eisenhower’s
adviser Nelson Rockefeller which examined the psychological aspects of U.S. strategy.36
However, as much as Lincoln and Eisenhower respected one another, Lincoln did

32 Nitze, Public Statements o f Deputy Secretary o f Defense Paul H. Nitze, 1967, (Washington, DC:
Department ofDefense, n.d.), 306, quoted in Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, 169.
33 Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, 167.
34 Letter Dwight Eisenhower to Milton Eisenhower, 04/6/63, EL, Milton Eisenhower Manuscripts, Box 15,
“Correspondence 1963.” Back in 1947, when Eisenhower was Army Chief o f Staff Lincoln decided to retire
to an academic career. Eisenhower begged him to stay on at the Pentagon because o f the “high value I
placed upon his knowledge, thoroughness and good sense.” Ibid.
35 Memorandum o f Conversation with the President, 08/23/57, JFD Papers, WH Memorandum Series, Box
5, “Meetings with the President (4);” Memorandum for the Record, 08/02/57, EL, JFD Papers, General
Correspondence and Memorandum Series, Box 2, “Strictly Confidential- L (1).”
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publicly express some opposing views. In a 1954 publication called Economics and
National Security, Lincoln argued that the U.S. had to prepare for war. Although he did
not expect the Soviets to launch an attack, the threat of war by miscalculation could not
be ignored. Since the Soviets were bent on world domination, the U.S. had no choice but
to sustain an economy based on being prepared for war while ensuring that the economy
stay healthy through government controls if needed. The implication here was similar to
that o f NSC-68 in that the nation could handle the added burdens to its economy for the
sake of national security. In May 1957, Lincoln took issue with the policy of massive
retaliation in an essay which advocated limited war capabilities. He believed that future
wars would likely be limited wars and asked, “Are we of the Western World so
committed to deterrent nuclear force, and so fearful of the slightest nuclear threat that we
lack the means, or wit, or both, to deal with local and limited situations?”37 Nitze agreed
with many of Lincoln’s views and the two got to work.
Meanwhile, a week before their final presentation, Cutler and Gray met with the
Gaither Panel for two hours. Cutler recorded that he and Gray tried to impress upon the
group “the necessity o f their taking the same kind of broad, over-all look at the problems
involved which the President has to take, and not focusing their attention merely on
rectifying particular deficiencies at considerably increased expenditure.”38 As Cutler saw
it, it looked like the report was going to recommend adding some $73 billion in programs

36 The Rockefeller study group was also called the Quantico II Panel, see FRUS, 1955-57, XIX:153-154.
37 George A . Lincoln, Economics and National Security: M anaging Am erica’s Resourcesfo r Defense, 2nd
ed., (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1954); Colonel G. A. Lincoln and L t Colonel Amos Jordan, Jr.,
“Technology and the Changing Nature o f General War,” M ilitary Review 36 (May 1957). Lincoln quoted in
Snead, Gaither Committee, 68.
38 Memorandum Cutler to Gray and Goodpaster, 10/30/57, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing
Notes Subseries, Box 16, “Security Resources Panel (2) 1957-58.”
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over the next five years. Worried, Cutler wrote to Eisenhower on November 4th,
explaining that the advisory group would meet with him that morning before presenting
the final report and that he had “been working hard to get the top Advisory Group to
approach this tremendous subject from a Presidential, rather than a parochial,
viewpoint.’” 9 Apparently Cutler was fearful the final report would reflect a narrow vision
which did not consider a broader context of foreign relations, foreign opinion, the
economy, and overall strategy. He was right.

The Report’s Conclusions
The final report, titled “Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age,” was
presented to Eisenhower and the NSC on November 7,1957. The Killian committee had
spoken of a steady confidence and urgency without despair, but the Gaither committee’s
report read like crisis with desperation. It read more like NSC-68 than anything else. In
fact, had the administration chosen to react to Sputnik in the same way Truman reacted to
Korea, the Gaither report could easily have become the next NSC-68. As Advisoiy Panel
member Robert Lovett reportedly said after reading the report, “It was like looking into
the abyss and seeing Hell at the bottom.”40 The report said that the United States was in
the gravest danger in its history and Sputnik was proof enough for many people. It
concluded that active and passive defense programs in existence and those programmed
for the future would not protect the civilian population against thermonuclear war. It

39 Letter Cutler to Eisenhower, 11/04/57, EL, AWF, Administrative Series, Box 11, “Cutler, Robert 195657(1).” Gaither headed this initial presentation to the President on November 4th before the NSC meeting on
November 7,1957. Others present were Sprague, Foster, Killian, McCloy, Doolittle, Frank Stanton, and
Camey. See Memorandum o f Conference with the President on November 4,1957,11/6/57, EL, AWF,
DDE Diary, Box 28, “November 1957 Staff Notes.”
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accepted Albert Wohlstetter’s assessment that Strategic Air Command was incredibly
vulnerable. The solution was to dramatically improve SAC, while developing an earlywarning radar system for an ICBM attack, and increasing production o f IRBMs and
ICBMs.41 In addition to the improvements made to SAC and the missile program, the
report also argued for increased limited war capabilities. And as far as the original
question o f fallout shelters was concerned, the report concluded that “a nationwide
fallout shelter program to protect the civil population...was the only feasible protection
for millions of people who will be increasingly exposed to the hazards of radiation.”42
The costs would be great, but well within the means of the country according to the
report.
The report claimed that the Soviet Union spent more than the United States on
national defense and estimated that Soviet annual military expenditures would be twice
that of America in the next ten years. In addition, the authors were greatly concerned by
the rapid military advances made by the Soviets since WWR After the war, the Soviets
were left with a formidable army, but little else. Now the nation boasted a nuclear
weapon program, advanced long-range bombers, long-range submarines, and an ICBM
program. In short, the report concluded the Soviet military threat lay not only in their
present military capabilities, but also “in the dynamic development and exploitation of
their military technology.”43 As Gaither explained to the President, “the peril to the

40 Quoted in Newhouse, War and Peace, 119.
41 Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age (The “Gaither Report”), 11/7/57, (Washington DC: US
Government Priming Office, 1976), 16-18. (Hereafter the Gaither Report).
42 Ibid., 19.
43 Ibid., 15.
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United States must be measured in megatonnage in the years ahead.”44 The economic and
military threat posed by the Soviets was so large, said the report, that should the Soviets
launch a nuclear attack on the United States, the current active and passive defense
programs, and those programmed for the fixture, offered little to no protection to the civil
population 45 To remedy the situation, the report recommended four things: building up
American nuclear offensive capabilities; strengthening active defenses; building a
national fallout shelter system; and introducing limited war capabilities.
First, in keeping with the tradition of relying on nuclear superiority as the first
line of deterrence, the report recommended increasing American nuclear striking power.
Preventing war was the best protection for the civil population so a strong deterrent
power was vital - so vital that the report assigned it the “highest relative value” in
defense. Specifically, the report recommended increasing ICBMs (Atlas and Titan) from
80 to 600 and increasing IRBMs (Thor and Jupiter) from 60 to 240 while accelerating the
Polaris submarine IRBM system.46 To protect the missiles, the report urged hardened
bases for the ICBMs be “phased in as rapidly as possible.”47
Second, active defenses had to be built up. That meant strengthening SAC by
reducing response time and increasing warning time. SAC had to be less vulnerable. To
lessen the vulnerability of SAC, reaction time had to be reduced by implementing SAC’s
“alert” concept, improving tactical warning by extending the early warning lines, and

44 Memorandum o f Conference with the President on November 4, 1957, 11/6/57, EL, AWF, DDE Diary,
Box 28, “November 1957 Staff Notes.”
45 Gaither Report, 16.
46 The Report’s recommendations for missile acceleration were substantially greater than present Defense
plans. For example, the Gaither Report recommended 600 ICBMs be operational by 1963, whereas the
Defense Department plans only called for 130 by that time. See Memorandum o f Discussion at the 350th
Meeting o f the NSC, 1/6/58, FRUS, 1958-60, 3:5.
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building a missile defense system around SAC bases.48 Further suggestions included the
widest possible dispersal of SAC aircraft, even to commercial airfields, and constructing
shelters on the SAC bases for planes, weapons, supplies, and personnel.49 In addition to
protecting SAC, an effective air defense system was imperative and had to be
strengthened continually. Keeping up this invulnerable deterrent through ensuring the
survival o f SAC and hardening and dispersing missiles had also been emphasized in the
Killian report.
Third, although the following suggestions were designed to help protect the
civilian population, the report concluded that to ensure survival, a nationwide fallout
shelter program was the “only feasible protection for millions of people who will be
increasingly exposed to the hazards of radiation. The Panel,” the report went on, “has
been unable to identify any other type of defense likely to save more lives for the same
money in the event of a nuclear attack.”50 But the report said the government should not
adopt the $32 billion FCDA proposal for blast and fallout shelters. There was a cheaper
way. The report saw blast shelters as less likely to be effective since one had to get into a
blast shelter before an attack, but those surviving an attack would have “adequate time
(one to five hours) to get into fallout shelters.”51 Fallout shelters made more sense and
were cheaper than the blast shelters as they did not have to be as reinforced to withstand

47 Gaither Report, 17-18.
48 Both Killian and Sprague had been told in 1955 that an “alert” system which would get at least 25% of
SAC’s aircraft off the ground was to be implemented. By 1957 that system had not yet been implemented
because o f lack o f funds and trained personnel. As o f September 1957, Sprague was told by SAC
Commander General Curtis LeMay some improvements had been made, but that “not a single plane could
have left the ground within six hours except for a few that were by chance in the air on a test at the time.”
See Memorandum o f Conference with the President Following NSC Meeting, 11/7/57, EL, AWF, DDE
Diary, Box 28, “November 1957 Staff Notes ”
49 Gaither Report, 17.
50 Ibid., 19.
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the blast and heat from an explosion.52 The report estimated that half the population
might be saved with fallout shelters and that a national program might only cost $5
billion a year over a five year period.53
Finally, the report talked about expanding the military’s capability to wage
limited war. This direction stemmed in part from the committee members’ lack of
enthusiasm for the policy of massive retaliation. The report recommended an
augmentation of American and Allied forces for limited war and provision o f greater
mobility for those forces. It also said that a national, not Service level, study should be
undertaken to “develop current doctrine on when and how nuclear weapons can
contribute to limited operations.”54 Although this section was underplayed within the
report, its inclusion is significant in that it was a contentious point between Eisenhower
and the Democrats like Nitze who sought to implement limited war capabilities.
Eisenhower had fought with his own national security team to discard limited war as an
option and NSC 5707/8 reflected the administration’s policy to not engage in limited
war.55 The issue for Eisenhower was moot.
Not surprisingly, the report recognized, like the Killian Committee before it, that
strategic warning was needed particularly in light of the reduced warning times created
by missile technology. Although the report suggested no specific measures for improved

51 Ibid., 19.
52 The FCDA report (NSC 5709) estimated $100 per occupant for group fallout shelters compared to $235
per occupant for blast shelters. See A Federal Shelter Program for Civil Defense, 03/29/57, NA, RG 273,
Box 44, “NSC- 5709,” A-6.
53 Gaither Report, 31.
54 Ibid., 18.
55 NSC 5707/8 was approved June 3, 1957. It was vital to Eisenhower that a limited war option not be
included in a Basic National Security Policy. If it were an option, then he feared limited war would result in
general nuclear war. See Craig, Destroying the Village, 62-67. NSC 5707/8 is printed in FRUS, 1955-57,
19:509-524.
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strategic warning it did imply that the U.S. at present had no sound way to receive
strategic warning.56 The members were unaware of the current U-2 program because of
its top-secret status. Even when information derived from U-2 missions could have been
helpful to Eisenhower in dispelling the missiie-gap myth that emerged out of the Gaither
report, the President refused to compromise the secrecy of the program.
In short, the report concluded that a shelter program alone was not enough to
ensure survival. Likewise, an air defense system was not enough either. Instead, a
combination of national fallout shelters and. air defense was the optimum way to allocate
resources to protect the nation against nuclear attack.57 In other words, even if active
defense measures delivered, a 100% kill-ratio, the committee believed shelters were still
needed to protect the population from fallout generated from American missiles or the
detonation of weapons from enemy aircraft shot down.58 In addition, the report assured
that, “I f deterrence should fail, and nuclear war should come through miscalculation or
design, the programs outlined...woukL.go far to ensure our survival as a nation....The
next two years are critical. If we fail to act at once,” the report warned, “the risk...will be
unacceptable.”59
The total cost for its recommendations was $44 billion over five years - $25
billion on civil defense and $19 billion for deterrent and offensive capabilities.60 Seeing
as the American people were capable o f shouldering the costs for WWII and the Korean
war, when 41% and 14% o f the GNP was devoted to defense respectively, the report was

36 The Gaither Report, 21.
37 Ibid., 33.
38 Memorandum for C utler Gaither Recommendations on Shelter, 02/14/58, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC
Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, “[Fallout SheltersJ(3) 1957-60.”
39 Gaither Report, 24; 25.
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confident that America could afford to increase its present spending on defense.61 What
the report did not acknowledge was that during those wars the United States took
casualties. Without that provocation, the public had to be shown the need for such
expenditures. In other words, public support in a period of hostilities can not be likened
to a period o f peace.62 However, the report conceded that an undertaking of all the
programs would cause a larger Federal debt, higher taxes, the need for additional private
investment, and the postponement or slow-down of the national highway construction,
one o f the few programs Eisenhower enthusiastically supported.63 These consequences
were not in line with Eisenhower’s New Look strategy and, as such, Eisenhower did not
accept the majority o f the recommendations or change his strategic thinking as many
members had desired.

Missiles Yes, Shelters No: Reactions and Implementations
The crux o f the report was that the focus for survival had to be on deterrence, and
strengthening American deterrence depended both on reducing the vulnerability of SAC
and maintaining nuclear superiority. However, the Gaither report overestimated the
capabilities of the Soviets. For example, the Soviet Union had only four operational
ICBMs by 1961, not the hundreds the report predicted. The committee members also
exaggerated the vulnerability o f SAC. In 1957 it was the Soviet Union that was

60 Ibid., 22.
61 Ibid., 23. In 1957, the U.S. spent 8.5% o f its GNP on defense and 10% on all national security programs.
62 Memorandum to Fredrick Dearborn from R_V. Mrozinski, 12/27/57, EL, WHO OSANSA, OCB Series,
Subject Subseries, Box 6, “Security Resources.”
63 The Gaither Report, 23. The Federal National Highway Act was passed in 1956 and it was a program
Eisenhower had been interested in since taking a cross-country trip by Army convoy in 1919. Impressed by
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vulnerable. Through intelligence reports from the U-2, Eisenhower understood this and
was not about to accept the report lock, stock and barrel.
Eisenhower believed that the American strategic forces were stronger than the
Committee said they were and that the overseas bases offered excellent dispersal capacity
for American power. He conceded dispersal was important at home and that things did
seem to move slowly in that area, but things were not all that dire. In fact, Eisenhower
stressed to the group that the United States was in no way behind the Soviets. The
President agreed with the committee that shelters on the SAC bases for supplies and
weapons were a good idea, but reminded them that many weapons were already
dispersed.64 However, in a budget meeting a few days later, Eisenhower did think one of
the most important things to provide additional defense funds for was the dispersal and
alert o f SAC. Although, he was quick to remind his defense secretary that should the
Department get the additional funds requested, “they must be prepared to give up such
things as excessive executive aircraft, etc.” and thought they could find $600 million or
more this way.65
Eisenhower was open to the idea of accelerating the missile program, but not to
the “crash program” levels that the Gaither report recommended. Historian John
Newhouse explained that Eisenhower was “judged by some (including Goodpaster and
Keeny) to be uncomfortable with crash programs. As a former military commander, he

the German Autobahnen, Eisenhower felt a highway program “was an ideal program for the federal
government to undertake.” F or more see Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President, 387.
64 Memorandum o f Conference with the President on November 4, 1957, 11/6/57, EL, AWF, DDE Diary,
Box 28, “November 1957 StaffNotes.”
65 Memorandum o f Conference with the President on November 11, 1957,11/16/57, EL, AWF, DDE Diary,
Box 28, “November 1957 StaffNotes.” Defense was asking for S200 million more for SAC dispersal and
reduction time proposals.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of th e copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.

274
seems to have worried that the act of preparing for war, if carried very far, makes
avoidance o f war- o f keeping under control the preparation- very difficult.”66 Rather, he
relied on the “good judgment” of Neil McElroy to keep the pace from becoming
excessive.67 McElroy did propose IRBM and Polaris acceleration, but was able to keep
the requested additional costs for each program well below the figures given by the
Gaither Committee.68 Keeping up a strong retaliatory force remained the key element for
defense. Eisenhower would not consider implementing measures for limited war
capabilities.69 “Maximum massive retaliation,” he said, “remains the crux o f our
defense.”70 Dulles agreed with the President, saying that the one point made by the Panel
he “most emphatically endorsed” was maintaining a deterrent capability at all costs.
“With such a deterrent capability,” he said, “we would be in a position to conduct our
foreign policy in such a manner as to assure victory in the cold war.”71
Dulles may even have felt that the recommendations in the Gaither report
threatened the policy of massive retaliation. During the committee’s presentation, Dulles
frequently intenupted and openly disagreed with the recommendations. He knew in
advance the conclusions of the report, having seen a memorandum in late October from

66 Newhouse, War and Peace, 120.
67 Memorandum o f Conference with the President on November 11, 1957, 11/16/57, EL, AWF, DDE Diary,
Box 28, “November 1957 StaffNotes.”
68 McElroy did not request any o f the missile programs be accelerated to match the levels o f the Gaither
report in either cost or number. See ibid.
69 Although the matter was closed for Eisenhower, it was still discussed and studied. Cutler brought forth
memos indicating support and programs from civilian and military men. Even the PSAC decided to set up a
Panel on Limited Warfare, in part because the TCP report said their was a need for a study o f the technology
o f limited warfare. See Memorandum for the President from Cutler on Limited war in the Nuclear Age,
08/07/57, EL, AWF, Administrative Series, Box 11, “Cutler, Robert 1956-57(1);” Record o f Meeting o f
PSAC, 05/18/59, EL, USPSAC Records, Box 5, “Records o f Action and Meetings- PSAC.”
70 Memorandum o f Conference with the President on November 4,1957, 11/6/57, EL, AWF, DDE Diary,
Box 28, “November 1957 StaffNotes ”
71 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 343d Meeting o f the National Security Council, 11/7/57, FRUS, 195557,19:634.
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his Policy Planning Staff, which had been briefed by members of the Gaither committee.
The Policy Planning Staff had been impressed with the Panel’s report and had certainly
given the Panel members reason to believe that the State Department was in line with
their thinking. Paul Nitze, who was at the PPS briefing, thought so and was disgusted that
Dulles could ignore the opinions of his staff.72 After the November 7th NSC meeting, a
furious Nitze sent Dulles a letter calling for his resignation as Secretary o f State. “I
should ask you to consider,” wrote Nitze, “in the light of events of recent years, whether
there is not some other prominent Republican disposed to exercise the responsibility of
Secretary o f State in seeking a balance between our capabilities and our unavoidable
commitments, equipped to form persuasive policies, and able to secure the confidence
and understanding of our allies.”73
The question of shelters remained open for study, but Eisenhower rejected the
report’s recommendations here. The construction o f fallout shelters was a lower priority
in the report, but nonetheless they were still recommended. As the report indicated, the
strongest defense combined both active and passive defense measures. Eisenhower
agreed that “shelters rank rather low in the list o f priorities” and commented that the
money spent on shelters would be better spent on “other things,” like improving active
defense programs and accelerating the missile programs.74 In fact, Eisenhower was just

72 Memorandum from Gerald Smith to Dulles: Discussion o f Preliminary Views o f Some Members o f the
Security Resources Panel, 10/23/57, NA, RG 59, Records o f the Policy Planning Staff 1957-61, Box 128,
“National Security.”
73 Letter Nitze to Dulles, 11/16/57, quoted in Callahan, Dangerous Capabilities, 173.
74 Memorandum o f Conference with the President on November 4,1957, 11/6/57, EL, AWF, DDE Diary,
Box 28, “November 1957 StaffNotes.”
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plain opposed to spending billions on shelters, although he thought individuals or
communities should be free to do so if they wished.75
Dulles agreed. He recognized that the United States would be better off with
shelters, “if it were possible by a wave of the hand to create shelters,” but such a program
would have serious effects on America’s economy and ability to provide allies with
economic aid. He also feared that a shelter program would “bring home to the people our
lack of faith in our capability to deter war.”76 This viewpoint greatly differed from the
report’s conclusions which stated that shelters would “symbolize our w ill to survive,'''' and
augment American deterrent power by discouraging an enemy attack because the U.S.
was prepared and ready to use its “strategic retaliatory power.”77
Dulles thought shelters might disrupt the effectiveness of deterrence. As he
explained to Eisenhower, he thought these matters of shelters were “largely a matter of
temperament, and that I was temperamentally unsympathetic to such defensive
measures.”78 AEC chairman Lewis Strauss agreed, believing shelters might actually
provoke the Soviets to launch a preemptive attack on the United States before it could
finish a truly effective shelter program. Dulles even suggested that “perhaps the United
States and the U.S.S.R. should conclude a disarmament agreement under which neither
would build shelters.”79

75 Memorandum o f Conversation with the President, 12/26/57, EL, JFD Papers, JFD Chronological Series,
Box 15, “December 1957 (1);” Letters Mrs. Allan Jones to Eisenhower, 9/19/61 and Eisenhower to
Freeman Gosden, 9/25/61, EL, DDE Papers, Post Presidential, 1961-69, Special Name Series, Box 4,
“Gosden, Freeman, 1960-61.”
76 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 351st Meeting o f the NSC, 01/16/58, FRUS, 1958-60,3:14-15.
77 Gaither Report, 33. Italics in original.
78 Memorandum o f Conversation with the President, 12/26/57, EL, JFD Papers, JFD Chronological Series,
Box 15, “December 1957 (1).”
79 Historian Neal Rosendorf saw this exchange as a precursor to U.S. strategic policy under future president
Richard Nixon. He writes, “in suggesting that stability and security might best be preserved by allowing a
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Another concern was Allied perception. Both Eisenhower and Dulles worried
about the consequences if the U.S. embarked on a shelter program and American allies
could not afford to do the same. Dulles figured allied support would be lost. “It might be
argued theoretically,” he said, “that the United States as the arsenal of the Free World
requires the protection of shelters but to say that the American people must be saved
from the effects of radiation and not the British or French and the others was tantamount
to losing our Allies.”80
But even if the shelters were deemed a good, idea militarily, diplomatically, and
economically, the administration would still need maximum support from the public.
Eisenhower said it was important that “we neither become panicked nor allow ourselves
to be complacent.”81 Spirituality and morale had to be maintained as part of the ‘Great
Equation.’ But, a federally funded program was bound to run into problems and
jealousies. For example, to obtain national support, the urgent need for the program
would have to be explained, which might frighten the public into panic. Furthermore, in
deciding how much funding each state received, some states might feel slighted.82 There
were too many logistics to figure in, and the Gaither report did not consider the total
picture.
The new director of the FCDA, Leo Hoegh, wanted to see a balanced program
between evacuation and shelters and not a wholesale decision for one or the other.8'’

degree o f vulnerability on both sides o f the superpower confrontation, [Dulles] had hit upon the fundamental
principle of Mutual Assured Destruction.” See Rosendorf “John Foster Dulles’ Nuclear Schizophrenia,” 82.
80 Memorandum o f Discussion at the 343d Meeting o f the NSC, 11/7/57, FRUS, 1955-57, 19:634.
81 Ibid., 632.
82 Memorandum to Cutler from Fredrick Dearborn, 12/18/57, EL, WHO OSANSA, OCB Series, Subject
Subseries, Box 6, “Security Resources.”
83 Val Peterson had stepped down from the FCDA in June 1957 to accept an ambassadorship to Denmark.
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Evacuation to outside fallout shelters was likely to work if an area had two to three hours
o f warning. In densely populated areas like Washington D.C. and New York, he
suggested a combination o f fallout and blast shelters, with an evacuation strategy. And
although Hoegh agreed with Eisenhower that a partnership between the Federal
government and the States and local authorities was need, he also thought there had to be
in the near future a “greater emphasis on the leadership role o f the Federal Government
in this partnership.”84 The question of shelters continued throughout the end of the
administration. Cutler explained to Sprague in March 1958 that the matter of shelters was
under active consideration again, but that there was a bigger problem at large. No one
doubted that fallout shelters could protect part o f the population, but the question was
“whether and how people survive in the contaminated world of a post-shelter period
following a truly massive nuclear exchange.”85 In addition, an Interdepartmental Shelter
Committee had been established. Its report concluded that it was unable to say that, even
given improvements made to active defenses, a nationwide fallout shelter program could
save enough citizens to ensure the survival of the nation.86 Eisenhower even privately
questioned who would want to survive such a devastating war.87 So, although Sprague

84 Memorandum for the Record, Interview with the Federal Civil Defense Administrator in Mr. Lay’s Office
on 12/11/57, NA, RG 273, Box 44, “NSC 5709- Background Documents.”
85 Letter Cutler to Robert Sprague, 03/19/58, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries,
Box 8, “[Fallout Shelters](3) 1957-60.”
86 The report was designated NSC 5807. Memorandum to Cutler: Interdepartmental Shelter Committee
Report, 03/14/58, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, “[Fallout Shelters](3)
1957-60.” Shelters continued to be studied through the end o f Eisenhower’s term. For example, Eisenhower
asked the OCDM, State, and Defense departments in 1960 to re-examine policies and programs for passive
defense o f the population, with particular reference to fallout shelters. Their report continued to emphasize
individual and private construction o f shelters, but concluded such efforts fell short o f protecting the entire
populatioa Tax credits o f $25 per shelter space and a requirement that all Federally-supported housing
construction include shelters were suggested. Briefing Note for the PB, OCDM Shelter Paper, 12/9/60, EL,
WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, “[Fallout Shelters](l) 1957-60.”
87 When he and his wife were planning to build a home at a California country club, a resident wrote to
Eisenhower asking if he might join her and her husband in a group effort to build a community bomb shelter
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and others continued to petition the administration for shelters, Eisenhower never
allowed a federally-funded national shelter program to come about
Historian Allan Winkler explained that the civil defense program remained a step
child in the overall defense campaign.88 Even during the one time that civil defense and
shelter building could have taken center stage, with the Gaither report, the administration
refused to pursue the civil defense agenda. But shelters took a back seat in the report
which dealt with other defense policies. The Eisenhower Administration did offer
.leadership, advice, and direction, but very little funding in regards to civil defense. Every
citizen was responsible for building his own shelter, although the federal government was
happy to provide the information needed for building and stocking such a shelter. In May
1958, Eisenhower introduced a National Shelter Policy, but it merely continued to
emphasize the notion that each individual was responsible for his own protection.89 Many
Americans did embrace the idea and by the end o f 1960 there were an estimated one
million family shelters in place. John F. Kennedy continued the policy o f offering advice
and direction on shelters, going as far as to writing a letter to the American public in Life
encouraging all to use the blueprints provided in that issue to build a shelter. But after the

for the country club to “set a good example.” Eisenhower clearly did not want to offend the woman, but
neither did he take her proposal very seriously as he wrote to a friend about it: “So far as I am personally
concerned, I am not sure whether I would really want to be living if this country o f ours should ever be
subjected to a nuclear bath. But even if I were persuaded that the building o f a shelter would be good, I
would most certainly insist that it would have to be ample to take care o f all the caddies, the workmen on
the golf course, together with everybody that works in the clubhouse, including waitresses, maids, janitors
and all the rest.” Letters Mrs. Allan Jones to Eisenhower, 9/19/61 and Eisenhower to Freeman Gosden,
9/25/61, EL, DDE Papers, Post Presidential, 1961-69, Special Name Series, Box 4, “Gosden, Freeman,
1960-61.”
88 Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 110.
89 The “National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization,” stated that the Federal Government’s
responsibilities were only the “direction and coordination o f the total national effort,” and that “individuals
and families are responsible for sustaining themselves in an emergency and for contributing to the general
survival and recovery effort.” See The National Plan for Civil Defense and Defense Mobilization, October
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Cuban Missile Crisis and a relaxation in cold war tensions, interest in constructing back
yard shelters declined.90
In addition to the four primary recommendations of the Gaither report,
Eisenhower had other concerns that the recommendations went against his ‘Great
Equation.’ He expressed to the Gaither Panel that the difficulty with a democracy was
how to keep up interest and support o f the people without creating hysteria and a
“government by crisis.” In other words, he could not just accept the report without regard
for its impact on the public, since “we have before us a big job of molding public opinion
as well as avoiding extremes.”91 The people had to be motivated to take up the cause of
defense. For example, the country needed people educated in science and technology, so
the country had to educate the people why that was required to gain their support In fact
that evening, Eisenhower began a series o f speeches aimed at calming the public and
directing their attention towards education.92 Eisenhower explained that the difficulty
was to stress the need for scientists and engineers enough to gamer support without
creating a crisis or garrison state. Furthermore, he said that to retain a free enterprise
system “we must retain incentives,” and, he noted, “the group’s study had not embraced
these complications.”93 He recognized that America needed to “carry a challenging load
for a couple of years,” but said it was “very hard to obtain the commitments to indefinite

1958, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 4, “[Civil Defense and Defense
Mobilization][1957-60].”
90 Winkler, Life Under a Cloud, 120, 122; “A Message to You from the President,” Life, 09/15/61.
91 Memorandum o f Conference with the President on November 4, 1957,11/6/57, EL, AWF, DDE Diary,
Box 28, “November 1957 StaffNotes.”
92 See Eisenhower, “Radio and Television Address to the American People on Science in National Security,
11/7/57,” and “Radio and Television Address to the American People on ‘Our Future Security,’” 11/13/57,
Public Papers o f the President, 1957,230; 234.
93 Memorandum o f Conference with the President on November 4,1957, 11/6/57, EL, AWF, DDE Diary,
Box 28, “November 1957 StaffNotes.”
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burdens.”94 So while the Gaither report described a nation in grave danger, Eisenhower
was not willing to let such a notion move the country into a direction o f crisis
government, hysteria, and excessive military spending.
It seemed to Eisenhower that the committee had not looked at the problem in its
entirety. Further matters needed to be explored. For example, he asked, “what can the
American people be expected to put up with in terms of the allocation o f the Gross
National Product over the next several years? Was the Panel proposing to impose
controls on the U.S. economy now? Are we now to advocate the re-introduction of
controls?”95 Before anyone could respond, the President explained that if this group were
sitting in the Kremlin, surely their recommendations would be adopted “in toto,
regardless o f the effect o f such action on our people.”96 He did not have that luxury. “We
have before us a big job of molding public opinion as well as o f avoiding extremes.”97
Eisenhower clearly thought the Gaither report represented an extreme instead of
upholding the idea o f the ‘Great Equation.’
In the end however, Eisenhower realized he had asked the wrong question o f the
committee. He had asked the committee to study a course o f action in the event of a
nuclear war, but he had no intention o f ever fighting a nuclear war. “You can’t have this
kind of war,” he said, “There just aren’t enough bulldozers to scrape the bodies off the
street.”98 So while he agreed to some moderate increases in missile production and

94 Ibid.
95 Memorandum o f discussion of343d meeting o f NSC, 11/7/57, FRUS, 1955-57, 19:632.
96 Ibid., 634.
97 Ibid.
98 Eisenhower quoted in Herken, Counsels o f War. 116.
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remedies to reduce SAC vulnerability - recommendations that complimented his strategic
thinking - hr rejected the bulk o f the report’s recommendations.

Leaks and Headaches
Eisenhower should have been able to put the report into a file cabinet without the
greater public knowing what the report said. He should have been able to say thank you
to the committee members for a job well done and expect them to return to their civilian
lives. Unfortunately for Eisenhower, the report was leaked to the press and many
committee members became active lobbyists campaigning for the report to be
implemented one hundred percent. These two developments, neither of which occurred
during the Solarium or Killian exercises, caused Eisenhower to reevaluate the usefulness
o f civilian committees.
Parts of the report and its grim conclusions were made public, making it even
more difficult for the President to reassure the public in light of Sputnik. Within weeks of
the report’s submission to the NSC, leaks about it began to appear in the press. The
weekend November 23rd edition of the New York Herald Tribune ran a somewhat
complete account o f the report." In an understatement, Robert Sprague said to Killian it
was “bad security on our study” and thought it might distress the President
“enormously.”100 He was right. Between the pressures created from Sputnik and the

99 Morton Halperin, “The Gaither Committee and the Policy Process,” World Politics, 13:3 (April 1961),
376.
100 Letter Robert Sprague to James Killian, 11/25/57, EL, WHO OSAST, Box 14, “Security Resources
Panel [June 1957-Nov. I960].”
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Gaither Report, Eisenhower suffered a mild stroke on November 25.101 Sprague also
worried that such a leak was going to hinder rather than help the implementation of the
recommendations made by the report. Killian agreed that the leaks were “unfortunate.”102
On December 20th, the Washington Post ran a story by Chalmers Roberts that was
a substantial summary o f the report and remained the most complete public record o f the
report until it was declassified in 1973.103 It began by saying that the Gaither report
portrayed the U.S. “in the gravest danger in its history,” and that America was well on its
way “in frightening course to the status of a second-class power.” It also reported that
many o f the members of the committee, “prominent figures in the Nation’s business,
financial, scientific, and educational communities,” were truly “frightened” and
“appalled” at the state of the American military posture compared to the Soviet Union.104
In addition, the press also reported from the Gaither report that in the event of war, 60 to
100 million Americans would likely be killed by radioactive fallout without a national
shelter program.105
These leaks and startling revelations led Congress to scream for the report to be
released. For example, Congressman Chet Holified (D-CA), chairman of the House
Subcommittee on Military Operations, which was investigating civil defense, requested a

101 Eisenhower recovered from what his doctor called a minor stroke within three days. See Ambrose,

Eisenhower, 455-457; Beschloss, MayDay, 149.
102 Killian to Sprague, 11/29/57, EL, WHO OS AST, Box 14, “Security Resources Panel [June 1957-Nov.
I960];” New York H erald Tribune, November 23,1957, p 1:8.
103 Chalmers Roberts, Washington Post, December 20,1957,1:6. The article was inserted into the
Congressional Record by Senator Clark o f Pennsylvania with the comment that “It so happens that the
withholding o f the conclusions o f the Gaither Report has been only partially effective, because in the brilliant
article written by Chalmers Roberts...the substance o f the report has already been made available.” Clark
quoted in Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 98.
1 Roberts, Washington Post, 12/20/57, copy in EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes
Subseries, Box 16, “Security Resources Panel (1) 1957-58.”

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

284
copy of the report or, at the very least, a briefing by someone in the Executive branch.
Senator Lyndon Johnson (D-TX), chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on
Preparedness, asked the president to release both the Killian and Gaither reports to
Congress, primarily because he thought they would be helpful in making a case to
increase defense appropriations and for ulterior political reasons.106 Others in Congress
agreed. One senator argued that the report should have forced the Administration into a
sense of urgency and said that Roberts’ article described the “critical situation which
confronts our country, and which I must say in all good conscience the President’s budget
does so little to remedy.”107 Once again Eisenhower faced unwarranted criticism for his
defense budget,108 and he was furious.
Cutler later said that his most difficult time with the president arose from the
Gaither report leaks.109 Given that it was Cutler who approved the expanded mandate of
the report, he was aware that the President ought to have been furious with him. “The
fracas ensuing from discreditable leaks to the press o f parts of the Committee’s report
dealing with aspects of military defenses of the nation,” Cutler recorded later, “would

105 “Fallout Shelters Are Part o f Our Defense,” The Providence Journal, 01/22/58, found in EL, WHO
OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, “[Fallout Shehers](3) 1957-60).”
106 Letter Lyndon Johnson to Eisenhower, 12/4/57 and Letter Chet Holifield to Eisenhower, 01/6/58, EL,
WH Central Files, Official File, Box 676, “OF-133-R” (Gaither Report). Also see Killian, Sputnik, Scientists,
and Eisenhower, 99; Halperin, “The Gaither Committee,” 378.
107 Senator Clark, Congressional Record, quoted in Halperin, “The Gaither Committee,” 378.
108 The criticism was unwarranted in part because Eisenhower had recently asked Congress for a higher
defense budget than Congress was willing to grant. In fact, Eisenhower reminded the Gaither Panel of that
feet in the November 7* NSC presentation The NSC minutes recorded that: “Enlarging on a comment made
in the course o f the presentation about the 38-billion dollar ceiling on the Defense Department program, the
President reminded those present that he had urged upon the Congress appropriations amounting to 39.5
billion rather than the 38 billion In spite o f a number o f meetings with members o f Congress on the budget,
in spite of the feet that he had gone on television to urge the validity o f his proposed appropriation,
Congress nevertheless cut the figure.” FRUS, 1955-57,19:632.
109 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower, 97. Biographer Stephen Ambrose wrote that by the winter o f
1957-1958, the President was “noticeably more irritable and short-tempered, and complained about his job

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

285
have caused a less understanding President to lop off the head o f his Special
Assistant.”110 Fortunately for Cutler, Eisenhower deeply respected him and was not about
to get rid of one of his most trusted assistants.111
During a period when Eisenhower was trying to reassure the American public in
the aftermath of Sputnik and deal with a Democratic Congress accusing the
administration of inadequate defense budgets, it was natural that Eisenhower was not
receptive to the charges being made in the papers that, according to the Gaither Report,
the U.S. was in grave danger. To release the report might panic the public, which
Eisenhower probably feared would result in wild demands for massive spending on all
kinds o f programs, ruining the economy and creating a garrison state and government by
crisis. The report contained figures of estimated American casualties from a Soviet attack
that were hypothetical, but still disturbing. Sherman Adams, the President’s Assistant,
explained that Eisenhower reasoned that “public knowledge of these speculative
conclusions, based on assumptions that could be challenged, would do the nation much
more harm than good.”112 Acting on his convictions about the ‘Great Equation,’ he
refused to make the report public.
He explained his reasons why to Senator Johnson. Eisenhower told Johnson that
the report would not be released to the public or to Congress because, from time to time,
groups o f civilian advisors that were called upon to advise the President did so with the

more than he ever had.” The series o f criticisms over the past two years, including Suez, Hungary, the
Middle East, Little Rock, and Sputnik, had taken their toll. See Ambrose, Eisenhower, 457.
110 Cutler, No Timefo r Rest, 355.
111 Eisenhower often expressed his deep appreciation for Cutler and complimented his work in letters to him.
In one particular letter, Eisenhower equated Cutler’s resignation to losing his right arm. See Letter,
Eisenhower to Cutler, 3/8/55, EL, AWF, Administrative Series, Box 10, “Cutler, General Robert, 1952-55
(2).”
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understanding that their advice would be kept confidential and he intended to honor that
understanding. Furthermore, their reports were official documents o f the National
Security Council and never before had documents of the NSC been furnished to
Congress. Eisenhower did remind Johnson that the information given to the study groups
was the same information that had been available to Congressional committees studying
the same problems and that the committees drew their own conclusions. However,
Eisenhower was careful to also mention that he had carefully considered the conclusions
of the Gaither report, along with those opinions from other advisors and study groups.113
By acknowledging the advice from the Gaither committee - a diverse, bipartisan, civilian,
committee - Eisenhower could claim he had an open mind and had called upon qualified
people outside of government, but that ultimately he found their recommendations
unpersuasive. What made this tactic more difficult to sell now was that the report had
been leaked. Had Eisenhower needed to publicly reject recommendations from the
Solarium Exercise or Killian Committee, the public would have had to take his word that
the recommendations were not sound. Since the conclusion made by the Gaither
committee that the United States was in grave danger was public knowledge through
press leaks and Congressional debates, Eisenhower had to explain to the American
people why he found the recommendations unpersuasive. To complicate matters further,
his refusal to release the report fueled rumors in Washington that the administration was

112 Sherman Adams, First Hand Report, (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961), 413-414.
113 Letter Eisenhower to Lyndon Johnson, n.d., (1/22/58), EL, WHO OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical
Subseries, Box 13, “Gaither Report [November 1957-January 1958](1).”

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

287
unwilling to face the realities o f the security situation.114 It was a position the President
did not enjoy.
However, Eisenhower was aware that the public release of some o f the
information in the report might be helpful to clarify the inaccuracies being reported in the
press. For example, the report did recommend fallout shelters, but it did not place
shelters on its highest priority list and recognized the limits of shelters in providing
protection against an attack. It also rejected the price tag the FCDA had suggested for
shelters of S32 billion. If the public were made aware o f these limitations and findings of
the report, Eisenhower might convince the public that money for shelters would be better
spent on other defenses. As one military friend wrote to Eisenhower in response to the
articles he had read about the Gaither report, “I think the recommendation of a long-term
program of shelter construction is absurd, the costs are absurd, and the fact that we have
the best Strategic Air Command in the world is not even mentioned... [and] it seems to
me that this report should be released so that the people have a chance to read it.” 115
Eisenhower explained that the release o f the report was impossible because of its
classified material but agreed if some of its contents could be made public it would “be
helpful to a sound public approach to our defense and civil defense needs.”116
While Eisenhower wanted to alleviate the fears o f the public, ultimately the
members of the Gaither committee wished to see the report’s contents made public to
arouse public demand that all the recommendations be implemented. After the Gaither

114 Adams, First Hand Report, 414.
115 Letter General Robert Wood to Eisenhower, 12/30/57, EL, WH Central Files, Official File, Box 676,
“OF-133-R” (Gaither Report).
116 Letter Eisenhower to General Robert Wood, 01/10/58, EL, WH Central Files, Official File, Box 676,
“OF-133-R” (Gaither Report).
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report was submitted, Robert Sprague told Eisenhower that the group was a most
dedicated bunch and offered that many o f the members were “extraordinarily well
informed” on many areas in national security and all were available individually or
collectively “for consultation...to explain or enlarge on any o f the recommendations
made in the report.” 117 Emphasizing the recurring theme that time was running out,
Sprague also recommended the establishment of another study group to recommend what
should be done to take advantage of the “very modest time” America had to make the
“most effective efforts.” 118 Eisenhower politely agreed to consider the idea and Sprague
encouraged Killian to mention it to the President so that he might take action on the
suggestion.119 But Dulles discouraged the idea, pointing to the “complications of having
independent groups dealing with segments only of the total problem.”120 Cutler agreed
and was frustrated by Sprague, saying that all of Sprague’s work on continental defense
seemed to have blinded him into a narrow view and that Sprague’s views about SAC
alert and vulnerability and shelters were his “stock-in-trade.” The trouble with Sprague,
Cutler went on to say, was that he “brushes all other considerations aside- foreign
relations, foreign repercussions, whether what we do to beef up etc., will actually bring
war nearer, etc. He has a single track mind of great capacity.” 121 Eisenhower had to agree
and thought that the usefulness of such advice and committees was limited, especially in
light of the recent events surrounding the Gaither committee.

117 Letter Robert Sprague to Eisenhower, 11/14/57, EL, WHO OSAST, Box 14, “Security Resources Panel
[June 1957-Nov. I960].”
113 Ibid.
119 Letters Eisenhower to Sprague, 11/18/57 and Sprague to Killian, 11/25/57, EL, WHO OSAST, Box 14,
“Security Resources Panel [June 1957-Nov. I960].”
120 Memorandum o f Conversation with the President, 11/25/57, EL, JFD Papers, W H Memorandum Series,
Box 5, “Meetings with the President 1957 (1).”
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Stories about the Gaither report continued to be published in the papers.
Eisenhower, Cutler, and Killian held the committee members responsible for the stories
and decided not to let the Gaither committee reconvene to review and comment on the
various department remarks about the report. Instead, the Science Advisory Committee
was asked to review those remarks. Cutler met with a number o f members o f the Gaither
committee, including Sprague, Oliver, and Jim Perkins, in February to convey the
President’s “exasperation” with the leaks and Congressional pressures. Cutler also
explained to the group that the function o f the study group was completed with its report;
it was “not a continuing body.” 122
Many committee members were outraged by these developments and believed
that since their work from June through November had proceeded without any leaks, the
responsible parties for the leaks were those who received the report after the report had
been submitted. One member, writing to Killian, described himself as “distressed” over
the accusations and believed that silencing the committee was a mistake. It was a mistake
because Sputnik, he believed, had frightened “a largely uninformed and hence easily
alarmed American public,” and the public had therefore to be educated about issues of
national security to allay their concerns. Bringing these issues into the arena of public
debate was something many members of the Gaither committee sought to do.123
By January, Panel members were making many efforts to circulate the contents of
the report to a wider public to raise public opinion and force the administration to act In

121 Letter Cutler to Admiral Radford, 07/9/58, EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries,
Box 8, [Fallout Shehers](2) 1957-60.”
122 Memorandum for Cutler Attendance at Meeting on Gaither Report, 02/12/58 and Gaither Procedure,
n.d., EL, WHO OSANSA, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 8, “[Fallout Shelters](3) 1957-60.”
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particular, three reports were circulated which reflected the perseverance of some
members to see their recommendations implemented. Paul Nitze wrote one report which
William Foster found so impressive that he suggested to James Killian that it be added to
the Supplementary papers for staff personnel in relevant departments like the JCS, State,
and NSC.124 Nitze also wrote with Abe Lincoln a 13 page paper submitted to the NSC
executive secretary which continued to push for limited war options. In it, they outlined
various approaches to limited war and stated the views o f every conceivable department
on the subject in attempts to demonstrate the support within the policy making
community for limited war.125 The third report was written by the technical advisor to the
committee, E. P. Oliver o f the RAND Corporation. Oliver’s nine page memo advised the
committee to take full advantage o f what he called a “favorable environment” created by
the leaks o f the report. He argued that the committee members had to “impress the
highest levels o f Government and all concerned with the unanimity o f their belief in at
least the highest priority category o f recommendations.”

Reflecting the tone o f the

original report, Oliver told his colleagues that the United States “had entered into a
period o f mortal danger” and reiterated the point that time was running out.127 Like his
other peers lobbying for more action, Oliver believed that Sputnik indicated the advances

123 Letter James Perkins to James Killian, 01/07/58, EL, WHO OSAST, Box 14, “Security Resources Panel
[June 1957-Nov I960].”
124 Letter William Foster to Killian, 01/13/58, EL, WHO OSAST, Box 14, “Security Resources Panel [June
1957-Nov. I960].
123 Paul Nitze and Abe Lincoln, Limited Military Operations, 12/26/57, EL, WHO OSANSA Special
Assistant Series, Subject Subseries, Box 11, “Security Resources Panel.” The report includes the views
about limited war from the Air Force, Army, Navy, State, SACEUR, ORO, and the RAND Corp.
126 E.P. Oliver, Memorandum to the Security Resources Panel Steering Committee and Advisory Panel:
Two Months Later, 01/14/58, EL, WHO OSAST, Box 14, “Security Resources Panel [June 1957- Nov.
I960],” 1.
127 Ibid., 1.
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being made in the Soviet Union and was most alarmed by the slowness of the
administration’s responses.
Oliver’s report also reflected the misinformed opinion many had that the Soviets
had surpassed the U.S. in weapon systems and had better intelligence information about
American weapon systems. He also believed the Soviets were likely to initiate a war and
surmised that war would come as a surprise air attack which SAC was painfully ill
prepared to withstand. What is striking about Oliver’s report is that he saw no room for
compromise in that the recommendations with the highest priority from the Gaither
report had to be implemented in their entirety. He accused the administration o f having
an inadequate and inflexible decision making process that impeded these
implementations. As such, Oliver said that the President had better have a “sober
understanding” of the situation to speed through these recommendations or else
Eisenhower would be forced to act because of an “external crisis of an aroused public
opinion.” 128 A government by crisis was something Eisenhower had dismissed earlier and
would not tolerate. Oliver was trying to create such an aroused public opinion.
Sprague, Gaither, and Jim Perkins also set about trying to bring the contents of
the report to a wider public. Meeting in mid-January, the three spent an entire day
discussing strategies and sent their recommendations to Killian for action. The three
agreed that the report should not be released verbatim as it did contain classified
information that might be valuable to the Soviets. However, after trying to write a
sanitized version, the three decided such a version was not effective enough and even
misleading. They did think that the summary report presented to the President was
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appropriate for public release and recommended that Eisenhower hold a press conference
soliciting the “widest possible discussion and debate o f matters vital to our national
security” and promising the release of relevant information vital to such a debate.129 The
three finally thought that the members of the Gaither committee ought to be permitted to
testify before the appropriate subcommittees of the Congress.130 However, Eisenhower,
in declining to furnish either the Gaither or Killian reports to Johnson’s Senate
Preparedness Subcommittee, made it impossible for members to testify. In fact, Gaither
was asked in March to testify to the Military Operations Subcommittee on the relative
importance of shelters in an over-all program of defense against modem weapons, but he
had to decline, noting that “it would be impossible for me to separate my views on this
important subject from the conclusions and recommendations o f the Security Resources
Panel...[and] that my testimony cannot with propriety be given without violating the
fundamental principles and considerations” of Eisenhower’s decision to keep the report
classified.131 The influence o f the civilian advisors had been greatly diminished.
Paul Nitze complained about this weakness in the ability of civilian consultants to
wield any real power in making policy. He explained a serious problem facing the
Gaither committee was that “the committee may be too far removed from executive
branch responsibilities to be fully effective. Those members o f the executive branch who
are actually responsible for carrying out policy...feel, perhaps rightly, that such groups are
out o f touch with the real problems with which the officials, in the end, must always deal.

_____
129 Letter Gaither to Killian, 01/14/58, EL, WHO OSAST, Box 14, “Security Resources Panel [June 1957Nov I960].”
130 Ibid.
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In any case, it is obvious that the committee, once its report has been presented, is in a
poor position to help fight its recommendation through the decision stage.”132 Nitze
missed the point that the civilian committees during the Eisenhower administration were
never asked to make policy. The reports were never intended to be policy papers. They
were, in the role of outside experts, simply advising the policy makers. As Gregg Herken
has pointed out, civilian experts during the first 15 years of the atomic age were
witnessing more than determining the shape of policy.133 Killian understood this more
than anyone else.
In his memoirs as Science Advisor, Killian reflected on the aftermath o f the
Gaither report. He thought the credibility of the report was severely damaged by the
newspaper leaks and limited Eisenhower’s ability to make policy. Had the report not
been leaked, Eisenhower might have been “in a better position to follow through on its
recommendations.”134 Furthermore, the public maneuvering and politicking that many of
the members engaged in to make the report public deeply concerned Killian. He reflected
that it is arguable “that a study group o f this kind had a responsibility to abide by the
terms o f reference given to it at the start of the study, to present its report in the most
persuasive possible manner, and then to leave to the administration the decisions about
what should be done about it and whether it should be made public.” 135 Such public
activism by the participants, Killian concluded, “tends to inhibit presidents from using

131 Letter Gaither to Chet Holifield, 3/19/58, EL, WHO OSAST, Box 14, “Security Resources Panel [June
1957-Nov I960].”
132 Paul Nitze, “Organization for National Policy Planning in the United States,” reprinted in U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Committee on Government Operations, Organizingfo r
National Security, Selected M aterials, 86* Congress, 2nd Session, Washington, DC, I960, 168, quoted in
Halperin, “The Gaither Committee,” 373.
133 Gregg Herken, Counsels o f War
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this highly valuable advisory process.”136 Eisenhower agreed and concluded that the
whole episode had proved “definitively the unwisdom of calling in outside groups.” 137

To the Farewell Address
Although Eisenhower rejected the use of civilian ad-hoc committees for the rest
of his term, he did not abandon all of the men who had served him well for five years. In
particular, the relationship developed between Eisenhower and the scientific community
through the Killian Committee remained strong. After Sputnik, Eisenhower established
the position of Special Assistant to the President on Science and Technology and the
President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). The creation of these two offices
allowed science advising to continue, if not the express use of civilian ad-hoc
committees. James Killian was appointed the first special assistant on Science and
Technology and he, and his successor George Kistiakowsky, assisted the administration
in reassuring the American public about the country’s scientific and technological
strength following Sputnik. They had their hands full because world public opinion of
American science in the aftermath of Sputnik was low.138 Herbert York, a scientist and
Gaither Committee member, observed that Killian was “a near-perfect match between

134 Killian, Sputnik, Scientists, and Eisenhower, 101.
135 ibid.
136 Ibid.
137 Memo o f conversation with President, 12/26/57, EL, JFD Papers, WH memo series, Box 5, “Meetings
with the President 1957 (1).”
133 After a few spectacular earth satellite launches, the general standing o f American science had recovered
by the fall o f 1958, only to decline again the next year after the Soviets were successful in hitting and
photographing the moon. See Memorandum to Douglas Dillon from George Allen, 12/24/59, N A RG 59,
Box 5204, “911.80-911.82.”
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the President and other key administrative figures on the one hand and the members of
PSAC and other principal scientists and engineering figures on the other hand.” 139
Killian, with the other members of PSAC, organized the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), advised Eisenhower on missile programs, and
advocated additional funds for the National Science Foundation (NSF) and other means
to strengthen American science. Also, upon the recommendations of PSAC, Eisenhower
announced the National Defense Education Act which was to provide scholarships for
the study of math and science, strengthening science education. Through the PSAC, the
Eisenhower years remained a golden age for scientists to have access to the President
outside of civilian committees. In particular, scientists had an opportunity to help the
President devise a limited nuclear test ban.
One effect of the Gaither report was a shift in attitude among many of the
scientists who worked on the committee away from seeking newer weapons and towards
seeking a nuclear test ban. The months o f work on the Gaither committee convinced
many o f the futility of defense against a nuclear war. As Jerome Wiesner recalled, “I
couldn’t comprehend the usefulness o f the difference between forty or fifty million and
eighty or ninety million dead.”140 In its pessimistic tone and dire conclusions, the Gaither
report actually caused many members to rethink their previous beliefs that science and
technology could win a nuclear war. Certainly science and technology could save lives in
a nuclear exchange, but society would be lost “We became increasingly convinced,”

139 Herbert York was a member o f Eisenhower’s President’s Science Advisory Committee and the first
Director o f Defense Research and Engineering in 1958. Herbert York, Race to Oblivion: A Participant "s
View o f the Arms Race, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 114.
140 Wiesner quoted in Herken, Counsels o f War, 116-117.
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Wiesner said, “that the distortion of society would be such no one would tolerate it.”141
Instead o f building up arms in a sense o f panic, a policy of nuclear moderation was
needed. York noted that, after the Gaither report came out, calmer voices took over.
Eisenhower heard those voices through PSAC. Eighteen of the scientists who worked on
the Gaither report were asked to serve on PSAC - including Wiesner and York- and
Eisenhower shortly asked them for their help on a nuclear test ban.142
What is curious is, if Eisenhower kept an important link open between himself
and the scientific community, why did he warn the nation of becoming captive to a
scientific-technological elite in his farewell address. The answer to that is that
Eisenhower’s address was not directed at his science advisors. It was directed at what
Herbert York called the “hard-sell technologists and their sycophants” who invented the
missile-gap and tried to exploit Sputnik and the Gaither report leaks and the fear both
caused.
Specifically Eisenhower warned in his Farewell Address that “public policy could
itself become the captive o f a scientific-technological elite,” and that “in councils of
government we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether
sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex.”143 What Eisenhower was
warning against was not so much his own science advisers within the President’s Science
Advisory Committee, but rather ‘scientific-technological elite’ special interest groups

141 Ibid.
142 Ibid., 118.
143 Eisenhower, “Farewell Address to the Nation,” Public Papers o f the President, 1960-61.

R e p ro d u c e d with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

297
that were springing up from the emphasis on military research and development in
industry, the press, and universities.144
Historian H. W. Brands wrote that Eisenhower’s farewell address was more o f an
admission o f defeat rather than a warning about the future, since it was Eisenhower who
promoted the growth of the military-industrial-complex.145 However, it was not that
Eisenhower believed that there was no place for a relationship between the military and
industry to foster new technologies. Indeed he did think there was a place for that as
evidenced by his promotion o f such growth. What Eisenhower warned against was the
potential that certain people had within this military-industrial complex to gain power
and dominate policy by playing upon the ignorance of the public through scare tactics.
Eisenhower was saying to the public “be wary o f accepting their claims, believing their
analyses, and buying their wares.”146 These hard-selling technocrats filled the public with
fear and then offered expensive technological solutions that were more loaded, said
York, with “engineering virtuosity than with good sense.” 147
It seemed to Eisenhower that many of the Gaither committee members who
actively campaigned for the implementation of the report, making false claims that
American security was vulnerable, were endangering the balance of the ‘Great Equation.’
They were creating fear and calling for aggressive defense spending. Since these men
were perceived as experts in their fields, it was easy for the public to become captivated.
Certainly the world had recently witnessed the miracles these experts created through

144James Killian, Sputnik; Scientists, and Eisenhower, 237.
145 H.W. Brands, “The Age o f Vulnerability: Eisenhower and the National Insecurity State,” American
H istorical Review 94 (October 1989), 988-89.
146 York, Race to Oblivion, 11.
147 Ibid.
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science and technology: radar had saved Britain in WWII, the A-bomb ended the war,
and even antibiotics were saving the world’s children. But the problem lay not only with
the public believing that these men could solve problems if only unleashed, the scientists
and engineers themselves believed it and that only they understood the problem. “As a
consequence,” wrote York, “many of them believed it was their patriotic duty to save the
rest of us whether or not we wanted them to,” and that “anyone who did not immediately
agree with their assessments o f the situation and who failed to recognize the necessity of
proceeding forthwith on the development and production of their solutions was said to be
unable to understand the situation, technically backward, and trying to put the budget
ahead of survival.” 148 People like Sprague and Nitze certainly felt that way. So
Eisenhower’s farewell warnings were not targeted against his own Science Advisory
Committee or a response to his experiences with the Solarium or Killian Committees.149
Rather, his warnings were, in part, rooted in the experiences he had during Sputnik and
the Gaither report.

The Gaither Committee was not a success like the Solarium Exercise and Killian
Committee before it. It failed for a number of reasons. First, the committee went too far
in expanding its mandate. The committee had to determine whether it had the
responsibility simply to determine technically and economically what kinds of shelters
could be built compared to what kinds of active defense systems could be built, or did it

l4S Ibid., 11-12.
149 James Killian wrote that “in this period, when Sputnik panic was being used to support an orgy o f
technological fantasies and a speed-up in the arms race, PSAC was a voice o f sense and moderation, and
that this was one o f the reasons it commanded the confidence o f its beleaguered chief.” Killian, Sputnik,
Scientists, and Eisenhower, 239.
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have a right to make a judgment about the overall passive and active defense measures.150
As civilian experts, they were called upon for their expertise, not for their policy making
agendas. Where Eisenhower failed was in his leadership. His lack of attention to the
group allowed the mandate to expand and its membership grow.
Eisenhower had firmly established both the membership and narrow assignments
of the Solarium Exercise and had fully backed the mission of the Killian Committee.
George Kennan’s appointment as chair of Task Force A predetermined the outcome of
the group’s report. James Killian, as chair, often mirrored Eisenhower’s own thinking
and successfully organized and managed a relatively large group. But Rowan Gaither,
coming from RAND, which often held differing opinions from that of Eisenhower, was
an odd choice. Furthermore, Gaither established a sprawling group with no manageable
subcommittees. At first glance, it would seem that Eisenhower and his aides dropped the
ball by failing to monitor the process. However, had the report never been leaked to the
public and had the committee members dispersed after the report was done as expected
instead of lobbying for the report, Eisenhower could have quietly put the report into a file
cabinet, and claim he carefully considered the recommendations but ultimately found
them unpersuasive. Had the final report agreed with Eisenhower’s views that the money
spent on passive defense would have been better spent on active defenses, the President
could have pointed to a diverse group of civilian experts in explaining why he rejected
the idea of a national shelter program - the group would have been made complicit in the

150 Scholar and scientist George Rathjens explained: “There is a serious problem in asking the right
questions. If the president has the interest, the background, and the ability, perhaps he will ask the right
questions. If he doesn’t, however, others have to ask the questions for him and sometimes try to answer
them, even if the questions are more encompassing than their own narrow discipline.” See George Rathjens,
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decision. Either way, Eisenhower probably did not feel that he had to be on top of the
Gaither committee since he had his mind made up already that the Federal Government
was not going to foot the bill for a national shelter system. The process backfired on the
President when the report became public.
Another reason the Gaither Committee failed was that in expanding their study to
active defenses they were not seeing the entire picture. Unlike with the Solarium and
Killian committees, the Gaither Committee did not have full access to all the reports that
were relevant to their new mandate. Eisenhower did not personally get involved in the
success o f the committee as he had with the Killian committee, and the consequence was
that the committee faced restrictions to classified information. For example, Admiral
Radford declined one request from the Gaither committee for two classified JCS reports
because he said it was not relevant to their study - the original study as he understood
it.131 In addition, important classified information gathered from U-2 missions was not
made available to the committee members. These restrictions compromised the ability of
the committee to successfully carry out their expanded mandate. As a result, the report
had suggested that a missile gap existed and proposed massive spending for both
aggressive and passive defense. Eisenhower rejected parts of the report because he would
not allow run-away spending to appease alarmists and neither he nor Dulles thought
spending billions on shelters was wise.152

“Science Advising: Eisenhower to the Present,” in Kenneth Thompson, The Presidency and Science
Advising, Vol. VIH, (New York: University Press o f America, 1991), 45.
151 Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary o f Defense from Radford, 07/31/57, NA, RG 218, Admiral
Radford Files, Box 36, “381(Continental DefenseX1957).”
152 Dulles told Eisenhower, “A strong offensive capability as a deterrent was more effective [than shelters] in
many ways.” Both opposed spending billions on shelters because they “felt it would have an adverse effect in
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What Eisenhower did accept from the Gaither report, strengthening deterrence
and the security o f second strike capabilities - the heart o f his strategic thinking - was
already in the works at some level, largely because o f the recommendations made by the
Killian committee. The report failed to convince Eisenhower to shift that thinking. He
was unmoved by the arguments to increase limited war capabilities. That was simply an
issue Eisenhower would not consider.
In the end, Eisenhower’s use o f civilian committees in his decision-making
process came to a close with the Gaither Committee. Both the Solarium Exercise and
Killian report reflected the ideas captured by the ‘Great Equation’ and Eisenhower’s
strategic thinking. The Gaither report did neither of these things. However, this alone is
not why Eisenhower stopped using civilian committees. As demonstrated, he could use a
committee’s report to make its members complicit in the policy-making process or reject
a report while claiming to have looked at all sides. What soured Eisenhower to civilian
groups after the Gaither report was the lack o f anonymity the members displayed and
their persistence in trying to make policy by exploiting the fears of the public.
Eisenhower respected the views o f civilian experts, but he did not tolerate their wanting
to assume more power and influence than they had. When Eisenhower controlled the
process o f civilian committees, he found them useful in his decision-making process.
When the Gaither committee became uncontrollable, he ceased using civilian experts.

many respects.” See, Memo o f conversation with the President, 12/26/57, EL, JFD Papers, WH Memo
Series, Box 5 “Meetings with the President 1957 (1),” 1.
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CONCLUSION

The Cold War brought heightened world tensions and technological changes that
revolutionized the nature o f war. Using expert committees could provide presidents with
valuable information on specific problems which emerged out o f the thermonuclear
revolution. To deal with this new world, from time to time presidents called upon civilian
study groups to advise the administration on particular foreign policy or national security
problems. Truman was the first to call upon such committees in the post-war period in
1948 to make a general survey of foreign intelligence activities.1The frequency of using
these groups grew during the Eisenhower Administration, and Eisenhower commented
that these various study groups of “specially qualified citizens” had been helpful to him
“in reaching important decisions and in making recommendations to the Congress,” and
that a number of their recommendations have been reflected in policy proposals.2
Eisenhower wanted to surround himself with all the facts in preparing the nation
for the threat of nuclear war, and calling upon civilian experts made sense. As General
Andrew Goodpaster remarked, Eisenhower “liked to have very thorough, comprehensive

1 U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, Committee on Government Operations,

OrganizationalH istory o f the National Security Council, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Washington D.C.,
1960, 10.
2 Letter Eisenhower to Lyndon Johnson, n.d., (1/22/58), EL, WHO OSS, Subject Series, Alphabetical
Subseries, Box 13, “Gaither Report [November 1957-January 1958](1).”
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evaluations made, targeted ultimately on specific options and specific lines of policy.”3
To get these evaluations, he often turned to advisory committees of experts. Their reports
were not meant to be policy, they were only meant to help in the preparation of policy.
Eisenhower made the final decisions, but he used this decision-making process to leam
from experts, to make critics complicit in the decision-making process, and to achieve his
own ends.
Through the Solarium Exercise, Eisenhower was able to craft a national security
policy which reflected his strategic thinking while embracing the idea of the ‘Great
Equation.’ He did this by careful selection of committee members and giving the three
task forces narrow assignments to predetermine an outcome. The exercise, in conjunction
with reports from the NSC Planning Board and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, resulted in the
basic national security policy paper, NSC 162/2. NSC 162/2 defined a ‘New Look’ for
national security which stressed a balanced budget and relied on a nuclear deterrent
force, second-strike capabilities, and a reduction in conventional forces, including the
capability to fight a limited war.
The thermonuclear revolution brought with it heightened concerns over surprise
attack and continental defense. The Killian Committee was a civilian committee made up
of many o f the top scientific minds in the nation. By applying science and technology to
the problems posed by the thermonuclear revolution, the Killian Committee
demonstrated to Eisenhower and his staff how beneficial scientific advising could be in
national security planning. Hoping that the committee, free from political and inter

3 “Project Solarium: A Collective Oral History with General Andrew Goodpaster, Robert Bowie, and
Ambassador George Kennan,” 2/27/88, Princeton University, Mudd Library, Woodrow Wilson School, Box
93, folder 10,10-11.
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service rivalries, could provide valuable solutions to the problems that vexed his Defense
Department, Eisenhower gave the committee his full support. The result was a report
which mirrored Eisenhower’s strategic thinking and recommended the acceleration of the
missile program, the development of the Polaris missile, and the development o f the U-2
reconnaissance plane.
By mid-decade, another concern from the thermonuclear revolution was receiving
increased attention: radioactive fallout. Although the Federal Government had
traditionally provided only limited funding for civil defense measures such as fallout
shelters, which might protect the population from radioactive fallout, the Federal Civil
Defense Administration recommended in 1957 that a $32 billion national shelter system
be built, and paid for, by the Federal government. However, Eisenhower did not feel that
it was the role o f the Federal Government to finance a national shelter program. Money
spent on passive defenses like shelters, in his mind, would be better spent on active
defenses like early warning systems. To evaluate the relative merits o f passive verses
active defenses, Eisenhower established the Gaither Committee.
Since Eisenhower’s mind was all but made up on the issue, he did not oversee the
Gaither Committee as he had the other two committees. If the report recommended that
passive defenses were not as effective as active defenses, the President could point to
their report as evidence from civilian experts that the Federal Government should not
finance a national shelter system. If the report concluded shelters were a worthy
expenditure, Eisenhower could still claim that he had had an open mind, looked at all
sides, but ultimately found the recommendations unpersuasive. When the Gaither report
was leaked to the press, his position was compromised. The public, and Congress, were
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led to believe that the United States was in grave danger and that the administration was
being too complacent. To complicate matters, some members of the committee began to
actively lobby for the implementation o f the report to the dismay of Eisenhower. The
entire experience had led him to question the usefulness of such committees and he never
called upon another civilian committee again while in office.
Certainly the issues which surrounded the Solarium and Killian committees were
not open to public debate- decisions about foreign policy, nuclear strategy, and
continental defense were matters handled within the administration. However, with
radioactive fallout becoming a public concern, as witnessed through the popular press
and popular culture, and with the alarm created by Sputnik, American foreign policy and
defense issues were open to public discussion. This became increasingly true in the next
decade as opposition grew towards American involvement in Vietnam. The people and
Congress were less willing to defer to the White House on defense issues. For example,
George Rathjens, as deputy director of the Advanced Research Projects Agency, recalled
that during the early Eisenhower years he was called by Congress as a government
witness. “The senators wanted to ask a few questions just to prove that they were awake
and that they had some interest in the subject,” he said, “but there was no thought of
giving me a hard time or suggesting that what we were spending money on was unwise.”4
Yet, after the Johnson years, that all changed and foreign policy and defense matters
became, as Rathjens said, “fair game for public discussion.”5

4 George Rathjens, “Science Advising: Eisenhower to the Present,” in Kenneth Thompson, The Presidency

and Science Advising, Vol. V m , (New York: University Press o f America, 1991), 42.
5 Ibid.
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Gregg Herken explained that in the first fifteen years after WWE, civilian experts
operated like “missionaries” - witnessing rather than shaping national policy. During the
Kennedy years, experts rose to political power as “the best and the brightest.” Their
advice substantially revised policy, but the tragedy of Vietnam destroyed the credibility
o f experts.6 Science advising suffered the same fate. While the 1950s were a golden age
for science advising, by the early 1970s Richard Nixon eliminated science advising inside
the White House.
That golden age for science continued briefly into the 1960s. Under Kennedy,
Jerome Wiesner succeeded Kistiakowsky as the President’s science advisor, and the two
were a good fit. Former science adviser during the Eisenhower era, George Rathjens,
noted that the two had known each other for a long time, had a special relationship, and
shared an intellectual curiosity.7 Lyndon Johnson did not share that same intellectual
curiosity and he and his adviser, Don Homig, did not have the same chemistry Kennedy
and Wiesner shared. Things got worse during the Nixon years. One member of the
President’s Science Advisory Committee who chaired a panel studying the supersonic
transport program for the White House went public with his opposition to it. This
incident led Nixon to disband the President’s Science Advisory Committee altogether.8
Although experts and scientists experienced a brief renewal during the Carter
years, many in the scientific community felt that their views were not welcomed by the
Reagan administration. Rathjens said that many scientists from Harvard and MIT “felt

6 See Gregg Herken, Counsels o f War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
7 Rathjens, “Science Advising: Eisenhower to the Present,” 40.
8 Richard Garwin was the member who spoke out against the supersonic transport. Ibid., 40-41.
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there was no way o f connecting with the administration.”9 The Reagan administration did
not call upon those in the scientific community for advice on technical matters, in part
because many of them objected to the Strategic Defense Initiative. Reagan did, however,
use civilian committees to advise on other matters.
Reagan created a bipartisan committee o f civilians with the intention of it being
public. To gamer public support for his policies in Latin America, Reagan appointed
former Secretary o f State Henry Kissinger to chair a commission on Central America in
1983. It had twenty three members ranging from labor representatives, academics,
businessmen, and former and present politicians. The final report laid out the Reagan
Doctrine in full view for the public to understand and accept.10 Ironically, where Reagan
wished to use a committee to gamer public support, the rise in public debate that ensued
over the Gaither report actually led to Eisenhower’s declining use of civilian committees.
Eisenhower’s experiences with civilian committees ended with Gaither, but they
continue to serve as valuable models. For example, during the 1980s, Robert Bowie
wrote that “incoming presidents may well be advised to emulate ‘Operation Solarium’ as
a means for developing an integrated strategy on the basis of competing analysis.” 11
Zbigniew Brzezinski also saw the Solarium Exercise as a creative process which was
orderly, rigorous, and effective.12James Killian believed that the techniques o f the
Killian Committee could be effectively used by the government to deal with the many

9 Ibid., 41.
10 For more on this commission see Gaddis Smith, The Last Years o f the Monroe Doctrine, 1945-1993,
(New York: Hill & Wang, 1994), 167-169.
11 Robert Bowie, “The President and the Executive Branch,” in The M aking o f Am erica’s Soviet Policy, ed.
Joseph Nye, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), 93.
12 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “NSC’s Midlife Crisis,” Foreign Policy, 69 (Winter 1987-88): 80-99.
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complex problems facing the foreign policy.13 An exercise such as the Killian committee
could also provide valuable information to the current administration on the feasibility of
a National Missile Defense or on solutions to the AIDS epidemic in Africa. However, to
make the most of such committees, the top experts need to come together unselfishly to
serve their country.
The end o f the Cold War has made it more difficult to solicit civilian experts to
give up their time for national security. During WWII, the Manhattan Project and the
radiation laboratory at MIT had assembled the nation’s top scientists who temporarily set
aside their academic and scientific careers to help win the war. After the war, when the
Cold War heated up and it seemed that the Soviet Union was an immediate threat, those
scientists and their students for the most part willingly rolled up their sleeves again for
the sake o f their country. The members of the Science Advisory Committee, for example,
were dedicated, brilliant men, tops in their fields, willing to sacrifice their time and
energy for a cause greater than themselves. Without the immediate threat the Soviets
posed in the early cold war ear, it is doubtful the same caliber of people would come to
Washington to serve their country.14

13 James Killian, Oral History, Columbia Oral History Project, 32-33.
14 It is also difficult for the government to compete with the salaries offered in the private sector from
companies like Bell Labs and IBM. Rathjens, 43-44.
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